The bill
Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act
S. 821, 119th Congress.
Sponsored by
Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]
ID: C001056
Follow the money
The bill
S. 821, 119th Congress.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 208-210 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 52.
April 27, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and get to the real diagnosis.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act (S 821) claims to provide "increased reporting" regarding Department of State guidelines on relations with Taiwan. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to appease the Taiwanese lobby and pander to the China-hawks in Congress.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 315 of the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 by requiring the Secretary of State to review and update guidance on relations with Taiwan every five years. Oh, wow. A whole new layer of bureaucratic red tape to ensure that our diplomats are sufficiently micromanaged.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: the Taiwanese government, the Chinese Communist Party (which will undoubtedly view this as a provocation), and various defense contractors who'll benefit from increased tensions in the region.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "legislative placebo." It creates the illusion of action while accomplishing nothing meaningful. The real impact will be to further entangle our foreign policy in a web of bureaucratic inefficiency and partisan posturing.
Let's not forget the underlying disease driving this legislation: the insatiable hunger for campaign contributions from defense contractors and the Taiwanese lobby. This bill is a symptom of a larger problem – the corrupting influence of money in politics and the perpetual need for politicians to grandstand on foreign policy issues they barely understand.
In short, S 821 is a masterclass in legislative obfuscation, designed to impress the gullible while serving the interests of the powerful. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than waste my time on this farce.
Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C001088
Top Contributors
22
ID: R000618
Top Contributors
26
ID: B001267
Top Contributors
24
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 32 nodes and 34 connections
Total contributions: $34
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill shares Project 2025's focus on congressional oversight and transparency in State Department actions, particularly regarding Taiwan/China policy, but it does not address the core Project 2025 objectives of treaty review, C-175 authority revocation, or freezing negotiations."
— 175 — Department of State numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing trea- ties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to nego- tiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned. The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles trea- ties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or inter- national agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public mean- ing of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consider- ation for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and sub- mission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agen- cies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons. Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes produc- tive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the — 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on increasing transparency and accountability in the State Department's Taiwan-related guidance, while the Project 2025 USAID section concerns internal agency reforms, training, hiring, and ideological priorities. Both touch on foreign policy oversight and accountability, but they address different agencies and substantive areas, resulting only a weak thematic connection."
— 279 — Agency for International Development clearances, and other components of the hiring process that are necessary for immediate onboarding while coordinating with the White House to bring in new appointees and make internal career employee changes. On Day One, USAID should halt all agencywide training and replace it with training modules to advance the President’s agenda. The Administration should appoint a Senior Accountable Official (SAO) to report on the agency’s adherence to Administration policy priorities, including on Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance, critical race theory, climate change, gender, and diversity and inclusion. It should also create a program to staff hard-to-fill positions overseas. Finally, the Administration should create a recruiting program for veterans and other groups to participate in career job opportunities at USAID. Former mis- sionaries, veterans, members of diasporas, and faith community stakeholders with overseas experience should be recruited to work at USAID on Schedule A appoint- ments, as Institutional Services Contractors, as Personal Services Contractors, and as Foreign Service Officers. CONCLUSION The next conservative Administration will have a unique opportunity to realign U.S. foreign assistance with American national interests and the principles of good governance and more accurately reflect the U.S. taxpayer’s unmatched charita- ble desire to help those in need. It can build on a strong baseline of conservative reforms undertaken by the Trump Administration to counter Communist China’s strategy of world domination. However, this will require that bold steps are taken on Day One to undo the gross misuse of foreign aid by the current Administration to promote a radical ideology that is politically divisive at home and harms our global standing. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Dr. William Steiger, Bethany Kozma, and Dr. Alma Golden deserve special mention. The author assumes full responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed therein should be attributed to any other individual. — 280 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. S. 1983, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law No. 87-195, 87th Congress, September 4, 1961, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-75/pdf/STATUTE-75-Pg424-2.pdf (accessed January 19, 2023). 2. U.S. Agency or International Development, “Journey to Self-Reliance Fact Sheet,” June 3, 2020, https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/documents/1870/journey-self-reliance-fact-sheet#:~:text=WHAT%20 IS%20THE%20JOURNEY%20TO%20SELF-RELIANCE%3F%20USAID%20is,greater%20 developmentoutcomesandworktowardatimewhenforeignassistanceisnolongernecessary.%20 It%E2%80%99s%20called%20the%20Journey%20to%20Self-Reliance (accessed March 17, 2023). 3. News release, “U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Mark Green’s Interview with C-Span’s ‘Newsmakers’ Host Susan Swain and Washington Post’s Carl Morello and Wall Street Journal’s Ben Kesling,” U.S. Agency for International Development, November 26, 2018, https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/news- information/press-releases/nov-26-2018-administrator-mark-green-interview-cspan-newsmakers (accessed March 17, 2023). 4. U.S. Agency for International Development, Digital Strategy 2020–2024, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-05/USAID_Digital_Strategy.pdf.pdf://www.usaid.gov/digital-development/usaid-digital-strategy (accessed March 17, 2023). 5. “U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific,” declassified in part by Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert C. O’Brien, January 5, 2021, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp- content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023), and Robert C. O’Brien, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” January 5, 2021, https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/OBrien-Expanded-Statement.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023). 6. News Release, “Fact Sheet: Prioritizing Climate in Foreign Policy and National Security,” The White House, October 21, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/21/fact-sheet- prioritizing-climate-in-foreign-policy-and-national-security/ (accessed January 28, 2023). 7. U.S. Agency for International Development, Climate Strategy 2020–2030, April 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/ sites/default/files/2022-11/USAID-Climate-Strategy-2022-2030.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023). 8. Adva Saldinger, “USAID Steps Up ‘Languishing’ Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Effort,” Devex.com, December 15, 2021, http://www.devex.com/news/usaid-steps-up-languishing-diversity-equity-and-inclusion- effort-102316 (accessed January 28, 2021). 9. U.S. Agency for International Development, “Gender Equity and Women Empowerment,” https://www.usaid. gov/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment (accessed January 30, 2023). 10. U.S. Agency for International Development, “Integrating Gender Equality and Female Empowerment in USAID’s Program Cycle,” ADS Chapter 25, partial revision date January 22, 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/ default/files/2022-12/205.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023). 11. S. 137, Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance Act, 117th Congress, introduced January 28, 2021, https:// www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/137#:~:text=Protecting%20Life%20in%20Foreign%20 Assistance%20Act.%20This%20bill,support%20for%20an%20entity%20that%20conducts%20 such%20activities (accessed January 20, 2023), and H.R. 534, Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance Act, 117th Congress, introduced January 28, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house- bill/534?s=1&r=450 (accessed January 20, 2023). 12. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Memorandum on Protecting Women’s Health at Home and Abroad,” Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, The White House, January 28, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/28/memorandum- on-protecting-womens-health-at-home-and-abroad/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 13. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13926, “Advancing International Religious Freedom,” June 2, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 109 (June 5, 2020), pp. 34951–34953, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-2020-06-05/pdf/2020-12430.pdf (accessed January 20, 2023). 14. 22 Code of Federal Regulations § 205.1, https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-II/part-205 (accessed March 18, 2023). 15. Contributor’s notes from internal USAID meetings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on increasing transparency of State Department guidance on Taiwan relations, which tangentially relates to the Project 2025 Treasury goal of addressing the economic and financial aspects of the geopolitical threat from China, but it does not involve Treasury regulatory, fiscal, or competitiveness measures."
— 691 — 22 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY William L. Walton, Stephen Moore, and David R. Burton INTRODUCTION The U.S. Treasury Department has a broad regulatory and policy reach. The next Administration should make major policy changes to: (1) reduce regulatory impediments to economic growth that reduce living standards and endanger pros- perity; (2) reduce regulatory compliance costs that increase prices and cost jobs; (3) promote fiscal responsibility; (4) promote the international competitiveness of U.S. businesses; and (5) better respect the American people’s due process and privacy rights. These goals should be accomplished through: executive action (primar- ily treasury orders and treasury directives) and departmental reorganization; rulemakings; promoting constructive policies in Congress; actions in international organizations; and treaties. The primary subject matter focus of the incoming Administration’s Treasury Department should be: l Tax policy and tax administration; l Fiscal responsibility; l Improved financial regulation; l Addressing the economic and financial aspects of the geopolitical threat posed by China and other hostile countries;
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.