A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the Department of the Treasury relating to the review of applications under the Bank Merger Act.

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Bill ID: 119/sjres/13
Last Updated: October 8, 2025

Sponsored by

Sen. Kennedy, John [R-LA]

ID: K000393

Follow the money

The bill

A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the Department of the Treasury relating to the review of applications under the Bank Merger Act.

SJRES. 13, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Sen. Kennedy, John [R-LA]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$223,920 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 875-878 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Became Public Law No: 119-19.

June 19, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed Senate

House Review

Passed Congress

Presidential Action

Became Law

📍 Current Status

This bill has become law!

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

SJRES 13 is a joint resolution that disapproves of a rule submitted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regarding bank mergers under the Bank Merger Act. Wow, what a thrilling title. I'm sure it kept you on the edge of your seat.

In reality, this bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the OCC's attempt to relax regulations and let banks run amok. The rule in question would have allowed for more streamlined reviews of bank mergers, making it easier for big banks to gobble up smaller ones. Because what could possibly go wrong with that?

But don't worry, Congress is here to "disapprove" of this rule, because they care deeply about the well-being of the American people. Or rather, they care deeply about the campaign contributions from the banking industry.

Let's examine the affected industries and sectors: big banks, community banks, and anyone who uses a bank (so, basically everyone). The OCC's original rule would have benefited large banks at the expense of smaller ones, but Congress is "protecting" us by disapproving it. How noble.

Compliance requirements? Timelines? Ha! This bill doesn't create any new regulations; it simply negates an existing one. It's a classic case of "do nothing, look busy." Enforcement mechanisms and penalties? Don't make me laugh. This is just a symbolic gesture to appease the masses.

Economic and operational impacts? Well, this bill will likely maintain the status quo, which means big banks will continue to dominate the market, and smaller banks will struggle to compete. But hey, at least Congress can claim they "did something."

In conclusion, SJRES 13 is a prime example of legislative lip service. It's a meaningless gesture designed to placate voters while allowing the banking industry to continue its merry way. I'm sure the OCC will just come up with another rule that benefits big banks, and Congress will pretend to be outraged all over again.

Diagnosis: Terminal case of regulatory capture, with symptoms of cowardice, stupidity, and a healthy dose of greed. Prognosis: more of the same.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Kennedy, John [R-LA]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$223,920
12 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$223,920

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
REITERMAN, MARY ELIZABETH
2 transactions
$34,800
2
VIVIAN, MICHAEL A
2 transactions
$34,800
3
JONES, SHIRLEY
2 transactions
$34,800
4
LACOSTE, ROGER
2 transactions
$34,800
5
LABEDZ, DAVID
3 transactions
$34,800
6
MAKI, NEIL JAMES
2 transactions
$10,025
7
COX, SANDY
2 transactions
$10,000
8
HENLEY, DOY
1 transaction
$8,354
9
HILL, VERNON
1 transaction
$7,529
10
HARTMAN, STEPHEN
1 transaction
$5,310
11
BRADDOCK, DAVID
1 transaction
$4,702
12
WHITE, JASON
1 transaction
$4,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Hagerty, Bill [R-TN]

ID: H000601

Top Contributors

10

1
WELDON
OrganizationWESTFIELD, NJ
$1,000
Mar 22, 2024
2
CARTER, JOY
AIRTECH INT'L • SALES
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$13,200
Jan 2, 2024
3
FULLER, CHRIS
TRANSCARD • OWNER
IndividualCHATTANOOGA, TN
$10,410
Aug 18, 2023
4
RADER, SALLY
CHILDREN'S CLINIC OF NASHVILLE • NURSE PRACTICTIONER
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$9,400
Mar 10, 2023
5
HALBOWER, JULIE MRS.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$9,400
Jun 24, 2024
6
HALBOWER, MATTHEW
PENTWATER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT • CEO
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$9,400
Jun 24, 2024
7
JOHNSON, CHARLES B. MR.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPALM BEACH, FL
$9,400
May 16, 2024
8
LES, JASON
RIOT PLATFORMS INC. • CEO
IndividualCOSTA MESA, CA
$9,400
Jul 13, 2024
9
MASIERO, THOMAS
ABG ENERGY LLC • CEO
IndividualPALL MALL, TN
$9,400
Jul 16, 2024
10
PRESTON, TAYLOR
EVELYN CAPITAL • MANAGING PARTNER
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$9,400
Jul 28, 2024

Sen. Tillis, Thomas [R-NC]

ID: T000476

Top Contributors

10

1
SASTRY, ASHWANI
SUNRISE VASCULAR • PHYSICIAN
IndividualORLANDO, FL
$3,400
Dec 12, 2024
2
AGARWAL, SAJJAN K
GREENHAWK CORPORATION • CEO
IndividualCARY, NC
$3,300
Dec 11, 2024
3
ALLYN, JILL
BRIGHTHOUSE FINANCIAL • INVESTMENTS
IndividualESTERO, FL
$3,300
Oct 17, 2024
4
BARATTA, JOSEPH PATRICK
BLACKSTONE • FINANCE EXECUTIVE
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Dec 18, 2024
5
BARATTA, JOSEPH PATRICK
BLACKSTONE • FINANCE EXECUTIVE
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Dec 18, 2024
6
BIELEN, RICHARD J
PROTECTIVE LIFE CORPORATION • PRESIDENT & CEO
IndividualMOUNTAIN BRK, AL
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
7
BLITZER, DAVID S
BLACKSTONE • CHAIRMAN
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Dec 12, 2024
8
BLITZER, DAVID S
BLACKSTONE • CHAIRMAN
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Dec 12, 2024
9
BRAND, MARTIN
BLACKSTONE • FINANCE
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Dec 20, 2024
10
CAMERON, WILLIAM H
CAMERON MANAGMENT • PRESIDENT
IndividualWILMINGTON, NC
$3,300
Oct 28, 2024

Sen. Scott, Tim [R-SC]

ID: S001184

Top Contributors

10

1
FAIRWAY INVESTMENTS, LLC
OrganizationGREENVILLE, SC
$13,200
May 23, 2023
2
FAIRWAY INVESTMENTS, LLC
OrganizationGREENVILLE, SC
$3,300
May 23, 2023
3
MK INTERNATIONAL LLC
OrganizationSUMTER, SC
$3,300
May 23, 2023
4
OSWALD COOKE & ASSOCIATES, LLC
OrganizationMOUNT PLEASANT, SC
$1,500
May 23, 2023
5
HUDSON CAPITAL ADVISORS LLC
OrganizationJERSEY CITY, NJ
$1,000
Oct 27, 2023
6
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$1,000
May 7, 2024
7
BOLDRICK, JAMES
STATEWIDE MINERALS CO • OWNER
IndividualMIDLAND, TX
$13,200
Jul 3, 2023
8
DUHAMEL, WILLIAM
ROUTE ONE INVESTMENT CO LP • INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$13,200
Jul 7, 2023
9
GROFF, SUSAN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNORTHRIDGE, CA
$13,200
Aug 3, 2023
10
EMMET, RICHARD
JANE STREET CAPITAL • FINANCE
IndividualLARCHMONT, NY
$13,200
Apr 17, 2023

Sen. Daines, Steve [R-MT]

ID: D000618

Top Contributors

10

1
CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD NATI
OrganizationPABLO, MT
$6,600
Mar 30, 2023
2
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$5,000
Jun 18, 2024
3
BLUECHIP FINANCIAL
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$3,300
Jun 20, 2024
4
HPUL PROJECT OPERATION
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$3,300
Jun 20, 2024
5
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
6
SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE
OrganizationSUQUAMISH, WA
$3,300
Sep 20, 2024
7
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
OrganizationLIVINGSTON, TX
$2,500
Oct 31, 2024
8
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
Jun 5, 2024
9
MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION
OrganizationOKMULGEE, OK
$1,000
Jun 20, 2024
10
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationDURANT, OK
$765
Oct 17, 2023

Sen. Moreno, Bernie [R-OH]

ID: M001242

Top Contributors

10

1
AMERICAN PRINCIPLES
PACMIAMI, FL
$1,000
Mar 11, 2024
2
SENATE CONSERVATIVES FUND
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$510
Dec 24, 2024
3
SOUTHERN OHIO HOLDING ORG. LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON COURT H, OH
$5,000
Mar 31, 2024
4
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$3,300
Dec 31, 2024
5
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$3,300
Dec 31, 2024
6
C AND D BILLS LTD
OrganizationFINDLAY, OH
$3,300
Jun 14, 2023
7
CLINTON COUNTY REPUBLICAN
OrganizationWILMINGTON, OH
$2,000
Sep 20, 2024
8
BOAK ENTERPRISES LLC
OrganizationCANFIELD, OH
$1,000
Sep 27, 2023
9
B2B CONCORD LLC
OrganizationHIGHLAND HEIGHTS, OH
$500
Sep 28, 2023
10
STATA FAMILY OFFICE
OrganizationDOVER, MA
$500
Jul 25, 2024

Donor Network - Sen. Kennedy, John [R-LA]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 55 nodes and 35 connections (46 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $299,740

Top Donors - Sen. Kennedy, John [R-LA]

Showing top 12 donors by contribution amount

12 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.95

    The joint resolution disapproves the OCC rule relating to 'Business Combinations Under the Bank Merger Act' (89 Fed. Reg. 78207). Disapproval of a rule that likely imposed additional scrutiny or requirements on bank mergers benefits commercial banks by reducing regulatory barriers to mergers and acquisitions.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Kennedy, John [R-LA])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 62%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SJRES 13 maintains stricter OCC review of bank mergers by disapproving a rule that would have eased consolidation, which contrasts with the Project 2025 financial regulatory agenda that generally seeks to reduce regulatory burdens and promote market flexibility."

Key themes:bank mergersOCC oversightfinancial regulationregulatory relief

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 61%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SJRES 13 focuses on disapproving an OCC rule related to bank merger reviews under the Bank Merger Act, while the Project 2025 policy excerpt primarily discusses the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), its civil penalty fund, structural reforms, and FCC oversight—topics not directly addressed in the bill. The alignment is weak, as both involve financial regulatory agencies but differ in specific focus and objectives."

Key themes:financial regulationregulatory oversightbanking industry

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 60%
Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SJRES 13 addresses OCC merger review rules, while Project 2025's Financial Regulatory Agencies section focuses on abolishing the CFPB and limiting its powers; both concern financial regulation but target different agencies and mechanisms, resulting only tangential alignment."

Key themes:bank regulationfinancial oversightregulatory relief

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely. — 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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