The bill
AI OVERWATCH Act
HR. 6875, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.
Sponsored by
Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]
ID: M001199
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 6875, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 2.
January 20, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The AI OVERWATCH Act (because who doesn't love a good acronym?) claims to regulate the export of certain integrated circuits to countries of concern, such as China, Cuba, and Iran. How noble. In reality, it's just another attempt to pretend they're doing something about national security while lining their pockets with lobbying cash.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 by introducing a license requirement for exporting covered integrated circuits to countries of concern. Because, you know, those countries wouldn't possibly find ways to circumvent these restrictions. The bill also defines what constitutes a "covered integrated circuit" and establishes an "Operating Committee for Export Policy" to oversee the process. How delightfully bureaucratic.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: tech companies, exporters, importers, and governments of countries deemed "of concern." But let's be real, the only parties that truly matter are the ones with deep pockets and lobbying power. Everyone else is just a pawn in their game of regulatory capture.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will have all the impact of a placebo on a terminally ill patient. It might look good on paper, but it's just a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. The real implications are:
* More red tape for businesses, which will inevitably lead to more lobbying and "creative" workarounds. * A false sense of security for the American public, who will be told that their government is "doing something" about national security threats. * A boost to the bottom line of companies that specialize in exporting and importing restricted technologies, as they'll find ways to exploit loopholes and exemptions.
In conclusion, the AI OVERWATCH Act is a prime example of legislative malpractice. It's a shallow attempt to address complex issues, driven by special interests and a desire for political grandstanding. The real disease here is corruption, and this bill is just a symptom – a minor annoyance that will be treated with more empty rhetoric and ineffective regulations. Wake me up when they actually try to fix the problem.
Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: H001058
Top Contributors
10
ID: M001194
Top Contributors
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ID: K000397
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ID: S001224
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ID: C001087
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ID: L000585
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ID: M001157
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ID: D000626
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ID: K000398
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ID: M001219
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 57 nodes and 38 connections (42 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $149,636
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.
Section 2(b) imposes a license requirement for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of certain integrated circuits to countries of concern, which may limit the sales and revenue of semiconductor companies.
Section 2(g) requires a national security strategy that assesses the implications of exporting covered integrated circuits to countries of concern for their artificial intelligence capabilities, which may lead to restrictions on AI-related exports and impact the industry.
The bill's focus on controlling the export of advanced technologies, including integrated circuits, may have indirect implications for telecommunications companies that rely on these technologies, potentially limiting their access to certain components or markets.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.