The bill
BRAVE Burma Act
HR. 3190, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]
ID: H001058
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 3190, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
28 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Small Business Administration" section, p. 786-788 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
February 10, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. The BRAVE Burma Act (HR 3190) - because nothing says "brave" like a bill that's been watered down to appease every special interest group with a stake in the game.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The stated purpose of this bill is to amend the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2022, because apparently, the original law wasn't rigorous enough. The real objective, however, is to give the appearance of doing something about human rights abuses in Burma while actually accomplishing very little.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill extends the sunset clause (because who needs accountability when you can just kick the can down the road?) and requires the President to make a determination about imposing sanctions on certain Burmese individuals. Oh, and it also instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to use their voice and vote at the International Monetary Fund to limit Burma's shareholding benefits if they're still under military rule. Wow, I bet the generals in Burma are shaking in their boots.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: human rights groups who will pretend this bill is a victory, Burmese dissidents who will be disappointed but not surprised, and the State Administration Council of Burma, which will continue to do whatever it wants because no one is actually going to hold them accountable.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will have all the impact of a feather duster on a grease stain. It's a symbolic gesture designed to placate the conscience of Congress while allowing business as usual to continue. The real implications are that this bill will be used as a talking point by politicians who want to appear tough on human rights, but in reality, it's just another example of legislative cowardice.
Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Legislative Lip Service Syndrome" (LLSS), characterized by a complete disconnect between the stated goals and actual outcomes. Symptoms include empty rhetoric, vague language, and a healthy dose of bureaucratic doublespeak. Treatment: a strong dose of skepticism and a healthy disregard for the politicians peddling this nonsense.
In short, the BRAVE Burma Act is a joke, and anyone who thinks it will actually make a difference in Burma's human rights situation needs to take a long, hard look at their own gullibility.
Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 64 nodes and 43 connections (47 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $375,500
Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped, 1 harmed.
Section 2 amends reporting requirements under the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, which is defense-related legislation, extending sanctions assessments and reporting for 7 years, indicating ongoing defense-related oversight and potential contracting opportunities.
Section 2(e)(1)(C) requires determination of sanctions on foreign persons operating in the jet fuel sector of Burma, including importation, exportation, transport, storage, or trade of jet fuel, which directly affects energy infrastructure firms involved in jet fuel logistics and supply chains.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The BRAVE Burma Act focuses on imposing sanctions and IMF shareholding limits on Burma, whereas the Project 2025 SBA section deals with domestic COVID-19 loan fraud cleanup, disaster loan administration, and religious entity eligibility; there is no substantive policy overlap."
— 753 — Small Business Administration COVID-19 Lending Program Accountability and Cleanup. A major immediate priority for the next Administration should be a final accounting and accelerated cleanup of fraudulent COVID-19 loan and grant activity. As noted by the SBA IG, “managing COVID-19 stimulus lending is the greatest overall challenge facing SBA, and it may likely continue to be for many years as the agency grapples with fraud in the programs….”40 The next Administration should: l Consider bringing in private-sector support and expertise to close out these programs. Forgiveness and fraud must be dealt with as swiftly as possible, and law enforcement officials must pursue fraud vigorously. Entities receiving PPP loans that did not meet eligibility for forgiveness must be required to pay back the money. For example, under the CARES Act,41 PPP loan applicants generally were eligible only if, together with all their affiliates, they had no more than 500 employees. Numerous Planned Parenthood affiliates self-certified eligibility for PPP loans during the initial wave of loans that were governed by the CARES Act’s size requirement. Many Senators and Representatives asserted that these Planned Parenthood organizations were ineligible because— considered together with their affiliates—they exceeded the maximum eligible size.42 The Trump Administration SBA notified several Planned Parenthood PPP recipients of its preliminary determination of their ineligibility and of SBA’s authority to take various actions against applicants that falsely certified their eligibility.43 To date, despite continued oversight attempts by Members of Congress,44 the SBA has taken no action on the Planned Parenthood loans other than to forgive them, and in 2021, it approved new PPP loans to Planned Parenthood affiliates.45 l Cooperate with ongoing congressional oversight efforts and determine whether SBA has authority to reverse the forgiveness decisions. If it does have that authority, the SBA should reverse the forgiveness decisions for the subject loans, reiterate its preliminary determinations of ineligibility, investigate the matter more thoroughly, and take all appropriate action when its investigation concludes. Regardless of whether it reverses its forgiveness, if its investigation uncovers evidence that Planned Parenthood affiliates or any other loan recipients knowingly misrepresented their eligibility in their applications, the SBA should make appropriate referrals to the Department of Justice. — 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55
AI Analysis:
"The BRAVE Burma Act focuses on sanctions, IMF shareholding limits, and foreign policy toward Burma, while the Project 2025 SBA section addresses disaster loans, religious eligibility, and SBIR/STTR programs—there is no substantive thematic overlap."
— 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55 — 755 — Small Business Administration The SBA uses the same “Religious Eligibility Worksheet,” SBA Form 1971, to make eligibility determinations for all affected programs, including the Business Loan Programs. Thus, the SBA continues to act as though the unconstitutional regulation were still in place, and there is no Establishment Clause basis for doing so. The next Administration should immediately: l Notify Congress under 28 U.S. Code § 530D that it will not enforce these unconstitutional regulations. l Take down SBA Form 1971. l Finalize the Trump Administration’s proposed rule or publish its own updated proposed rule to remove the unconstitutional regulations. Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs. The SBA “coordinates and monitors the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) pro- grams for all federal agencies with extramural budgets for research or research and development (R/R&D) in excess of the expenditures established in sections 9(f) and 9(n) of the Small Business Act.”56 The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 extended these programs from September 30, 2022, through September 30, 2025.57 SBIR requires that 3.2 percent of spending by agencies with extramural R&D budgets of $100 million or more must be directed to small businesses. STTR allo- cates 0.45 percent of federal research spending to small firms.58 Research has shown that this small portion of federal R&D spending is disproportionately effective.59 The SBIR program has consistently demonstrated its ability to fund advanced technologies through to private-market viability and invests more in America’s heartland than venture capital invests.60 SBIR and STTR have overcome the tendency of federal contracting officers to deal only with large firms that are familiar to them and have the expertise and lobbying clout to navigate the federal procurement process. The next Adminis- tration should: l Continue the SBIR and SBTT programs as they successfully fund the next wave of technological innovation to compete with Big Tech. l Urge Congress to expand the amount that other agencies are required to set aside from their general R&D budgets for the SBIR program. l Ensure the enactment of stricter rules requiring that SBIR funds must be expended on capital investments in the United States.
AI Analysis:
"The BRAVE Burma Act focuses on foreign sanctions and IMF shareholding limitations for Burma, which is unrelated to the Project 2025 Small Business Administration objectives of modernizing SBA operations, strengthening the Office of Advocacy, and improving regulatory flexibility for small businesses."
— 751 — Small Business Administration implement relevant initiatives to reach small businesses. Programs would be nonduplicative and implemented on a first-come, first-served basis. l A modern, revamped, and streamlined SBA that better utilizes current technology and platforms for operations, for reporting, and in its programs to reach, service, and engage small businesses. l An Office of Advocacy that is strengthened by a renewed mandate and additional resources to protect against overregulation along with a research agenda that includes measuring the total cost that federal regulation imposes on small businesses. Accountability and Managerial Practice. The SBA lacks accountability and managerial practices to measure the effectiveness, success, and integrity of its various programs. As a future Administration evaluates agency structure and the particulars of how the SBA is spending appropriated funds, it should immediately require actions and procedures to compel a culture of accountability and perfor- mance. Specifically: l Require performance metrics and internal procedures to safeguard taxpayer dollars and program integrity. As noted in an October 2022 IG report, failure to adopt procedures that would reliably capture data and information for various programs, coupled with significant challenges and weaknesses regarding IT investments, systems development, and security controls, presents significant risks to program integrity and increased risk of waste, fraud, and abuse.34 Addressing these shortcomings and risks should be a priority challenge and action item for the next Administration. As underscored by the Inspector General in his introduction to the report, “Pandemic response has, in many instances, magnified the challenging systemic issues in SBA’s mission-related work.”35 l Review all internal government watchdog recommendations and require that SBA management implement or address outstanding and ongoing OIG and GAO recommendations within a specified time frame (ideally within 90 days of a recommendation) and on an ongoing basis. Strengthening the Office of Advocacy. The SBA Office of Advocacy (Advo- cacy) is “an independent office” within the SBA.36 It accounts for about one one-thousandth of SBA spending and 0.75 percent of SBA personnel. Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, both under its current authority and with suggested — 752 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise reforms, the Office of Advocacy could be a powerful weapon against the adminis- trative state’s regulatory extremism. l Amend the RFA so that all agencies are required to provide a copy of any proposed rule (other than bona fide emergency rules) along with initial regulatory flexibility analysis to the Office of Advocacy at least 60 days before a notice of proposed rulemaking is submitted for publication in the Federal Register. The Office of Advocacy would submit comments to agencies within 30 days, and each agency would have to consider these comments, make changes in the proposed rule based on those comments, or explain in a revised regulatory flexibility analysis why it chose not to change the proposed rule. The Office of Advocacy’s pre-proposing comments would be published on the agencies’ and its own websites. RFA economic analysis should be expanded to include indirect costs along with direct costs. In addition, the next Administration should require other agencies to seek Advocacy’s input. Currently, other agencies deny Advocacy the ability to enforce their duty to consider the effect of regulations on small entities by construing their regulations as not having significant economic impact, which would otherwise serve as a trigger for Advocacy’s input. Congress should presumptively exempt small businesses from new agency rules to force agencies to seek Advocacy’s input and permit new rules to apply to small businesses only with Advocacy signoff under specified criteria. l Increase the Office of Advocacy’s budget by at least 50 percent ($4.6 million). This would allow Advocacy to hire approximately 25 attorneys, economists, and scientists and enhance its role in the regulatory process. l Explicitly direct federal agencies to comply with the RFA. This would be similar to the approach adopted by President Trump in his January and February 2017 executive orders directing agencies to relieve the cost and burden of regulation on business.37 Advocacy should organize regional roundtables, onsite small-business visits, and an online platform to hear directly from small businesses and entities as it did from June 2017 through September 2018.38 This activity produced 26 letters to federal agencies and highlighted specific regulations that need reform and how Congress had addressed the most burdensome rules through the Congressional Review Act.39
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.