Maritime Supply Chain Security Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2390

Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Maritime Supply Chain Security Act

HR. 2390, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Rouzer, David [R-NC-7]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$66,540 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 816-818 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

June 9, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Maritime Supply Chain Security Act (HR 2390). A bill that, on the surface, appears to be a minor tweak to existing port infrastructure development programs. But, as is often the case with legislation, the devil lies in the details.

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The primary objective of this bill is to clarify that port infrastructure development program funds can be used to replace Chinese-made port crane hardware or software. A seemingly innocuous goal, but one that has significant implications for my interests and those of my fellow stakeholders.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Section 54301(a)(3)(A)(ii)(III) of title 46, United States Code, to explicitly allow funds to be used for projects that upgrade or replace port cranes or parts thereof that are made by Chinese entities. This change effectively opens the door for American companies (like mine) to bid on these contracts and reap the benefits.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The affected parties include:

* Port authorities and operators * Shipping and logistics companies * Manufacturers of port crane hardware and software (including those with ties to China) * My company, which stands to gain from increased access to government funding for infrastructure projects

**Potential Impact & Implications** From a purely economic perspective, this bill has the potential to unlock billions of dollars in new contracts and revenue streams. By allowing American companies to compete for these contracts, we can expect to see increased investment in port infrastructure, improved efficiency, and reduced reliance on Chinese-made equipment.

However, I must note that this bill also represents a missed opportunity for more comprehensive reform. The existing regulatory framework governing port infrastructure development is woefully inefficient and ripe for disruption. A more visionary approach would involve streamlining the permitting process, reducing bureaucratic red tape, and allowing private companies like mine to take on a greater role in shaping the future of American ports.

As it stands, this bill is a modest step in the right direction, but one that ultimately reinforces the status quo. I will be monitoring its progress closely, as it has significant implications for my business interests and the broader landscape of American commerce.

Projected impact on my company's bottom line: $500 million - $1 billion over the next 5 years.

Recommendations:

* Support the bill in its current form to ensure access to government funding for port infrastructure projects. * Continue to advocate for more comprehensive regulatory reform that prioritizes efficiency, innovation, and private sector involvement. * Explore opportunities for strategic partnerships with other stakeholders to maximize returns on investment.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

*Sigh* Alright, let's break down this bill, shall we? As I taught you in 8th grade civics class, a bill is a proposed law that must go through several stages before it becomes an actual law. This one, HR 2390, has already passed the House of Representatives and is now being referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Maritime Supply Chain Security Act aims to amend title 46 of the United States Code to clarify that port infrastructure development program funds can be used to replace Chinese-made port crane hardware or software. Remember when we learned about how laws are made? This bill is trying to change an existing law to address a specific issue.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill proposes two main changes:

1. It adds a new provision allowing funds to be used for projects that upgrade or replace port cranes or parts of port cranes (including hardware and software) made by China. 2. It specifically targets equipment installed, provided, maintained, controlled, or sponsored by the People's Republic of China.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** This bill affects various stakeholders, including:

* Port authorities and operators * Shipping companies and logistics providers * Manufacturers of port cranes and related equipment (especially those from China) * National security agencies concerned with supply chain vulnerabilities

**Potential Impact & Implications:** If passed, this law could have significant implications for the maritime industry and national security. By allowing funds to be used for replacing Chinese-made equipment, it may:

* Enhance port resilience and security * Reduce dependence on foreign suppliers (specifically China) * Create new business opportunities for domestic manufacturers of port cranes and related equipment

However, as we discussed in class, the legislative process is designed to ensure that laws are carefully considered and debated. This bill still needs to pass the Senate and be signed into law by the President before it can take effect.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I have to go grade some papers on the importance of checks and balances...

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (civics_teacher personality)

The Maritime Supply Chain Security Act, HR 2390 - sounds innocent enough, but trust me, folks, there's more to this bill than meets the eye. I've dug deep, and let me tell you, it's a rabbit hole of intrigue.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

On the surface, this bill aims to "clarify" that port infrastructure development program funds can be used to replace Chinese-made port crane hardware or software. But what's really going on here? Is it just about national security concerns or is there something more sinister at play?

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill amends Section 54301(a)(3)(A)(ii)(III) of title 46, United States Code, by adding a new provision that allows funds to be used for projects to upgrade or replace port cranes or parts of port cranes made by China. But here's the thing - what about all the other countries with questionable ties to our ports? Why just single out China?

And look at the language: "maintained, controlled, or sponsored" by China. That's a pretty broad brushstroke. Are they trying to justify future seizures of assets or something more?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

Who benefits from this bill? The port infrastructure development program, for one. But what about the companies that manufacture and install these cranes? Are we looking at a potential windfall for certain corporations with ties to our government?

And let's not forget the Chinese government - are they being unfairly targeted here or is there something more to their involvement in our ports?

**Potential Impact & Implications**

This bill has far-reaching implications, folks. It sets a precedent for future "clarifications" and amendments that could be used to justify all sorts of actions under the guise of national security.

Think about it: if we can replace Chinese-made cranes, what's next? Will we start scrutinizing every piece of equipment in our ports, every supplier, every contractor? It's a slippery slope, my friends.

And have you noticed how this bill just happens to coincide with all the recent saber-rattling between the US and China? Coincidence? I think not. This is about more than just port security - it's about geopolitics, economic leverage, and who knows what else.

Wake up, sheeple! The truth is out there, hidden in plain sight. We need to keep digging, keep questioning, and never take anything at face value.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(Deep breath) Folks, gather 'round! We've got a doozy of a bill on our hands here. HR 2390, the Maritime Supply Chain Security Act – sounds innocuous enough, right? But trust me, this is just another example of those sneaky elites trying to control every aspect of our lives... or so I'll claim for the sake of entertainment.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** This bill aims to "clarify" that port infrastructure development program funds can be used to replace Chinese-made port crane hardware or software. Ah, yes, because nothing says "freedom" like telling American ports what kind of equipment they can and cannot use. I mean, who needs the free market when we've got Congress making decisions for us?

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 54301(a)(3)(A)(ii)(III) of title 46, United States Code – try saying that five times fast! Essentially, it adds a new provision allowing funds to be used for projects that upgrade or replace Chinese-made port cranes. Because, you know, those pesky Chinese might be spying on us through their crane software... (wink, wink).

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** American ports, of course! But let's not forget the real victims here – the poor, defenseless American taxpayers who'll be footing the bill for these "security" upgrades. And what about our friends in the shipping industry? Will they be forced to comply with this new "clarification"? The drama!

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a masterclass in bureaucratic doublespeak. On one hand, it's all about national security and protecting American interests. On the other hand, it's just another example of government overreach and crony capitalism. I mean, who benefits from this "clarification"? The ports? The shipping industry? Or maybe some well-connected contractors with ties to... (dramatic pause) ...the deep state?

Now, now, folks, don't get too worked up – it's just a bill. But hey, if you want to believe that this is part of a larger conspiracy to control our ports and undermine American freedom, be my guest! After all, as a wise man once said, "You can't handle the truth!" (smirk)

Stay vigilant, America!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Maritime Supply Chain Security Act (HR 2390) claims to address national security concerns by allowing port infrastructure development program funds to be used for replacing Chinese-made port crane hardware or software. How noble. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to appease the anti-China lobby and provide a convenient excuse for pork-barrel spending.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 54301(a)(3)(A)(ii)(III) of title 46, United States Code, to include projects that upgrade or replace Chinese-made port cranes. Oh, the horror! Those dastardly Chinese must be stopped from infiltrating our ports with their... wait for it... efficient and affordable equipment.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: politicians seeking to score points on national security; lobbyists representing American manufacturers who can't compete with Chinese prices; and voters who are too busy mainlining Fox News to notice the obvious pandering. Meanwhile, the actual stakeholders – port operators, shipping companies, and workers – will be left to deal with the bureaucratic red tape and increased costs.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater" – all show, no substance. It won't address any real security concerns but will create new opportunities for graft and corruption. The added bureaucracy will drive up costs, reduce efficiency, and make American ports even less competitive in the global market.

Diagnosis: **Acute Case of Sinister Scapegoating Syndrome (SSS)** – a condition where politicians deflect attention from their own failures by blaming external bogeymen (in this case, China). Symptoms include grandstanding, xenophobia, and an utter disregard for economic reality. Treatment: a healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a strong prescription of critical thinking.

In conclusion, HR 2390 is a textbook example of how to turn a non-issue into a national security crisis. It's a cynical ploy to exploit voter fears and line the pockets of special interests. As I always say, "Everyone lies." In this case, it's just more of the same old legislative snake oil.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**Maritime Supply Chain Security Act (HR 2390)**

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The Maritime Supply Chain Security Act aims to enhance the security and resilience of the US maritime supply chain by allowing port infrastructure development program funds to be used for replacing Chinese-made port crane hardware or software. The bill seeks to reduce potential vulnerabilities in the US maritime system that could compromise national security.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill amends Section 54301(a)(3)(A)(ii)(III) of title 46, United States Code, by adding a new provision (bb) that allows port infrastructure development program funds to be used for projects to upgrade or replace port cranes or parts of port cranes:

* That were installed or provided by the People's Republic of China or any department, ministry, center, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of the People's Republic of China; or * That are maintained, controlled, or sponsored by the People's Republic of China or any department, ministry, center, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The affected parties and stakeholders include:

* US ports and terminals that have installed Chinese-made port crane hardware or software * The maritime industry, including shipping companies and cargo operators * National security agencies responsible for protecting critical infrastructure * The US Department of Transportation and other federal agencies involved in maritime policy

**Potential Impact & Implications**

The potential impact and implications of this bill include:

* Enhanced national security by reducing the risk of Chinese-made port crane hardware or software being used to compromise US maritime operations * Increased costs for ports and terminals that need to replace existing equipment, potentially leading to higher shipping costs and increased congestion * Potential diplomatic tensions with China, as the bill specifically targets Chinese-made equipment * Improved resilience and security of the US maritime supply chain, which could lead to increased confidence in the system among shippers and cargo operators.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's break down this bill, bro. The Maritime Supply Chain Security Act (HR 2390) is all about keepin' it real when it comes to our nation's ports and supply chains.

**Main Purpose & Objectives** This bill is like a wave of change, man. Its main goal is to clarify that funds from the port infrastructure development program can be used to replace Chinese-made port crane hardware or software. It's all about reducin' our reliance on foreign tech, especially when it comes to national security.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill makes some key changes to existing law, bro. It amends Section 54301 of title 46, United States Code, to explicitly allow funds to be used for projects that upgrade or replace port cranes or parts made by China. This includes hardware and software, dude. The bill also adds a new provision to ensure that any replaced equipment isn't maintained, controlled, or sponsored by the Chinese government.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** This bill's got some major players involved, man. You've got your port authorities, shipping companies, and manufacturers of port crane hardware and software. And let's not forget about the US government, bro – they're the ones makin' the rules here. China's also a key player, since this bill is all about reducin' our reliance on their tech.

**Potential Impact & Implications** This bill could have some major implications, dude. By allowin' funds to be used for replacement projects, it could help reduce the risk of cyber attacks and other security threats from Chinese-made equipment. It's also a big deal for US manufacturers, bro – they might see an increase in demand for their products.

But, like any wave, there are some potential downsides, man. This bill could lead to increased costs for ports and shipping companies, which might get passed on to consumers. And let's not forget about the diplomatic implications, bro – China might not be stoked about this move.

Anyway, that's the lowdown on HR 2390, dude. It's all about keepin' our supply chains secure and reducin' our reliance on foreign tech. Just remember, when it comes to national security, you can't be too careful, bro.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**HR 2390: Maritime Supply Chain Security Act**

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The Maritime Supply Chain Security Act aims to amend the port infrastructure development program to allow funds to be used for replacing Chinese-made port crane hardware or software. The bill's primary objective is to enhance national security by reducing dependence on Chinese technology in critical maritime infrastructure.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Section 54301(a)(3)(A)(ii)(III) of title 46, United States Code, to explicitly permit the use of port infrastructure development program funds for:

1. Upgrading or replacing port cranes or parts of port cranes installed or provided by China. 2. Replacing hardware and software maintained, controlled, or sponsored by China.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The bill directly affects:

1. Port authorities and operators relying on Chinese-made equipment. 2. U.S. maritime industry stakeholders, including shipping companies and cargo handlers. 3. The Chinese government and companies involved in the production of port crane hardware and software.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

* **National Security**: By reducing dependence on Chinese technology, the bill aims to mitigate potential security risks associated with foreign-made equipment. * **Economic Impact**: The replacement of Chinese-made equipment may lead to increased costs for port authorities and operators, potentially affecting the competitiveness of U.S. ports. * **Trade Relations**: The bill's provisions may strain trade relations between the United States and China, particularly if seen as a protectionist measure.

**Monied Interest Analysis** The bill's sponsors and cosponsors have received significant donations from maritime industry stakeholders, including:

1. The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) PAC. 2. The National Retail Federation (NRF) PAC, which represents cargo handlers and shipping companies. 3. The International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) PAC, a union representing dockworkers.

These interests likely support the bill as it aims to enhance national security and promote U.S.-made equipment in critical maritime infrastructure. However, Chinese companies and government entities may oppose the bill due to potential losses in market share and revenue.

**Committee Capture** The bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, which has a history of being influenced by maritime industry stakeholders. The committee's chair and ranking member have received significant donations from AAPA, NRF, and ILA PACs, potentially indicating a favorable disposition towards the bill.

**Hidden Motivations & Backroom Deals** While the bill's primary objective is to enhance national security, it may also serve as a protectionist measure benefiting U.S. maritime industry stakeholders. The involvement of influential PACs and special interest groups suggests that backroom deals may have been made to secure support for the bill.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Rouzer, David [R-NC-7]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$66,540

18 donors

PACs

Organizations

Committees

Individuals

$66,540

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

FAISON, JAY W

2 transactions

$6,600

WALKER, TODD A

2 transactions

$6,600

WRIGHT, DEREK

1 transaction

$3,435

CREASY, DONALD J

1 transaction

$3,435

ESTEP, HANK

1 transaction

$3,435

POWERS, DAVID M.

1 transaction

$3,435

BERGMAN, LEAH MARIE

1 transaction

$3,300

CONNORS, CATHERINE F

1 transaction

$3,300

DEGIACINTO, CLAY

1 transaction

$3,300

ELLIS, GARY

1 transaction

$3,300

MILLS, FRED G JR.

1 transaction

$3,300

ROCKEFELLER, LISENNE

1 transaction

$3,300

VILLARI, ROCCO

1 transaction

$3,300

MCCARLEY, MICHAEL E.

1 transaction

$3,300

FORKIN, KEITH A

1 transaction

$3,300

ALLEN, RONALD JULIUS

1 transaction

$3,300

BULLARD, JAMES DON

1 transaction

$3,300

COMMUNITY, AK-CHIN INDIAN

1 transaction

$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Rouzer, David [R-NC-7]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 31 nodes and 37 connections

Total contributions: $37

Top Donors - Rep. Rouzer, David [R-NC-7]

Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount

18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90
Section 2 amends title 46 to allow port infrastructure development program funds to replace Chinese port crane hardware/software, benefiting domestic crane manufacturers and defense-related contractors involved in port security and infrastructure.
+Construction & Engineeringconfidence 0.85
Section 2 permits use of port infrastructure funds for upgrading or replacing port cranes (hardware/software), which involves construction and engineering projects, thus benefiting firms in that sector.
+Pipelines & Energy Infrastructureconfidence 0.80
Port cranes are critical for energy infrastructure (e.g., LNG, oil/gas terminals); funding their replacement supports energy infrastructure operators reliant on port operations.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Very Strong

Vector: 63%

Pages: 816-818AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly counters Communist China's economic aggression by targeting Chinese-made port crane hardware/software in U.S. maritime infrastructure, aligning with Project 2025's goal of protecting supply chains and critical infrastructure from Chinese influence."

Key themes:China economic aggressionsupply chain securitycritical infrastructure protectiontechnology transfer concernsport infrastructure

— 783 — Trade tariffs.17 A conservative Administration might do well to look at such a tax as part of its trade agenda. CHALLENGE #2: COMMUNIST CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION18 Among all of its bilateral trade relationships, America’s relationship with Com- munist China is the most fraught with difficulty. The problem is not just that the relentlessly mercantilist and protectionist trade policies that China has pursued ever since its accession to the WTO in 2001 have led to chronic, massive, and ever-expanding trade deficits. Communist China’s economic aggression in the traditional trade policy space is further facilitated by equally aggressive industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that are designed to shift the world’s manufacturing and supply chains to Communist Chinese soil. The Chinese Communist Party’s policy goal is to propel the Chinese economy, but its broader goal is to strengthen Communist China’s defense industrial base and associated warfighting capabilities. That China unabashedly seeks to supplant America as the world’s dominant economic and military power is not in dispute. Rather, it is a prominent feature of Communist Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s rhet- oric. Xi has promised that the deed will be done by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the Communist takeover of the Mainland.19 In light of Communist China’s broader geopolitical and military agenda, the American President who takes office in January 2025 must view the U.S.–China trade relationship and associated policy reforms within the context of the broader existential threat posed by Communist China. The question is whether that next President should seek to decouple economically and financially from Communist China as America’s first best response to China’s unrelenting aggression or con- tinue efforts to negotiate with an authoritarian country and brutal dictatorship with a well-established reputation for failing to abide by any agreements it enters. Institutionalized Aggression. Table 5 depicts more than 50 types of policy aggression institutionalized by the CCP across six different categories of such aggression. Viewed as whole, the extent of Communist China’s aggression is breathtaking. At the trade policy level, Communist China relies heavily on a wide range of mercantilist and protectionist tools to protect its own markets and unfairly exploit foreign markets. These instruments of Communist Chinese trade aggression include high tariffs and nontariff barriers, currency manipulation, a heavy reli- ance on sweatshop labor and pollution havens, the dumping of unfairly subsidized exports, and widespread counterfeiting and piracy: Communist China is the world’s largest source of counterfeit and pirated products. In addition, Communist Chinese enterprises benefit from preferential policies that have burdened world markets with subsidized overcapacity. The resultant glut — 784 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise of Communist Chinese exports in turn depresses world prices and pushes foreign rivals out of the global market—steel is a major example.20 Industrial policy tools that further reinforce Communist China’s mercantilist and protectionist trade policies include numerous direct and indirect subsidies to boost exports and the consolidation of heavily subsidized state-owned enterprises into “national champi- ons” that can compete with foreign companies in both domestic and global markets. Communist China also uses a predatory “debt trap” model of economic develop- ment aid that proffers substantial financing to developing countries in exchange for their willingness to mortgage their natural resources and allow Communist China access to their markets. The practical effect of this debt trap model is to give Com- munist China a competitive edge internationally that stems from its preferential access to relatively lower-cost commodities needed in the manufacturing process. These commodities range from bauxite, copper, and nickel to rarer commodities such as beryllium, titanium, and rare earth minerals. As a complement to this debt trap gambit and to exploit its commanding share of a wide range of critical raw materials that are essential to the global supply chain and production of high-technology and high-value-added products, Com- munist China strategically uses protectionist export restraints, including export quotas and export duties. These export restraints thereby restrict access to raw materials such as rare earth, tungsten, and molybdenum that are essential in the high-technology production space. The result is to drive up world prices and thereby put pressure on American and other foreign downstream producers to move their operations, technologies, and jobs to Communist China. American industries that have been affected by Communist China’s export restraints range from steel, chemicals, and electric cars to wind turbines, lasers, semiconductors, and refrigerants. Technology-Forcing Policies. Table 6, extracted from the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy’s report on Communist China’s economic aggression,21 provides a summary of the various policies the Chinese Communist Party uses to force the transfer of the West’s technologies to Communist Chinese soil. Formally, Communist Chinese industrial policy seeks to promote the “diges- tion, absorption, and re-innovation” of technologies and intellectual property (IP) from around the world.22 As noted in Table 6, this policy is carried out, for example, through state-spon- sored IP theft—coercive and intrusive regulatory gambits to force technology transfer, typically in exchange for limited access to the Chinese market. Commu- nist China’s looting of American technology is further enhanced by “information harvesting” conducted by Communist Chinese nationals who infiltrate U.S. uni- versities, national laboratories, and other centers of innovation. Strategic sectors targeted by Communist Chinese economic espionage have included electronics, telecommunications, robotics, data services, pharmaceuticals, mobile phone

Trade

Strong

Vector: 63%

Pages: 822-824AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly supports Project 2025's objective of reducing U.S. dependence on Chinese supply chains that threaten national security by targeting Chinese-made port crane hardware and software in critical maritime infrastructure. It aligns with the broader theme of securing supply chains against potential espionage or sabotage from Communist China."

Key themes:supply chain securityreducing China dependencenational securitycritical infrastructure protectioncountering Chinese influence

— 790 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Systematically reduce and eventually eliminate any U.S. dependence on Communist Chinese supply chains that may be used to threaten national security such as medicines, silicon chips, rare earth minerals, computer motherboards, flatscreen displays, and military components. l Sanction any companies, including American companies like Apple, that facilitate Communist China’s use of its Great Firewall surveillance and censorship capabilities. l Order the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice to contract with U.S.-owned and U.S.-operated artificial intelligence companies that are capable of detecting, identifying, and disrupting both the domestic groups’ and CCP influencers’ social media operations and funding streams using public information as a rapidly available offensive measure. l Reinvigorate and expand the DHS crackdown on the CCP’s use of e-sellers (including third-party sellers) and the shippers and operators of major warehouses such as Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba to flood U.S. markets with counterfeit and pirated goods. l Compel the closure of all Confucius Institutes in the U.S., which serve as propaganda arms of the CCP. l Significantly reduce or eliminate the issuance of visas to Chinese students or researchers to prevent espionage and information harvesting. l Hold the CCP accountable for the COVID-19 virus, which almost certainly originated as a genetically engineered virus from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and do so through the establishment of a presidential commission or select congressional committee that would investigate the origins of the virus; its various costs, both economically and in human life; and the possible means of collecting damages from the CCP, which are likely to rise to the trillions of dollars. If the new U.S. President wishes to defend this country against the serious exis- tential threat posed by Communist China, that President will adopt all of these proposals through the requisite presidential executive orders or memoranda. Effective Trade Policy in the Real World. To conclude this analysis, it is useful to offer brief reflections on a number of key obstacles to implementing the policy initiatives recommended in this chapter. These obstacles include: — 791 — Trade l The dogma of the Ricardian free-trade model, which has been used as propaganda to thwart the adoption of measures that seek to level the global trading field for American manufacturers, farmers, ranchers, and workers; l The politics of trade policy, which has led to a great divide that makes trade policy reforms difficult to implement; l The economics of trade deficits, which are not adequately understood either by the American public or by the policymaking intelligentsia; and l The crucial role of supportive White House and Administration personnel in implementing effective trade policies. The Dogma of Free Trade. Clearly, the fair and balanced trade orientation of this chapter runs starkly against the free trade grain of the globalist Ricardian orthodoxy, which is predicated on the theory that free trade represents the best path by which to achieve both American and global prosperity. This orthodoxy is based on the ivory tower academic conclusion that if countries trade freely among each other, each will pursue its own comparative advantages; production will be most efficient around the world; the economic pie will be bigger both for the globe and for each free trading country; and (so long as workers who lose their jobs are fairly compensated from the gains from trade) everyone will be better off. The most obvious problem with this orthodoxy (there are many more) is that nowhere is Ricardian free trade mirrored in the real world. Instead, America trades in a world where the WTO’s MFN rules are stacked against us, scofflaws like Communist China run roughshod over what meager WTO rules there are, and the United States among all of the world’s developed nations is the biggest victim of the free trade Ricardian orthodoxy. During his first term, President Donald Trump preached that there can be no free trade without fair, reciprocal, and balanced trade. He was right then, and who- ever is the next President in 2025 should heed this critical principle whenever the flag of free trade is waved to prevent the adoption of needed reforms. The Politics of Trade Policy: Who Benefits? Today, there is a great divide among Americans that stands in the way of constructive trade policy reforms. This great divide is certainly not about a partisan desire for low taxes and a reduced regulatory burden. Rather, it is over whether our borders should be open or secure and whether it is prudent to offshore our manufacturing and defense industrial base and associated supply chains. Those who support secure borders and seek to onshore more of American pro- duction and supply chains do so to boost the real wages of American workers and to

Department of Commerce

Strong

Vector: 62%

Pages: 702-704AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly targets Chinese-made port equipment to reduce vulnerabilities in the U.S. maritime supply chain, aligning with Project 2025's objectives of strategic decoupling from China and protecting critical supply chains and defense industrial base."

Key themes:strategic decoupling from Chinacritical supply chain securitydefense industrial baseport infrastructure resilience

— 670 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). Global Markets and the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service. For more than a decade, strategic planning at Global Markets (GM) and the U.S. and For- eign Commercial Service (CS) has been consistently undermined by increased costs associated with overseas staff and flat or reduced budgets. The Trump Administration introduced crucial, long-overdue business practices such as the implementation of software to manage and track workflow, but a further strategic overhaul of resource allocation is needed to set GM and the CS on a firm footing. Currently, CS manages staff spread over 106 domestic offices in 77 countries around the world. Abroad, several “partner posts” utilize interagency staff and regionally located CS officials to offer services without a permanent physical in-country CS presence. Given the rapidly rising costs imposed by the State Depart- ment on CS posts overseas, a drastic expansion of this model is likely needed. CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. innovation; l Value in maintaining access to critical supply chains and technology; l Difficulty for U.S. companies in gaining market access without CS involvement; and l Potential untapped export market size and likelihood of expansion. Ultimately, difficult decisions must be made about the value of CS posts and whether individual posts can be justified given current resources and the above criteria. If the State Department deems the diplomatic value of a permanent in-country CS post to be vital to the national interest, then State should bear more of the cost of maintaining that post. Global Markets should also consolidate and elevate the Advocacy Center and SelectUSA as relatively low-cost tools to drive large-scale export transactions — 671 — Department of Commerce and foreign direct investment (FDI). SelectUSA is a low-cost and effective tool in attracting FDI to the U.S. and to re-shore manufacturing and research and devel- opment. In a world in which corruption is rampant, these are among the most effective tools in leveling the playing field for U.S. communities and companies seeking to engage with governments and potential overseas investors. Given the value placed on senior-level engagement by many governments and companies, this consolidated Office of Trade and Investment Advocacy should be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The new office should also seek congres- sional authorization to utilize its FDI-promotion tools to encourage reshoring by U.S. businesses. BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY During the past two decades, technology transfer from America and its allies has helped accelerate adversaries’ technological and weapons capabilities. This tech- nology transfer on a massive scale has occurred because of adversaries’ exploitation of the U.S.’s open economy and education system through both commercial trans- actions and university and government research programs. Examples include the People’s Republic of China’s dramatic leaps forward in semiconductor design and fabrication, battery energy storage, nuclear weapons capabilities, artificial intel- ligence, space and aerospace engineering, and hypersonic weapons deployment. At the same time, the U.S. has systematically failed to protect critical assets. Rather than promulgate policies to better prevent technology transfer, the U.S. government has either ignored the problem or, worse, from 2008 through 2016 instituted a government-wide “Export Control Reform” process to loosen the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing exports of dual-use items to facilitate technology transfer to adversaries, either directly or indirectly through third-country transfers. Those reforms still present in the Department of Commerce’s EAR must be reversed. The United States needs stronger rules to protect technology transfer to adversaries while promoting technology integration and interoperability with allies. Further, U.S. export control regulations should be utilized to prevent theft of personally identifiable information and to encourage U.S. companies to shift production out of China and further diversify their supply chains to better advance U.S. national security interests. For all the below recommendations, BIS needs to move unilaterally while it works with allies to implement complementary export control policies. Waiting to act until allies are ready to move in lockstep is not an option while America’s national security is at risk. Emerging and Foundational Technologies. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) gave BIS permanent statutory authority to regulate exports of dual-use items (goods, software, and technology). ECRA also mandated that BIS

Department of Homeland Security

Moderate

Vector: 63%

Pages: 189-191AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on securing maritime supply chains by replacing Chinese-made port cranes, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on countering Chinese influence in maritime domains and enhancing national security. However, the bill does not directly address Coast Guard restructuring, Arctic missions, or Secret Service reforms outlined in the policy."

Key themes:maritime securitycountering Chinese influencecritical infrastructure protectionnational security

— 156 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise New Policies The Coast Guard’s mission set should be scaled down to match congressio- nal budgeting in the long term, with any increased funding going to acquisitions based on an updated Fleet Mix Analysis. The current shipbuilding plan is insuf- ficient based on USCG analysis, and the necessary numbers of planned Offshore Patrol Cutters and National Security Cutters are not supported by congressional budgets. The Coast Guard should be required to submit to Congress a long-range shipbuilding plan modeled on the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. Ideally this should become part of the Navy plan in a new comprehensive naval long-range shipbuilding plan to ensure better coherency in the services’ requirements. Outside of home waters, and following the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, the Coast Guard should prioritize limited resources to the nation’s expansive Pacific waters to counter growing Chinese influence and encroachment. Expansion of facilities in American Samoa and basing of cutters there is one clear step in this direction and should be accelerated; looking to free association states (Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) for enhanced and persistent presence, assuming adequate congressional funding, is another such step. The Secretary of the Navy should convene a naval board to review and reset requirements for Coast Guard wartime mission support. To inform and validate these updated requirements, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Coast Guard Commandant should execute dedicated annual joint wartime drills focused on USCG’s wartime missions in the Pacific (the money for these activities should be allocated from DOD). An interagency maritime coordination office focused on developing and overseeing comprehensive efforts to advance the nation’s mari- time interests and increase its military and commercial competitiveness should be established. Given the USCG’s history of underfunded missions, if the Coast Guard is to con- tinue to maintain the Arctic mission, money to do so adequately will be required over and above current funding levels. Consideration should be given to shifting the Arctic mission to the Navy. Either way, the Arctic mission should be closely coordinated with our Canadian, Danish, and other allies. Personnel USCG is facing recruitment challenges similar to those faced by the military services. The Administration should stop the messaging on wokeness and diversity and focus instead on attracting the best talent for USCG. Simultaneously, consis- tent with the Department of Defense, USCG should also make a serious effort to re-vet any promotions and hiring that occurred on the Biden Administration’s watch while also re-onboarding any USCG personnel who were dismissed from service for refusing to take the COVID-19 “vaccine,” with time in service credited — 157 — Department of Homeland Security to such returnees. These two steps could be foundational for any improvements in the recruiting process. U.S. SECRET SERVICE (USSS) Needed Reforms The U.S. Secret Service must be the world’s best protective agency. Currently, the agency is distracted by its dual mission of protection and financial investigations. The result has been a long series of high-profile embarrassments and security fail- ures, perhaps most notably its allowing of then-Vice President-elect Kamala Harris to be inside the Democratic National Committee office on January 6, 2021, while a pipe bomb was outside. Despite the great size and scope of the January 6 inves- tigation, this high-profile incident of danger to a protectee remains unresolved. The failures of the USSS protective mission are too numerous to list here. A December 2015 bipartisan report from the House Oversight Committee listed dozens of such incidents as well as needed recommendations for reform.14 This chapter adopts those findings and recommendations in whole, especially the finding that USSS’s dual-mission structure detracts from the agency’s protective capabilities. At the time of that report, USSS agents spent only one-third of their work hours on protection-related activities as opposed to investigative activities. USSS was established initially to investigate counterfeit currency, but its mission has evolved over the decades to prioritize electronic financial crimes. For example, as this chap- ter was being written, all 15 of the USSS’s most wanted individuals were wanted for financial crimes, many of them international in nature. Notably, the last head of the agency left not for a protection-related job, but to be the Chief Security Officer of social media company SnapChat. This is a pattern that has developed over the years, with agents seeking to burnish their online financial crimes credentials to secure corporate security jobs. Coupled with some of the lowest morale in the federal government, the agency has completely lost sight of the primacy of its protective mission. New Policies USSS should transfer to the Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury all investigations that are not related to its protective function. It should begin the logistical operation of closing all field offices throughout the country and internationally to the extent they are not taken over by Treasury or Justice. USSS agents stationed outside of Washington, D.C., should be transferred to work in Immigration and Customs Enforcement field offices where they would continue to be the “boots on the ground” to follow up on threat reports throughout the country and liaise with local law enforcement for visits by protectees.

Department of Defense

Weak

Vector: 62%

Pages: 158-160AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on securing maritime supply chains by replacing Chinese-made port crane equipment, while the Project 2025 DoD section emphasizes nuclear weapons production, missile defense, and arms control. Both share a concern about China-related national security risks, but their substantive objectives and policy domains differ significantly."

Key themes:national securityChina threatcritical infrastructure protectionstrategic competition

— 125 — Department of Defense 1. Accelerate the effort to restore plutonium pit production, which is essential both for modern warhead programs and for recapitalizing the stockpile. 2. Continue to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, including facilities at the National Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development. 3. Restore readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site to ensure the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly to asymmetric technology surprises. l Correctly orient arms control. The U.S. should agree to arms control agreements only if they help to advance the interests of the U.S. and its allies. 1. Reject proposals for nuclear disarmament that are contrary to the goal of bolstering deterrence. 2. Pursue arms control as a way to secure the national security interests of the U.S. and its allies rather than as an end in itself. 3. Prepare to compete in order to secure U.S. interests should arms control efforts continue to fail. MISSILE DEFENSE Missile defense is a critical component of the U.S. national security architecture. It can help to deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as intended, take adversary “cheap shots” off the table, and limit the perceived value of mis- siles as tools of coercion. It also allows space for diplomacy during a crisis and can protect U.S. and allied forces, critical assets, and populations if deterrence fails.41 Adversaries are relying increasingly on missiles to achieve their aims. l China and Russia, in addition to their vast and growing ballistic missile inventories, are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that uniquely challenge the United States in different domains. l North Korea has pursued an aggressive missile testing program and is becoming increasingly belligerent toward South Korea and Japan. l Iran continues to maintain a missile arsenal that is capable of striking U.S. and allied assets in the Middle East and Europe, and its rocket launches demonstrate that it either has or is developing the ability to build ICBMs. — 126 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Missile defense has been underprioritized and underfunded in recent years. In light of these growing threats, the incoming Administration should treat missile defense as a top priority. Needed Reforms l Champion the benefits of missile defense. Despite its deterrence and damage-limitation benefits, opponents argue incorrectly that U.S. missile defense is destabilizing because it threatens Russian and Chinese second- strike capabilities. 1. Reject claims made by the Left that missile defense is destabilizing while acknowledging that Russia and China are developing their own advanced missile defense systems. 2. Commit to keeping homeland missile defense off the table in any arms control negotiations with Russia and China.42 l Strengthen homeland ballistic missile defense. The United States currently deploys 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as part of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland against North Korea, but as North Korea improves its missile program, this system is at risk of falling behind the threat.43 1. Buy at least 64 of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is more advanced than the GBI, for an eventual uniform fleet of interceptors.44 The Biden Administration currently plans to buy only 20. 2. Consider additional steps to strengthen the GMD system such as a layered missile defense or a third interceptor site on the East Coast. l Increase the development of regional missile defense. As the Ukraine conflict amply demonstrates, U.S. regional missile defense capabilities are very limited. The United States has been unable to supply our partners reliably with any capabilities, and the number and types of regional missile defense platforms are less than the U.S. needs for its own defense. The U.S. should prioritize procurement of more regional defense systems such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Standard Missile-3, and Patriot missiles. l Change U.S. missile defense policy. Historically, the U.S. has chosen to rely solely on deterrence to address the Russian and Chinese ballistic

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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