A resolution expressing condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party's persecution of religious minority groups, including Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists and the detention of Pastor "Ezra" Jin Mingri and leaders of the Zion Church, and reaffirming the United States' global commitment to promote religious freedom and tolerance.

— 787 — Trade attempts to negotiate with the CCP to strategically decoupling economically and financially from Communist China. The Fruitlessness of Further Negotiations. If the past is prologue, and as we learned during the Trump Administration, any further negotiations with Com- munist China are likely to be both fruitless and dangerous: fruitless because the CCP now has a very well-established reputation for bargaining in bad faith and dangerous because as long as the CCP’s aggression continues, it will further weaken America’s manufacturing and defense industrial base and global supply chains. The record regarding Communist China’s bad-faith negotiating is clear. In September 2015, President Barack Obama stood with Xi Jinping in the White House Rose Garden where Xi solemnly promised not to militarize the South China Sea and agreed that Communist China would not conduct knowingly cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.31 Within a year, the first promise would be broken.32 As for Communist China’s cyberattacks on American busi- nesses, they have never stopped. Upon taking office in 2017, President Trump put on hold his 2016 campaign promise to put high tariffs on Chinese products immediately. Instead, as a gesture of good faith, he sought to negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement with China that would have addressed many of the issues raised in this discussion. By the middle of 2018, it was clear that the CCP had no intention of bargaining in good faith. As a result, on June 15, President Trump began to impose a series of tariffs33 on Chinese products that would eventually rise to cover more than $500 billion of Chinese imports. These tariffs would lead Communist China’s lead nego- tiator, Vice Premier Liu He, to agree tentatively in April of 2019 to what would have been the most comprehensive trade deal in global history.34 On May 3, 2019, however, Liu would renege on that 150-page deal and seek its drastic re-trading.35 Finally, on January 15, 2020, the U.S. and Communist China signed a “Phase One” deal that was a pale shadow of the original deal.36 This so-called Skinny Deal (as it was derisively and rightly called) combined proposed modest Communist Chinese reforms on issues related to forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft with promises of large-scale purchases of agricultural, manufactur- ing, and energy products. To date, this deal has been a predictable bust: Communist China has failed to consummate a significant fraction of its promised purchases and has made little or no progress on reforming its mercantilist, protectionist, and technology transfer–forcing policies. The clear lesson learned in both the Obama and Trump Administrations is that Communist China will never bargain in good faith with the U.S. to stop its aggres- sion. An equally clear lesson learned by President Trump, which he was ready to implement in a second term, was that the better policy option was to decouple both economically and financially from Communist China as further negotiations would indeed be both fruitless and dangerous. — 788 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise TABLE 6 Vectors of Communist China’s Economic Aggression in the Technology and IP Space 1. Physical Theft and Cyber-Enabled Theft of Technologies and IP • Physical Theft of Technologies and IP Through Economic Espionage • Cyber-Enabled Espionage and Theft • Evasion of U.S. Export Control Laws • Counterfeiting and Piracy • Reverse Engineering 2. Coercive and Intrusive Regulatory Gambits • Foreign Ownership Restrictions • Adverse Administrative Approvals and Licensing Requirements • Discriminatory Patent and Other IP Rights Restrictions • Security Reviews Force Technology and IP Transfers • Secure and Controllable Technology Standards • Data Localization Mandates • Burdensome and Intrusive Testing • Discriminatory Catalogues and Lists • Government Procurement Restrictions • Indigenous Technology Standards that Deviate from International Norms • Forced Research and Development • Antimonopoly Law Extortion • Expert Review Panels Force Disclosure of Proprietary Information • Chinese Communist Party Co-opts Corporate Governance • Placement of Chinese Employees with Foreign Joint Ventures 3. Economic Coercion • Export Restraints Restrict Access to Raw Materials • Monopsony Purchasing Power 4. Information Harvesting • Open-Source Collection of Science and Technology Information • Chinese Nationals in U.S. as Non-Traditional Information Collectors • Recruitment of Science, Technology, Business, and Finance Talent 5. State-Sponsored, Technology-Seeking Investment • Chinese State Actors Involved in Technology-Seeking FDI • Chinese Investment Vehicles Used to Acquire and Transfer U.S. Technologies and IP – Mergers and Acquisitions – Greenfi eld Investments – Seed and Venture Funding SOURCE: White House Offi ce of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse. archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). A heritage.org

— 820 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. “From China with Love: AI, Robotics, AR/VR Are Hot Areas for Chinese Investment In US,” CB Insights, August 1, 2017, https://www.cbinsights.com/research/chinese-investment-us-tech-expert-research/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 31. “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People's Republic of China in Joint Press Conference,” The White House, September 25, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- pressffice/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint (accessed February 25, 2023). 32. Ankit Panda, “It’s Official: Xi Jinping Breaks His Non-Militarization Pledge in the Spratlys,” The Diplomat, December 16, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/its-official-xi-jinping-breaks-his-non-militarization- pledge-in-the-spratlys/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 33. Press release, “USTR Issues Tariffs on Chinese Products in Response to Unfair Trade Practices,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, June 15, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press- releases/2018/june/ustr-issues-tariffs-chinese-products (accessed February 25, 2023). 34. Yen Nee Lee, “‘New Consensus’ Reached on US–China Trade, Says Chinese Vice Premier Liu He,” CNBC, updated April 5, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/05/us-china-trade-new-consensus-reached-says- chinas-liu-he.html (accessed February 25, 2023). 35. Reuters, “China Backtracked on Nearly All Aspects of US Trade Deal: Sources,” CNBC, May 8, 2019, https:// www.cnbc.com/2019/05/08/china-backtracked-on-nearly-all-aspects-of-us-trade-deal-sources.html (accessed February 25, 2023). 36. Fact Sheet, “Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, January 15, 2020, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/US_China_Agreement_Fact_Sheet.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 37. Warren Buffett, “Warren Buffett: Here’s How I Would Solve the Trade Problem,” Fortune, April 29, 2016, http:// fortune.com/2016/04/29/warren-buffett-foreign-trade/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 38. See, for example, Jeffrey Miron, “Forget the Wall Already, It’s Time for the U.S. to Have Open Borders,” Cato Institute Commentary, July 31, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/forget-wall-already- its-time-us-have-open-borders (accessed February 25, 2023); Scott Lincicome and Alfredo Carrillo Obregon, “The (Updated) Case for Free Trade,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 925, April 19, 2022, https://www.cato. org/sites/cato.org/files/2022-04/PA-925_2.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023); Katheryn Russ, “Yes, US Trade Agreements Led to Economic Gains, Especially in Services, New Report Says,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Trade and Investment Policy Watch Blog, July 20, 2021, https://www.piie.com/blogs/ trade-and-investment-policy-watch/yes-us-trade-agreements-led-economic-gains-especially (accessed February 25, 2023); Monica de Bolle, “Why Remittance Taxes to Finance a Border Wall Are a Bad Idea…for the US,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Realtime Economics Blog, January 10, 2017, https://www. piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/why-remittance-taxes-finance-border-wall-are-bad-idea-us (accessed February 25, 2023). 39. This is a key theme of the author’s White House memoir Taking Back Trump’s America: Why We Lost the White House and How We’ll Win It Back (New York and Nashville: Bombardier Books, 2022). 40. 19 U.S.C. § 1862, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1862 (accessed February 27, 2023). 41. For a historical example, see Douglas A. Irwin, “Did Late-Nineteenth-Century U.S. Tariffs Promote Infant Industries? Evidence from the Tinplate Industry,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 60, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 336–360, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2566374 (accessed February 21, 2023). For a recent example, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Eujin Jung, “The High Taxpayer Cost of ‘Saving’ US Jobs Through ‘Made in America,’” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Trade and Investment Policy Watch, August 5, 2020, https:// www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/high-taxpayer-cost-saving-us-jobs-through-made- america (accessed February 21, 2023). 42. Stephen J. Dubner, “Were Colonial Americans More Literate than Americans Today?” Freakonomics, September 1, 2011, https://freakonomics.com/2011/09/were-colonial-americans-more-literate-than- americans-today/ (accessed February 21, 2023). — 821 — Trade 43. Randy E. Barnett and Andrew Koppelman, “The Commerce Clause: Common Interpretation,” National Constitution Center, https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/articles/article-i/clauses/752 (accessed February 21, 2023); Randy E. Barnett, “The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause,” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 1 (2001), pp. 101–147, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=5074&context=uclrev (accessed February 21, 2023). 44. Wells King, “Rediscovering a Genuine American System,” American Compass, Rebooting the American System, May 4, 2020, https://americancompass.org/rediscovering-a-genuine-american-system/ (accessed February 21, 2023). See also Phillip W. Magness and James R. Harrigan, “Henry Clay’s ‘American System’ Is Bad News for the American Economy,” American Institute for Economic Research, December 8, 2022, https://www.aier.org/article/ henry-clays-american-system-is-bad-news-for-the-american-economy/ (accessed February 21, 2023), and Iain Murray, “The Founding Fathers and Free Trade,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, Open Market Blog, September 20, 2022, https://cei.org/blog/the-founding-fathers-and-free-trade/ (accessed February 21, 2023). 45. Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), pp. 147–154. 46. Ibid., p. 125. 47. Michael Urquhart, “The Employment Shift to Services: Where Did it Come From?” U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 107, No. 4 (April 1984), p. 16, https://stats.bls.gov/opub/ mlr/1984/04/art2full.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 48. H.R. 10378, Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Public Law 66-261, 66th Congress, June 5, 1920, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/41/STATUTE-41-Pg988.pdf (accessed February 22, 2023. 49. Tori K. Smith, “The Proof Is In: Tariffs Are Hurting the U.S.,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 27, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/the-proof-tariffs-are-hurting-the-us. 50. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030, January 2020, p. 33, https:// www.cbo.gov/publication/56073 (accessed February 21, 2023). 51. H.R. 11970, Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Public Law No. 87-794, 87th Congress, October 11, 1962, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-76/pdf/STATUTE-76-Pg872.pdf (accessed February 22, 2023). 52. H.R. 10710, Trade Act of 1974, Public Law No. 93-618, 93rd Congress, January 3, 1975, https://www.congress. gov/93/statute/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg1978-2.pdf (accessed February 22, 2023). 53. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/ (accessed February 22, 2023). 54. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Eujin Jung, “Steel Profits Gain, but Steel Users Pay, Under Trump’s Protectionism,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Trade and Investment Policy Watch, December 20, 2018, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/steel-profits-gain-steel-users-pay-under- trumps (accessed February 21, 2023). 55. Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, “New China Tariffs Increase Costs to U.S. Households,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics Blog, May 23, 2019, https://libertystreeteconomics. newyorkfed.org/2019/05/new-china-tariffs-increase-costs-to-us-households/ (accessed February 21, 2023). 56. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED), Series CLF16OV, “Civilian Labor Force Level,” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CLF16OV (accessed February 21, 2023). 57. Stephen Morgan, “Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Exports of Agricultural Commodities,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Amber Waves, March 7, 2022, https://www.ers.usda. gov/amber-waves/2022/march/retaliatory-tariffs-reduced-u-s-states-exports-of-agricultural-commodities/ (accessed February 21, 2023). 58. Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce, “Disentangling the Effects of the 2018–2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 2019-086, December 23, 2019, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/ files/2019086pap.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Data Tools: Industries at a Glance: Primary Metal Manufacturing: NAICS 331,” data extracted February 17, 2023, https://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag331.htm (accessed February 21, 2023). 59. Ryan Young, “Lessons from the GM layoffs: End the Tariffs and the Subsidies,” Fox Business, November 28, 2018, https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/lessons-from-the-gm-layoffs-end-the-tariffs-and-the-subsidies (accessed February 21, 2023).

— 814 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Its beneficiaries have proven they can get adequate financing from private banks. EXIM’s charter expires at the end of 2026. The agency will close automatically unless Congress and the President decide to extend it. Closing EXIM should be one of the next Administration’s easiest decisions. Adopting a Multi-Pronged China Strategy. An effective American policy toward China needs to take a realistic view of the country, its leaders, their strengths, and the serious challenges they face. It should be comprehensive and flexible. A threatened CCP is dangerous, perhaps now more than at any time since Mao Tse-Tung, as Xi Jinping continues to use strong-arm tactics to consolidate his power and saber-rattling to challenge the international order. At the same time, recent revelations about China’s official statistics overstating its GDP by 30 percent track well with other problems that were already known.77 These include one of the world’s worst demographic aging curves thanks to China’s one-child policy; a population that may already be declining; an unsustainable debt load that is already causing problems; countless failed boondoggles, from empty cities to its underwhelming Belt-and-Road Initiative, that are wasting significant resources; Xi Jinping’s authoritarian turn; increasing state control of the economy; and a zero-COVID policy that has sabotaged the economy and driven away foreign investment.78 America has its problems, but it is in better shape than China on nearly every measure, especially in the long run. While the facts on the ground should inoculate the next Administration against the most strident China fearmongering circulating in the media and in Washington, that does not mean that the government in Beijing is no threat to American interests. The question is: What should we do about it? A serious China policy will require American policymakers to integrate doc- trines, institutional prerogatives, expertise, and realistic objectives. Traditional Cabinet-level bureaucracies like those at the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce will need to work together to pursue a comprehensive American strat- egy. Scores of incremental, narrowly targeted policies are necessary. They will not make for good soundbites on cable news, and many will operate slowly and out of sight from most news cycles even as progress is made. An effective China policy must also allow for adaptation because the CCP will not sit idly by. As people react to developments, America needs flexible options. Trade isolationism is inherently inflexible because it reduces the number of con- tact points with China. This is a tougher political sell than loud, simplistic jeremiads, but going the extra mile to solve these difficult coordination problems is vital to America’s interests. Trade and engagement with China are necessary if we are to contain the threats that China poses to its neighbors and to the U.S. The next Administration should: — 815 — Trade l End China’s developing-nation status in the WTO and other international organizations. China is an advanced manufacturing economy and should be treated as such, even if its political and legal institutions remain those of a developing nation, to prevent it from exploiting its status to gain special privileges. l Use a target, not a blanket. There should be actions against Chinese firms that are known to have engaged in unfair trade practices such as intellectual property theft. Rather than blanket tariffs or non-tariff barriers aimed at entire Chinese industry sectors, firms that act in bad faith should be targeted individually. This policy was employed to good effect early in the Trump Administration but was abandoned in favor of a less effective blanket tariff policy. l Rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Dropping out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement might have been the Trump Administration’s biggest trade policy mistake. The TPP was already negotiated and would have strengthened an alliance against China, including most of its biggest trading partners in East Asia and the Americas. America’s departure created tensions and infighting, distracting the U.S. and its allies from the goal at hand: countering China. The other 11 TPP countries continue, without American input or influence, under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPATPP) to develop a modern institutional framework to contain Chinese commercial imperialism. Rejoining this alliance should be a top priority in the next conservative Administration’s China policy. Accession negotiations are likely to be difficult, given that the CPATPP suspended several clauses that were important to the United States (such as provisions relating to patents and aspects of investor-state dispute resolution) when the U.S. pulled out of the TPP agreement in 2017. Diplomatic and economic pressure against Beijing will be more effective when its largest trading partners work in concert. Beijing’s diplomats will have a hard time employing a divide-and-conquer policy against a united front of the sort that the TPP offers. l Refocus the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity on trade. President Biden began the process to create IPEF in 2022, but any agreement will likely still be under negotiation when the next Administration takes office. IPEF is similar to the TPP, but its member