The bill
Foreign Adversary AI Risk Assessment and Diplomacy Act
HR. 7058, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
Sponsored by
Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]
ID: B001322
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 7058, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 248-250 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 45 - 0.
March 25, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Foreign Adversary AI Risk Assessment and Diplomacy Act (HR 7058) claims to address the "national security risks" posed by foreign adversaries using generative artificial intelligence for malicious activities. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to justify more bureaucratic busywork, padding the pockets of defense contractors, and further entrenching the surveillance state.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of State to conduct assessments of the risks posed by foreign adversaries using AI for malicious activities. Oh, wow, I bet this will be a real challenge – identifying threats that don't actually exist or are wildly exaggerated. The assessments will include analyses of incidents, emerging trends, and recommendations to mitigate these "risks." Because, you know, the US government has a stellar track record of predicting and preventing cyber threats (cough, Snowden, cough). This bill also expands the definition of "foreign adversary" to include any country that doesn't toe the US line, because who needs nuance in international relations?
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects will benefit from this bill: defense contractors, AI startups looking for government handouts, and politicians seeking to burnish their national security credentials. The actual stakeholders – American citizens, foreign nations, and the global community – will be subjected to more surveillance, propaganda, and potential conflict escalation.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will likely lead to a further militarization of AI research, more aggressive cyber operations, and an increased risk of conflict with "foreign adversaries." It will also provide a convenient pretext for the US government to expand its surveillance powers, under the guise of "protecting national security." Meanwhile, the real issues – like addressing the actual risks of AI development, promoting international cooperation, and ensuring accountability in AI research – will be ignored or paid lip service.
In conclusion, HR 7058 is a classic case of legislative malpractice. It's a bill designed to appease the military-industrial complex, justify more government overreach, and distract from the real challenges facing the world. The diagnosis? A bad case of "Security Theater-itis," characterized by symptoms of bureaucratic self-interest, xenophobia, and a complete disregard for the well-being of actual human beings. Prognosis? More of the same: pointless assessments, wasteful spending, and a further erosion of civil liberties. Joy.
Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: H001098
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ID: S000168
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 57 nodes and 41 connections (50 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $184,411
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 3 requires assessments of foreign adversaries' use of generative AI for malicious activities, which may drive demand for AI safety, detection, and defensive technologies, benefiting AI and cloud infrastructure providers.
Section 3(b)(1)(C) includes analysis of malicious cyber operations enabled by generative AI, likely increasing need for cybersecurity defenses and thus benefiting cybersecurity firms.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 excerpt concern assessing and countering threats from foreign adversaries, particularly highlighting the need for intelligence-informed national security actions; however, the bill focuses on State Department AI risk assessments while Project 2025 emphasizes intelligence community reforms, FISA, and politicization safeguards, resulting in only moderate thematic overlap."
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?
AI Analysis:
"The bill’s focus on assessing foreign adversary AI risks and promoting transparency aligns with Project 2025’s goals of strengthening national security intelligence, restoring accountability, and improving defense against foreign threats, though it does not directly address DOD‑DHS alignment or security‑clearance reforms."
— 107 — Department of Defense 5. Establish true alignment between DOD and DHS both to improve the defense of critical U.S. infrastructure and national border integrity and to develop vital information that enables defense against foreign targeted disruptions.23 l Restore accountability and public trust. In recent years, public trust in Defense Intelligence has been eroded by, for example, flawed assumptions leading up to our Afghanistan withdrawal, flawed Russia–Ukraine assessments, divergences in relations with key Gulf allies, and voids being filled by Russia and China around the world. For trust to be restored and sustained, officials must be held accountable. 1. Restore DIE critical thinking. Establish mechanisms to restore analytic integrity and return to true intelligence-driven operations. The next Administration should eliminate the conflict of interest in the current customer-based model (in which the customer is always right) by enforcing time-tested procedures that guarantee independent analysis, even if it means challenging policymakers’ assumptions. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security’s leadership role should be expanded to include providing analytic top-line views and improve DIE transparency by highlighting diverging views. 2. Elevate the DIE’s voice in national policy discussions, commensurate with the DIE’s 75 percent share of the IC budget. Present defense intelligence to senior policymakers, either independently to avoid all-source bias or in consensus products like the National Intelligence Estimates. l Eliminate peripheral intelligence obligations that do not advance military readiness. In 2019, following the catastrophic 2015 data breach at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) accepted transfer of the responsibility to conduct security clearance and suitability investigations for 95 percent of the U.S. government’s civilian workforce. This decision, which grew out of an intention to deconstruct OPM, was wrongheaded on many levels and made the federal bureaucracy dependent on a new overlay of DOD bureaucracy, in a sense instilling DOD control of civilian managers. This function should be returned to OPM except for military security clearance investigations.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on State Department assessments of foreign adversary AI risks, while the Project 2025 excerpt emphasizes intelligence community neutrality, FISA reforms, and guarding against politicization; there is only a tangential connection through broader national security concerns."
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include:
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.