Sponsored by
Sen. Cruz, Ted [R-TX]
ID: C001098
Follow the money
The bill
SJRES. 3, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of the Treasury" section, p. 739-741 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Message received in Senate: Returned to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of H.Res. 212.
March 11, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
The "Gross Proceeds Reporting by Brokers That Regularly Provide Services Effectuating Digital Asset Sales" rule is a mouthful, isn't it? Sounds like a bunch of bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo designed to confuse and intimidate. But fear not, dear citizens, for I'm here to translate this gibberish into plain English.
In short, the IRS wants brokers who deal with digital assets (think cryptocurrencies) to report gross proceeds from these transactions. Simple enough, right? Wrong! This bill is a classic case of "legislative lupus" – it's a symptom of a deeper disease: the government's insatiable hunger for control and revenue.
The real motivation behind this rule is not to protect consumers or prevent tax evasion (although those are nice soundbites). No, no. It's about one thing: money. The IRS wants its cut of the digital asset pie, and it's willing to strangle innovation with red tape to get it.
Now, let's examine the "affected industries and sectors." Ah, yes! The usual suspects: cryptocurrency exchanges, brokerages, and other financial institutions that deal with digital assets. These poor souls will have to navigate a Byzantine compliance regime, complete with timelines, reporting requirements, and penalties for non-compliance. Joy!
But wait, there's more! The enforcement mechanisms are where things get really interesting. The IRS will be empowered to impose fines, penalties, and even revoke licenses for non-compliant brokers. Ah, the sweet taste of bureaucratic overreach!
As for economic and operational impacts, let me put it this way: this rule is a cancer that will metastasize throughout the digital asset ecosystem. It will stifle innovation, drive businesses offshore, and create a black market for those who refuse to play by the government's rules.
In conclusion, SJRES 3 is a textbook case of "regulatory rheumatism" – a chronic condition characterized by stiffness, pain, and limited mobility (in this case, the ability of businesses to operate freely). The diagnosis? A bad case of government greed, with symptoms including bureaucratic overreach, stifling innovation, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy.
Treatment? Well, that's simple: a strong dose of skepticism, a dash of critical thinking, and a healthy disdain for the legislative process. But don't worry, folks; I'm sure our esteemed lawmakers will continue to peddle their snake oil, and we'll all just have to suffer through it.
Sen. Cruz, Ted [R-TX]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
No individual contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: L000571
Top Contributors
10
ID: H000601
Top Contributors
10
ID: T000476
Top Contributors
10
ID: S001232
Top Contributors
10
ID: B001305
Top Contributors
10
ID: M001242
Top Contributors
10
ID: C001114
Top Contributors
10
ID: C001095
Top Contributors
10
ID: L000577
Top Contributors
10
ID: B001299
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 50 nodes and 45 connections (37 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $1,628,859
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
The joint resolution disapproves an IRS rule requiring gross proceeds reporting by brokers that regularly provide services effectuating digital asset sales. Disapproval of this reporting rule benefits crypto/fintech firms by reducing regulatory compliance burdens and avoiding expanded reporting requirements on digital asset transactions.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"SJRES 3 aligns with Project 2025's goal of reducing burdensome financial regulations by seeking to nullify an IRS rule that would increase reporting requirements on digital asset brokers, reflecting a broader skepticism toward costly AML-CFT compliance measures. Both emphasize reducing regulatory overreach that disproportionately affects smaller financial entities and question the efficacy of current enforcement frameworks."
— 707 — Department of the Treasury There were 2 .7 million suspicious activity reports (SARs) filed in 2021.60 The number of CTRs filed were approximately 10 times that number.61 In 2014, FinCEN anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) rules cost an estimated $5 billion to $8 billion per year.62 Undoubtedly, this cost is now substantially higher both because of inflation and because the rules have become more onerous.63 Yet there is little evidence that this massive expenditure of resources is doing much good,64 and there is no evidence regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. The AML-CFT regime is a major contributing factor causing the decline in the number of small broker-deal- ers and the decline in the competitiveness of community banks. Congress must require FinCEN to annually publish data regarding: l The number of SARs filed; l The number of CTRs filed;65 l The number of AML-CFT prosecutions, disaggregating those in which the AML-CFT prosecution is stand-alone and in which the prosecution is an add-on count connected to other predicate crime;66 l The number of AML-CFT convictions (similarly disaggregated); l The number and aggregate amount of AML-CFT fines imposed and the type of institution upon which the fine was imposed; and l Annual estimates of the aggregate costs imposed on private entities by the AML-CFT regime.67 Without this data, it is impossible for policymakers to make an informed judg- ment about the effectiveness of the AML-CFT regime. Congress should also require both FinCEN and the Government Accountability Office to undertake separate evaluations regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. FinCEN should be required to undertake a thorough retrospec- tive review of its regulations and various statutory requirements and report to Congress on its findings in a publicly available report. Anecdotes and assurances from FinCEN staff that all is well—but that even more onerous requirements are needed—are not enough. Congress should repeal the Corporate Transparency Act, and FinCEN should withdraw its poorly written and overbroad beneficial ownership reporting rule. Both are targeted at the smallest businesses in the U.S. (those with 20 or fewer employees) and will do nothing material to impede criminal finance.68 The FinCEN — 708 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise beneficial ownership reporting rule will impose costs exceeding $1 billion annu- ally and is exceedingly poorly drafted.69 FinCEN itself estimates that more than 33 million businesses will be affected and that costs will be $547 million to $8.1 billion annually.70 THE “EQUITY” AGENDA Under the Biden Administration, the Treasury Department has appointed a Counselor for Racial Equity, established an Advisory Committee on Racial Equity, and created an office for Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility. All these should be eliminated. Treasury has created several new offices to promote “equity” and has made this its first of five strategic goals in its Fiscal Year 2022–2226 Strategic Plan. “Equity” is identified as a cross-cutting theme in 15 of 19 of the plan’s objectives. The avowed purpose of these initiatives is to implement policies that delib- erately favor some races or ethnicities over others. The casual acceptance and rapid spread of racist policymaking in the federal government must be forcefully opposed and reversed. The next conservative Administration should take affirma- tive steps to expose and eradicate the practice of critical race theory and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) throughout the Treasury Department. These steps will include: l Identify every Treasury official who participated in DEI initiatives and interview him or her for the purpose of determining the scope and nature of these initiatives and to ensure that such initiatives are completely ended. l Make public immediately all communications relating to the work of the Treasury’s critical race theory and DEI initiatives. l Treat the participation in any critical race theory or DEI initiative, without objecting on constitutional or moral grounds, as per se grounds for termination of employment. l Expose and make public all training materials and initiatives designed to single out any race, ethnicity, or sex for special treatment. The Administration should eliminate the 25-member Treasury Advisory Com- mittee on Racial Equity. CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISK Treasury has created a new departmental office, “Climate Hub,” and has made “combating climate change” one of the Biden Treasury Department’s top five
AI Analysis:
"SJRES 3 aligns with Project 2025's call for clearer regulatory treatment of digital assets by opposing IRS overreach in digital asset reporting, supporting the broader goal of reducing burdensome and unclear regulation in the digital asset space, which Project 2025 argues has been mishandled by agencies like the SEC and CFTC."
— 834 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as a swap execution facility (SEF) under Sections 2(i)27 and 5h28 of the CEA. Currently, it is not clear whether having one or a small number of U.S. participants would require SEF registration under prior staff guidance, which has led foreign swap trading platforms to exclude all U.S. persons from their platforms or to go through the process of seeking an exemption from registration. l Amend Section 2 of the CEA to authorize the CFTC Chairman to remove the agency’s Executive Director without a Commission vote. l To augment Commissioners’ independence, establish funding amounts for the Commissioners’ offices by statute with adjustments for inflation, with no requirement for a Commissioner to obtain budget or expense approvals from the Chairman or the agency’s administrative staff. The CFTC should: l Allocate more resources to core agency functions rather than ancillary and support operations. l Replace the existing position limits rule, which reduces liquidity and makes markets more volatile, with further delegation of authority to the exchanges to set position limits and position accountability levels where appropriate for the relevant market. l Reduce overly prescriptive rules implementing the CFTC’s core principles. l Apply the definitions of “U.S. Person” and “Guarantee” in the CFTC’s 2020 rule on cross-border application of swaps regulations (2020 Cross-Border Rule)29 to the regulatory requirements that remain covered by the CFTC’s 2013 guidance on the subject (2013 Guidance).30 Currently, the definition of each of these foundational terms differs depending on whether the requirement in question is covered by the 2020 Cross-Border Rule or the 2013 Guidance. l Remove the regulatory categories of “affiliate conduit” and “foreign consolidated subsidiary” from the 2013 Guidance and the CFTC’s cross- border rule on margin for uncleared swaps,31 respectively. These categories were replaced by the concept of a “Significant Risk Subsidiary” for purposes of the 2020 Cross-Border Rule because of widespread market confusion and compliance difficulties arising from their broad and vague scope. — 835 — Financial Regulatory Agencies DIGITAL ASSETS Both the SEC and the CFTC have been irresponsible actors in the digital asset area. They have had more than a decade to promulgate rules governing digital assets, yet the SEC has utterly failed to do so, and the CFTC has provided only minimal guidance. Instead, both agencies have chosen regulation by enforce- ment—and have done it poorly. They neither adequately protect investors nor provide responsible market participants with the regulatory environment that they need to thrive. The SEC and CFTC should clarify the treatment of digital assets (coins or tokens). Specifically, they should: l Promulgate a joint regulation providing that a holder of digital assets may not be deemed a party to an investment contract or an investor in a common enterprise unless, while the enterprise is a going concern, the holder is entitled to a share of the earnings or profits of the common enterprise or a defined flow of payments from the common enterprise in consideration of the investment or unless, upon liquidation, the holder has rights against the assets of the common enterprise. Otherwise, the digital asset shall be deemed a commodity to be regulated by the CFTC, not the SEC. l Amend the definition of commodity to include digital assets that are not a security as so defined and amend the definition of security to make it clear that a certificate (digital, electronic, or otherwise) that represents ownership of commodities and is convertible into a physical commodity on demand is not a security but a commodity. In the absence of regulatory action, Congress should enact legislation that achieves these goals. IMPROVED REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND SROS Congress and the SEC need to conduct more robust oversight of self-regulatory organizations, and SROs need to be reformed; otherwise, as discussed above, SRO regulatory functions should be merged into the SEC. The SEC, FINRA itself, or Congress should: l In the absence of merging FINRA into the SEC as recommended, require that: 1. FINRA’s Board of Governors meetings be open to the public unless the board votes to meet in executive session.
AI Analysis:
"SJRES 3 aligns with Project 2025's goal of reducing burdensome IRS reporting requirements, particularly those affecting small businesses and increasing compliance costs, by seeking to nullify a rule that would expand gross proceeds reporting for digital asset brokers."
— 701 — Department of the Treasury administers these reporting programs, most of this expense is mandated by Con- gress, not the IRS. One of the primary reasons that Congress mandates ever-increasing infor- mation reporting is that the Treasury Department and the Joint Committee on Taxation staff almost always overestimate how much revenue will be gained from still more burdensome information reporting, and they do not estimate or report private compliance costs. Congress and the Treasury Department must undertake a serious review of the information reporting regime and reduce the burden on the public—especially small businesses. Small businesses suffer disproportionately from complexity and administrative burdens. Costs do not increase linearly with size, so elevated administrative costs have an adverse effect on the competitiveness of small firms. Budget. The operating budget of the IRS should be held constant in real terms. The resources allocated to the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate should be increased by at least 20 percent (about $44 million). The Office of Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion should be closed. Provided that IT management is changed; an effective, well-considered implementation plan is adopted; and serious oversight is put in place, additional resources dedicated solely to IT modernization may be warranted. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The Treasury Department should withdraw from Senate consideration the Protocol Amending the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.48 The protocol will lead to substantially more transnational identity theft, crime, industrial espionage, financial fraud, and suppression of political oppo- nents and religious or ethnic minorities by authoritarian and corrupt governments, including China, Colombia, Nigeria, and Russia. Unlike the original multilateral convention, the amended convention is open to all governments—including many that are either hostile to the United States, have serious corruption problems, or have inadequate privacy protections. The new Administration should also oppose the multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information.49 International organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, and the Inter- national Monetary Fund espouse economic theories and policies that are inimical to American free market and limited government principles. The global elites who operate the IMF regularly advance higher taxes and big centralized government. The IMF has intervened in American policy debates—and has even recommended that the U.S. raise taxes. The IMF’s record of advancing global financial stability has been mixed at best. Its development assistance and lending programs in third- world countries have more often than not retarded growth rather than advancing it. The Treasury Department plays an important role in these international institutions and should force reforms and new policies. The U.S., however, should — 702 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise withdraw from both the World Bank and the IMF and terminate its financial con- tribution to both institutions. If the U.S. is to provide economic assistance or humanitarian aid to other nations, it should do so unilaterally—not through the pass-throughs of international aid orga- nizations, non-governmental organizations, or other nations. These organizations and countries simply create expensive middle-men, while U.S. funds are intercepted before being distributed to those in need. Also, these foreign entities have interests that do not coincide with American national security and economic interests. FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY Treasury should make balancing the federal budget a mission-critical objective. The federal budget absorbs enormous resources from the economy, both in money taken from taxpayers and in money borrowed. The budget should be balanced by driving down federal spending while maintaining a strong national defense and not raising taxes. To reduce interest payments on the debt, Treasury should lock in current rel- atively low interest rates by issuing longer duration bonds, and even consider creating a 50-year treasury bill. Most of the federal debt rolls over on average about every three to four years. But interest rates, even with the latest Federal Reserve rate increases, are still below the 5 percent historical average. Treasury would thus save taxpayers money during the next several decades by issuing fewer short-term notes that will probably have to be rolled over at higher rates in the future. To promote transparency of finances, each year Americans should receive a financial statement of the U.S. government alerting citizens of the revenues, expen- ditures, deficit, and debt for the preceding fiscal year. The statement should also include this individual family’s pro-rata share of the debt based on family size. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS The Treasury must act more assertively in international financial institutions to protect and advance U.S. national interests—and oppose those that do not. It should employ a carrot-and-stick approach by increasing its activity and commitment to those financial institutions that are willing and able to adjust to this new approach and by zeroing out or potentially exiting those institutions that rely on U.S. capital while advancing agendas that run counter to U.S. interests. l A major emphasis of effecting this change must be the addition of a large new cadre of U.S. professionals and contractors at these international financial institutions. l The U.S. must insist on the hiring and support of this human capital as a condition to future funding.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.