An original resolution authorizing expenditures by the Committee on Environment and Public Works.
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Sen. Capito, Shelley Moore [R-WV]
ID: C001047
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another thrilling episode of "Congressional Theater" brought to you by the Committee on Environment and Public Works. This bill, SRES 59, is a masterclass in bureaucratic doublespeak, a symphony of meaningless words designed to lull you into a coma.
Let's dissect this festering boil of a bill:
**New Regulations:** None. Zilch. Zero. This bill doesn't create or modify any regulations; it simply authorizes the committee to spend money on... well, whatever they want.
**Affected Industries and Sectors:** Ha! You think this bill affects anyone outside the Beltway? Please. It's a self-serving exercise in congressional navel-gazing. The only "industry" affected is the lobbying sector, which will no doubt see an uptick in business as companies try to curry favor with committee members.
**Compliance Requirements and Timelines:** Oh boy, are you ready for some thrilling compliance requirements? The bill sets forth a series of arbitrary deadlines for the committee to spend money on things like "consultants" (read: lobbyists) and "training" (read: junkets). Wow, I can barely contain my excitement.
**Enforcement Mechanisms and Penalties:** Don't make me laugh. This bill is a joke, and there's no one to enforce it even if they wanted to. The committee will do what it wants, when it wants, because that's how Congress works.
**Economic and Operational Impacts:** Ah, now we get to the good stuff. This bill will have exactly zero impact on the environment or public works. It's a slush fund for congressional cronies and special interests. The only "impact" is the $14 million price tag attached to this boondoggle.
In conclusion, SRES 59 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a waste of time, money, and oxygen. If I had to diagnose this bill, I'd say it's suffering from a severe case of "Congressionalitis": a disease characterized by an inability to do anything meaningful or useful.
Treatment? None required. This bill will die on its own, suffocated by the weight of its own irrelevance.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Capito, Shelley Moore [R-WV]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 7 — Foreword Instead, party leaders negotiate one multitrillion-dollar spending bill—several thousand pages long—and then vote on it before anyone, literally, has had a chance to read it. Debate time is restricted. Amendments are prohibited. And all of this is backed up against a midnight deadline when the previous “omnibus” spending bill will run out and the federal government “shuts down.” This process is not designed to empower 330 million American citizens and their elected representatives, but rather to empower the party elites secretly nego- tiating without any public scrutiny or oversight. In the end, congressional leaders’ behavior and incentives here are no differ- ent from those of global elites insulating policy decisions—over the climate, trade, public health, you name it—from the sovereignty of national electorates. Public scrutiny and democratic accountability make life harder for policymakers—so they skirt it. It’s not dysfunction; it’s corruption. And despite its gaudy price tag, the federal budget is not even close to the worst example of this corruption. That distinction belongs to the “Administrative State,” the dismantling of which must a top priority for the next conservative President. The term Administrative State refers to the policymaking work done by the bureaucracies of all the federal government’s departments, agencies, and millions of employees. Under Article I of the Constitution, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” That is, federal law is enacted only by elected legislators in both houses of Congress. This exclusive authority was part of the Framers’ doctrine of “separated powers.” They not only split the federal government’s legislative, executive, and judicial powers into different branches. They also gave each branch checks over the others. Under our Constitution, the legislative branch—Congress—is far and away the most powerful and, correspondingly, the most accountable to the people. In recent decades, members of the House and Senate discovered that if they give away that power to the Article II branch of government, they can also deny responsi- bility for its actions. So today in Washington, most policy is no longer set by Congress at all, but by the Administrative State. Given the choice between being powerful but vulnerable or irrelevant but famous, most Members of Congress have chosen the latter. Congress passes intentionally vague laws that delegate decision-making over a given issue to a federal agency. That agency’s bureaucrats—not just unelected but seemingly un-fireable—then leap at the chance to fill the vacuum created by Congress’s preening cowardice. The federal government is growing larger and less constitutionally accountable—even to the President—every year. l A combination of elected and unelected bureaucrats at the Environmental Protection Agency quietly strangles domestic energy production through difficult-to-understand rulemaking processes;
Introduction
— 7 — Foreword Instead, party leaders negotiate one multitrillion-dollar spending bill—several thousand pages long—and then vote on it before anyone, literally, has had a chance to read it. Debate time is restricted. Amendments are prohibited. And all of this is backed up against a midnight deadline when the previous “omnibus” spending bill will run out and the federal government “shuts down.” This process is not designed to empower 330 million American citizens and their elected representatives, but rather to empower the party elites secretly nego- tiating without any public scrutiny or oversight. In the end, congressional leaders’ behavior and incentives here are no differ- ent from those of global elites insulating policy decisions—over the climate, trade, public health, you name it—from the sovereignty of national electorates. Public scrutiny and democratic accountability make life harder for policymakers—so they skirt it. It’s not dysfunction; it’s corruption. And despite its gaudy price tag, the federal budget is not even close to the worst example of this corruption. That distinction belongs to the “Administrative State,” the dismantling of which must a top priority for the next conservative President. The term Administrative State refers to the policymaking work done by the bureaucracies of all the federal government’s departments, agencies, and millions of employees. Under Article I of the Constitution, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” That is, federal law is enacted only by elected legislators in both houses of Congress. This exclusive authority was part of the Framers’ doctrine of “separated powers.” They not only split the federal government’s legislative, executive, and judicial powers into different branches. They also gave each branch checks over the others. Under our Constitution, the legislative branch—Congress—is far and away the most powerful and, correspondingly, the most accountable to the people. In recent decades, members of the House and Senate discovered that if they give away that power to the Article II branch of government, they can also deny responsi- bility for its actions. So today in Washington, most policy is no longer set by Congress at all, but by the Administrative State. Given the choice between being powerful but vulnerable or irrelevant but famous, most Members of Congress have chosen the latter. Congress passes intentionally vague laws that delegate decision-making over a given issue to a federal agency. That agency’s bureaucrats—not just unelected but seemingly un-fireable—then leap at the chance to fill the vacuum created by Congress’s preening cowardice. The federal government is growing larger and less constitutionally accountable—even to the President—every year. l A combination of elected and unelected bureaucrats at the Environmental Protection Agency quietly strangles domestic energy production through difficult-to-understand rulemaking processes; — 8 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Bureaucrats at the Department of Homeland Security, following the lead of a feckless Administration, order border and immigration enforcement agencies to help migrants criminally enter our country with impunity; l Bureaucrats at the Department of Education inject racist, anti-American, ahistorical propaganda into America’s classrooms; l Bureaucrats at the Department of Justice force school districts to undermine girls’ sports and parents’ rights to satisfy transgender extremists; l Woke bureaucrats at the Pentagon force troops to attend “training” seminars about “white privilege”; and l Bureaucrats at the State Department infuse U.S. foreign aid programs with woke extremism about “intersectionality” and abortion.3 Unaccountable federal spending is the secret lifeblood of the Great Awokening. Nearly every power center held by the Left is funded or supported, one way or another, through the bureaucracy by Congress. Colleges and school districts are funded by tax dollars. The Administrative State holds 100 percent of its power at the sufferance of Congress, and its insulation from presidential discipline is an unconstitutional fairy tale spun by the Washington Establishment to protect its turf. Members of Congress shield themselves from constitutional accountability often when the White House allows them to get away with it. Cultural institutions like public libraries and public health agencies are only as “independent” from public accountability as elected officials and voters permit. Let’s be clear: The most egregious regulations promulgated by the current Administration come from one place: the Oval Office. The President cannot hide behind the agencies; as his many executive orders make clear, his is the respon- sibility for the regulations that threaten American communities, schools, and families. A conservative President must move swiftly to do away with these vast abuses of presidential power and remove the career and political bureaucrats who fuel it. Properly considered, restoring fiscal limits and constitutional accountability to the federal government is a continuation of restoring national sovereignty to the American people. In foreign affairs, global strategy, federal budgeting and pol- icymaking, the same pattern emerges again and again. Ruling elites slash and tear at restrictions and accountability placed on them. They centralize power up and away from the American people: to supra-national treaties and organizations, to left-wing “experts,” to sight-unseen all-or-nothing legislating, to the unelected career bureaucrats of the Administrative State.
Introduction
— 294 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise to transforming the food system on its web site and other department-dis- seminated material, and it should expressly and regularly communicate the principles informing the objectives listed above, as well as promote these prin- ciples through legislative efforts. The USDA should also carefully review existing efforts that involve inappropriately imposing its preferred agricultural practices onto farmers. Address the Abuse of CCC Discretionary Authority. With the exception of federal crop insurance, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is generally the means by which agricultural-related farm bill programs are funded. The CCC is a funding mechanism, which, in simple terms, has $30 billion a year at its disposal.24 Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act (Charter Act)25 gives the Secretary of Agriculture broad discretionary authority to spend “unused” CCC money. However, in general, past Agriculture Secretaries have not used this power to any meaningful extent. This changed dramatically during the Trump Administration, when this discretionary authority was used to fund $28 billion in “trade aid” to farmers, consisting primarily of the Market Facilitation Program. In 2020, this authority was used for $20.5 billion in food purchases and income subsidies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.26 At the time, critics warned that this use of the CCC, which in effect created a USDA slush fund, would lead future Administrations to abuse the CCC, such as by pushing climate-change policies.27 Predictably, this is precisely what the Biden Administration has done, using the discretionary authority to create programs out of whole cloth, arguably without statutory authority,28 for what it refers to as climate-smart agricultural practices.29 The merits of the various programs funded through the CCC discretionary authority is not the focus of this discussion. The major problem is that the Secre- tary of Agriculture is empowered to use a slush fund. Billions of dollars are being used for programs that Congress never envisioned or intended. Concern about this type of abuse is not new. In fact, from 2012 to 2017, Congress expressly limited the Agriculture Secretary’s discretionary spending authority under the Charter Act.30 And this was before the recent massive discretionary CCC spending occurred. The use of the discretionary power is a separation of powers problem, with Congress abrogating its spending power. This power is ripe for abuse—as could be expected with any slush fund—and it is a possible way to get around the farm bill process to achieve policy goals not secured during the legislative process. The next Administration should: l Refrain from using section 5 discretionary authority. The USDA can address this abuse on its own by following the lead of most Administrations and not using this discretionary authority. — 295 — Department of Agriculture l Promote legislative fixes to address abuse. Ideally, Congress would repeal the Secretary’s discretionary authority under section 5 of the Charter Act. There is no reason to maintain such authority. If Congress needs to spend money to assist farmers, it has legislative tools, including the farm bill and the annual appropriations process, to do so in a timely fashion. While not an ideal solution, Congress could also amend the Charter Act to require prior congressional approval through duly enacted legislation before any money is spent. At a minimum, Congress should amend the Charter Act to: l Limit spending to directly help farmers and ranchers address issues due to unforeseen events not already covered by existing programs and that constitute genuine emergencies that must be addressed immediately. l Prohibit the CCC from being used to assist parties beyond farmers and ranchers. l Clarify that spending is only to address problems that are temporary in nature and ensure that funding is targeted to address such problems. l Tighten the discretion within section 5 and identify ways for improper application of the Charter Act to be challenged in court. Reform Farm Subsidies. Too often, agricultural policy becomes synonymous with farm subsidy policy. This is unfortunate, because making them synony- mous fails to recognize that agricultural policy covers a wide range of issues, including issues that are outside the proper scope of the USDA, such as environ- mental regulation. However, there is no question that farm subsidies are an important issue within agricultural policy that should be addressed by any incoming Adminis- tration. There are several principles that even subsidy supporters would likely agree upon, including the need to reduce market distortions. Subsidies should not influence planting decisions, discourage proper risk management and innovation, incentivize planting on environmentally sensitive land, or create barriers to entry for new farmers. Farm subsidies can lead to these market distortions and there- fore, it would hardly be controversial to ensure that any subsidy scheme should be designed to avoid such problems. The overall goal should be to eliminate subsidy dependence. Despite what might be conventional wisdom, many farmers receive few to no subsidies,31 with most subsidies going to only a handful of commodities. According to the Congres- sional Research Service (CRS), from 2014 to 2016, 94 percent of farm program
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About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.