The bill
MATCH Act
HR. 8170, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.
Sponsored by
Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]
ID: B001322
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 8170, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 798-800 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 36 - 8.
April 21, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt inhabitants of Congress. The MATCH Act, a bill so cleverly crafted to sound like it's about national security, but in reality, it's just another symptom of the disease that plagues our political system: corruption, greed, and a healthy dose of stupidity.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to restrict the export of certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components to countries deemed "adversaries" by the United States. Because, you know, those pesky Chinese companies might actually start producing advanced-node integrated circuits that could rival our own. The horror! The real objective, of course, is to protect the interests of American corporations that dominate the semiconductor industry, while pretending to care about national security.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the government to identify and restrict the export of covered semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components to countries like China. It also mandates diplomatic efforts to convince allied countries to adopt similar controls, because who needs international cooperation when you can just strong-arm your friends into doing your bidding? The bill also establishes a licensing policy of denial for exports to certain facilities, because why bother with due process when you can just deny everything?
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include American corporations that produce semiconductor manufacturing equipment, Chinese companies like Huawei and SMIC, and allied countries that will be pressured into adopting similar controls. Oh, and let's not forget the poor souls who actually have to implement these restrictions – the bureaucrats who will have to navigate this Byzantine regulatory landscape.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact of this bill is to further escalate the ongoing tech Cold War between the United States and China. It will likely lead to retaliatory measures from China, which could harm American businesses that rely on Chinese supply chains. But hey, who needs a functioning global economy when you can have a good old-fashioned trade war? The implications are clear: this bill is a recipe for disaster, a perfect storm of protectionism, nationalism, and bureaucratic incompetence.
In conclusion, the MATCH Act is a textbook example of how to write a bill that sounds good on paper but is actually a thinly veiled attempt to protect corporate interests while pretending to care about national security. It's a disease, really – a symptom of a broader illness that afflicts our political system. And we're all just along for the ride, watching as our elected officials engage in this farcical dance of legislative theater, completely oblivious to the fact that they're making fools of themselves and harming the very people they claim to represent. Bravo, Congress. Bravo.
Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001194
Top Contributors
10
ID: M001218
Top Contributors
10
ID: M001231
Top Contributors
10
ID: G000592
Top Contributors
10
ID: H001058
Top Contributors
10
ID: S001229
Top Contributors
10
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
10
ID: R000622
Top Contributors
10
ID: G000604
Top Contributors
10
ID: S001230
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 57 nodes and 41 connections (50 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $192,174
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 3(c)(3) establishes U.S. jurisdiction and applies countrywide controls to covered semiconductor manufacturing equipment exported from allied supplier countries, requiring licenses with a policy of denial for servicing and end-use controls, directly restricting the industry's ability to export equipment and components to countries of concern.
Section 2(2) notes that advanced computing applications like AI are transforming military affairs, and the bill's export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (Section 3) indirectly hinder AI development by limiting access to advanced-node integrated circuits, which are foundational for AI hardware.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 765 — 26 TRADE THE CASE FOR FAIR TRADE Peter Navarro For decades the world has struggled with a shifting maze of punitive tariffs, export subsidies, quotas, dollar-locked currencies, and the like. Many of these import-inhibiting and export-encouraging devices have long been employed by major exporting countries trying to amass ever larger [trade] surpluses. Warren Buffett, CEO, Berkshire Hathaway1 The Chinese government is implementing a comprehensive, long-term industrial strategy to ensure its global dominance…. Beijing’s ultimate goal is for domestic companies to replace foreign companies as designers and manufacturers of key technology and products first at home, then abroad. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission2 The United States of America is the world’s dominant superpower and remains the world’s arsenal of democracy. To maintain that global positioning—and thereby best protect the homeland and our own democratic institutions—it is critical that the United States strengthen its manufacturing and defense industrial base at the same time that it increases the reliability and resilience of its globally dispersed
— 765 — 26 TRADE THE CASE FOR FAIR TRADE Peter Navarro For decades the world has struggled with a shifting maze of punitive tariffs, export subsidies, quotas, dollar-locked currencies, and the like. Many of these import-inhibiting and export-encouraging devices have long been employed by major exporting countries trying to amass ever larger [trade] surpluses. Warren Buffett, CEO, Berkshire Hathaway1 The Chinese government is implementing a comprehensive, long-term industrial strategy to ensure its global dominance…. Beijing’s ultimate goal is for domestic companies to replace foreign companies as designers and manufacturers of key technology and products first at home, then abroad. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission2 The United States of America is the world’s dominant superpower and remains the world’s arsenal of democracy. To maintain that global positioning—and thereby best protect the homeland and our own democratic institutions—it is critical that the United States strengthen its manufacturing and defense industrial base at the same time that it increases the reliability and resilience of its globally dispersed — 766 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise supply chains. That will necessarily require the onshoring of a significant portion of production currently offshored by American multinational corporations. Trade policy can and must play an essential role in an American manufacturing and defense industrial base renaissance. However, several major challenges in the international trading environment are pushing America in the opposite direction. The first challenge is rooted in MFN: the “most favored nation” rule of the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the MFN rule, WTO members must apply the lowest tariffs that they apply to the products of any one country to the products of every other country.3 However, WTO members can charge higher tariffs if they apply these nonreciprocal tariffs to all countries. The practical result has been the systematic exploitation of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers through higher tariffs institutionalized by MFN. In turn, this unfair and nonreciprocal trade has resulted in chronic U.S. trade deficits with much of the rest of the world. This systemic trade imbalance serves as a brake and bridle on both GDP growth and real wages in the American economy while encumbering the U.S. with significant foreign debt. The second challenge is part of the broader existential threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its quest for global dominance. That chal- lenge is rooted in the CCP’s continued economic aggression, which begins with mercantilist and protectionist trade policy tools such as tariffs, nontariff barriers, dumping, counterfeiting and piracy, and currency manipulation. However, Com- munist China’s economic aggression also extends to an intricate set of industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that have dramatically skewed the international trading arena. Both the unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade institutionalized by the WTO and Communist China’s economic aggression are weakening America’s man- ufacturing and defense industrial base even as the fragility of globally dispersed supply chains has been brought into sharp relief by the COVID-19 pandemic with its associated lockdowns and other disruptions and by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian revanchism, in particular, has demonstrated once again how bad actors on the world stage can use trade policy (for example, export restraints on natural gas) as a weapon of war. LAYING THE TRADE DEFICIT PREDICATE The great football coach Bill Parcells once said, “You are what your record says you are.” America’s record on trade—specifically American’s chronic and ever-ex- panding trade deficit—says that America is the globe’s biggest trade loser and a victim of unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade. During the first year of the Biden Administration, the overall U.S. trade defi- cit, including goods and services, soared by 29 percent, from $654 billion in 2020 to $845 billion in 2021.4 Over the same time period, imports of consumer goods,
— 789 — Trade The following policy options were on the drawing board or in discussion as preparations for a potential Trump second term were being made. These options span the spectrum from purely trade-related like increasing tariffs to cutting off Communist China’s access to American financial markets, research institutions, and consumers. The next American President should strongly consider adopting all of them as a package: l Strategically expand tariffs to all Chinese products and increase tariff rates to levels that will block out “Made in China” products, and execute this strategy in a manner and at a pace that will not expose the U.S. to lack of access to essential products like key pharmaceuticals. l Provide significant financial and tax incentives to American companies that are seeking to onshore production from Communist China to U.S. soil. l Stop Communist China’s abuse of the so-called de minimis exemption, which allows it to evade the tariffs for products valued at less than $800. l Prohibit Communist Chinese state-owned enterprises from bidding on U.S. government procurement contracts (for example, contracts for subway and other transportation systems). l Prohibit the use of Communist Chinese–made drones in American airspace. l Ban all Chinese social media apps such as TikTok and WeChat, which pose significant national security risks and expose American consumers to data and identity theft. l Prohibit all Communist Chinese investment in high-technology industries. l Prohibit U.S. pension funds from investing in Communist Chinese stocks. l Delist any Communist Chinese stocks that do not meet Public Company Accounting Oversight Board standards or, alternatively, close off the Chinese “A shares” stock market to U.S. investment and deregister U.S.- sanctioned Communist Chinese companies. l Prohibit the use of Hong Kong clearinghouses as transit points for American capital investing in the Chinese mainland. l Prohibit the inclusion of Chinese sovereign bonds in U.S. investors’ portfolios. — 790 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Systematically reduce and eventually eliminate any U.S. dependence on Communist Chinese supply chains that may be used to threaten national security such as medicines, silicon chips, rare earth minerals, computer motherboards, flatscreen displays, and military components. l Sanction any companies, including American companies like Apple, that facilitate Communist China’s use of its Great Firewall surveillance and censorship capabilities. l Order the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice to contract with U.S.-owned and U.S.-operated artificial intelligence companies that are capable of detecting, identifying, and disrupting both the domestic groups’ and CCP influencers’ social media operations and funding streams using public information as a rapidly available offensive measure. l Reinvigorate and expand the DHS crackdown on the CCP’s use of e-sellers (including third-party sellers) and the shippers and operators of major warehouses such as Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba to flood U.S. markets with counterfeit and pirated goods. l Compel the closure of all Confucius Institutes in the U.S., which serve as propaganda arms of the CCP. l Significantly reduce or eliminate the issuance of visas to Chinese students or researchers to prevent espionage and information harvesting. l Hold the CCP accountable for the COVID-19 virus, which almost certainly originated as a genetically engineered virus from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and do so through the establishment of a presidential commission or select congressional committee that would investigate the origins of the virus; its various costs, both economically and in human life; and the possible means of collecting damages from the CCP, which are likely to rise to the trillions of dollars. If the new U.S. President wishes to defend this country against the serious exis- tential threat posed by Communist China, that President will adopt all of these proposals through the requisite presidential executive orders or memoranda. Effective Trade Policy in the Real World. To conclude this analysis, it is useful to offer brief reflections on a number of key obstacles to implementing the policy initiatives recommended in this chapter. These obstacles include:
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.
To make technical amendments to update statutory references to certain provisions which were formerly classified to chapters 14 and 19 of title 25, United States Code, and to correct related technical errors.
119/hr/4584
International Traffic in Arms Regulations Licensing Reform Act
119/hr/4215
DETERRENT Act
119/hr/1048