Foreign Adversary AI Risk Assessment and Diplomacy Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/7058
Last Updated: May 3, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]

ID: B001322

Follow the money

The bill

Foreign Adversary AI Risk Assessment and Diplomacy Act

HR. 7058, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.

The sponsor

Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$126,974 raised

26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

66% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 229-231 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 45 - 0.

March 25, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Foreign Adversary AI Risk Assessment and Diplomacy Act (HR 7058) claims to address the "national security risks" posed by foreign adversaries using generative artificial intelligence for malicious activities. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to justify more bureaucratic busywork, padding the pockets of defense contractors, and further entrenching the surveillance state.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of State to conduct assessments of the risks posed by foreign adversaries using AI for malicious activities. Oh, wow, I bet this will be a real challenge – identifying threats that don't actually exist or are wildly exaggerated. The assessments will include analyses of incidents, emerging trends, and recommendations to mitigate these "risks." Because, you know, the US government has a stellar track record of predicting and preventing cyber threats (cough, Snowden, cough). This bill also expands the definition of "foreign adversary" to include any country that doesn't toe the US line, because who needs nuance in international relations?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects will benefit from this bill: defense contractors, AI startups looking for government handouts, and politicians seeking to burnish their national security credentials. The actual stakeholders – American citizens, foreign nations, and the global community – will be subjected to more surveillance, propaganda, and potential conflict escalation.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will likely lead to a further militarization of AI research, more aggressive cyber operations, and an increased risk of conflict with "foreign adversaries." It will also provide a convenient pretext for the US government to expand its surveillance powers, under the guise of "protecting national security." Meanwhile, the real issues – like addressing the actual risks of AI development, promoting international cooperation, and ensuring accountability in AI research – will be ignored or paid lip service.

In conclusion, HR 7058 is a classic case of legislative malpractice. It's a bill designed to appease the military-industrial complex, justify more government overreach, and distract from the real challenges facing the world. The diagnosis? A bad case of "Security Theater-itis," characterized by symptoms of bureaucratic self-interest, xenophobia, and a complete disregard for the well-being of actual human beings. Prognosis? More of the same: pointless assessments, wasteful spending, and a further erosion of civil liberties. Joy.

Related Topics

National Security & IntelligenceForeign Aid & DiplomacyDefense Spending & Procurement
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$126,974
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$12,900
Committees
$0
Individuals
$114,074

No PAC contributions found

1
THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION
3 transactions
$8,600
2
KALISPEL TRIBAL ECONOMIC AUTHORITY
2 transactions
$3,300
3
YAKAMA NATION
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
JHASHI, VAJA
1 transaction
$13,200
2
PLATH, PETER
2 transactions
$13,200
3
SCHNAUBELT, CHRISTOPHER
2 transactions
$6,870
4
BENNETT, GREGG
1 transaction
$6,600
5
CONNORS, JOHN
1 transaction
$6,600
6
CONNORS, KATHY
1 transaction
$6,600
7
MERCK, MAGGIE
1 transaction
$6,600
8
ODERMAT, MARY
1 transaction
$6,600
9
PARKS, DAVE
1 transaction
$6,600
10
CHAUDHRY, ASIF
1 transaction
$6,600
11
MAHMOOD, ARSHAD
1 transaction
$6,600
12
SLIVKA, BENJAMIN
1 transaction
$5,829
13
JOHNSON, KEVIN
1 transaction
$5,000
14
ANDERSON, MARK
1 transaction
$3,435
15
BRIDGEWATER, JACK
1 transaction
$3,435
16
HERCHE, THOMAS
1 transaction
$3,435
17
RINDLAUB, SARAH
1 transaction
$3,435
18
WETZEL, SCOTT
1 transaction
$3,435

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Hamadeh, Abraham J. [R-AZ-8]

ID: H001098

Top Contributors

10

1
CLB PARTNERS
OrganizationGILBERT, AZ
$12,000
Jan 28, 2024
2
ADVANTAGE INSURANCE PLLC
OrganizationPHOENIX, AZ
$3,300
May 7, 2024
3
JARDIN RATZKEN PLLC
OrganizationTEMPE, AZ
$1,000
Feb 26, 2024
4
JARDIN RATZKEN PLLC
OrganizationTEMPE, AZ
$1,000
Mar 26, 2024
5
HAMADEH, WASEEM J
HOH INVESTMENT GROUPMANAGING MEMBER
IndividualPHOENIX, AZ
$13,200
Dec 29, 2023
6
MANLEY, DWIGHT
SELF-EMPLOYEDINVESTMENTS
IndividualBREA, CA
$13,200
Dec 13, 2023
7
HAYDEN, STEPHEN
ENTREPRENEURENTREPRENEUR
IndividualELLENSBURG, WA
$13,200
Mar 14, 2024
8
PRICE, KAPU
PATRIOT DISPOSALSELF-EMPLOYED
IndividualPRESCOTT, AZ
$13,200
Feb 29, 2024
9
HAYDEN, STEPHEN
ENTREPRENEURENTREPRENEUR
IndividualELLENSBURG, WA
$13,200
Mar 14, 2024
10
NOWOCIEN, PIOTR
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualPINECREST, FL
$9,900
Mar 16, 2024

Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27]

ID: S000168

Top Contributors

10

1
POARCH BANK OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
May 26, 2023
2
POARCH BANK OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Jun 7, 2024
3
MICCOSUKEE TRIBE
OrganizationMIAMI, FL
$1,000
Dec 19, 2023
4
DIAZ-OLIVER, REMEDIOS MRS.
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$6,600
Dec 29, 2023
5
FALIC, JANA
HOMEMAKERHOMEMAKER
IndividualBAL HARBOUR, FL
$6,600
Dec 31, 2023
6
MENDOZA GOMEZ, ROSSY A.
ROSE CAFEOWNER
IndividualCORAL GABLES, FL
$6,600
Dec 29, 2023
7
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,600
Oct 17, 2023
8
WEEKLEY, RICHARD
SELF-EMPLOYEDREAL ESTATE DEVELOPER
IndividualHOUSTON, TX
$6,600
Nov 7, 2023
9
BARQUET, ROY
FOLEY & LARDNER LLPATTORNEY
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$6,600
Dec 6, 2023
10
PETERFFY, THOMAS
INTERACTIVE BROKERS GROUPCHAIRMAN
IndividualPALM BEACH, FL
$6,600
Dec 27, 2023

Rep. Ezell, Mike [R-MS-4]

ID: E000235

Top Contributors

10

1
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC - ALEX HINSON, PARTNER AND CHIEF EXEC. OFFICER
OrganizationBIRMINGHAM, AL
$2,500
Nov 2, 2023
2
ALLY TELECOM GROUP LLC - PARTNERSHIP - MITCH KALIFEH
OrganizationMETAIRIE, LA
$2,500
Aug 30, 2023
3
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$1,000
Apr 25, 2023
4
GONC LTC, LLC
OrganizationJACKSON, MS
$1,000
Sep 14, 2023
5
STEED'S COLLISION CTR, LLC - LAURA STEED MANAGER
OrganizationBILOXI, MS
$1,000
Aug 30, 2023
6
WATKINS & EAGER PLLC - GRANT SELLERS, PARTNER
OrganizationJACKSON, MS
$1,000
Aug 30, 2023
7
TEN ONE STRATEGIES - JOHN HUGHES, MANAGING PARTNER
OrganizationJACKSON, MS
$500
Aug 25, 2023
8
GULF PRIDE COMPANIES, LLC - ERICH N. NICHOLS, MANAGER
OrganizationGULFPORT, MS
$250
Aug 30, 2023
9
WATKINS & EAGER PLLC - GRANT SELLERS, PARTNER
OrganizationJACKSON, MS
$250
Aug 25, 2023
10
DUNAGIN, MELINDA
DUNAGIN PEST SOLUTIONSOFFICE MANAGER
IndividualHATTIESBURG, MS
$3,300
Nov 1, 2024

Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]

ID: S001229

Top Contributors

10

1
SASSO, APRIL
HOMEMAKERHOMEMAKER
IndividualCARMEL, IN
$6,600
Oct 30, 2024
2
PONDER, JACQUELINE
BOWMAN FAMILY HOLDINGSLAWYER
IndividualGREENWOOD, IN
$3,437
Oct 29, 2024
3
KING, CHRISTOPHER M.
RUNNEBOHM CONSTRUCTION, INC.OWNER
IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN
$3,300
Jun 7, 2024
4
CALDWELL, JORDAN
CALDWELL'S INC.EXECUTIVE
IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN
$3,300
Oct 20, 2024
5
DOPPELT, BRIAN
BAINBRIDGE COMPANIESEXECUTIVE
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
6
KING, KYLIE A.
HOMEMAKERHOMEMAKER
IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN
$3,300
Oct 20, 2024
7
SASSO, RICK C.
INDIANA SPINE GROUPPHYSICIAN
IndividualCARMEL, IN
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
8
SCHUMACHER, AMY MAE
THE HERITAGE GROUPCEO
IndividualCARMEL, IN
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
9
MCALLISTER, CHRIS
TARBERT PROPERTIES LPPARTNER
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
10
ZINK, JAMES C.
ZINK DISTRIBUTINGCHAIRMAN / CEO
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Nov 2, 2024

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

10

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITEDOWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC.BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELFPRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTECEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Rep. Rutherford, John H. [R-FL-5]

ID: R000609

Top Contributors

10

1
CHICKASAW NATION
PACADA, OK
$1,000
Jun 16, 2023
2
MOHEGAN TRIBE OF INDIANS OF CONNECTICUT
OrganizationMONTVILLE, CT
$1,000
Nov 4, 2024
3
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$1,000
Nov 4, 2024
4
MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION
OrganizationOKMULGEE, OK
$1,000
Jun 30, 2024
5
DEMOCRACY ENGINE LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$9
May 7, 2024
6
DEMOCRACY ENGINE LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$3
Jun 30, 2024
7
DEMOCRACY ENGINE LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$2
May 7, 2024
8
DEMOCRACY ENGINE LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$1
Apr 4, 2024
9
DEMOCRACY ENGINE LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$1
Apr 12, 2024
10
DEMOCRACY ENGINE LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$1
Jun 3, 2024

Rep. McDowell, Addison P. [R-NC-6]

ID: M001240

Top Contributors

10

1
FLOW, MEGHAN
HOMEMAKERHOMEMAKER
IndividualLEWISVILLE, NC
$6,600
Mar 1, 2024
2
FLOW, MEGHAN
IndividualLEWISVILLE, NC
$6,600
Feb 29, 2024
3
KING, SEBASTIAN
SELF EMPLOYEDCONSULTANT
IndividualPFAFFTOWN, NC
$3,435
May 28, 2024
4
JOHNSON, BRIAN
IndividualALEXANDRIA, VA
$3,300
Oct 23, 2024
5
BROWN, THOMAS
MINDSETPARTNER
IndividualCHEVY CHASE, MD
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
6
TOWNSEND, JOHN
PAY TEL COMMUNICATIONSOWNER
IndividualKERNERSVILLE, NC
$3,300
Oct 20, 2024
7
BRAUER, CAMILLA
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualBRIDGETON, MO
$3,300
Sep 20, 2024
8
BRAUER, STEPHEN
HUNTER ENGINEERINGCHAIRMAN
IndividualBRIDGETON, MO
$3,300
Sep 18, 2024
9
SHAHEEN, LAWRENCE
SELF-EMPLOYEDATTORNEY
IndividualCHARLOTTE, NC
$3,300
Jul 16, 2024
10
CANNON, CRAIG
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTONATTORNEY
IndividualWINSTON SALEM, NC
$3,300
Dec 31, 2024

Rep. Haridopolos, Mike [R-FL-8]

ID: H001099

Top Contributors

10

1
JARNES, LARRY
NORTHBORO BUILDERS INCBUILDER
IndividualMELBOURNE, FL
$9,900
May 20, 2024
2
FARINELLA, NICK
SELF-EMPLOYEDREALTOR
IndividualMELBOURNE, FL
$3,518
May 6, 2024
3
HILL, KEVIN
RE/MAX ALTERNATIVEREALTOR
IndividualINDIAN HARBOUR BEA, FL
$3,518
May 6, 2024
4
MOLLEN, JACK
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualMELBOURNE, FL
$3,518
May 17, 2024
5
SHOULDERS, KATHY
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualINDIAN HARBOUR BEA, FL
$3,518
May 21, 2024
6
SHOULDERS, WILLIAM
HANDEX CONSULTING REMEDIATIONEXECUTIVE
IndividualINDIAN HARBOUR BEA, FL
$3,518
Apr 30, 2024
7
BERRY, JAMES
DELTA AIR LINESPILOT
IndividualMELBOURNE, FL
$3,435
Sep 10, 2024
8
DANDRIDGE, STEPHANIE
SOTHEBYSREALTOR
IndividualINDIALANTIC, FL
$3,435
Sep 19, 2024
9
FLACHS, BRUCE
PRESCIENT NATIONALINSURANCE
IndividualVERO BEACH, FL
$3,435
Sep 4, 2024
10
MARUMOTO, ALAN K.
UNIVERSITY CENTER IMAGINGPHYSICIAN
IndividualINDIALANTIC, FL
$3,435
Sep 13, 2024

Rep. Van Epps, Matt [R-TN-7]

ID: V000139

Top Contributors

0

No contribution data available

Rep. Fine, Randy [R-FL-6]

ID: F000484

Top Contributors

0

No contribution data available

Donor Network - Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 57 nodes and 41 connections (50 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $184,411

Top Donors - Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

3 Orgs18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.

  • Section 3 requires assessments of foreign adversaries' use of generative AI for malicious activities, which may drive demand for AI safety, detection, and defensive technologies, benefiting AI and cloud infrastructure providers.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.85

    Section 3(b)(1)(C) includes analysis of malicious cyber operations enabled by generative AI, likely increasing need for cybersecurity defenses and thus benefiting cybersecurity firms.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate65.9%
Pages: 229-231

— 196 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware. In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26 The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy. CONCLUSION The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective. In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy.

Introduction

Moderate65.9%
Pages: 229-231

— 196 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware. In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26 The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy. CONCLUSION The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective. In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy. — 197 — Department of State The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders and staff of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James Carafano, Spencer Chretien, Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans, Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael Pillsbury, Max Primorac, Reed Rubenstein, Brett Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John Zadrozny.

Introduction

Moderate64.8%
Pages: 254-256

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

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Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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