Fair Credit Reporting Reseller Accuracy Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8141
Last Updated: September 10, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Follow the money

The bill

Fair Credit Reporting Reseller Accuracy Act

HR. 8141, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$86,668 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 875-878 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 689.

August 31, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

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Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**Summary of H.R. 8141: Fair Credit Reporting Reseller Accuracy Act**

**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of H.R. 8141 is to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to impose accuracy obligations on "resellers" of consumer report information—entities that repackage and transmit data originally compiled by consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) like Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion. The bill claims to enhance data integrity by requiring resellers to follow "reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy" before passing along consumer information. In reality, this is a performative gesture dressed up as consumer protection—a legislative Band-Aid on a hemorrhaging system. The true objective appears to be shielding resellers from liability while creating the illusion of reform, all without addressing the root causes of inaccuracy: garbage-in, garbage-out data sourcing, lax oversight, and the profit-driven indifference of the credit reporting industry.

**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Section 607 of the FCRA (15 U.S.C. § 1681e) by adding subsection (f), which: - Mandates that resellers implement "reasonable procedures" to ensure "maximum possible accuracy" of consumer data before transmission. - Provides a **liability shield**: resellers cannot be held liable under FCRA if they "accurately communicate" information obtained from another CRA—effectively immunizing them as long as they pass along bad data faithfully. - Defines "reseller" by reference to Section 603 of the FCRA, which includes entities that assemble and resell consumer reports for purposes like credit, insurance, or employment screening.

This creates a perverse incentive: resellers are encouraged to act as mere conduits, absolved of responsibility for verifying data integrity, while being told to follow vague, unenforceable "reasonable procedures." It’s like telling a photocopier to "ensure maximum possible accuracy" before reproducing a smudged document—then giving it immunity if it copies the smudge perfectly.

**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Resellers** (e.g., data brokers, background check firms, aggregators like LexisNexis or CoreLogic): Primary beneficiaries. Gain legal cover for transmitting inaccurate data so long as they don’t alter it. - **Consumer Reporting Agencies (CRAs)**: Indirectly benefit. Their data flows downstream with less accountability, and they face no new obligations. - **Consumers**: Supposedly protected, but in reality, left exposed. The bill does nothing to improve data quality at the source, correct errors, or empower individuals to challenge inaccuracies. - **End Users** (employers, lenders, landlords): Continue to rely on potentially flawed data, now with an added layer of bureaucratic theater. - **Trial Lawyers & Regulators**: Lose a potential avenue for accountability, as the liability shield narrows avenues for redress.

**4. Potential Impact & Implications** The practical impact will be negligible—if not counterproductive. By focusing on resellers while exempting them from liability for passing along inaccurate data (so long as they don’t modify it), the bill entrenches the status quo: a system where errors proliferate unchecked, consumers bear the burden of correction, and profit-driven entities face no meaningful consequences for disseminating junk data.

This is not reform—it’s regulatory cosmetics. It allows Congress to claim action on credit reporting accuracy while doing nothing to curb the underlying incentives for sloppy data practices. The "reasonable procedures" standard is unenforceable vagueness; the liability shield is a get-out-of-jail-free card for data laundering.

In sum: H.R. 8141 is a solution in search of a problem—or rather, a problem misdiagnosed to justify doing nothing useful. It treats the symptom of inaccurate data transmission while ignoring the metastatic disease: an unaccountable, oligopolistic industry that treats consumer data as a commodity to be exploited, not a responsibility to be guarded. Expect more errors, more harm, and more hollow congratulations from

Related Topics

Government Operations & AccountabilityCybersecurity & Data PrivacyWater & Air Quality Regulations
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💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$86,668
18 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$85,668

No PAC contributions found

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
BATMASIAN, JAMES
2 transactions
$13,200
2
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
2 transactions
$13,068
3
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
2 transactions
$7,800
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,600
5
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
1 transaction
$5,300
6
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
1 transaction
$3,400
7
BANKE, BARBARA
1 transaction
$3,300
8
BERTUSSI, THOMAS P. MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
BOONE, DAN
1 transaction
$3,300
10
CHRISTIE, CHRIS
1 transaction
$3,300
11
CLAUGUS, THOMAS
1 transaction
$3,300
12
DUBITSKY, ALEX
1 transaction
$3,300
13
FORCHHEIMER, JODY
1 transaction
$3,300
14
GINSBURG, MARTIN
1 transaction
$3,300
15
GROSSMAN, JAY
1 transaction
$3,300
16
HARRIS, JOSH
1 transaction
$3,300
17
HUGIN, KATHLEEN
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5]

ID: G000583

Top Contributors

29

1
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$22,941
Apr 12, 2024
2
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$10,621
May 10, 2024
3
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
May 15, 2024
4
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 15, 2024
5
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 30, 2024
6
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$5,751
Apr 1, 2024
7
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
8
SEKAS LAW GROUP LLC
OrganizationENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NJ
$1,500
Apr 12, 2024
9
SANDOR F. GENET & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
OrganizationNORTH MIAMI BEACH, FL
$250
Apr 12, 2024
10
FIRESTONE MILKEN, SARAH
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$13,200
Jul 2, 2024

Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9]

ID: M001204

Top Contributors

22

1
PRIDE MOBILITY PRODUCTS CORP
OrganizationDURYEA, PA
$2,500
Sep 18, 2024
2
COTLER, YUDACUFSKI, HUEBNER
OrganizationSAINT CLAIR, PA
$1,000
Apr 23, 2024
3
DOWD, JOHN J
SUNDANCE VACATIONS • PRESIDENT
IndividualLEHIGHTON, PA
$6,600
Mar 25, 2024
4
PEYKOFF, ANDY
NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC • CEO
IndividualLAS VEGAS, NV
$6,600
Mar 22, 2024
5
DOWD, JOHN J
SUNDANCE VACATIONS • PRESIDENT
IndividualLEHIGHTON, PA
$6,600
Sep 18, 2024
6
ROWAN, MARC J
APOLLO MANAGEMENT • MANAGEMENT
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 23, 2023
7
ROWAN, CAROLYN
CAROLYN ROWAN COLLECTION • OWNER
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 23, 2023
8
RICH, BRIAN R MR. JR
GILBERTON COAL CO. • EXECUTIVE SALES
IndividualCONSHOHOCKEN, PA
$6,600
Oct 24, 2024
9
VOLPE, ELLEN M
SELF • HOMEMAKER
IndividualWAVERLY TOWNSHIP, PA
$5,800
May 31, 2023
10
VOLPE, CHARLES J
EXCALIBUR INSURANCE MGMT • PRESIDENT
IndividualWAVERLY TOWNSHIP, PA
$5,800
May 31, 2023

Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

ID: W000812

Top Contributors

24

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Aug 23, 2023
2
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, INC., PAC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$2,000
Jul 14, 2023
3
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, INC., PAC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$500
Mar 15, 2023
4
WINRED
OrganizationARLINGTON, VA
$9
May 9, 2024
5
WILHELM, MARK A MR.
SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORP. • CHAIRMAN & CEO
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Dec 18, 2023
6
DRURY, TIM M.
DRURY DEVELOPMENT • PRESIDENT
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Feb 27, 2023
7
DANFORTH, JOHN C
DOWD BENNETT LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Feb 17, 2023
8
TRACY, RICHARD L. MR.
DOT FOODS, INC. • PRESIDENT
IndividualDES PERES, MO
$13,200
Feb 17, 2023
9
RINEY, RODGER O. MR.
T.D. AMERITRADE • ADVISOR TO CEO
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Mar 23, 2023
10
O'CONNELL, JOHN T.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Mar 15, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 47 nodes and 51 connections

Total contributions: $51

Top Donors - Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount

1 Org17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 harmed.

  • −Commercial Banksconfidence 0.80

    Section 2 of the bill amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act to require resellers of consumer report information to follow reasonable procedures for accuracy, which may increase compliance costs for commercial banks that resell such information.

  • Section 2 of the bill amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act to require resellers of consumer report information to follow reasonable procedures for accuracy, which may increase compliance costs for insurance companies that resell such information.

  • Section 2 of the bill amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act to require resellers of consumer report information to follow reasonable procedures for accuracy, which may increase compliance costs for private equity and hedge funds that invest in companies that resell such information.

  • −Crypto & Fintechconfidence 0.60

    Section 2 of the bill amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act to require resellers of consumer report information to follow reasonable procedures for accuracy, which may increase compliance costs for crypto and fintech companies that resell such information.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

  • from 11 contributions
    • KRONE, DAVID BRETT$6,600
    • ROWAN, MARC J$6,600
    • SINGER, PAUL$6,600
    • KLEINMAN, SCOTT$3,300
    • SHUMWAY, CLAYTON$2,300
  • from 4 contributions
    • BANKS, KEITH$1,500
    • IZZO, PETE$1,000
    • ZAMBAS, TASOS D$500
    • MILLER, WILLIAM$104
  • from 2 contributions
    • CARNEY, CONOR$2,000
  • from 3 contributions
    • GILLSTON, SETH$1,000
    • MARENGO, PETER$250
    • HOLLAND, CHRIS$250

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Moderate
Vector: 63%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both HR 8141 and the Project 2025 Financial Regulatory Agencies section aim to strengthen consumer financial protection and oversight by the CFPB, though the bill focuses on reseller accuracy while the Project 2025 text emphasizes CFPB structure and civil penalty fund operations."

Key themes:consumer financial protectioncredit reporting accuracyCFPB oversightreseller accountability

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 60%
Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8141 focuses on improving accuracy in consumer reporting through reseller accountability, while Project 2025 seeks to dismantle the CFPB and reduce its regulatory authority. The bill strengthens FCRA enforcement, which contrasts with Project 2025's goal of limiting CFPB power, resulting in only weak thematic overlap regarding consumer financial protection."

Key themes:consumer financial protectionFCRAregulatory oversight

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely. — 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office

Trade

Weak
Vector: 60%
Pages: 863-865AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8141 focuses on improving accuracy of consumer credit reporting, while the Project 2025 Trade section addresses securities offerings, capital market regulations, and SEC administrative reforms; both involve financial regulation but target different sectors and objectives."

Key themes:financial regulationconsumer protectionregulatory oversight

— 831 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Either democratize access to private offerings by broadening the definition of accredited investor for purposes of Regulation D or eliminate the accredited investor restriction altogether.15 l Allow traditional self-certification of accredited investor status for all Regulation D Rule 506 offerings. l Exempt small micro-offerings from registration requirements.16 l Exempt small and intermittent finders from broker–dealer registration requirements and provide a simplified registration process for private placement brokers.17 l Exempt peer-to-peer lending from federal and state securities laws and reduce the regulatory burden on Regulation CF debt securities. l Make the Title I Emerging Growth Company (EGC) exemptions permanent for all EGCs. l Reduce the regulatory burden on small broker–dealers and exempt privately held, non-custodial broker–dealers from the requirements to use a PCAOB- registered firm for their audits. Congress should: l Amend the Internal Revenue Code to disregard crowdfunding and Regulation A shareholders for purposes of the 100-shareholder limit for Subchapter S corporations.18 BETTER CAPITAL MARKETS To improve capital markets, the SEC should: l Preempt blue sky registration, qualification, and continuing reporting requirements for securities traded on established securities markets (including a national securities exchange or an alternative trading system).19 l Terminate the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) program.20 l Abolish Rule 144 and other regulations that restrict securities resales and instead require a company that has sold securities to provide sufficient current informa- tion to the market to permit reasonable investment decisions and secondary sales. — 832 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should: l Prohibit the SEC from requiring issuer disclosure of social, ideological, political, or “human capital” information that is not material to investors’ financial, economic, or pecuniary risks or returns. The proposed SEC climate change rule, which would quadruple the costs of being a public company, is particularly problematic.21 l Repeal the Dodd–Frank mandated disclosures relating to conflict minerals, mine safety, resource extraction, and CEO pay ratios.22 l Oppose efforts to redefine the purpose of business in the name of social justice; corporate social responsibility (CSR); stakeholder theory; environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria; socially responsible investing (SRI); sustainability; diversity; business ethics; or common- good capitalism. l Prohibit securities regulators, including SROs, from promulgating rules or taking other actions that discriminate, either favorably or unfavorably, on the basis of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group. SEC ADMINISTRATION To enable it to achieve its core mission more effectively, the SEC should:23 l Publish better data on securities offerings, securities markets, and securities law enforcement and publish an annual data book of time series data on these matters. Specifically, the SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) needs to do a much better job of collecting and reporting fundamental data regarding offerings, regulatory costs, violations, enforcement, investors, state regulator taxes, fees and activities, and other matters. l Ensure that SEC resources flow toward its core functions and away from ancillary and support functions or from missions that do not fall within the SEC’s statutory charge. l Ensure that any three SEC Commissioners are empowered to place an item on the agenda and to receive adequate staff support to do so even without the Chairman’s support.

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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