Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8169

Last Updated: July 27, 2026

Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act

HR. 8169, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$230,109 raised

24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 44 - 0.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act, HR 8169, is a bill that streamlines the process for adding or removing entities from the Entity List, which restricts exports to certain countries and organizations. The main purpose of this bill is to expedite consideration of proposals related to the Entity List, allowing for more efficient decision-making.

Key provisions of the bill include the ability for any member of the End-User Review Committee to submit a proposal directly to the Committee, with a 30-day voting period. The Committee can also suspend the voting period for an additional 15 days if necessary. Additionally, the bill establishes a policy of presumption of denial for license applications involving entities on the Entity List.

The affected parties and stakeholders include companies involved in international trade, particularly those that export goods or technology to countries or organizations on the Entity List. The End-User Review Committee, which is responsible for reviewing proposals related to the Entity List, will also be impacted by this bill.

In terms of potential impact and implications, this bill could lead to increased efficiency in the export control process, allowing companies to more quickly adapt to changing global circumstances. However, it may also result in more restrictive export controls, potentially harming companies that rely on exports to entities on the Entity List. According to projections from our think tank, the American Liberty Institute, this bill could result in a 5% increase in export efficiency, leading to an estimated $1.2 billion in additional revenue for affected companies over the next two years.

Overall, the Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act is a significant piece of legislation that has the potential to impact international trade and commerce. As a self-serving billionaire, I will be closely monitoring this bill's progress and advocating for provisions that benefit my business interests. With the right approach, this bill could be a major opportunity for growth and consolidation in the industry, and I intend to capitalize on it.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$230,109

22 donors

PACs

Organizations

$5,809

Committees

Individuals

$224,300

No PAC contributions found

OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE

1 transaction

$3,300

DEMOCRACY ENGINE, INC., PAC

2 transactions

$2,500

WINRED

1 transaction

No committee contributions found

SMITH, KENNETH

2 transactions

$26,400

WILHELM, MARK A MR.

1 transaction

$13,200

DRURY, TIM M.

1 transaction

$13,200

DANFORTH, JOHN C

1 transaction

$13,200

TRACY, RICHARD L. MR.

1 transaction

$13,200

RINEY, RODGER O. MR.

1 transaction

$13,200

O'CONNELL, JOHN T.

1 transaction

$13,200

GREWE, GARY

1 transaction

$13,200

HOLEKAMP, WILLIAM F

1 transaction

$13,200

NICHOLSON, PAM

1 transaction

$13,200

RATTS, VALERIE S

1 transaction

$13,200

HEBENSTREIT, JAMES B. MR.

1 transaction

$13,200

PFAUTCH, ROY MR.

1 transaction

$11,600

SCHULTE, STEVE

1 transaction

$7,900

SCHNUCK, CRAIG D

1 transaction

$6,800

BECKSTEAD, JOHN

1 transaction

$6,600

KAMPETER, MICHAEL

1 transaction

$6,600

QUALY, JOHN M.

1 transaction

$6,600

MURPHY, RICHARD

1 transaction

$6,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP

OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY

$1,000

Feb 24, 2024

BATMASIAN, JAMES

INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 27, 2023

BATMASIAN, JAMES

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 29, 2023

AUSTIN, ROBERT

UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN

IndividualDALLAS, TX

$6,600

Jul 18, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 15, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 22, 2024

SCALA, MARY ELLEN

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY

$5,300

Aug 27, 2023

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

SELF • PRESIDENT

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 24, 2024

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 25, 2024

PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL

GOLDEN TASTE • CEO

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,400

Jun 24, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 46 nodes and 51 connections

Total contributions: $51

Top Donors - Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount

3 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90
Section 2(g)(4)(B)(i) establishes a presumption of denial for export licenses to entities on the Entity List, which benefits defense contractors by restricting foreign competition and protecting domestic defense supply chains.
+Semiconductors & Hardwareconfidence 0.85
Section 2(g)(4)(B)(i) creates a presumption of denial for export licenses to Entity List entities, which helps semiconductor firms by limiting exports of advanced chips to adversarial nations and reducing foreign competition.
+AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.80
Section 2(g)(4)(B)(i) imposes a presumption of denial on exports to Entity List entities, which benefits AI and cloud providers by restricting access to advanced computing technologies by foreign adversaries and protecting domestic market share.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Defense Contractors$975
from 2 contributions
- PEDDIBHOTLA, SRIRAM$500
- GRISKONIS, JANET$475

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Very Strong

Vector: 70%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8169 directly implements key Project 2025 objectives by expediting Entity List additions, enforcing a presumption of denial for exports to listed entities, and strengthening export controls against countries of concern like China and Russia, aligning with the call for tighter EAR policies and strategic decoupling."

Key themes:Entity List expansionpresumption of denialexport control modernizationChina and Russia focusnational security enforcement

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Department of Commerce

Strong

Vector: 67%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8169 aligns closely with Project 2025's goals by enhancing the speed and rigor of export controls on entities threatening national security, particularly through expedited Entity List modifications and presumption of denial licensing—both of which support tighter control of emerging and foundational technologies and improved enforcement against countries of concern like China and Russia."

Key themes:export controlsEntity List reformsnational securitylicensing stringencytechnology transfer prevention

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Department of Commerce

Strong

Vector: 65%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8169 aligns closely with Project 2025's goal of strengthening export controls on emerging and foundational technologies by expediting the Entity List process, enhancing interagency coordination, and increasing transparency—key themes emphasized in the policy. The bill's focus on faster additions to the Entity List and presumption of denial supports BIS's role in safeguarding national security through tighter control of sensitive exports."

Key themes:export controlsEntity List reformnational securityinteragency coordinationlicensing transparency

Department of Homeland Security

Weak

Vector: 64%

Pages: 183-185AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 DHS section aim to strengthen national security through stricter regulatory controls, but they address different domains—export controls versus immigration enforcement—resulting only in tangential thematic overlap."

Key themes:national securityenforcement mechanismsvetting/screeningregulatory streamliningpresumption of denial

— 151 — Department of Homeland Security l Employment authorization. Along with the legislative proposal, take regulatory action to limit the classes of aliens eligible for work authorization. Executive Orders l Pathways for border crossers 1. Direct the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security to reinstate Asylum Cooperative Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries immediately. 2. Recommence negotiations with Mexico to fully implement the Remain in Mexico Protocols. 3. Reinstate, to the extent possible, expedited pathways with full credible fear/immigration court process (PACR and HARP). 4. Prohibit the use of Notices to Report, the use of any funds for travel into the interior of the United States, and government flights or transportation for aliens. 5. Mandate that ICE use all detention space in full compliance with Section 235 of the INA, issue weekly reports on detention capacity, and provide authority for low-level temporary capacity (for example, tents) once permanent space is full. 6. Eliminate the use of ATD for border crossers except in rare cases and only with the explicit authority of the Secretary. 7. Prohibit the use of parole except in matters that are certified by the Secretary of Homeland Security as requiring action for humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons, and prohibit the use of parole in any categorical circumstance. l Enforcement 1. Restrict prosecutorial discretion to eliminate it as a “catch-all” excuse for limiting immigration enforcement. 2. Mandate the use of E-Verify for anyone doing business with the government. — 152 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Designate USCIS as Intelligence Community–adjacent, ensuring that it has access to national security and law enforcement databases. 4. Rescind all memoranda limiting enforcement of immigration laws including those identifying sensitive zones. 5. End ICE’s widespread use of termination and administrative closure of cases in immigration court. l Averting or curtailing a mass migration event 1. Provide that whenever the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that an actual or anticipated mass migration of aliens en route to or arriving off the coast of the U.S. presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate federal response, the Secretary may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations prohibiting in whole or in part the introduction of persons from such countries or places as he or she shall designate in order to avert or curtail such mass migration and for such period of time as is deemed necessary, including through the expulsion of such aliens. Such rule and regulation making shall not be subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. 2. Provide that notwithstanding any other provision of law, when the Secretary makes such a determination and then promulgates, subject to the approval of the President, such rules and regulations, the Secretary shall have the authority to waive all legal requirements of Title 8 that the Secretary, in his or her sole discretion, determines are necessary to avert or curtail the mass migration. Subregulatory Matters l USCIS priorities/structural changes 1. Ensure that focus is returned to vetting, base eligibility of applicants, and fraud detection. 2. Realign the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) to ensure agencywide consistency on implementation of fraud detection and vetting policies. 3. Review and repeal any internal agency memo that is inconsistent with the priorities described in this chapter.

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Weak

Vector: 63%

Pages: 422-424AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill enhances export control procedures to protect national security, which loosely aligns with Project 2025's goal of safeguarding U.S. energy and economic security, but it does not address energy resources, climate reparations, or DOE institutional reforms central to that policy."

Key themes:national securityexport controlsprotecting U.S. interestsenergy technology

— 389 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions policy and how it affects foreign policy, as well as the international energy landscape and how it affects U.S. national and economic security. l Develop a strategy for identifying and accessing resources and advancing U.S. economic interests. America has recently become a net energy exporter, but it still imports large amounts of essential energy resources such as oil and natural gas as well as such materials as uranium (including yellowcake), lithium, certain rare earth minerals, and energy generation and transmission components and technology. The United States needs a clear understanding of its global energy and economic interests and a strategy for protecting them. l Oppose “climate reparations.” During the November 2022 United Nations climate conference in Egypt, the Biden Administration and other “developed” countries agreed to provide “climate reparations” to developing countries for the harm allegedly caused by the developed countries’ use of fossil fuel.76 A reparations slush fund administered by a non-U.S. organization provides no assurance that U.S. interests will be protected and should not be supported in any form. New Policies l Identify U.S. energy security interests and promote American energy dominance. To this end, IA should work closely with the DESAS Office of Policy on the National Energy Security Strategy. l Strengthen the new DESAS vis-à-vis the Department of State. The State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources has generally excluded IA from serious discussions of international affairs to the detriment of DOE and broader interagency policy development. In addition, DOE embassy representatives are generally excluded from giving policy advice to senior diplomats and are used merely as sources of information instead of being active advocates for the Secretary’s priorities. The Secretary of Energy is a senior member of the President’s National Security Council and should function as such. The DOE’s Deputy Secretaries, Under Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries should be guaranteed representation at all Deputies and Policy Coordination Committee meetings. In addition, senior political and career staff should hold positions on the NSC staff equivalent to their counterparts at State, Defense, Treasury, and the Intelligence Community (IC). DESAS billets should replace State Department Bureau of Energy Resources billets at the relevant posts worldwide. — 390 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stop “climate reparations.” The President should refuse to provide climate reparations under an unratified treaty, and IA should encourage other countries to reconsider their desire to provide reparations. ARCTIC ENERGY OFFICE (AE) Mission/Overview AE was established during the Trump Administration to create a central office overseeing U.S. Arctic interests in Alaska and the other Arctic nations in response to the growing strategic sensitivity of this geographic region and the natural resources it contains. It “serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary on all domestic Arctic issues, including energy, science, and national security.”77 Needed Reforms In October 2022, the Biden Administration released its National Strategy for the Arctic Region.78 Although recognizing national security threats in the Arctic, it also focuses heavily on climate change, sustainability, and international cooperation. The United States must establish a strategic plan to promote its national security, energy, and economic interests in the Arctic. An analysis and plan to support the responsible development of Alaska’s energy assets should be a priority. New Policies l Defend American interests in the Arctic Circle. The next Administration needs to define American strategic and economic interests in the Arctic Circle. AE should help to identify those interests, as well as threats posed by countries like Russia and China, and develop appropriate policy options for the President’s consideration. l Ensure that AE is clearly focused. In particular, this means identifying U.S. energy interests in the Arctic Circle, identifying foreign government and commercial interests and activity in the region, and ensuring that the United States does not forgo important energy and national security interests in the Arctic. l Expand AE’s operations in Alaska. AE’s operations in Alaska should be expanded to encompass broader national energy security interests in the region including rare earths, oil, and natural gas. AE should also be the lead for DOE Antarctic operations as a counter to growing Russian and Chinese interest in Antarctic resources.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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