Space National Guard Establishment Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Sen. Crapo, Mike [R-ID]
ID: C000880
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7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. The Space National Guard Establishment Act of 2025 is a masterclass in bureaucratic doublespeak, designed to create the illusion of progress while accomplishing nothing meaningful.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to establish a new branch of the military, the Space National Guard, because what every country needs is another layer of bureaucracy and redundant personnel. The sponsors claim this will enhance national security, but I'm not buying it. This is just a thinly veiled attempt to justify more pork-barrel spending and create new opportunities for contractors to line their pockets.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes the Space National Guard as a reserve component of the Space Force (because we didn't have enough redundant branches already). It also transfers existing personnel from various Air National Guard units to this new entity, because who needs actual training or expertise when you can just rebrand existing staff? The bill prohibits additional personnel from being assigned to the Space National Guard, except for those specified in the legislation. How convenient.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: defense contractors, politicians looking for a soundbite, and voters who will be convinced that this is somehow making them safer. The actual beneficiaries of this bill will be the companies that receive contracts to "support" the Space National Guard, and the politicians who get to claim they're "tough on national security."
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will accomplish nothing meaningful in terms of enhancing national security. It's a classic case of "solution in search of a problem." The real impact will be on the taxpayers' wallets, as we foot the bill for this bureaucratic boondoggle. Expect more waste, more inefficiency, and more opportunities for corruption.
Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Legislative Attention Deficit Disorder" (LADD). Symptoms include a lack of focus, an inability to address actual problems, and a tendency to create new ones. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach, and a willingness to call out the obvious lies and spin. Prognosis: poor.
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đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Crapo, Mike [R-ID]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 57 — Executive Office of the President of the United States House, creating the risk that the CEA’s role in the policymaking process will be diminished. A future Administration should consider hiring that reflects the White House calendar (mid-January) and involves the Office of Presidential Personnel. NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL (NSPC) The National Space Council is responsible for providing advice and recommen- dations to the President on the formulation and implementation of space policy and strategy. It is charged with conducting a whole-of-government approach to the nation’s space interests: civil, military, intelligence, commercial, or diplomatic. Historically, it has been chaired by the Vice President at the President’s direction, and its members consist of members of the Cabinet and other senior executive branch officials as specified by the President in Executive Order 13803.32 The NSpC’s purpose is to ensure that the President’s priorities relative to space are carried out and, as necessary, to resolve policy conflicts among departments and agencies that are related to space. Space projects and programs are risky, complex, expensive, and time consum- ing—although commercial space innovations are lowering costs and accelerating schedules. Nevertheless, while fiscal discipline should not be ignored, long-term policy stability is crucial to investors, innovators, industry, and agencies. Policy stability is easier when policies and programs are aligned with long-term national interests as opposed to those of particular advocacy groups or political factions. The Trump Administration’s major space policies—including the U.S. Space Force, the Artemis program to land the next Americans on the moon, and support for a strong commercial space sector—have endured under the Biden Administration. Major challenges remain in implementation and regulatory reform to keep up with rapidly evolving space markets and competitors. These include the long-term sustainability of space activities in light of increasing orbital debris; creation of space situational awareness services for civil and commercial uses; management of mega-constellations; licensing of new commercial remote sensing capabilities; keeping up with licensing demands due to high launch rates; transitioning Inter- national Space Station operations to multiple, privately owned space platforms; and (most important) accelerating the acquisition and fielding of national security space capabilities in response to an increasingly aggressive China. The Vice President should have a clear understanding with the National Secu- rity Advisor and the White House Counsel that they and their respective staffs will work within the White House to determine the scope and leadership of policy reviews that can overlap multiple areas of responsibility. A similar understanding is necessary with the heads of other policy councils such as the NEC, DPC, and National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). As a result of the President’s direction and the Vice President’s leadership, the NSpC under the Trump Administration was able to coordinate a wide range of — 58 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise space policy reviews, legislative proposals, and regulatory reforms smoothly. The NSpC generally led on space issues within the EOP, but other White House offices also took on space topics. l As a member of the NSpC, and in coordination with other members, the Office of Science and Technology Policy developed a national space weather strategy, research and development (R&D) plans to mitigate the effects of orbital debris, and protocols for planetary protection to avoid biological contamination of celestial bodies. l The Council of Economic Advisers did research on the economic benefits of space property rights. l OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Reform updated and streamlined commercial launch licensing and commercial remote sensing satellite rules. During the Trump Administration, if a topic was purely military, such as stand- ing up the U.S. Space Command, the NSC took the lead. If a topic cut across military, civil, and commercial sectors, as was the case with cybersecurity in space, the NSpC and NSC would cochair the policy review groups. Trusted, collegial relationships across the White House complex are critical to successful space policy development, implementation, and oversight. Nowhere is this more important than in the relationship between the NSpC staff and OMB staff who oversee civil and national security–related space spending. Teamwork between the NSpC and OMB staff can communicate clear presidential priorities to departments and agencies, facilitating smooth development of the President’s budget request. The NSpC and OMB have many opportunities to collaborate in promoting presidential priorities while finding offsets in lower-priority programs and funding lines. OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY (OSTP) The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was created by the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976.33 Before its creation, Presidents received their advice and counsel on such matters through advisers and boards that had no statutory authority. The Director of OSTP is one of the few Senate-confirmed positions within the Executive Office of the President. Consistent with other laws, the President may delegate to the Director of OSTP directive authority over other elements of the executive branch. Other EOP policy officials and organizations such as the NSC and NEC are formally only advisory with relevant agency directives issued by the President.
Introduction
— 57 — Executive Office of the President of the United States House, creating the risk that the CEA’s role in the policymaking process will be diminished. A future Administration should consider hiring that reflects the White House calendar (mid-January) and involves the Office of Presidential Personnel. NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL (NSPC) The National Space Council is responsible for providing advice and recommen- dations to the President on the formulation and implementation of space policy and strategy. It is charged with conducting a whole-of-government approach to the nation’s space interests: civil, military, intelligence, commercial, or diplomatic. Historically, it has been chaired by the Vice President at the President’s direction, and its members consist of members of the Cabinet and other senior executive branch officials as specified by the President in Executive Order 13803.32 The NSpC’s purpose is to ensure that the President’s priorities relative to space are carried out and, as necessary, to resolve policy conflicts among departments and agencies that are related to space. Space projects and programs are risky, complex, expensive, and time consum- ing—although commercial space innovations are lowering costs and accelerating schedules. Nevertheless, while fiscal discipline should not be ignored, long-term policy stability is crucial to investors, innovators, industry, and agencies. Policy stability is easier when policies and programs are aligned with long-term national interests as opposed to those of particular advocacy groups or political factions. The Trump Administration’s major space policies—including the U.S. Space Force, the Artemis program to land the next Americans on the moon, and support for a strong commercial space sector—have endured under the Biden Administration. Major challenges remain in implementation and regulatory reform to keep up with rapidly evolving space markets and competitors. These include the long-term sustainability of space activities in light of increasing orbital debris; creation of space situational awareness services for civil and commercial uses; management of mega-constellations; licensing of new commercial remote sensing capabilities; keeping up with licensing demands due to high launch rates; transitioning Inter- national Space Station operations to multiple, privately owned space platforms; and (most important) accelerating the acquisition and fielding of national security space capabilities in response to an increasingly aggressive China. The Vice President should have a clear understanding with the National Secu- rity Advisor and the White House Counsel that they and their respective staffs will work within the White House to determine the scope and leadership of policy reviews that can overlap multiple areas of responsibility. A similar understanding is necessary with the heads of other policy councils such as the NEC, DPC, and National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). As a result of the President’s direction and the Vice President’s leadership, the NSpC under the Trump Administration was able to coordinate a wide range of
Introduction
— 110 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise there are no general or field-grade officers who served as planners or commanders against a near-peer adversary in combat. 4. Examine the logic of emerging Army concepts about employing massed long-range fires and effects without considering how to gain advantage by closing with and dominating an adversary on land. 5. Recognize that high-intensity land combat operations cannot be sustained through short-term individual or unit rotations in the style of the sustained low-intensity campaigns conducted over the past 20 years. 6. Transform how the National Guard is employed during extended operations short of declared war to preclude back-to-back federal and state deployments of National Guard soldiers in order to stabilize and preserve military volunteerism in our communities. 7. Revamp Army school curricula to concentrate on preparation for large- scale land operations that focus on defeating a peer threat. 8. Address the underlying causal issues driving increasing Army suicide rates, which have surpassed pre–World War II rates and are now eclipsing the rate among civilians. U.S. NAVY As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to “provide and maintain a Navy.” Inherent in this phrase is a recognition that there is a vital national interest in the maritime environment and that this national interest requires sustained planning and investment. This is as true today as it was almost 250 years ago and will remain true into the future. The U.S. Navy (USN) exists for two primary reasons: to project prompt, sus- tained, and effective combat power globally, both at sea and ashore, and to deter aggression by potential adversaries by maintaining a forward operating presence in conjunction with allies and partners. Today, the People’s Republic of China Peo- ple’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can challenge the USN’s ability to accomplish its mission in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In the production, employment, and control of maritime forces, the USN must consider the scope and rate of technological change and, where appropriate, adapt its processes and workforce development. In balancing the necessary long-term industrial model of naval platforms against emerging short-term opportunities, the USN must take account of advances that may present vulnerabilities and risks as well as what is assured and secure. — 111 — Department of Defense Needed Reforms l Invest in and expand force structure. The USN’s organizing principle remains platform-centered: vessels manned by sailors. The manned surface and subsurface forces act in concert with land-based, air-based, and space- based forces to project power outside sovereign territory, principally by operating in international waters. Investments must be closely coordinated with these other elements of military power. 1. Build a fleet of more than 355 ships.26 2. Develop and field unmanned systems to augment the manned forces. 3. Require that range and lethality be the key factors in all procurement and sustainment decisions for ships, aircraft, and munitions. l Reestablish the General Board. In contrast with the Navy General Board that served ship development so well during the interwar period, the current joint process27 for defining the requirements for major defense acquisitions is not well-suited to long-term planning of the sort that is needed for USN fleet architecture and shipbuilding. The interwar General Board should serve as a model, empowered with final decision authority over all requirements documents concerning ships and the major defense systems fielded on ships. The individual board members would ensure a broad base of knowledge as well as independent thinking.28 l Establish a Rapid Capabilities Office. The USN must transition technology into warfighting capability more rapidly. It must foster a culture of innovation that includes connecting theoretical and intangible ideas with real production environments that produce tangible and practical outcomes and adapting proven processes to advance material solutions. 1. Harness innovation and willingness to tolerate risk so that “good enough” systems can be fielded rapidly. 2. Use the Space Development Agency as a model. 3. Establish an oversight Board of Directors made up of the service chief, service secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.