A resolution electing Robert M. Duncan, of the District of Columbia, as Secretary for the Majority of the Senate.

— 64 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe- cially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda. To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas, Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett. — 65 — Executive Office of the President of the United States ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed January 30, 2023). 2. James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 47, January 30, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Madison/01-10-02-0266 (accessed January 30, 2023). 3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A) and 1341(a)(1)(B), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341 (accessed January 30, 2023); § 1342, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342 (accessed January 30, 2023); and § 1517(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a) (accessed January 30, 2023). 4. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 5. Brent J. McIntosh, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 6. See Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Extending Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12866 to Independent Regulatory Agencies,” 43 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 8, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2020/12/30/2019-10-08-extend-reg-review.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 7. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 8. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13891, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235– 55238, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 9. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 20170, pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 10. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 11. See note 8, supra. 12. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55239–55243, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 13. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13893, “Increasing Government Accountability for Administrative Actions by Reinvigorating Administrative PAYGO,” October 10, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 200 (October 16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 14. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,” May 19, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 2020), pp. 31353–31356, esp. 31355, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 15. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13979, “Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 16. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13980, “Protecting Americans from Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6817–6820, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

— 34 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise There should be one Cabinet Secretary who reports to the Chief of Staff’s office, either directly or through a deputy chief, according to the chief’s preference and focus. The Cabinet Secretary maintains a direct relationship with all members of the Cabinet. The OCA further consists of deputies and special assistants who work with each department’s principal, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other senior staff. The OCA also connects the departments to WHO offices. The OCA coordinates with the Chief of Staff’s office and the Office of Communi- cations to promote the President’s agenda through the Cabinet departments and agencies. The Cabinet’s communications staffers are obviously another critical component of this operation. In prior Administrations, the OCA has played a vital role by tracking the Pres- ident’s agenda for the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs, and senior advisers. It has worked with each department and agency to advance policy priorities. In the future, amplifying this function would truly benefit both the President and the conser- vative movement. From time to time throughout an Administration, travel optics, ethics chal- lenges, and Hatch Act7 issues involving Cabinet members, deputies, and senior staffers can arise. The OCA is normally tasked with keeping the WHO informed of such developments and providing support if and when necessary. The ideal Cabinet Secretary will have exceptional organizational skills and be a seasoned political operative or attorney. Because many Cabinet officials have been former presidential candidates, governors, ambassadors, and Members of Congress, the ideal candidate should also possess the ability to interact with and persuade accomplished individuals. OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON (OPL) The OPL is critically important in building coalitions and support for the Pres- ident’s agenda across every aligned social, faith-based, minority, and economic interest group. It is a critical tool for shaping public opinion and keeping myriad supporters, as well as “frenemies” and opponents alike who are within reach, better informed. The OPL is a notably large office. It should have one Director who reports to the Chief of Staff’s office, either directly or through a deputy, according to the chief’s preference and focus. The Director must maintain relationships not only with other WHO heads, but also with the senior staff of every Cabinet department and agency. Since a President’s agenda is always in motion, it is important for the OPL to facilitate listening sessions to receive the views of the various leaders and mem- bers of key interest groups. The OPL should also have a sufficient number of deputies and special assistants to cover the vast number of disparate interest groups that are engaged daily. The — 35 — White House Office OPL has, by far, held more meetings in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB) and within the West Wing itself than any other office within the WHO. The OPL is the chief White House enforcer and gatekeeper among these var- ious interest groups. It has operated best whenever the Chief of Staff has given it permission to use both the proverbial “carrot” and the proverbial “stick.” To make this work, communication with the chief’s office is vital. Additionally, the OPL has had an outsized role in presidential scheduling and both official and political travel. The OPL Director should come from the President’s election campaign or Cap- itol Hill—but should not have deeply entrenched connections to a K Street entity or any other potential stakeholder. Some prior relationships can create real or perceived biases toward one group or another. The Director should be amiable, gregarious, highly organized, and willing to shoulder criticism and pushback from interest groups and other elements of the Administration. Unlike the Director, OPL deputies and special assistants need a deep under- standing of the capital, from K Street to Capitol Hill. They should have extensive experience in private industry, the labor sector, the conservative movement, and among the specific interest groups with which they will be asked to engage on behalf of the White House. OPL staffers work with more external and internal parties than any other WHO staffers. In turn, they must be effective communicators and initiative-takers. They must also be able to influence, persuade, and—most important—listen to various stakeholders and ensure that they feel heard. All OPL staffers must understand from the outset that their jobs might be modified or even phased out entirely as the Administration’s priorities change. OFFICE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS (IGA) The IGA connects the White House to state, county, local, and tribal govern- ments. In other words, it is the one-stop shop for disseminating an Administration’s agenda to all non–federal government entities. The IGA should have a Director to whom one or two Deputy Directors report. The Director must ensure that the White House remains connected to all non– federal government entities. The interests and perspectives of these entities are represented in policy discussions, organized events with the West Wing, EOP senior staff, and IGA staff throughout the departments and agencies. The IGA can be staffed in a variety of ways, but two arrangements are most common: l Each deputy and that deputy’s staffers are responsible for a type of government. l A group of staffers is responsible for a specific geographical region of the country.

— 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner. — 867 — Federal Election Commission ENDNOTES 1. 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. 2. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1). 3. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(c) and (d). 4. Bradley A. Smith and Stephen M. Hoersting, “A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission,” 1 Election Law Journal 2 (2002), p. 162. 5. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2). 6. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1). 7. Former Commissioner Steven Walther (2006–2022) was listed nominally as an independent but he was recommended to President George W. Bush for nomination by former Nevada Sen. Harry Reid (D) and almost always voted in line with the Democrat commissioners on the FEC. 8. Hans von Spakovsky served as a commissioner from 2006 to 2007 in a recess appointment. While no other nominee has been rejected by the Senate, the tradition of bipartisan voice vote confirmation has largely ended. Two Republican nominees—Allen Dickerson and Sean Cooksey—were confirmed on party-line votes in 2020. And one Democrat—Dara Lindenbaum—was confirmed with the support of only six Republican senators in 2022. 9. The term of the 6th Commissioner, Dara Lindenbaum (D), will expire on April 30, 2027. 10. 52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(6). 11. “Statement of Chairman Allen J. Dickerson and Commissioners Sean J. Cooksey and James E. ‘Trey’ Trainor, III Regarding Concluded Enforcement Matters,” Federal Election Commission (May 13, 2022), https://www. fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/Redacted_Statement_Regarding_Concluded_Matters_13_ May_2022_Redacted.pdf. 12. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 13. It should be noted, however, that the constitutional authority of a President to, among other things, remove appointees and direct the actions of independent agencies is a hotly contested and increasingly litigated issue. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); and Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021). 14. H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021–2022). 15. Bradley A. Smith and Stephen M. Hoersting, “A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission,” 1 Election Law Journal 2 (2002), p. 171. 16. Id.