A resolution calling on the Government of Panama to expel officials and interests of the People's Republic of China and terminate Chinese management of key Panamanian ports.
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Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO]
ID: S001227
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Bill Summary
Another brilliant example of congressional theater, where our esteemed leaders pretend to care about national security while actually serving the interests of their corporate overlords.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** This resolution is a masterclass in grandstanding, masquerading as a genuine concern for national security. The main purpose is to "express profound concern" (read: virtue signal) about China's influence in Panama and demand that Panama expel Chinese officials and terminate their management of key ports.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The resolution calls on the Government of Panama to:
1. Reaffirm its commitment to the Neutrality Treaty, which is a nice way of saying "do what we tell you." 2. Review and terminate agreements with Chinese state-owned enterprises or China-based private entities. 3. Expel all officials from the People's Republic of China operating within Panamanian ports and critical infrastructure projects.
The resolution also urges the US Government to:
1. Leverage provisions in the Neutrality Treaty to monitor and address threats to the neutrality of the Panama Canal (because we need more excuses for military intervention). 2. Provide technical, financial, and strategic support to Panama as it seeks to assert sovereignty over its critical infrastructure (read: bribe them with aid).
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
1. China: The boogeyman du jour. 2. Panama: A country that's been reduced to a pawn in the great game of geopolitics. 3. US corporations: Who will benefit from the increased "security" and "stability" provided by this resolution (read: more contracts for defense contractors). 4. Lobbyists: Who will reap the rewards of their efforts to shape this resolution.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This resolution is a thinly veiled attempt to:
1. Justify increased US military presence in the region. 2. Undermine China's growing influence in Latin America. 3. Provide a pretext for future interventions and regime changes. 4. Enrich defense contractors and other corporate interests.
In short, this resolution is a cynical exercise in fear-mongering, designed to distract from the real issues facing our nation while serving the interests of those who actually run the show.
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 89 â Section 2: The Common Defense The solution to this problem is strong political leadership. Skinner writes, âThe next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the President and, thereby, the American people.â Because the Senate has been extraordinarily lax in fulfilling its constitutional obligation to confirm presidential appointees, she recommends putting appointees into acting roles until such time as the Senate confirms them. Skinner writes that State should also stop skirting the Constitutionâs trea- ty-making requirements and stop enforcing âagreementsâ as treaties. It should encourage more trade with allies, particularly with Great Britain, and less with adversaries. And it should implement a âsovereign Mexicoâ policy, as our neighbor âhas functionally lost its sovereignty to muscular criminal cartels that effectively run the country.â In Africa, Skinner writes, the U.S. âshould focus on core security, economic, and human rightsâ rather than impose radical abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives. Divisive symbols such as the rainbow flag or the Black Lives Matter flag have no place next to the Stars and Stripes at our embassies. When it comes to China, Skinner writes that âa policy of âcompete where we must, but cooperate where we canââŚhas demonstrably failed.â The Peopleâs Repub- lic of Chinaâs (PRC) âaggressive behavior,â she writes, âcan only be curbed through external pressure.â Efforts to protect or excuse China must stop. She observes, â[M]any were quick to dismiss even the possibility that COVID escaped from a Chinese research laboratory.â Meanwhile, Skinner writes, â[g]lobal leaders includ- ing President Joe BidenâŚhave tried to normalize or even laud Chinese behavior.â She adds, âIn some cases, these voices, like global corporate giants BlackRock and Disneyââor the National Basketball Association (NBA)ââdirectly benefit from doing business with Beijing.â Former vice president of the U.S. Agency for Global Media Mora Namdar writes in Chapter 8 that we need to have people working for USAGM who actually believe in America, rather than allowing the agencies to function as anti-American, tax- payer-funded entities that parrot our adversariesâ propaganda and talking points. Former acting deputy secretary of homeland security Ken Cuccinelli says in Chap- ter 5 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a creation of the George W. Bush era, should be closed, as it has added needless additional bureaucracy and expense without corresponding benefit. He recommends that it be replaced with a new âstand-alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet levelâ and that the remaining parts of DHS be distributed among other departments. Former chief of staff for the director of National Intelligence Dustin Carmack writes in Chapter 7 that the U.S. Intelligence Community is too inclined to look in the rearview mirror, engage in âgroupthink,â and employ an âoverly cautiousâ approach aimed at personal approval rather than at offering the most accurate, unvarnished intelligence for the benefit of the country. And in Chapter 9, former acting deputy administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development Max
Introduction
â 89 â Section 2: The Common Defense The solution to this problem is strong political leadership. Skinner writes, âThe next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the President and, thereby, the American people.â Because the Senate has been extraordinarily lax in fulfilling its constitutional obligation to confirm presidential appointees, she recommends putting appointees into acting roles until such time as the Senate confirms them. Skinner writes that State should also stop skirting the Constitutionâs trea- ty-making requirements and stop enforcing âagreementsâ as treaties. It should encourage more trade with allies, particularly with Great Britain, and less with adversaries. And it should implement a âsovereign Mexicoâ policy, as our neighbor âhas functionally lost its sovereignty to muscular criminal cartels that effectively run the country.â In Africa, Skinner writes, the U.S. âshould focus on core security, economic, and human rightsâ rather than impose radical abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives. Divisive symbols such as the rainbow flag or the Black Lives Matter flag have no place next to the Stars and Stripes at our embassies. When it comes to China, Skinner writes that âa policy of âcompete where we must, but cooperate where we canââŚhas demonstrably failed.â The Peopleâs Repub- lic of Chinaâs (PRC) âaggressive behavior,â she writes, âcan only be curbed through external pressure.â Efforts to protect or excuse China must stop. She observes, â[M]any were quick to dismiss even the possibility that COVID escaped from a Chinese research laboratory.â Meanwhile, Skinner writes, â[g]lobal leaders includ- ing President Joe BidenâŚhave tried to normalize or even laud Chinese behavior.â She adds, âIn some cases, these voices, like global corporate giants BlackRock and Disneyââor the National Basketball Association (NBA)ââdirectly benefit from doing business with Beijing.â Former vice president of the U.S. Agency for Global Media Mora Namdar writes in Chapter 8 that we need to have people working for USAGM who actually believe in America, rather than allowing the agencies to function as anti-American, tax- payer-funded entities that parrot our adversariesâ propaganda and talking points. Former acting deputy secretary of homeland security Ken Cuccinelli says in Chap- ter 5 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a creation of the George W. Bush era, should be closed, as it has added needless additional bureaucracy and expense without corresponding benefit. He recommends that it be replaced with a new âstand-alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet levelâ and that the remaining parts of DHS be distributed among other departments. Former chief of staff for the director of National Intelligence Dustin Carmack writes in Chapter 7 that the U.S. Intelligence Community is too inclined to look in the rearview mirror, engage in âgroupthink,â and employ an âoverly cautiousâ approach aimed at personal approval rather than at offering the most accurate, unvarnished intelligence for the benefit of the country. And in Chapter 9, former acting deputy administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development Max â 90 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Primorac asserts that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) must be reformed, writing, âThe Biden Administration has deformed the agency by treating it as a global platform to pursue overseas a divisive political and cultural agenda that promotes abortion, climate extremism, gender radicalism, and interventions against perceived systematic racism.â If the recommendations in the following chapters are adopted, what Skinner says about the State Department could be true for other parts of the federal gov- ernmentâs national security and foreign policy apparatus: The next conservative President has the opportunity to restructure the making and execution of U.S. defense and foreign policy and reset the nationâs role in the world. The recom- mendations outlined in this section provide guidance on how the next President should use the federal governmentâs vast resources to do just that.
Introduction
â 826 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise moderate content in good faithââin a way that eliminates the expansive, non-tex- tual immunities that courts have read into the statute.â In addition to taking unilateral action, Carr says, the FCC should work with Congress on legislative changes to ensure that âInternet companies no longer have carte blanche to censor protected speech while maintaining their Section 230 protections.â Carr writes that during the Trump Administration, the FCC took an âappro- priately strong approach to the national security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party.â The FCC put Huawei on its Covered List of entitiesâits list of those posing âan unacceptable riskâ to U.S. national security. Carr writes that TikTok also poses a âserious and unacceptableâ risk to U.S. national security, while providing âBeijing with an opportunity to run a foreign influence campaign by determining the news and information that the app feeds to millions of Americans,â and the next Administration should ban it. Whatâs more, Carr writes, âU.S. busi- nesses are aiding Beijingâoften unwittinglyââin its effort to become, by 2030, âthe global leader in artificial intelligence.â In part, they are doing so by providing âBei- jing access to their high-powered cloud computing services.â Carr asserts that âit is time for an Administration to put in place a comprehensive plan that aims to stop U.S. entities from directly or indirectly contributing to Chinaâs malign AI goals .â Former Federal Election Commissioner Hans von Spakovsky writes in Chap- ter 29 that while âthe authority of the President over the actions ofâ the Federal Election Commission âis extremely limited,â the President âmust ensure that the [Justice Department], just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear viola- tionsâ of the Federal Election Campaign Act. âThe department must not construe ambiguous provisionsâŚin a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity,â he writes. The FEC has six members, three from each party, and its determinations require a majorityâso, they require the support of at least one member of each party. DOJ should not âprosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situated individual has not violated the law,â writes von Spakovsky. Moreover, he writes that the âPresident should vigorously oppose all effortsââsuch as the language in the âFor the People Act of 2021âââto change the structure of the FECâ so that it would have an âodd numberâ of members. The current structure âensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being weaponized.â In Chapter 27, David R. Burton writes that the Securities and Exchange Com- mission (SEC) âshould be reducing impediments to capital formation, not radically increasing themâ by pushing a costly âclimate changeâ agenda, as it is doing under the Biden Administration. Discussing the Federal Trade Commission, Adam Can- deub writes in Chapter 30, âAntitrust law can combat dominant firmsâ baleful effects on democraticâ notionsââsuch as free speech, the marketplace of ideas, shareholder control, and managerial accountability as well as collusive behavior â 827 â Section 5: Independent Regulatory Agencies with government.â Under the Biden FTC, he writes, firms try âto get out of anti- trust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings.â Candeub says that state AGs âare far more responsive to their constituentsâ than the federal government generally is, and he recommends that the FTC establish a position in the chairmanâs office that is âfocused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, DC, to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTCâs jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth.â
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About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.