The bill
Expanding the Fast Track Act of 2026
HR. 8003, 119th Congress — read as touching Pipelines & Energy Infrastructure.
Sponsored by
Rep. Deluzio, Christopher R. [D-PA-17]
ID: D000530
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 8003, 119th Congress — read as touching Pipelines & Energy Infrastructure.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "19" section, p. 655-657 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Subcommittee Hearings Held
July 20, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Expanding the Fast Track Act of 2026 is a cleverly crafted exercise in doublespeak, designed to make it seem like our esteemed lawmakers are actually doing something productive. In reality, this bill is a Trojan horse for special interests and a testament to the boundless stupidity of its sponsors, Mr. Deluzio and Mr. Crank. The main purpose? To further line the pockets of their corporate benefactors, of course.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill lowers the cost estimate threshold for infrastructure projects from $200 million to $50 million, making it easier for smaller (read: more corruptible) projects to bypass rigorous permitting processes. Because, you know, what could possibly go wrong with fast-tracking construction projects and ignoring environmental concerns? It's not like we've seen that movie before... and it always ends in catastrophic failure.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects will benefit from this legislative abomination: construction companies, lobbyists, and the politicians who take their bribes. Meanwhile, the environment, local communities, and taxpayers will be left to deal with the consequences of hasty, ill-conceived projects. But hey, who needs responsible governance when there are campaign contributions to be made?
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the chronic corruption and incompetence that plagues our government. By prioritizing special interests over the public good, our lawmakers are essentially prescribing a lethal dose of greed and stupidity to the American people. The potential impact? More crony capitalism, more environmental disasters, and more reasons for the average citizen to lose faith in the system.
In conclusion, HR 8003 is a masterclass in legislative malpractice, a cynical attempt to serve the interests of the powerful at the expense of the powerless. It's a testament to the enduring power of money and influence in Washington, where the only thing more abundant than corruption is the stupidity of those who enable it. Bravo, Congress. You've managed to create a bill that's simultaneously a joke and a tragedy. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do... like watching paint dry.
Rep. Deluzio, Christopher R. [D-PA-17]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C001137
Top Contributors
21
ID: H001100
Top Contributors
26
ID: M001228
Top Contributors
22
ID: M001223
Top Contributors
27
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 56 nodes and 60 connections
Total contributions: $60
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 helped.
Section 2(a) and (b) lower the cost estimate threshold for infrastructure projects, potentially streamlining the permitting process for energy infrastructure projects, such as pipelines and LNG terminals.
Section 2(a) and (b) lower the cost estimate threshold for infrastructure projects, potentially increasing the number of construction and engineering projects that can utilize the faster permitting process.
Section 2(a) and (b) may lead to increased infrastructure development, which could have a positive impact on the real estate industry by improving accessibility and value of properties.
Section 2(a) and (b) may lead to increased infrastructure development, such as roads and bridges, which could benefit the surface transportation industry.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Deluzio, Christopher R. [D-PA-17])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 DOT section aim to improve infrastructure delivery efficiency and increase transparency, but the bill focuses on lowering permitting thresholds for smaller projects while the policy emphasizes public‑private partnerships, value‑for‑money analysis, and private sector risk transfer, resulting in only moderate thematic overlap."
— 623 — Department of Transportation l Policymakers should maintain awareness and promote transparency regarding the continued existence of this loan program and whether private financiers are being disintermediated by the subsidized BAB lending that the private sector simply cannot match. l A cost-benefit analysis of the federal government’s potential replacement and disintermediation of the private financing sector regarding infrastructure loans, which is not currently performed, should be conducted on a regular basis. PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS Much infrastructure could be funded through public–private partnerships (P3s), a procurement method that uses private financing to construct infrastructure. In exchange for providing the financing, the private partner typically retains the right to operate the asset under requirements specified by the government in a contract called a concession agreement. In addition, the private partner is given the right either to collect fees from the users of the asset or to receive a periodic payment from the government conditioned on the asset’s availability: If a highway is not open to traffic when it should be, for example, the government’s payment to the private concessionaire is reduced. The best practice for a government that is interested in using a P3 to deliver a project is for the government first to perform a value-for-money study, which compares the costs and benefits of procuring the asset under a typical procurement against the costs and benefits of utilizing a P3. Since private equity is involved, the financing costs for P3s are higher, but they also are frequently more than offset by the private sector’s ability to generate efficiencies and cost savings in the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the asset. If the value-for-money study finds that the efficiencies of a P3 and the value of risk shifted to the private sector exceed the additional financing costs, then utilizing a P3 is good public policy because Americans have better infrastructure at a lower cost. As well as providing better transportation facilities for Americans, P3s offer a number of benefits to governments. Specifically, they: l Provide access to some of the world’s best talent with vast experience in delivering infrastructure, l Create incentives for innovation and creativity, l Shift unique project risks to companies that are familiar with those risks, and — 624 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Allow designers, contractors, and maintenance teams to work together through the delivery of the process to focus on lifecycle costs as opposed to just initial design and construction costs. It should be noted that project funding and P3s are not synonymous. Policy- makers and government leaders frequently mistake the financing that P3s provide for funding. A P3 allows the government to obtain equity from the private sector, but that equity has to be paid back with interest. Like a loan, a P3 can be used to accelerate revenues and provide needed capital to help pay the upfront costs of a project, but also like a loan, the private P3 investors must be paid back for investors to realize a financial return. Some mistakenly think that using a P3 would allow a road or bridge to be deliv- ered without increases in tolls or taxes. It is important to remember that all funding for governmental infrastructure comes from either taxes or user fees. P3 financing can be used to make those funding sources more efficient, but it cannot replace the need for taxes or user fees to provide the funding for the project. In addition, a poorly managed P3 procurement process (the process govern- ment uses to identify the best private P3 partner) can result in excessive consultant costs and years-long delays in delivery. While P3s can offer efficiencies in delivering the project, the P3 procurement process itself can be significantly longer and more expensive than traditional procurement processes. Finally, and possibly most important, a P3 gives a private party the ability to collect fees or payments over decades (a period well beyond the length of the careers of the political appointees who sign contracts with private parties). Thus, P3s create an opportunity for current governmental leaders to obtain a higher upfront payment from the private party in exchange for greater user fees paid by future generations who will use the asset. In other words, a governmental CEO (governor, mayor, head of an authority) can use a P3 to impose unnecessarily high costs on users decades in the future in exchange for upfront cash. It is important that contracts be transparent in order to minimize this possibility. A P3’s greatest public value is realized when the procurement model is used for a project that is unusually risky or a type of project with which the government has limited experience such as a tunnel or light rail line. P3s are an excellent tool for transferring risk from the public sector to the private sector and can create considerable value for the taxpaying public. However, a high degree of expertise is required to ensure that the risk transfer warrants the higher financing and pro- curement costs that P3s impose. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES As private companies develop a future of new, emerging technologies, one role for DOT is driving clarity in the government’s role and setting standards for safety,
AI Analysis:
"HR 8003 aligns with Project 2025's goal of reducing federal overreach in infrastructure by streamlining permitting for smaller projects, thus decreasing bureaucratic delays—a shared objective with FHWA reform efforts. However, the bill does not address specific Project 2025 targets like revoking California's waiver or refocusing FHWA solely on highways."
— 629 — Department of Transportation l Revoke the special waiver granted to California by the Biden Administration. California has no valid basis under the Clean Air Act to claim an extraordinary or unique air quality impact from carbon dioxide emissions, and EPCA is clear that under no circumstances may a state agency regulate fuel economy in place of DOT. The federal government should therefore exercise its preemptive authority over CARB and take all steps necessary to invalidate any inconsistent fuel economy requirements imposed by CARB, including its ban on sales of internal combustion engines. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has jurisdiction over the inter- state highway system, which is vital for the transportation of goods and people throughout the country. The FHWA, in conjunction with state DOTs, works to ensure the quality and safety of highways and bridges. However, over the course of decades, presidential Administrations and Con- gress have caused the FHWA to go beyond its original mission. The variety of infrastructure projects now eligible for funding through the FHWA include fer- ryboat terminals, hiking trails, bicycle lanes, and local sidewalks. In many cases, such projects should be the sole responsibility of local or state governments, not dependent on FHWA funding. For local projects, federal involvement adds red tape and bureaucratic delays rather than value. The Biden Administration has broadened the FHWA’s scope by emphasizing the priorities of progressive activists instead of pursuing practical goals. These policies include a focus on “equity,” a nebulous concept that in practice means awarding grants to favored identity groups, as well as imposing obligations on states concern- ing carbon dioxide emissions from highway traffic—areas not encompassed within FHWA’s statutory authorities. Furthermore, the Biden Administration’s embrace of the “Vision Zero” approach to safety often means actively seeking congestion for automobiles to reduce speeds. Finally, the Administration has sought to use a “guidance memo” to impose policies not enacted by Congress, most notably to make it harder for growing states to expand highway capacity. Instead, the next Administration should: l Seek to refocus the FHWA on maintaining and improving the highway system. l Remove or reform rules and regulations that hamper state governments. l Reduce the amount of federal involvement in local infrastructure decisions. — 630 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise AVIATION Americans value the ability to travel safely and inexpensively by air. In the United States, the private sector has developed the world’s safest, most effective passenger and cargo air transport networks. Current policies threaten to undo that legacy and to strangle the development of new technologies such as drones and “advanced air mobility,” including small aircraft to serve as air taxis or to conduct quiet vertical flights. Starting in the 1970s, deregulation and increased competition turned air travel from a luxury to an affordable travel option enjoyed by most Americans. The United States has four major airlines, each with roughly 20 percent of the domestic market. They compete with each other over the vast majority of routes. Several smaller carriers provide additional competition and other options for travelers. The current Administration’s policies are self-contradictory. In order to pla- cate specific labor groups, the Biden Administration not only opposes the growth of the major airlines, which would reduce the price of air travel, but also opposes measures—such as low-fare foreign competition and joint ventures of smaller U.S. carriers—that would increase competition. Another problematic area is aviation consumer protection. Congress has autho- rized DOT to prohibit specific “unfair and deceptive practices” in the airline industry after undertaking a hearing process—authority exercised by the Office of Aviation Consumer Protection within the General Counsel’s Office. Beginning with the Obama Administration, this authority has been used to justify broad new regulations—in the name of achieving “fair” competition—that would impose burdensome disclosure mandates and other costly requirements without a sufficient process for gathering supporting evidence. The Trump Administration reformed the process for issuing such “unfair and deceptive practices” rules,9 but the Biden Administration promptly reversed those reforms.10 A new Administration should restore them. In general, the next Administration should focus its efforts on making air travel more affordable and abundant, increasing safety, increasing competition to benefit the flying public, and removing obstacles to the rapid deployment of emerging aviation technologies that hold the promise of improved safety, compe- tition, opportunity, and growth. To achieve a more level playing field and increase options for the traveling public, the next Administration should: l Publicly indicate that a new Administration would support joint- venture efforts by smaller carriers (for example, Jet Blue and Spirit) to achieve scale necessary to reduce costs and compete more effectively with the larger carriers. l Review foreign ownership and control limitations and, if necessary, work with Congress to change existing statutes. Worldwide investors
AI Analysis:
"HR 8003 focuses on streamlining federal permitting for infrastructure projects by lowering cost thresholds, which is unrelated to the HUD-focused Project 2025 policy objectives concerning housing market reforms, DEI/ESG critiques, homelessness approaches, or housing supply constraints. There is no direct thematic or policy overlap between transportation permitting reform and the specified HUD initiatives."
— 515 — Department of Housing and Urban Development 25. Process must prioritize where political leadership can implement administrative reforms through regulatory action and subregulatory guidance reforms. 26. China and other foreign nations should not be able to disrupt our nation’s housing markets, including by artificially driving up prices and reducing affordability and access to housing for Americans who are crowded out of the market by such market participation. 27. These initiatives are maintained under such designations as diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI); critical race theory (CRT); black, indigenous, Pacific Islander, and other people of color (BIPOC); and environmental, social, and governance (ESG). 28. At a minimum, these efforts duplicate what the federal government already collects and assesses; at worst, they institute arbitrary procedures in real estate appraisal practices that undermine integrity and perversely introduce arbitrary biases into what should be an unbiased system for determining financial value. 29. Revise regulatory and subregulatory guidance, where applicable within statutory authorities, that adds unnecessary delay and costs to the construction and development of new housing and has been estimated to account for about 40 percent of new housing unit costs in multifamily housing. 30. The Biden Administration has issued a proposed rule to replace the Trump Administration’s “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice” rule that had repealed earlier rules expanding AFFH enforcement. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Fair Housing, “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 153 (August 7, 2020), pp. 47899–47912, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-07/pdf/2020-16320.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023), and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 88, No. 27 (February 9, 2023), pp. 8516–8590, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-07-16/pdf/2015-17032.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 31. Certain pilot initiatives may encourage greater take-up of loan products designed for faster equity accumulation, including loans with shorter terms and accelerated amortization schedules. In concept, the FHA’s Home Equity Accelerator Loan (HEAL) and Good Neighbor Next Door (GNND) pilot initiatives might lead to meaningful wealth generation for first-time buyers, but they should be available to all eligible households only when they do not arbitrarily discriminate based on race or other characteristics. 32. Housing supply does remain a problem in the U.S., but constructing more units at the low end of the market will not solve the problem. Investors and developers can deliver at more efficient cost new units that will allow for greater upward mobility of rental and ownership housing stock and better target increased construction of mid-tier rental units. Further, and more fundamental to the housing supply challenge in markets across the U.S., localities can consider revising land use, zoning, and building regulations that constrict new housing development, adding time delays and costs that impede construction. Federal housing policy should get out of the way where possible and minimize the distortive impact that stimulating greater demand through loose lending can have in driving up housing prices for households that are looking for affordable entry into the housing market. 33. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Housing and Community Development Act of 1980: Verification of Eligible Status,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 91 (May 10, 2019), pp. 20589–20595, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-05-10/pdf/2019-09566.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 34. Reforms should contemplate rent payment flexibilities, allow escrow savings, and set maximum term limits that can reduce implicit penalties for increasing household incomes over eligibility terms for housing assistance and reweight waiting-list prioritization for two-parent households. 35. Some PHAs have been able to implement work requirements and term limit policies in various congressionally authorized demonstration programs, notably the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program established in 1996 for 39 PHAs (Congress has since authorized another 100 PHAs) in which participating MTW PHAs were given authority to implement rent reforms, work requirements and other experimental policies in rental assistance programs along with flexibilities in the use of capital and operating appropriations. 36. The FSS program has a general five-year term with a possible two-year extension, which could be applied at the term limit for overall benefits, and certain PHAs have imposed five-year to seven-year term limits. Families in these programs build escrow savings during their term eligibility that helps to facilitate successful transitions to family self-sufficiency and unassisted housing. — 516 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 37. HUD should implement administrative changes in regulation and guidance and seek statutory authority to end all Housing First directives of Continuum of Care (CoC) grantees and contract homelessness providers in addition to establishing restrictions on local Housing First policies where HUD grant funds are used. 38. The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) was established in the 1990s, and numerous Administrations have devoted enormous resources to the Housing First model, experimenting with various ways to provide federally financed rapid rehousing and permanent housing opportunities. Housing First is a far-left idea premised on the belief that homelessness is primarily circumstantial rather than behavioral. The Housing First answer to homelessness is to give someone a house instead of attempting to understand the underlying causes of homelessness. Federal intervention centered on Housing First has failed to acknowledge that resolving the issue of homelessness is often a matter of resolving mental health and substance abuse challenges. Instead of the permanent supportive housing proffered by Housing First, a conservative Administration should shift to transitional housing with a focus on addressing the underlying issues that cause homelessness in the first place. 39. The Senate Low-Income First-Time Homebuyers (LIFT) Act would address this policy goal. See S. 2797, Low-Income First-Time Homebuyers Act of 2021 (LIFT Homebuyers Act of 2021), 117th Congress, introduced September 22, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s2797/BILLS-117s2797is.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 40. FHA did not facilitate the widespread use of 30-year mortgages until the 1950s when, interacting with Federal Reserve policies, federal agencies began broader adoption of the mortgages, which, despite lowering the monthly repayment terms, result in slow equity accumulation and wealth-building opportunities. 41. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 fundamentally revised the scope of federal regulation in the nation’s housing finance system, placing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the purview of a newly established Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and establishing a Housing Trust Fund (HTF) that is administered in the HUD Office of Community Planning and Development. See H.R. 3221, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-289, 110th Congress, July 30, 2008, https://www.congress. gov/110/plaws/publ289/PLAW-110publ289.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 42. Guiding questions: What reforms should be proposed that could be accomplished within five years? What reforms can be done administratively, and what reforms would need legislative authorization? Are there functions that HUD administers that could be achieved more effectively at another department or agency? What big-picture reforms should be proposed that might take more than five years that would reorganize HUD and its programs to meet the objectives in the vision or mission? What would occur in the absence of these public finance subsidies? How much crowd-out do these subsidies create in the market? Would America be a seriously underhoused nation without these subsidies? Who are the policies intended to benefit? What organizational changes must be made? 43. The Faircloth Amendment (Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998) amended the Housing Act of 1937 to maintain public housing units at 1999 levels, preventing housing authorities from maintaining more public housing than they did then. H.R. 4194, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105-276, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Title V, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ276/PLAW-105publ276.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). In recent years, the statutory restriction on new construction of public housing units has been circumvented through some narrow uses of preservation programs such as the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, initially authorized in 2012 and reauthorized several times since under higher program unit conversion caps. Congress also provided paths for renewal and continuation of a portion of existing public housing; project/site-based housing stock (refinancing with long-term HAP contract commitments); and Section 8 units through the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 (MAHRA). H.R. 2158, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Public Law No. 105-65, 105th Congress, October 27, 1997, Title V, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ65/PLAW-105publ65.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 44. As the evolution of HUD rental assistance transitions away from the public housing model toward housing choice vouchers, there should be adequate landlord participation to ensure that the supply of housing units for rent in these programs meets the demand for rent among eligible tenants. This issue has been addressed in various ways, including by a task force instituted at the department during the Trump Administration, but could likely remain a challenge in the administration of the program.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.