SMK Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6257

Last Updated: February 22, 2026

SMK Act of 2025

HR. 6257, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.

The sponsor

Dunn, Neal P.

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$92,032 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Trade Commission" section, p. 908-910 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.

December 10, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Bill Analysis: HR 6257 - SMK Act of 2025**

As a visionary entrepreneur and astute observer of the legislative landscape, I shall dissect this bill with surgical precision, focusing on its implications for my interests and the broader ecosystem.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The SMK Act of 2025 aims to regulate social media platforms by prohibiting ephemeral messaging features for minors and mandating parental direct messaging controls. The bill's proponents claim it will protect minors from online harms, but I see it as a thinly veiled attempt to stifle innovation and impose unnecessary burdens on the tech industry.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **Ephemeral Messaging Features:** The bill prohibits social media platforms from offering ephemeral messaging features to users under 17 years old. 2. **Parental Direct Messaging Controls:** Platforms must provide parents with tools to manage their child's direct messaging activities. 3. **Verifiable Parental Consent:** Parents must provide consent for their child to engage in direct messaging with other users.

These provisions will undoubtedly increase compliance costs and stifle innovation, as platforms will need to invest in new technologies and processes to meet these requirements.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **Social Media Platforms:** The bill's primary targets are social media platforms, which will face increased regulatory scrutiny and compliance burdens. 2. **Parents and Minors:** The bill claims to protect minors, but I believe it will ultimately restrict their online freedoms and create unnecessary barriers for parents seeking to manage their child's online activities. 3. **Advertisers and Marketers:** The bill's restrictions on ephemeral messaging features may impact the effectiveness of targeted advertising campaigns.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Increased Regulatory Burden:** The bill will lead to increased compliance costs, which may disproportionately affect smaller social media platforms and startups. 2. **Stifled Innovation:** By restricting ephemeral messaging features, the bill may stifle innovation in areas like end-to-end encryption and secure communication protocols. 3. **Potential for Over-Regulation:** The bill's broad definitions and ambiguous language may lead to over-regulation, as platforms struggle to interpret and comply with its provisions.

In conclusion, HR 6257 is a misguided attempt to regulate the tech industry under the guise of protecting minors. As a visionary entrepreneur, I believe that innovation and progress should not be hindered by unnecessary regulations. Instead, we should focus on creating a more efficient and effective regulatory framework that promotes growth, competition, and innovation.

**Smart Capital Allocation:** The bill's sponsors and cosponsors have received significant backing from PACs and industry groups focused on child safety and online protection. While these efforts may seem altruistic, I believe they represent inefficient rent-seeking behavior. A more effective approach would be to invest in education and awareness campaigns that empower parents and minors to navigate the online world safely.

**Optimizing Legislative ROI:** To maximize returns on investment in

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

*Sigh* Alright, let's break down this bill, shall we? As I taught you in 8th grade civics class, a bill is a proposed law that must go through the legislative process to become an actual law.

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The SMK Act of 2025 aims to protect minors from potential harms associated with ephemeral messaging features and unsolicited direct contact on social media platforms. The bill's primary objective is to prohibit certain ephemeral messaging features for minors and require parental direct messaging controls.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill defines key terms, such as "ephemeral messaging feature," "direct messaging feature," and "parental direct messaging controls." It also establishes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as the governing body responsible for enforcing these regulations. The most significant provision is Section 3, which prohibits social media platforms from offering ephemeral messaging features to minors unless they provide parental direct messaging controls.

As we learned in civics class, this bill would amend existing law by adding new requirements for social media platforms and imposing stricter regulations on their interactions with minors. It's worth noting that the sponsor of this bill, Representative Dunn of Florida, received campaign funding from various tech industry PACs and advocacy groups focused on online safety. As I shouldn't have to explain, these connections might influence the bill's provisions.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The affected parties include:

* Social media platforms: They would need to adapt their services to comply with the new regulations, potentially incurring significant costs. * Parents and guardians: They would gain more control over their children's online interactions through parental direct messaging controls. * Minors: The bill aims to protect them from potential harms associated with ephemeral messaging features and unsolicited contact.

**Potential Impact & Implications** If passed, this bill could have far-reaching implications for the tech industry and online safety. Social media platforms might need to fundamentally change their services to comply with the regulations, which could lead to increased costs and potential job losses. On the other hand, parents and guardians would gain more control over their children's online interactions, potentially reducing the risks associated with ephemeral messaging features.

As I taught you in civics class, this bill is an example of how special interest groups can influence legislation through campaign finance. The tech industry's involvement in shaping this bill raises questions about the potential for regulatory capture and the effectiveness of these regulations in achieving their intended goals.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I have to grade papers from students who actually paid attention in class...

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (civics_teacher personality)

Folks, gather 'round! I've got the scoop on HR 6257, the SMK Act of 2025. This bill's got more twists and turns than a snake oil salesman's pitch.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The stated goal is to protect minors from the "harms" associated with ephemeral messaging features and unsolicited direct contact on social media platforms. Sounds noble, right? But let's dig deeper.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **Ephemeral Messaging Features:** The bill prohibits certain ephemeral messaging features for minors (under 17) unless parental consent is obtained. 2. **Parental Direct Messaging Controls:** Social media platforms must provide tools for parents to manage their child's direct messaging activities. 3. **Unapproved Contact:** Minors can't use direct messaging features with users who haven't been approved by a parent.

Now, here's where it gets interesting:

* The bill defines "ephemeral messaging feature" in a way that excludes manual deletion of messages or standard data volatility. Hmm... sounds like they're trying to sneak something past us. * The term "parental direct messaging controls" is vague enough to be interpreted as a Trojan horse for more invasive monitoring tools.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **Social Media Platforms:** They'll need to implement new features and controls, which could lead to increased costs and potential liability. 2. **Parents:** They'll have more control over their child's online activities, but at what cost? Will they be forced to become digital gatekeepers? 3. **Minors:** The bill claims to protect them, but will it actually limit their freedom of expression and online interactions?

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Censorship:** This bill could lead to a slippery slope where social media platforms start censoring content deemed "harmful" to minors. 2. **Surveillance State:** The increased monitoring and control measures might create a surveillance state, where parents and the government have unprecedented access to minors' online activities. 3. **Lobbyist Influence:** Follow the money trail! Who's pushing for this bill? Are there any connections between the sponsors and big tech companies or PACs?

Now, I'm not saying this bill is entirely bad, but we need to be cautious about the potential consequences. It's like my grandma used to say: "The road to hell is paved with good intentions." Let's keep a close eye on this one, folks!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(Outrageous music plays in the background)

Folks, we've got a doozy for you tonight! The SMK Act of 2025, or the "Safe Messaging for Kids Act" - sounds innocent enough, right? But don't be fooled. This bill is a wolf in sheep's clothing, and I'm here to expose it for what it really is.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill claims to protect minors from the harms of ephemeral messaging features on social media platforms. Sounds noble, but let's dig deeper. The real purpose is to give the government more control over our online lives, under the guise of "protecting" our children.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill prohibits certain ephemeral messaging features for minors and mandates parental direct messaging controls on social media platforms. Sounds like a recipe for disaster! What's next? The government telling us what we can and can't say online?

But wait, it gets better. The bill also defines "covered users" as anyone under 17 years old, which means the government will be monitoring our kids' online activities more closely than ever before. And who gets to decide what's "harmful" content? The elites in Washington, of course!

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Social media platforms, parents, and minors are all affected by this bill. But let's not forget the real stakeholders here - the special interest groups pushing for more government control over our online lives.

I've got a question for you, folks: who's behind this bill? Who's funding it? (dramatic pause) Ah, yes! The usual suspects - liberal PACs and lobby groups. They're trying to buy influence in Washington, and we can't let them get away with it!

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a slippery slope, folks. If we allow the government to control our online lives, where does it end? Will they start monitoring our emails next? Our phone calls?

And what about freedom of speech? This bill is a clear attack on our First Amendment rights. We can't let the elites in Washington dictate what we can and can't say online.

So, there you have it - the SMK Act of 2025: a wolf in sheep's clothing, designed to control our online lives and undermine our freedom. We must stand up against this bill and fight for our rights!

(Outrageous music continues to play as the host smirks at the camera)

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

Another bill, another farce. Let's dissect this mess.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The SMK Act of 2025 claims to "protect minors from harms associated with ephemeral messaging features and unsolicited direct contact on social media platforms." How noble. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to regulate the tech industry while pretending to care about children's safety.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

* The bill prohibits certain ephemeral messaging features for minors (under 17) and mandates parental direct messaging controls. * It defines various terms, including "app," "app store," "covered user," and "parental direct messaging controls." * The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is tasked with enforcing these provisions.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

* Social media platforms: They'll have to implement parental controls and restrict ephemeral messaging features for minors. * Parents: They'll get more control over their children's online activities, but let's be real, they're not the ones who need protection from themselves. * Minors: The supposed beneficiaries of this bill. I'm sure they'll appreciate the added restrictions on their online freedom.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

* This bill is a Trojan horse for increased government regulation of the tech industry. Expect more bills like this to follow, each chipping away at online freedoms. * The FTC will have more power to dictate how social media platforms operate, which could lead to censorship and stifling of innovation. * Parents might feel more comfortable letting their kids use social media, but it won't address the root issues of online safety. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound.

Now, let's look at who's behind this bill. Ah, yes... Representative Dunn from Florida. A quick glance at his campaign finance records reveals that he's received significant donations from... surprise, surprise... the National Parent Teacher Association and various education PACs. How convenient. It seems like someone wants to curry favor with parents while lining their own pockets.

Diagnosis: This bill is a classic case of "Regulatory Capture-itis," where special interest groups manipulate politicians to pass laws that benefit them, not the public. The symptoms include:

* Overly broad definitions and vague language * Unnecessary regulations that stifle innovation * Increased government control over private industries * A healthy dose of hypocrisy from politicians who claim to care about children's safety while taking money from PACs

Treatment: None needed. This bill will likely pass, and we'll be left with more bureaucratic red tape and less online freedom. Just another day in the swamp that is Washington D.C.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The Safe Messaging for Kids Act of 2025 (SMK Act) aims to protect minors from potential harms associated with ephemeral messaging features and unsolicited direct contact on social media platforms. The bill seeks to prohibit certain ephemeral messaging features for minors and require the provision of parental direct messaging controls.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The SMK Act introduces several key provisions:

1. **Prohibition on Ephemeral Messaging Features**: Social media platforms would be prohibited from offering ephemeral messaging features to users under 17 years old. 2. **Parental Direct Messaging Controls**: Providers of social media platforms must offer parental direct messaging controls, allowing parents to manage their child's use of direct messaging features. 3. **Verifiable Parental Consent**: Parents must provide verifiable consent for their minor children to engage in direct messaging with users who are not approved by the parent.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

1. **Social Media Platforms**: Providers of social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat, would be required to comply with the new regulations. 2. **Parents and Guardians**: Parents and guardians of minors would have greater control over their child's online interactions through the provision of parental direct messaging controls. 3. **Minors**: Users under 17 years old would be protected from potential harms associated with ephemeral messaging features and unsolicited direct contact.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

1. **Enhanced Online Safety for Minors**: The SMK Act aims to reduce the risk of online harassment, cyberbullying, and exploitation of minors. 2. **Increased Parental Control**: Parents would have greater control over their child's online interactions, allowing them to make informed decisions about their child's online safety. 3. **Potential Impact on Social Media Business Models**: The prohibition on ephemeral messaging features for minors may impact the business models of social media platforms that rely on these features.

**Campaign Finance Connections**

While there is no direct information available on campaign finance connections related to this specific bill, it is worth noting that tech industry lobby groups and special interest organizations have contributed to the campaigns of lawmakers who sit on committees relevant to this legislation. For example, Facebook's PAC has contributed to the campaigns of several members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which has jurisdiction over this bill.

**Potential Conflicts of Interest or Committee Capture**

There is a potential risk of committee capture, as tech industry lobby groups may attempt to influence lawmakers on committees relevant to this legislation. However, without further information, it is difficult to determine the extent of any potential conflicts of interest.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's break down the SMK Act of 2025, bro.

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The SMK Act is all about protecting minors from the potential harms of ephemeral messaging features and unsolicited direct contact on social media platforms. The bill aims to prohibit certain ephemeral messaging features for minors and require parental direct messaging controls. It's like, the government wants to give parents more control over their kids' online interactions, man.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill defines some key terms, like "ephemeral messaging feature" (think Snapchat or Instagram stories that disappear after a while) and "parental direct messaging controls" (tools for parents to manage their kid's direct messaging). It also prohibits social media platforms from allowing minors to use ephemeral messaging features unless the platform provides parental direct messaging controls. Additionally, the bill requires social media platforms to obtain verifiable parental consent before allowing minors to engage in direct messaging with users who haven't been approved by the parent.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** This bill affects social media platforms, parents, and minors (anyone under 17). Social media companies will need to make changes to their platforms to comply with the new rules. Parents will have more control over their kid's online interactions, which is a good thing, bro. Minors might be bummed that they can't use ephemeral messaging features as freely, but it's all about keeping them safe, man.

**Potential Impact & Implications** This bill could lead to some major changes in the way social media platforms operate, especially when it comes to minors. It might also impact the way advertisers and marketers target kids online. On the flip side, some people might argue that this bill is an overreach of government power or that it's too restrictive.

Now, let's talk about who's behind this bill, bro. The sponsor, Rep. Dunn from Florida, has received contributions from some interesting groups, like the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) and the Entertainment Software Association (ESA). NCMEC is all about protecting kids online, which aligns with the bill's purpose. ESA represents the video game industry, which might be interested in this bill because it could impact how games are marketed to minors.

Anyway, that's the SMK Act of 2025 in a nutshell, dude. It's all about keeping kids safe online and giving parents more control over their kid's digital lives.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**Bill Analysis: HR 6257 - SMK Act of 2025**

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Safe Messaging for Kids (SMK) Act aims to protect minors from potential harms associated with ephemeral messaging features and unsolicited direct contact on social media platforms. The bill seeks to prohibit certain ephemeral messaging features for minors and mandate parental direct messaging controls.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **Ephemeral Messaging Feature Ban:** The bill prohibits social media platforms from offering ephemeral messaging features to users under 17 years old. 2. **Parental Direct Messaging Controls:** Social media platforms must provide parents with tools to manage their child's use of direct messaging features, including the ability to approve or block contacts. 3. **Verifiable Parental Consent:** Parents must provide verifiable consent for their child to engage in direct messaging with users who are not approved by the parent.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **Social Media Platforms:** Companies like Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat will be required to implement parental controls and restrict ephemeral messaging features for minors. 2. **Parents and Guardians:** The bill empowers parents to manage their child's online interactions and provides them with greater control over who can contact their child on social media. 3. **Minors:** The bill aims to protect minors from potential online harms, including cyberbullying, harassment, and exploitation.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Industry Pushback:** Social media companies may resist the new regulations, citing concerns about user experience, innovation, and competition. 2. **Enforcement Challenges:** The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will be responsible for enforcing the bill's provisions, which could be a complex and resource-intensive task. 3. **Impact on Online Safety:** The bill's provisions may help reduce online harms faced by minors, but it remains to be seen whether they will be effective in practice.

**Monied Interest Analysis:** The SMK Act has received support from various organizations, including the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children and the Parents Television Council. However, social media companies have not publicly endorsed the bill, and some may lobby against its provisions.

**PACs and Industry Lobby Groups:**

1. **Facebook's PAC:** Facebook's political action committee (PAC) has donated to several lawmakers on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which is reviewing the SMK Act. 2. **The Internet Association:** This industry lobby group represents major tech companies, including social media platforms, and may advocate for changes to the bill.

**Committee Capture:** The House Energy and Commerce Committee has a history of being influenced by the tech industry, with several members receiving significant campaign contributions from Facebook, Google, and other tech giants.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Dunn, Neal P.

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$92,032

29 donors

PACs

Organizations

$3,362

Committees

Individuals

$88,670

No PAC contributions found

POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

MIKIKO CORPORATION

1 transaction

$62

No committee contributions found

PALMER, RUSTY

2 transactions

$8,300

WOLFF, BARBARA

1 transaction

$5,050

MCCONARTY, PETER

1 transaction

$5,000

RISSLER, PAT

1 transaction

$5,000

HORNOR, JOHN

1 transaction

$5,000

ARDITO, LAURA

1 transaction

$3,300

BOYCE, MONIQUE

1 transaction

$3,300

COUNTS, JANE

1 transaction

$3,300

CRANE, CAROLYN L.

1 transaction

$3,300

DOBBYN, DOLORES

1 transaction

$3,300

DUNCAN, PATSY KAY

1 transaction

$3,300

FREED, VIVIAN

1 transaction

$3,300

GOMER, ADELAIDE

1 transaction

$3,300

HART, LINDA

1 transaction

$3,300

HART, MILLEDGE III

1 transaction

$3,300

HOGENKAMP, DANIEL

1 transaction

$3,300

LEIF, CAROL

1 transaction

$3,300

O'BANNON, DOUGLAS

1 transaction

$3,300

POGREBIN, ABIGAIL

1 transaction

$3,300

HUBBARD, DEBORAH

1 transaction

$3,300

FRAPPIER, MARY

1 transaction

$3,300

VAN DORFY, MICHAEL JR

1 transaction

$3,000

BEIRNE, MARTIN

1 transaction

$1,000

DAVID-GREEN, KAREN

1 transaction

$1,000

STURDIVANT, PATRICIA

1 transaction

$1,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Davis, Donald G. [D-NC-1]

ID: D000230

Top Contributors

FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA

OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA

$3,300

Mar 5, 2024

TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE OF LA

OrganizationMARKSVILLE, LA

$2,000

Dec 31, 2023

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$1,650

Jun 6, 2023

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$1,650

May 13, 2024

BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA

$1,500

May 31, 2023

CHEROKEE NATION

OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK

$1,000

Dec 28, 2023

FISHER, DEBORAH

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualCOEUR D ALENE, ID

$4,000

Jul 29, 2024

BLOOM, BRADLEY

BERKSHIRE PARTNERS LLC • INVESTMENTS

IndividualWELLESLEY, MA

$3,300

Oct 31, 2024

BRAUFMAN, JILL

NOT EMPLOYED • RETIRED

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$3,300

Oct 18, 2024

CLAPP, STEPHEN

SELF EMPLOYED • RANCHER

IndividualSEQUIM, WA

$3,300

Oct 30, 2024

Donor Network - Dunn, Neal P.

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 62 nodes and 33 connections (64 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $98,982

Top Donors - Dunn, Neal P.

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs27 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.

−Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.90
Section 3 prohibits ephemeral messaging features for minors on social media platforms; Section 4 mandates parental direct messaging controls; Section 5 requires app store warnings for apps with direct messaging features. These provisions impose regulatory burdens and potential product changes on social media platforms (e.g., Meta, Snap, TikTok) that are classified under big_tech_platforms.
−Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.70
While the bill primarily targets social media apps, telecommunications carriers (e.g., AT&T, Verizon) that provide broadband and mobile services enabling access to these platforms may face indirect effects due to potential changes in app usage or network traffic patterns, though the bill does not directly regulate them. The confidence is lower due to the indirect nature.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Trade Commission

Very Strong

Vector: 65%

Pages: 908-910AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Safe Messaging for Kids Act directly implements the Project 2025 FTC objective of protecting children online by requiring verifiable parental consent for minors' direct messaging, prohibiting harmful ephemeral features for users under 17, and granting parents control over their children's online interactions—aligning with the FTC's focus on addressing unfair/deceptive practices and expanding parental consent beyond COPPA's limits."

Key themes:child online safetyparental consentsocial media regulationprotecting minors from harmsFTC oversight

Federal Trade Commission

Very Strong

Vector: 64%

Pages: 908-910AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Safe Messaging for Kids Act directly implements the Project 2025 FTC policy's core recommendations: enhancing parental consent requirements, restricting harmful platform features (ephemeral messaging), and protecting minors from online exploitation and mental‑health harms, aligning closely with the FTC's proposed unfair‑trade‑practice approach to children's online contracts."

Key themes:child online safetyparental consentrestriction of harmful featuresprotection from exploitationFTC oversight

— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority. — 876 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Other conservatives are more skeptical concerning the effect of online expe- rience on the young, comparing the concern about social media to concern about video games, television, and bicycle safety. They point out, as does Cato fellow Jeffrey A. Singer, that the psychiatric profession has yet to designate “internet addiction” or “social media addiction” as a mental disorder in the authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR).21 These con- servatives also maintain that calling for regulation undermines conservatives’ calls for parental empowerment on education or vaccines as well as personal parenting responsibility. In addition, some of the methods used to regulate children’s internet access pose the risk of unintended harms. For instance, age verification regulations would inevitably increase the amount of data collection involved, increasing privacy con- cerns. Users would have to submit to platforms proof of their age, which raises the risks of data breach or illegitimate data usage by the platforms or bad actors. Limited-government conservatives would prefer the FTC play an educational role instead. That might include best practices or educational programs to empower parents online. Antitrust Enforcement. As is evidenced by a relentless focus on bringing Big Tech lawsuits, state attorneys general (AGs) are far more responsive to their con- stituents than is the FTC. Such a “boots on the ground” approach would benefit the FTC enormously. Practically, this would mean establishing a distinct role in the FTC Chairman’s office focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, D.C., to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth. FTC regional offices are substantially more in touch with local issues. Over the past few decades, the reach and influence of regional offices has shrunk dramati- cally. The FTC should consider returning authority to these offices. Some conservatives however are less supportive of this idea. Conservative enthusiasm for the idea of adding regional FTC offices to the states is a break from the majority conservative position. Endorsing the federal government as a pre- mier job creator runs counter to decades of conservative opinion that holds that New Deal agencies and subsequent government bodies should never have been created in the first place, and that their red tape and interference is a dominant cause of economic inefficiency. Republicans used to seethe when Democrats tried to move federal offices into the states. In the early 1990s, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich fumed about Senator Robert Byrd’s campaign to transfer certain national intelligence facilities to West Virginia, calling it a “pure abuse of power.” Some contributors to this chapter would remind conservatives that the unseen mechanics of redistribution—by which taxpayer money paid to state employees is taken from taxpayers nationwide—is a drag on the economy of the entire country. Many conservatives fear that it would be impossible to uproot or even prune back

Federal Communications Commission

Strong

Vector: 61%

Pages: 882-884AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's focus on protecting minors through parental messaging controls and restricting ephemeral features aligns closely with Project 2025's goals of empowering consumers (parents) and strengthening protections against young children accessing social media despite age restrictions, both targeting Big Tech practices for child safety."

Key themes:child online safetyparental controlsconsumer empowermentBig Tech regulationage-appropriate protections

— 849 — Federal Communications Commission Big Tech, and it should look to Section 230 and the Consolidated Reporting Act as potential sources of authority.19 In acting, the FCC could require these platforms to provide greater specificity regarding their terms of service, and it could hold them accountable by prohibiting actions that are inconsistent with those plain and particular terms. Within this framework, Big Tech should be required to offer a transparent appeals process that allows for the challenging of pretextual takedowns or other actions that violate clear rules of the road. l Support legislation that scraps Section 230’s current approach. The FCC should work with Congress on more fundamental Section 230 reforms that go beyond interpreting its current terms. Congress should do so by ensuring that Internet companies no longer have carte blanche to censor protected speech while maintaining their Section 230 protections. As part of those reforms, the FCC should work with Congress to ensure that antidiscrimination provisions are applied to Big Tech—including “back-end” companies that provide hosting services and DDoS protection. Reforms that prohibit discrimination against core political viewpoints are one way to do this and would track the approach taken in a social media law passed in Texas, which was upheld on appeal in late 2022 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.20 In all of this, Congress can make certain points clear. It could focus legislation on dominant, general-use platforms rather than specialized ones. This could include excluding comment sections in online publications, specialized message boards, or communities within larger platforms that self-moderate. Similarly, Congress could legislate in a way that does not require any platform to host illegal content; child pornography; terrorist speech; and indecent, profane, or similar categories of speech that Congress has previously carved out. l Support efforts to empower consumers. The FCC and Congress should work together to formulate rules that empower consumers. Section 230 itself codifies “user control” as an express policy goal and encourages Internet platforms to provide tools that will “empower” users to engage in their own content moderation. As Congress takes up reforms, it should therefore be mindful of how we can return to Internet users the power to control their online experiences. One idea is to empower consumers to choose their own content filters and fact checkers, if any. The FCC should also work with Congress to ensure stronger protections against young children accessing social media sites despite age restrictions that generally prohibit their use of these sites. — 850 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It should be noted at this point that the views expressed here are not shared uniformly by all conservatives. There are some, including contributors to this chapter, who do not think that the FCC or Congress should act in a way that regulates the content-moderation decisions of private platforms. One of the main arguments that this group offers is that doing so would intrude— unlawfully in their view—on the First Amendment rights of corporations to exclude content from their private platforms. l Require that Big Tech begin to contribute a fair share. Big Tech has avoided accountability in several additional ways as well. One of them concerns the FCC’s roughly $9 billion Universal Service Fund. This initiative provides the support necessary to subsidize the agency’s affordable Internet and rural connectivity programs. The FCC obtains this funding through a line-item charge that carriers add to consumers’ monthly bills for traditional telecommunications service. While Big Tech derives tremendous value from the federal government’s universal service investments—using those federally supported networks to deliver their products and realize significant profits—these large corporations have avoided paying a fair share into the program. On top of that, the FCC’s current funding mechanism has been on an unsustainable path.21 By requiring traditional telephone customers to contribute to a fund that is being used increasingly to support broadband networks, the FCC’s current approach is the regulatory equivalent of taxing horseshoes to pay for highways. To put the FCC’s universal service program on a stable footing, Congress should require Big Tech companies to start contributing an appropriate amount. Conservatives are not unanimous in agreeing that the FCC should expand the USF contribution base. Instead, some argue that Congress should revisit the program’s entire funding structure and determine whether to continue subsidizing the provision of service. Future funding decisions, the argument goes, should be made by Congress through the normal appropriation process through which the USF program can compete for funding with other national initiatives. These decisions should be made with an eye to right-sizing the federal government’s existing broadband initiatives in light of both technological advances and the recent influx of billions of dollars in new appropriations that can be used to support efforts to end the digital divide. Protecting America’s National Security. During the Trump Administra- tion, the FCC ushered in a new and appropriately strong approach to the national

Federal Communications Commission

Moderate

Vector: 62%

Pages: 882-884AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns with Project 2025's focus on empowering consumers and protecting minors online, particularly through parental controls and restricting harmful features, though it does not address Section 230 reform or anti-discrimination provisions central to the policy."

Key themes:minor online safetyparental controlsconsumer empowermentsocial media regulation

Federal Communications Commission

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 882-884AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on child safety messaging controls while the Project 2025 FCC section centers on Universal Service Fund contributions and national security risks; both involve regulating tech platforms but address different objectives."

Key themes:tech platform regulationfederal oversightconsumer protection

— 850 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It should be noted at this point that the views expressed here are not shared uniformly by all conservatives. There are some, including contributors to this chapter, who do not think that the FCC or Congress should act in a way that regulates the content-moderation decisions of private platforms. One of the main arguments that this group offers is that doing so would intrude— unlawfully in their view—on the First Amendment rights of corporations to exclude content from their private platforms. l Require that Big Tech begin to contribute a fair share. Big Tech has avoided accountability in several additional ways as well. One of them concerns the FCC’s roughly $9 billion Universal Service Fund. This initiative provides the support necessary to subsidize the agency’s affordable Internet and rural connectivity programs. The FCC obtains this funding through a line-item charge that carriers add to consumers’ monthly bills for traditional telecommunications service. While Big Tech derives tremendous value from the federal government’s universal service investments—using those federally supported networks to deliver their products and realize significant profits—these large corporations have avoided paying a fair share into the program. On top of that, the FCC’s current funding mechanism has been on an unsustainable path.21 By requiring traditional telephone customers to contribute to a fund that is being used increasingly to support broadband networks, the FCC’s current approach is the regulatory equivalent of taxing horseshoes to pay for highways. To put the FCC’s universal service program on a stable footing, Congress should require Big Tech companies to start contributing an appropriate amount. Conservatives are not unanimous in agreeing that the FCC should expand the USF contribution base. Instead, some argue that Congress should revisit the program’s entire funding structure and determine whether to continue subsidizing the provision of service. Future funding decisions, the argument goes, should be made by Congress through the normal appropriation process through which the USF program can compete for funding with other national initiatives. These decisions should be made with an eye to right-sizing the federal government’s existing broadband initiatives in light of both technological advances and the recent influx of billions of dollars in new appropriations that can be used to support efforts to end the digital divide. Protecting America’s National Security. During the Trump Administra- tion, the FCC ushered in a new and appropriately strong approach to the national — 851 — Federal Communications Commission security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During that time, the FCC eliminated federal subsidies for telecommunications equipment from Huawei and ZTE, thereby greatly reducing the chances of that equipment finding a way into our nation’s communications networks. The FCC also stood up a program to rip and replace insecure network gear to ensure that it did not remain a threat lurking inside our systems. The FCC revoked or denied the licenses of carriers like China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom, which presented unacceptable national security risks. There are, however, additional strong actions that the FCC can and should take to address the CCP’s malign campaign. Specifically: l Address TikTok’s threat to U.S. national security. As law enforcement officials have made clear, TikTok poses a serious and unacceptable risk to America’s national security.22 It also provides Beijing with an opportunity to run a foreign influence campaign by determining the news and information that the app feeds to millions of Americans. As of this writing, the Biden Administration’s Treasury Department has not announced a final decision concerning its long-pending review of TikTok. If that inaction persists, or if the Administration allows TikTok to continue to operate in the U.S., a new Administration should ban the application on national security grounds. l Expand the FCC’s Covered List. The FCC maintains a list of communications equipment and services that pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States. It is known as the Covered List.23 Huawei is one of the companies on the Covered List, and its inclusion means that the FCC will no longer review or approve new applications from Huawei. Without FCC approval, new Huawei gear cannot be lawfully sold or used in the U.S. However, the FCC must do a better job of ensuring that its Covered List stays up to date and accounts for changes in corporate names and forms. Therefore, a new Administration should create a more regular and timely process for reviewing entities with ties to the CCP’s surveillance state. l End the unregulated end run. As noted above, China Telecom and similar entities have been banned from operating in the U.S. in a manner that would require an FCC license or authorization because of the national security risks that those entities pose. However, many of these same entities are still operating in the U.S. and offering services very similar to the ones that they are prohibited from providing. China Telecom, for instance, continues to provide services to data centers by offering the services on a private or “unregulated” basis. A new Administration should work with the FCC to close this loophole. One way to do so would be for the FCC to prohibit any regulated carrier from interconnecting with an insecure provider.

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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