The bill
Aviation Innovation and Global Competitiveness Act
HR. 7553, 119th Congress — read as touching Aerospace (Commercial).
Sponsored by
Rep. Nehls, Troy E. [R-TX-22]
ID: N000026
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 7553, 119th Congress — read as touching Aerospace (Commercial).
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Transportation" section, p. 664-666 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by Voice Vote.
September 14, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of H.R. 7553: Aviation Innovation and Global Competitiveness Act**
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of H.R. 7553 is to modernize the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) type certification process to accommodate "new and novel technologies," particularly in advanced air mobility (e.g., eVTOLs, powered-lift aircraft), while maintaining safety and ensuring U.S. global leadership in aviation. In reality, this bill is a transparent attempt to fast-track certification for well-connected aerospace startups and defense contractors eager to monetize flying taxis and drone delivery fleets—safety be damned if it slows quarterly earnings. The bill masquerades as innovation policy but functions as regulatory capture with a PowerPoint deck.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill mandates several procedural overhauls under the guise of "transparency" and "efficiency": - **Section 2** requires the FAA Administrator to publish a public plan within 180 days to improve the issue paper process, maximize use of industry consensus standards (read: let Boeing and Airbus write their own rules), create stable policy on recurring certification issues, and consider performance-based standards. - It further demands standard expected timelines for certification milestones within 270 days, including FAA response times to issue papers, exemption petitions, and compliance proposals—complete with reporting requirements to Congress. - Crucially, **subsection (c)** provides a giant loophole: the Administrator may exclude "complex issues" deemed unsafe from these timelines—meaning the FAA can ignore the whole thing if it actually has to do its job. - **Section 3** requires the FAA to define criteria for when an issue warrants an issue paper—essentially asking the agency to clarify when it should actually pay attention to a problem. - The bill mandates consultation with industry stakeholders (aircraft manufacturers, vertiport developers, unions) and annual reporting on performance metrics—because nothing says "safety oversight" like quarterly KPIs reviewed by lobbyists.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Helped:** Aerospace startups (Joby, Archer, Lilium), defense contractors (Lockheed, Boeing), infrastructure investors, and vertiport developers salivating over public funding for flying car pads. - **Neutral/Potentially Harmed:** FAA safety inspectors and engineers, who get more paperwork and consultation mandates without additional resources—now expected to do more with less while being told to "trust the process." - **At Risk:** The flying public, who will soon be asked to trust that an aircraft certified via industry-written consensus standards and accelerated timelines won’t drop out of the sky over a suburban mall. - **Ignored:** Taxpayers, who subsidize this innovation theater through FAA appropriations while getting zero equity in the flying taxi boom.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** If enacted, this bill will likely accelerate certification of novel aircraft by weakening procedural rigor under the banner of "innovation." Expect more reliance on industry self-certification, faster approvals for unproven technologies, and a gradual erosion of the FAA’s role as a skeptical gatekeeper—replaced by a facilitative service provider for aviation venture capital. The "transparency" and "timelines" are theater; the real goal is to reduce regulatory friction for politically connected firms. History suggests this ends poorly: see the 737 MAX debacle, where delegation and timeline pressure compromised safety. This bill doesn’t fix the FAA—it gives it a nicer website while handing the keys to the certification process to the highest bidder. In short: it’s not about competitiveness. It’s about letting Silicon Valley play test pilot with your life—and calling it progress.
Rep. Nehls, Troy E. [R-TX-22]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 7 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C001072
Top Contributors
22
ID: O000019
Top Contributors
34
ID: P000613
Top Contributors
28
ID: G000583
Top Contributors
29
ID: W000829
Top Contributors
22
ID: B001323
Top Contributors
20
ID: M000871
Top Contributors
22
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 37 nodes and 37 connections
Total contributions: $37
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 2 improves the transparency of the FAA type certification process, which supports innovation in aviation and the development of new technologies, benefiting the commercial aerospace industry.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's call for FAA reform to support advanced air mobility, streamline certification, and enhance U.S. competitiveness in aviation innovation. Both emphasize modernizing regulatory processes, leveraging industry standards, and accelerating approval timelines for emerging technologies while maintaining safety."
— 631 — Department of Transportation are providing access to capital to foreign airlines for innovations and new equipment purchases that U.S. airlines cannot match. The U.S. should use the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process to keep out nefarious foreign actors while allowing investment from investors in designated like-minded countries so long as U.S.-based investors maintain plurality ownership. l Establish a New Entry Initiative that commits the federal government to approving or rejecting the applications of new air carriers within 12 months. l Initiate a rulemaking to allocate slot-pairs more consistently to airlines at capacity-controlled airports on the primary basis of safety, maximizing capacity, and competition. In a perfect world, the market would dictate these options, but in the highly regulated international aviation sector, the current incentives are to keep out com- petitors. Slot regulations have not been updated since the 1990s. Well-meaning legislation and the pilot shortage are adversely affecting aviation safety. In the wake of the 2009 Colgan Airlines crash, all commercial pilots and copilots were required to have 1,500 flight hours. Today, facing a pilot shortage, larger and safer twin-engine planes with two pilots are being phased out of service at smaller airports and replaced by single-engine planes that have only one pilot. This trend could be reversed if copilots were required to have fewer flight hours or could count certified simulator training. Federal subsidies are also distorting the commercial market. The Essential Air Service (EAS) program subsidizes flights to 200 small airports that are not otherwise commercially viable. The program was established in the 1970s as a temporary measure to cushion deregulation. It has since been made permanent. Finally ending the program would free hundreds of pilots to serve larger markets with more passengers. A new Administration could reform regulations to encour- age airports in lower-served areas of the nation. International air travel is regulated and restricted by individual treaties between the United States and other countries. The new Administration should remain committed to the laudatory goal of “Open Skies.” However, many of the largest emerging markets are not fully open, and our aviation policies should reflect that reality and ensure that U.S. air carriers compete on a level playing field. Specifically, so long as U.S. carriers are not able to fly over Russian airspace, the U.S. should not allow foreign carriers serving markets in East Asia and South Asia to enjoy a com- petitive advantage by continuing to allow them to fly to the U.S. China has failed to put in place several of the policies to which it has already agreed; the U.S. should — 632 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise not offer additional negotiations until the Chinese implement the agreements they have already signed. The current Administration’s policies in several areas that affect aviation and limit America’s future opportunities for growth are internally inconsistent. In addition to a New Entry Initiative, the new Administration should establish an interagency clearinghouse to drive consistent policies across the government on spectrum, drones, and advanced air mobility. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION With a budget of $18.6 billion requested for FY 202311 and an international regulatory footprint, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is DOT’s most visible mode. It needs reform. Air traffic control (ATC) operations account for two-thirds of FAA’s budget, and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is far behind its counterparts in Australia, Canada, and Western Europe in implementing 21st century technology. The FAA’s primary mission is ATC; its two smaller functions are distributing federal airport grants and regulating all aspects of aviation safety. The FAA was once considered the world’s best government aviation agency. Those days are long past. In the more than five decades since 1958 when the Federal Aviation Agency (precursor to the Federal Aviation Administration) was formed, there have been notable developments in air traffic control technology, aircraft avionics, and engine reliability, but despite many well-intentioned attempts, there have been few changes in the FAA’s funding structure. The FAA is still improperly organized and financed, and the management reforms provided in the late 1990s remain largely unused. The FAA is 10 years older than DOT. It provides two separate and functionally different services: the world’s largest and most complex Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and, at the same time, the world’s largest civil aviation regulatory and certificatory agency. The first is a 24/7/365 air traffic service provider. The second is an inherently governmental organization responsible for ensuring that aerospace operators, vehicles, airports, and ANSPs are properly certified and follow all FAA regulations. These two different organizations ought to run separately. The FAA is the only modern Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the world that does not assess fees for its services. Its funding structure, subject to the annual appropriations process, stifles efficiency and innovation—and the FAA does not innovate well. It spends too much time and money on research and development (R&D) and is not very good at either one. It should get out of the R&D business and focus on testing, evaluating, and certifying private-sector innovation much more quickly than it does today. The FAA workforce needs to modernize. The agency needs safety and certifi- cation experts, not professional airframe and powerplant mechanics (A&Ps). It
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's call for FAA reform to support advanced air mobility, streamline certification, and enhance U.S. competitiveness in aviation innovation, particularly through transparency, performance-based standards, and stakeholder consultation."
— 632 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise not offer additional negotiations until the Chinese implement the agreements they have already signed. The current Administration’s policies in several areas that affect aviation and limit America’s future opportunities for growth are internally inconsistent. In addition to a New Entry Initiative, the new Administration should establish an interagency clearinghouse to drive consistent policies across the government on spectrum, drones, and advanced air mobility. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION With a budget of $18.6 billion requested for FY 202311 and an international regulatory footprint, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is DOT’s most visible mode. It needs reform. Air traffic control (ATC) operations account for two-thirds of FAA’s budget, and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is far behind its counterparts in Australia, Canada, and Western Europe in implementing 21st century technology. The FAA’s primary mission is ATC; its two smaller functions are distributing federal airport grants and regulating all aspects of aviation safety. The FAA was once considered the world’s best government aviation agency. Those days are long past. In the more than five decades since 1958 when the Federal Aviation Agency (precursor to the Federal Aviation Administration) was formed, there have been notable developments in air traffic control technology, aircraft avionics, and engine reliability, but despite many well-intentioned attempts, there have been few changes in the FAA’s funding structure. The FAA is still improperly organized and financed, and the management reforms provided in the late 1990s remain largely unused. The FAA is 10 years older than DOT. It provides two separate and functionally different services: the world’s largest and most complex Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and, at the same time, the world’s largest civil aviation regulatory and certificatory agency. The first is a 24/7/365 air traffic service provider. The second is an inherently governmental organization responsible for ensuring that aerospace operators, vehicles, airports, and ANSPs are properly certified and follow all FAA regulations. These two different organizations ought to run separately. The FAA is the only modern Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the world that does not assess fees for its services. Its funding structure, subject to the annual appropriations process, stifles efficiency and innovation—and the FAA does not innovate well. It spends too much time and money on research and development (R&D) and is not very good at either one. It should get out of the R&D business and focus on testing, evaluating, and certifying private-sector innovation much more quickly than it does today. The FAA workforce needs to modernize. The agency needs safety and certifi- cation experts, not professional airframe and powerplant mechanics (A&Ps). It — 633 — Department of Transportation needs to hire people trained to oversee mechanics, engineers, and pilots. It is time to consider promoting the FAA’s top executive team from within and requiring strict professional requirements for its top appointees. Organizations such as the FAA whose sole responsibility is public safety should be fully auditable and led by experts in their field or industry with oversight from DOT leadership. For 60 years, the FAA was the global leader in aerospace, from general aviation to commercial space, but the U.S. lead has vanished. The FAA’s overly bureaucratic, legalistic, byzantine, and more recently hyperpoliticized way of processing regu- lations, adopting innovation, publishing rules, and procuring new technologies has been eclipsed by foreign CAAs and ANSPs that are eagerly certifying drones and creating environments in which new technologies and new entrants, such as air taxis, can thrive. To regain America’s global leadership in aviation, the next Administration should: l Separate the FAA from DOT or, at a minimum, separate the ATO from the FAA. l Completely restructure the FAA’s funding system so that the nation’s aviation system is not held prisoner to annual appropriations or used as a political football to solve nonaviation problems. l Require the FAA to operate more like a business. The FAA has not made good use of the unique authority it has been given in areas like personnel and acquisition. In Europe, conventional control towers are being replaced by digital/remote towers with high-resolution cameras and other sensors on tall structures and at points adjoining runways. In Germany and Scandinavia, as many as 15 small air- ports can be controlled from one remote tower center. The FAA has yet to certify a single digital/remote tower. Text messaging between controllers and pilots is widespread over the oceans. The ATO began to implement what is now called DataComm in 2002 but sus- pended the project in 2003. This was restarted at airport control towers in 2016, but as of October 2022, it was available in only seven of the 20 high-altitude control centers. Current technology enables flights to be managed “anywhere from anywhere,” but the ATO resists consolidating its 20 aging centers into a much smaller number—and lacks the funds to consolidate them. The FAA as regulator and the ATO as traffic manager have no plans in place to handle millions of drones and other emerging technologies such as electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's aviation objectives by seeking to streamline FAA certification processes, reduce regulatory barriers, and promote innovation in emerging aviation technologies like eVTOLs and advanced air mobility—goals explicitly supported in the Project 2025 aviation section. Both emphasize increasing competitiveness, safety, and deployment of new technologies while maintaining oversight."
— 629 — Department of Transportation l Revoke the special waiver granted to California by the Biden Administration. California has no valid basis under the Clean Air Act to claim an extraordinary or unique air quality impact from carbon dioxide emissions, and EPCA is clear that under no circumstances may a state agency regulate fuel economy in place of DOT. The federal government should therefore exercise its preemptive authority over CARB and take all steps necessary to invalidate any inconsistent fuel economy requirements imposed by CARB, including its ban on sales of internal combustion engines. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has jurisdiction over the inter- state highway system, which is vital for the transportation of goods and people throughout the country. The FHWA, in conjunction with state DOTs, works to ensure the quality and safety of highways and bridges. However, over the course of decades, presidential Administrations and Con- gress have caused the FHWA to go beyond its original mission. The variety of infrastructure projects now eligible for funding through the FHWA include fer- ryboat terminals, hiking trails, bicycle lanes, and local sidewalks. In many cases, such projects should be the sole responsibility of local or state governments, not dependent on FHWA funding. For local projects, federal involvement adds red tape and bureaucratic delays rather than value. The Biden Administration has broadened the FHWA’s scope by emphasizing the priorities of progressive activists instead of pursuing practical goals. These policies include a focus on “equity,” a nebulous concept that in practice means awarding grants to favored identity groups, as well as imposing obligations on states concern- ing carbon dioxide emissions from highway traffic—areas not encompassed within FHWA’s statutory authorities. Furthermore, the Biden Administration’s embrace of the “Vision Zero” approach to safety often means actively seeking congestion for automobiles to reduce speeds. Finally, the Administration has sought to use a “guidance memo” to impose policies not enacted by Congress, most notably to make it harder for growing states to expand highway capacity. Instead, the next Administration should: l Seek to refocus the FHWA on maintaining and improving the highway system. l Remove or reform rules and regulations that hamper state governments. l Reduce the amount of federal involvement in local infrastructure decisions. — 630 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise AVIATION Americans value the ability to travel safely and inexpensively by air. In the United States, the private sector has developed the world’s safest, most effective passenger and cargo air transport networks. Current policies threaten to undo that legacy and to strangle the development of new technologies such as drones and “advanced air mobility,” including small aircraft to serve as air taxis or to conduct quiet vertical flights. Starting in the 1970s, deregulation and increased competition turned air travel from a luxury to an affordable travel option enjoyed by most Americans. The United States has four major airlines, each with roughly 20 percent of the domestic market. They compete with each other over the vast majority of routes. Several smaller carriers provide additional competition and other options for travelers. The current Administration’s policies are self-contradictory. In order to pla- cate specific labor groups, the Biden Administration not only opposes the growth of the major airlines, which would reduce the price of air travel, but also opposes measures—such as low-fare foreign competition and joint ventures of smaller U.S. carriers—that would increase competition. Another problematic area is aviation consumer protection. Congress has autho- rized DOT to prohibit specific “unfair and deceptive practices” in the airline industry after undertaking a hearing process—authority exercised by the Office of Aviation Consumer Protection within the General Counsel’s Office. Beginning with the Obama Administration, this authority has been used to justify broad new regulations—in the name of achieving “fair” competition—that would impose burdensome disclosure mandates and other costly requirements without a sufficient process for gathering supporting evidence. The Trump Administration reformed the process for issuing such “unfair and deceptive practices” rules,9 but the Biden Administration promptly reversed those reforms.10 A new Administration should restore them. In general, the next Administration should focus its efforts on making air travel more affordable and abundant, increasing safety, increasing competition to benefit the flying public, and removing obstacles to the rapid deployment of emerging aviation technologies that hold the promise of improved safety, compe- tition, opportunity, and growth. To achieve a more level playing field and increase options for the traveling public, the next Administration should: l Publicly indicate that a new Administration would support joint- venture efforts by smaller carriers (for example, Jet Blue and Spirit) to achieve scale necessary to reduce costs and compete more effectively with the larger carriers. l Review foreign ownership and control limitations and, if necessary, work with Congress to change existing statutes. Worldwide investors
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.