The bill
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the European Union's actions to diversify from Russian energy sources.
SRES. 488, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the European Union's actions to diversify from Russian energy sources.
Download PDFBill ID: 119/sres/488
Last Updated: November 7, 2025
Sponsored by
Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
ID: S001181
Follow the money
The sponsor
Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
$72,850 raised
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
85% match to Project 2025
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 410-412 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
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Bill Summary
Another exercise in legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of the Senate. Let's dissect this farce and reveal the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of SRES 488 is to express the Senate's sense of approval for the European Union's efforts to diversify away from Russian energy sources. Wow, what a bold move – a non-binding resolution that accomplishes nothing concrete. The objectives are twofold: (1) to virtue-signal about Russia's aggression in Ukraine and (2) to pretend that the Senate is doing something meaningful about it.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** This resolution is a masterclass in stating the obvious. It "welcomes" the EU's commitment to reducing dependence on Russian energy, "calls on" Hungary to follow suit, and "underscores" opposition to the Nord Stream pipeline projects. In other words, it does nothing to change existing law or policy. The only notable provision is the expression of concern about Hungary's increased reliance on Russian energy – a concern that will likely be met with a collective shrug from Budapest.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved in this farce:
* European Union member states, who are already taking steps to reduce their dependence on Russian energy * Russia, which will continue to find ways to circumvent sanctions and maintain its grip on the global energy market * Hungary, which will likely ignore the Senate's "concern" and continue to do business with Russia * The Trump Administration, which gets a shoutout for imposing secondary sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft – because who doesn't love a good game of sanctions whack-a-mole?
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of this resolution will be precisely zero. It's a feel-good exercise in grandstanding, designed to make Senators look like they're doing something about Russia's aggression without actually taking any meaningful action.
In reality, the EU is already making progress on reducing its dependence on Russian energy, and Hungary will continue to do what it wants. The Senate's "concern" will be met with a dismissive wave of the hand from Budapest.
The only real implication of this resolution is that it will provide a convenient talking point for Senators looking to burnish their foreign policy credentials without actually doing any heavy lifting.
Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of Legislative Theater-itis, a disease characterized by grandiose language, empty posturing, and a complete lack of substance. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for hypocrisy, and a willingness to call out the obvious lies and spin.
Related Topics
International Treaties & Agreements
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
Total Contributions
$72,850
13 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$250
Committees
$0
Individuals
$72,600
No PAC contributions found
1
TILT LANDSCAPE MAINTENANCE LLC
$250
No committee contributions found
1
HAWASH, NOUR
$19,800
2
HAWASH, SAFA
$6,600
3
KANDIL, MARIAM
$6,600
4
SHAH, JAWAD
$6,600
5
SIMMONS, IAN
$6,600
6
SOLTAN, BOSHRA
$6,600
7
JONDY, JENAN
$3,300
8
KANDIL, OSAMA
$3,300
9
WU, ALBERT
$3,300
10
MORIN, THOMAS
$3,300
11
CROWLEY, MATTHEW
$3,300
12
HUNT, SWANEE
$3,300
Donor Network - Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
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Showing 28 nodes and 21 connections (45 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $72,850
Top Donors - Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
Showing top 13 donors by contribution amount
1 Org12 Individuals
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
- +Oil & Gasconfidence 0.90
Resolution welcomes EU actions to end dependence on Russian fossil fuels and sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, which would reduce Russian oil/gas market share and benefit non-Russian oil and gas producers.
- +Pipelines & Energy Infrastructureconfidence 0.85
Resolution supports banning Russian LNG imports into EU and sanctions on Rosneft/Lukoil, which would shift LNG and oil flows to other suppliers, benefiting midstream operators and LNG export terminals.
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Department of Energy and Related Commissions
Strong
Vector: 61%Pages: 410-412AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The bill’s push to reduce EU reliance on Russian fossil fuels and to coordinate sanctions aligns with Project 2025’s emphasis on boosting U.S. energy security, expanding LNG exports to allies, and prioritizing fossil fuel supply over climate-focused programs."
Key themes:energy securityLNG export expansionfossil fuel focusreducing Russian energy dependencesanctions coordination
— 377 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions majority of critical materials are mined or processed (or both) in Russia and China.36 The processing of critical materials from fossil fuel waste products (primarily coal) has shown some potential and, in view of our vast domestic reserves of coal and abundant waste from coal mining and combustion, should be pursued. New Policies l Eliminate FECM. The next Administration should work with Congress to eliminate all of DOE’s applied energy programs, including those in FECM (with the possible exception of those that are related to basic science for new energy technology). Taxpayer dollars should not be used to subsidize preferred businesses and energy resources, thereby distorting the market and undermining energy reliability. l Rename FECM (if it cannot be eliminated) under its original designation as the Office of Fossil Energy and with its original mission: increasing energy security and supply through fossil fuels. l Focus on energy security and supply. Absent elimination of FECM, Congress should direct FECM appropriations toward increasing energy security and supply. Congress has already directed these goals (including the reduction of costs).37 l Ensure that LNG export approvals are reviewed and processed in a timely manner. In particular: 1. Ensure that LNG export applications are reviewed and approved expeditiously. 2. Maintain the categorical exclusion from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)38 for LNG exports that was established by the Trump Administration39 or (if it is revoked by the Biden Administration) reinstate it. 3. Work with Congress to expand automatic approvals to include allies such as NATO as well as nations that have free trade agreements with the U.S. l Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The Biden Administration moved responsibility for the SPR to CESER. Regardless of where the responsibility lies, the new DESAS should ensure that the SPR is maintained for national strategic purposes and not misused for political gain. — 378 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Budget The FY 2023 budget request for FECM was approximately $893.2 million.40 FECM’s requested appropriation can be compared to the more than $4.0 billion requested for the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy.41 The disparity in funding demonstrates how DOE’s research activities and substantial portions of its organizational structure are now focused entirely on the reduction of CO2 emissions rather than energy access or energy security. OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY (EERE) Mission/Overview The Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy traces its roots to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,42 but most of its programs today are rooted in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.43 Under the Biden Administration, EERE’s mission is “to accelerate the research, development, demonstration, and deployment of technologies and solutions to equitably transition America to net- zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions economy-wide by no later than 2050” and “ensure [that] the clean energy economy benefits all Americans.”44 The office is made up of three “pillars”: energy efficiency, renewable energy, and sustainable transportation. Needed Reforms l End the focus on climate change and green subsidies. Under the Biden Administration, EERE is a conduit for taxpayer dollars to fund progressive policies, including decarbonization of the economy and renewable resources. EERE has focused on reducing carbon dioxide emissions to the exclusion of other statutorily defined requirements such as energy security and cost. For example, EERE’s five programmatic priorities during the Biden Administration are all focused on decarbonization of the electricity sector, the industrial sector, transportation, buildings, and the agricultural sector.45 l Eliminate energy efficiency standards for appliances. Pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 as amended, the agency is required to set and periodically tighten energy and/or water efficiency standards for nearly all kinds of commercial and household appliances, including air conditioners, furnaces, water heaters, stoves, clothes washers and dryers, refrigerators, dishwashers, light bulbs, and showerheads. Current law and regulations reduce consumer choice, drive up costs for consumer appliances, and emphasize energy efficiency to the exclusion of other important factors such as cycle time and reparability.
Department of State
Strong
Vector: 59%Pages: 214-216AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The bill strongly aligns with Project 2025's Department of State section by supporting continued U.S. involvement in countering Russian aggression in Ukraine through coordinated sanctions and energy diversification, reflecting the interventionist conservative viewpoint that prioritizes U.S. national security interests in Europe."
Key themes:Ukraine conflictRussian sanctionsenergy securityNATO coordinationcountering Russian aggression
— 182 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l One school of conservative thought holds that as Moscow’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine drags on, Russia presents major challenges to U.S. interests, as well as to peace, stability, and the post-Cold War security order in Europe. This viewpoint argues for continued U.S. involvement including military aid, economic aid, and the presence of NATO and U.S. troops if necessary. The end goal of the conflict must be the defeat of Russian President Vladimir Putin and a return to pre-invasion border lines. l Another school of conservative thought denies that U.S. Ukrainian support is in the national security interest of America at all. Ukraine is not a member of the NATO alliance and is one of the most corrupt nations in the region. European nations directly affected by the conflict should aid in the defense of Ukraine, but the U.S. should not continue its involvement. This viewpoint desires a swift end to the conflict through a negotiated settlement between Ukraine and Russia. l The tension between these competing positions has given rise to a third approach. This conservative viewpoint eschews both isolationism and interventionism. Rather, each foreign policy decision must first ask the question: What is in the interest of the American people? U.S. military engagement must clearly fall within U.S. interests; be fiscally responsible; and protect American freedom, liberty, and sovereignty, all while recognizing Communist China as the greatest threat to U.S. interests. Thus, with respect to Ukraine, continued U.S. involvement must be fully paid for; limited to military aid (while European allies address Ukraine’s economic needs); and have a clearly defined national security strategy that does not risk American lives. Regardless of viewpoints, all sides agree that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is unjust and that the Ukrainian people have a right to defend their homeland. Furthermore, the conflict has severely weakened Putin’s military strength and provided a boost to NATO unity and its importance to European nations. The next conservative President has a generational opportunity to bring res- olution to the foreign policy tensions within the movement and chart a new path forward that recognizes Communist China as the defining threat to U.S. interests in the 21st century. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Peace and stability in Northeast Asia are vital interests of the United States. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan are critical allies for ensuring a free and open Indo–Pacific. They are indispensable military, economic, diplomatic, and technology partners. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North — 183 — Department of State Korea) must be deterred from military conflict. The United States cannot permit the DPRK to remain a de facto nuclear power with the capacity to threaten the United States or its allies. This interest is both critical to the defense of the Amer- ican homeland and the future of global nonproliferation. The DPRK must not be permitted to profit from its blatant violations of international commitments or to threaten other nations with nuclear blackmail. Both interests can only be served if the U.S. disallows the DPRK’s rogue regime behavior. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS Western Hemisphere The United States has a vested interest in a relatively united and economically prosperous Western Hemisphere. Nonetheless, the region now has an overwhelm- ing number of socialist or progressive regimes, which are at odds with the freedom and growth-oriented policies of the U.S. and other neighbors and who increasingly pose hemispheric security threats. A new approach is therefore needed, one that simultaneously allows the U.S. to re-posture in its best interests and helps regional partners enter a new century of growth and opportunity. The following core policies must be part of this new direction: l A “sovereign Mexico” policy. Mexico is currently a national security disaster. Bluntly stated, Mexico can no longer qualify as a first-world nation; it has functionally lost its sovereignty to muscular criminal cartels that effectively run the country. The current dynamic is not good for either U.S. citizens or Mexicans, and the perfect storm created by this cartel state has negative effects that are damaging the entire hemisphere. The next Administration must both adopt a posture that calls for a fully sovereign Mexico and take all steps at its disposal to support that result in as rapid a fashion as possible. l A fentanyl-free frontier. The same cartels that parasitically run Mexico are also working with the PRC to fuel the largest drug crisis in the history of North America. These Mexican cartels are working closely with Chinese fentanyl precursor chemical manufacturers, importing those precursor chemicals into Mexico, manufacturing fentanyl on Mexican soil, and shipping it into the United States and elsewhere. The highly potent narcotic is having an unprecedented lethal impact on the American citizenry. The next Administration must leverage its new insistence on a sovereign Mexico and work with other Western Hemisphere partners to halt the fentanyl crisis and put a decisive end to this unprecedented public health threat.
Department of Energy and Related Commissions
Moderate
Vector: 58%Pages: 446-448AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The bill and the Project 2025 DOE section both address energy security and reducing reliance on Russian fossil fuels, and they reference the DOE's role in international energy affairs, though the bill focuses on foreign sanctions while the Project 2025 text outlines domestic DOE programs and missions."
Key themes:energy securityRussian energy sanctionsinternational cooperationDOE Office of International AffairsREPowerEU alignment
— 413 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 62. U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Management Program, “About the Federal Energy Management Program: Mission and Stakeholders,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/about-federal-energy- management-program (accessed February 13, 2023). 63. See, for example, 42 U.S. Code § 8252, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8252 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8253, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8253 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8254, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8254 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8255, https://www.law. cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8255 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8256, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ text/42/8256 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8257, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8257 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8258, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8258 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8259b, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8258b (accessed February 13, 2023); § 15852, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/15852 (accessed February 13, 2023); and § 17143, https://www. law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/17143 (accessed February 13, 2023). 64. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13834, “Efficient Federal Operations,” May 17, 2018, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 99 (May 22, 2018), pp. 23771–23774, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-05- 22/pdf/2018-11101.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 65. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “FY 2022 Request Overview Briefing,” June 2021, p. 11, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/FY2022-EERE-budget-request- energy-efficiency.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 66. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 21. 67. U.S. Department of Energy, Clean Energy Corps, “Careers,” https://www.energy.gov/CleanEnergyCorps (accessed March 13, 2023). 68. Ibid. 69. U.S. Department of Energy, “DOE Kicks Off Recruitment to Support Implementation of Bipartisan Infrastructure Law,” January 13, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-kicks-recruitment-support- implementation-bipartisan-infrastructure-law (accessed March 13, 2023). 70. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “About EIA,” https://www.eia.gov/about/ (accessed February 13, 2023). 71. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Levelized Costs of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2022,” March 2022, p. 1, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_ generation.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 72. U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2016, April 2018, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy. pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 73. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 24, and 105. 74. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “Mission: Our Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/ia/ our-mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 75. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “Priorities: Our Objectives,” https://www.energy. gov/ia/priorities (accessed February 13, 2023). 76. Editorial Board, “Biden Signs Up for Climate Reparations,” The Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-signs-up-for-climate-change-reparations-europe-fund-un-john-kerry- poor-countries-bank-capitalism-11668974219 (accessed February 13, 2023). 77. U.S. Department of Energy, Arctic Energy Office, “About the Arctic Energy Office,” https://www.energy.gov/ arctic/about-arctic-energy-office (accessed March 1, 2023). 78. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, The White House, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 79. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence website, https://www.energy.gov/ intelligence/office-intelligence-and-counterintelligence (accessed February 13, 2023). 80. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Policy, “Publications,” https://www.energy.gov/policy/office-policy (accessed February 13, 2023). — 414 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 81. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Technology Transitions, “About Us: Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/ technologytransitions/mission-0 (accessed February 13, 2023). 82. Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR); Basic Energy Sciences (BES); Biological and Environmental Research (BER); Fusion Energy Sciences (FES); High-Energy Physics (HEP); Nuclear Physics (NP); Isotope R&D and Production (IRP); and Accelerator R&D and Production (ARDAP). U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 5, Science, April 2022, pp. 10–14, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-5- science-v2.pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 83. For example, the CHIPS and Science Act authorizes $50 billion for the Office of Science. U.S. Department of Energy, “Statement by Secretary Granholm on Congressional Passage of the CHIPS and Science Act,” July 28, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/statement-secretary-granholm-congressional-passage-chips-and- science-act (accessed February 13, 2023). 84. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 5, Science, April 2022, p. 7, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/doe- fy2023-budget-volume-5-science-v2.pdf (accessed March 2, 2023). 85. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, “Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/em/ mission (accessed March 1, 2023). 86. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, “Cleanup Sites,” https://www.energy.gov/ em/cleanup-sites (accessed March 1, 2023). 87. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “DOE’s Environmental Liability,” GAO-21-585R, June 2021, p. 2, https:// www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-585r.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 88. Chart, “EM’s Annual Spending and Estimated Environmental Liability (Fiscal Years 2011–2020),” in ibid., p. 1. 89. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 6, Environmental Management, April 2022, p. 53, https://www.energy.gov/sites/ default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-6-em-v3.pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 90. Ibid. 91. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Waste: DOE Needs Greater Leadership Stability and Commitment to Accomplish Cleanup Mission, GAO-22-104805, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104805. pdf#:~:text=DOE%20Needs%20Greater%20Leadership%20Stability%20and%20Commitment%20to,May%20 2022%20GAO-22-104805%20United%20States%20Government%20Accountability%20Office May 2022, (accessed February 14, 2023). 92. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 93. 93. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, Title I, Subtitle B. 94. Ibid., Title III, § 304. 95. See, for example, Chapter 4, “The Need for Geologic Disposal,” in Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, January 2012, pp. 27–31, https://www.energy.gov/sites/ default/files/2013/04/f0/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). 96. Press release, “DOE Announces $16 Million to Support Consent-Based Siting for Spent Nuclear Fuel,” U.S. Department of Energy, September 20, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-16-million- support-consent-based-siting-spent-nuclear-fuel (accessed February 14, 2023). 97. U.S. Department of Energy, Agency Financial Report, Fiscal Year 2022, DOE/CF-0191, p. 58, https://www. energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/fy-2022-doe-agency-financial-report.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 98. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, Title III, § 302. 99. Ibid., p. 57. 100. Table, “Department of Energy Comparative Organization by Congressional Control, FY 2023,” p. 5, in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, “FY 2023 Budget Justification: Summary Budget Documents,” https://www.energy.gov/cfo/articles/fy-2023-budget-justification (accessed March 13, 2023). 101. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Missions,” https://www.energy.gov/ nnsa/missions#:~:text=NNSA%20ensures%20the%20United%20States%20maintains%20a%20safe%2C,of%20 nuclear%20and%20radiological%20terrorism%20around%20the%20world (accessed March 2, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.