I&A Mission Reorientation Act of 2026
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]
ID: P000048
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.
May 13, 2026
Introduced
Committee Review
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The I&A Mission Reorientation Act of 2026 is a cleverly crafted exercise in bureaucratic doublespeak. Its primary objective is to "realign" the mission of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to rebrand the I&A's existing failures as "emerging threats" and "proactive approaches" to intelligence collection. It's a classic case of putting lipstick on a pig.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding a new paragraph (24) to section 201(d), which supposedly prioritizes the I&A's operational mission to provide timely and efficient intelligence support to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, as well as private sector entities. Oh, please, this is just a euphemism for "we're going to keep doing what we've been doing, but with more buzzwords." The bill also requires the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to submit a report detailing the implementation of these changes, because, you know, accountability is overrated.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the I&A, DHS, state and local governments, private sector entities, and, of course, the intelligence community. It's a veritable who's who of bureaucratic self-interest. Each player will continue to pursue their own agendas, while paying lip service to the notion of "collaboration" and "two-way information sharing."
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of this bill will be negligible, aside from providing a temporary PR boost to the I&A and DHS. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, a desperate attempt to distract from the underlying issues plaguing our intelligence apparatus. The real implications are that this bill will further entrench the existing power structures, allowing the same incompetent bureaucrats to continue making the same mistakes, while pretending to be proactive.
In conclusion, the I&A Mission Reorientation Act of 2026 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical exercise in obfuscation, designed to confuse and mislead the public, while perpetuating the status quo. As a seasoned diagnostician of political diseases, I prescribe a healthy dose of skepticism and a strong stomach to anyone foolish enough to take this bill at face value. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch our elected officials pretend to be competent.
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
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Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Magaziner, Seth [D-RI-2]
ID: M001223
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Fedorchak, Julie [R-ND-At Large]
ID: F000482
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Pou, Nellie [D-NJ-9]
ID: P000621
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 28 nodes and 32 connections
Total contributions: $132,535
Top Donors - Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]
Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
- +Cybersecurity confidence 0.80
Section 3(a) mentions 'identifying and addressing emerging threats through forward-deployed intelligence capabilities' which could imply an increased need for cybersecurity solutions, benefiting the industry.
- +Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech confidence 0.70
Section 2(a)(2) notes the Office's foundational mission is to 'fuse law enforcement and intelligence information', potentially increasing demand for law enforcement and surveillance technology.
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill's focus on enhancing intelligence sharing, identifying emerging threats, and maintaining robust engagement with stakeholders aligns with Project 2025's objectives of fortifying the US Intelligence Community and defending against foreign enemies. The emphasis on two-way collaboration and information sharing also supports the policy's goal of empowering the right personnel to manage and execute actions within the IC."
— 201 — 7 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Dustin J. Carmack MISSION STATEMENT To arm a future incoming conservative President with the knowledge and tools necessary to fortify the United States Intelligence Community; to defend against all foreign enemies and ensure the security and prosperity of our sovereign nation, devoid of all political motivations; and to maintain constitutional civil liberties. OVERVIEW The United States Intelligence Community (IC) is a vast, intricate bureaucracy spread throughout 18 independent and Cabinet subagencies.1 According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the IC’s mission is “to col- lect, analyze, and deliver foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information to America’s leaders so they can make sound decisions to protect our country.”2 An incoming conservative President needs to use these intelligence authorities aggressively to anticipate and thwart our adversaries, including Russia, Iran, North Korea, and especially China, while maintaining counterterrorism tools that have demonstrated their effectiveness. This means empowering the right personnel to manage, build, and effectively execute actions dispersed throughout the IC to deliver intelligence in an ever-challenging world. It also means removing redun- dancies, mission creep, and IC infighting that could prevent these collection tools from providing objective, apolitical, and empirically backed intelligence to the IC’s premier customer: the President of the United States. Today, as Abraham Lincoln famously said, “The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion…. [W]e must think anew, and act — 202 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise anew.”3 The Intelligence Community maintains an incredible capacity to achieve its mission, but both the IC and the somewhat antiquated infrastructure that sup- ports it often place too high a priority on yesterday’s threats and methodologies instead of trying to identify possible future threats or the methodologies that might be needed to combat them. The IC also often spends too much time over- correcting for past mistakes. The unintended consequences include hesitancy, groupthink, and an overly cautious approach that allows personal incentives to drive preset courses. The IC must be perceived as a depoliticized protector of America’s civil rights and security. The American people are understandably frustrated by the fact that those who abuse power are rarely held to account for their actions. This must change, beginning with leadership that is both committed to ensuring that these agencies faithfully execute the laws of the land under the Constitution and resolved to punish and remove any officials who have abused the public trust. The IC must also start to look forward, not backward. A concerted, disciplined, leadership-led initiative must be undertaken to refocus and shift IC prioritization, funding, and authorities to new and emerging threats, technologies, and methodol- ogies if the United States is to prevail against its global adversaries.4 Unfortunately, America’s major strategic threat is a nation-state peer and possibly ahead of the U.S. in strategic areas. An incoming President must understand that today’s intel- ligence competition could well require analyzing technologies the U.S. does not have or compartmentalizing certain information as was done during the Cold War because of intelligence penetration. A future President’s ability to drive the resources needed to defeat another nation-state giant should therefore be the focus of near-term IC reforms. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (ODNI) The ODNI was established in the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11 and intelli- gence failures leading up to the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq. The office and its functions stem from authorities established under executive orders promulgated by President George W. Bush in 2004, followed by statutory authorizations in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).5 Proponents of an ODNI hoped to establish reforms similar to the Goldwater– Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) reforms of the 1980s, which identified recurring problems within DOD’s command-and-control architecture and led to unified Combatant Commands with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior ranking member of the armed forces and principal military adviser to the President. The ODNI was envisioned as a small but powerful IC coordinating agency led by a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). As the President’s principal intelligence adviser, the DNI would lead and provide oversight of the President’s intelligence authorities while wielding a cudgel—budget and appointment
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill and the Project 2025 policy have weak alignment as they both relate to intelligence and national security, but the bill focuses on the Office of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of Homeland Security, while the policy discusses broader intelligence community reforms and leadership structures. The overlap is tangential, with shared themes of intelligence sharing and support, but distinct in scope and objectives."
— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill and the Project 2025 policy have weak alignment as they are tangentially related through their focus on intelligence and national security, but the bill specifically addresses the reorientation of the I&A's mission within DHS, whereas the policy focuses on broader intelligence community reforms and leadership."
— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort. — 207 — Intelligence Community l Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations. This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved. As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future. l Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync. l Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.