Strengthening Exports Against China Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/753

Last Updated: August 20, 2026

Strengthening Exports Against China Act

S. 753, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$97,654 raised

28 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Export-Import Bank" section, p. 758-760 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearings held.

March 25, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Strengthening Exports Against China Act, S 753. A bill that attempts to tweak the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to exclude certain financing from default rate calculations. How quaint.

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The bill's primary objective is to facilitate exports by excluding specific types of financing from the default rate calculation, thereby allowing the Export-Import Bank to provide more loans without hitting its lending cap. The sponsors claim this will help American businesses compete with China. Amusing.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** Section 2 of the bill amends Section 6(a)(3) of the Export-Import Bank Act by adding a new exclusion for financing that replaces or competes with products or services provided by entities on the Entity List or specially designated nationals and blocked persons. This change allows the bank to provide more loans without increasing its default rate.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The bill affects American exporters, particularly those in industries competing with Chinese companies. It also impacts the Export-Import Bank itself, as it will be able to provide more loans without hitting its lending cap. However, I'm more interested in how this bill might affect my own business interests and investments.

**Potential Impact & Implications** From a purely economic perspective, this bill may lead to an increase in exports, potentially benefiting American businesses. However, I see it as a minor tweak that won't significantly impact the global trade landscape. The real question is: How will this bill affect my bottom line?

As a savvy investor and entrepreneur, I'm more concerned about the potential for increased competition from Chinese companies. If this bill leads to more American exports, it may create new opportunities for me to invest in industries that benefit from these changes.

But let's be clear: This bill is not a game-changer. It's a minor adjustment to an existing law, and its impact will be limited. The real power players – people like myself, with the means to shape global markets – won't be significantly affected by this legislation.

In conclusion, S 753 is a trivial bill that attempts to address a minor aspect of international trade. Its impact will be negligible, and it's unlikely to change the course of global commerce. As someone who has built an empire through strategic investments and calculated risk-taking, I'll continue to monitor this bill's progress, but I won't lose any sleep over its potential implications.

Projected impact on my wealth: $0.00 (it's a drop in the bucket) Potential opportunities for consolidation and deregulation: Minimal Recommendation: Monitor, but don't bother investing too much time or resources into this one.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$97,654

24 donors

PACs

Organizations

$11,850

Committees

Individuals

$85,804

No PAC contributions found

LAS VEGAS PAIUTE TRIBE

1 transaction

$3,300

MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS

1 transaction

$2,500

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

2 transactions

$2,000

ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE

1 transaction

$1,500

MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION

1 transaction

$1,000

MOHEGAN TRIBE OF INDIANS OF CONNECTICUT

1 transaction

$1,000

CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA

1 transaction

$550

No committee contributions found

LONGTIN, LUANN

1 transaction

$17,325

ROOPE, CALEB

2 transactions

$6,600

PORTER, KRISTINE L.

2 transactions

$6,600

PORTER, JON CHRISTOPHER JR

2 transactions

$6,600

SLIFKA, ROSALYN

1 transaction

$5,800

NAGY, AURANGZEB N.

1 transaction

$4,800

LONGTIN, DAVID

1 transaction

$4,700

DE BURLO, C. RUSSELL

1 transaction

$3,500

SIMON, DEBORAH

1 transaction

$3,375

COOKE, JOHN

1 transaction

$3,356

SEYEDIN, NADER

1 transaction

$3,348

SWEEN, PAUL

1 transaction

$3,300

CARUSO, RICK J.

1 transaction

$3,300

EMERSON, WILLIAM

1 transaction

$3,300

MOLASKY, CHRISTY

1 transaction

$3,300

KATZ, MICHAEL

1 transaction

$3,300

LEVIN, DEBORAH

1 transaction

$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Rounds, Mike [R-SD]

ID: R000605

Top Contributors

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$1,000

Nov 22, 2023

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$1,000

Apr 30, 2024

CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA

OrganizationDURANT, OK

$500

Nov 1, 2024

ROWAN, CAROLYN

CAROLYN ROWAN COLLECTION • OWNER

IndividualGREENWICH, CT

$6,600

Mar 30, 2023

ROWAN, MARC J

APOLLO MGMT. • CEO

IndividualGREENWICH, CT

$6,600

Mar 30, 2023

HEGYI, ALBERT

1ST FINANCIAL BANK • BANKER

IndividualSOUTHPORT, CT

$6,600

Aug 22, 2023

ROWAN, CAROLYN

CAROLYN ROWAN COLLECTION • OWNER

IndividualGREENWICH, CT

$6,600

Mar 30, 2023

ROWAN, MARC J

APOLLO MGMT. • CEO

IndividualGREENWICH, CT

$6,600

Mar 30, 2023

HEGYI, ALBERT

1ST FINANCIAL BANK • BANKER

IndividualSOUTHPORT, CT

$6,600

Aug 22, 2023

PFAUTCH, ROY

CIVIC SERVICE, INC. • CONSULTANT

IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO

$6,600

Feb 20, 2024

Donor Network - Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV]

Show Also Donated To

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Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 70 nodes and 73 connections

Total contributions: $73

Top Donors - Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV]

Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount

7 Orgs17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80
Section 2(B)(i)(I) excludes financing for entities that facilitate replacement or competition with products/services of entities on the Entity List maintained by BIS, which includes many Chinese defense and technology firms; this benefits U.S. defense contractors by reducing competition from Chinese firms in export financing.
+Semiconductors & Hardwareconfidence 0.75
Section 2(B)(i)(I) excludes financing for entities that compete with products/services of entities on the Entity List, which includes Chinese semiconductor firms; this benefits U.S. semiconductor companies by reducing Chinese competition in export financing.
+Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.70
Section 2(B)(i)(I) excludes financing for entities that compete with products/services of entities on the Entity List, which includes Chinese tech firms like Huawei and SMIC; this benefits U.S. big tech platforms by limiting Chinese competition in export financing.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Semiconductors & Hardware$2,550
from 24 contributions
- MCINTYRE, BRUCE$2,000
- KESKES, SIA$250
- LEARY, JONATHAN$180
- PARE, DIANA$120
Defense Contractors$500
from 1 contribution
- DILAPI, CHRISTINE$500
Big Tech Platforms$255
from 11 contributions
- MCMAHON, TOM$225
- GINESTRA, MARCOS$30

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Export-Import Bank

Very Strong

Vector: 68%

Pages: 758-760AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly amends the Export-Import Bank Act to increase U.S. export financing aimed at countering Chinese economic influence, which mirrors Project 2025's call for the United States to use EXIM as a strategic tool to oppose China's aggressive export credit practices."

Key themes:Export-Import Bankcountering Chinese economic influenceexport credit financingBelt and Road Initiativesupporting U.S. exporters vs. China

Export-Import Bank

Very Strong

Vector: 67%

Pages: 758-760AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly amends the Export-Import Bank Act to enhance U.S. export financing aimed at countering Chinese economic influence, which mirrors Project 2025's call for using EXIM as a strategic weapon to oppose China's aggressive export credit practices and support American exporters."

Key themes:Export-Import Bankcountering Chinese influencesupporting U.S. exportersexport credit financingstrategic competition

— 725 — Export-Import Bank l China’s export credit activity is greater than that of the ECAs of the entire G7 combined. Today, China is the world’s largest official creditor, maintaining a portfolio more than twice the size of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund combined. l China’s highly aggressive Belt and Road Initiative, which has prompted international criticism for ensnaring the developing world in “debt-trap diplomacy,” has created a sphere of economic and strategic influence that includes about 150 countries, rivaling the relationships of the United States and her allies. Unlike America and the G7 economies, China does not subscribe to the rules- based order that has governed export credit financing for nearly a century. As in so many other things, China plays by its own rules and is opaque in how it operates, weaponizing its export credit financing deals by offering developing nations terms that are often “too good to be true.” Once the project is underway, the Chinese have been known to change the terms, making a project unaffordable for the purchasing country. These tactics have yielded China important strategic plunder like mines and critical minerals, satellites, and even ports like those in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and Mombasa, Kenya. Export credit is a strategic weapon in China’s whole-of-government approach to enhance its global power, economic might, and national security. The only country that has the economic heft to counter China’s aggressions in export credit financing is the United States. Not only do American companies risk losing out to Chinese competitors for international opportunities if EXIM is not there to offer support, but a United States without a functioning export credit agency also leaves an unchecked China with a wide-open field to claim jurisdiction over swaths of ocean and shipping lanes, expand its economic influence, and create major changes in the global balance of power. In response to Chinese aggression in export credit, the ECAs of other coun- tries have reacted defensively to change their policies and programs to avoid losing access to large chunks of global markets. Many countries, including strong U.S. allies like the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Italy, have changed the mission of their ECAs from one of leveling the playing field for their exporters to hunting proactively for transactions for their businesses and advancing their national strategic interests over the long term. In addition, foreign buyers, par- ticularly those looking to build large international projects, have been indicating that the availability of government-backed financing is a core component of their evaluation of bids and identification of sourcing. Allied nations have taken steps like lowering their content requirements in order to lure more deals, often at U.S. expense. — 726 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Meanwhile, U.S. content requirements have remained constant, and the United States continues to abide by traditional Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) rules. For example: l The United Kingdom offered Boeing financing backed by Britain’s ECA if Boeing would put Rolls Royce engines on its jets instead of GE engines. l Italy’s ECA offered General Electric export credit financing in exchange for moving the production of some of its turbine components from the United States to Italy. China’s tactics, as well as those of some of America’s allies, have been success- ful in drawing manufacturing and the jobs associated with that production away from U.S. soil. EXIM’s 2018 Competitiveness Report accurately documents how extensively foreign ECAs have expanded programs aimed at embedding their small and medium-sized exporters into the global supply chain to the detriment of U.S. exporters, particularly small businesses.35 To ignore these changes and leave the United States without its own export financing weapon is to resign the United States to a reduced role in world geopolitical affairs and accept fewer jobs and lower standards of living for many Americans. Critics of EXIM employ a host of defamatory slurs like “crony capitalism” and “Bank of Boeing.” The “Bank of Boeing” moniker is particularly misleading, as it was born in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis when the airline industry was par- ticularly hard hit and private-sector financing was not available for many airlines looking to purchase Boeing aircraft. EXIM’s portfolio tends to be cyclical with different industries relying on export credit financing at different points in time, depending on economic conditions. The truth is that EXIM provides financing only when the private sector will not or cannot (a concept known as additionality). In addition: l When EXIM does provide financing, usually in the form of a loan or loan guarantee, the borrower pays interest rates that are driven by the market. l EXIM does not undercut the private sector. It does not solicit any applications for financing, and all applications are judged on the merits of the transactions. l All transactions must have “reasonable assurance of repayment,” which is why EXIM has an exceptionally low default rate, historically hovering around 0.5 percent—a default rate that is the envy of private banking.

Trade

Strong

Vector: 66%

Pages: 816-818AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly addresses Project 2025's concern about Communist China's economic aggression by using the Export-Import Bank to bolster U.S. exports that compete with Chinese entities, thereby countering China's mercantilist and technology-forcing practices."

Key themes:countering Chinese economic aggressionsupporting U.S. exportsExport-Import Bank financingEntity List restrictionstechnology transfer concerns

— 783 — Trade tariffs.17 A conservative Administration might do well to look at such a tax as part of its trade agenda. CHALLENGE #2: COMMUNIST CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION18 Among all of its bilateral trade relationships, America’s relationship with Com- munist China is the most fraught with difficulty. The problem is not just that the relentlessly mercantilist and protectionist trade policies that China has pursued ever since its accession to the WTO in 2001 have led to chronic, massive, and ever-expanding trade deficits. Communist China’s economic aggression in the traditional trade policy space is further facilitated by equally aggressive industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that are designed to shift the world’s manufacturing and supply chains to Communist Chinese soil. The Chinese Communist Party’s policy goal is to propel the Chinese economy, but its broader goal is to strengthen Communist China’s defense industrial base and associated warfighting capabilities. That China unabashedly seeks to supplant America as the world’s dominant economic and military power is not in dispute. Rather, it is a prominent feature of Communist Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s rhet- oric. Xi has promised that the deed will be done by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the Communist takeover of the Mainland.19 In light of Communist China’s broader geopolitical and military agenda, the American President who takes office in January 2025 must view the U.S.–China trade relationship and associated policy reforms within the context of the broader existential threat posed by Communist China. The question is whether that next President should seek to decouple economically and financially from Communist China as America’s first best response to China’s unrelenting aggression or con- tinue efforts to negotiate with an authoritarian country and brutal dictatorship with a well-established reputation for failing to abide by any agreements it enters. Institutionalized Aggression. Table 5 depicts more than 50 types of policy aggression institutionalized by the CCP across six different categories of such aggression. Viewed as whole, the extent of Communist China’s aggression is breathtaking. At the trade policy level, Communist China relies heavily on a wide range of mercantilist and protectionist tools to protect its own markets and unfairly exploit foreign markets. These instruments of Communist Chinese trade aggression include high tariffs and nontariff barriers, currency manipulation, a heavy reli- ance on sweatshop labor and pollution havens, the dumping of unfairly subsidized exports, and widespread counterfeiting and piracy: Communist China is the world’s largest source of counterfeit and pirated products. In addition, Communist Chinese enterprises benefit from preferential policies that have burdened world markets with subsidized overcapacity. The resultant glut — 784 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise of Communist Chinese exports in turn depresses world prices and pushes foreign rivals out of the global market—steel is a major example.20 Industrial policy tools that further reinforce Communist China’s mercantilist and protectionist trade policies include numerous direct and indirect subsidies to boost exports and the consolidation of heavily subsidized state-owned enterprises into “national champi- ons” that can compete with foreign companies in both domestic and global markets. Communist China also uses a predatory “debt trap” model of economic develop- ment aid that proffers substantial financing to developing countries in exchange for their willingness to mortgage their natural resources and allow Communist China access to their markets. The practical effect of this debt trap model is to give Com- munist China a competitive edge internationally that stems from its preferential access to relatively lower-cost commodities needed in the manufacturing process. These commodities range from bauxite, copper, and nickel to rarer commodities such as beryllium, titanium, and rare earth minerals. As a complement to this debt trap gambit and to exploit its commanding share of a wide range of critical raw materials that are essential to the global supply chain and production of high-technology and high-value-added products, Com- munist China strategically uses protectionist export restraints, including export quotas and export duties. These export restraints thereby restrict access to raw materials such as rare earth, tungsten, and molybdenum that are essential in the high-technology production space. The result is to drive up world prices and thereby put pressure on American and other foreign downstream producers to move their operations, technologies, and jobs to Communist China. American industries that have been affected by Communist China’s export restraints range from steel, chemicals, and electric cars to wind turbines, lasers, semiconductors, and refrigerants. Technology-Forcing Policies. Table 6, extracted from the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy’s report on Communist China’s economic aggression,21 provides a summary of the various policies the Chinese Communist Party uses to force the transfer of the West’s technologies to Communist Chinese soil. Formally, Communist Chinese industrial policy seeks to promote the “diges- tion, absorption, and re-innovation” of technologies and intellectual property (IP) from around the world.22 As noted in Table 6, this policy is carried out, for example, through state-spon- sored IP theft—coercive and intrusive regulatory gambits to force technology transfer, typically in exchange for limited access to the Chinese market. Commu- nist China’s looting of American technology is further enhanced by “information harvesting” conducted by Communist Chinese nationals who infiltrate U.S. uni- versities, national laboratories, and other centers of innovation. Strategic sectors targeted by Communist Chinese economic espionage have included electronics, telecommunications, robotics, data services, pharmaceuticals, mobile phone

Export-Import Bank

Weak

Vector: 66%

Pages: 752-754AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill seeks to expand the Export-Import Bank's financing capacity to counter Chinese economic influence, while the Project 2025 policy critiques the Bank as ineffective at promoting growth and argues its subsidies merely redistribute economic activity. Both texts address the Export-Import Bank and US exports, but they pursue opposing objectives regarding the Bank's role."

Key themes:Export-Import BankUS exportscompetition with Chinasubsidy effectivenesseconomic growth

— 719 — Export-Import Bank but the unseen effects are ignored. For example, funding for one industry or firm might take more jobs away from other industries and firms, resulting in a net job loss even though jobs are created for the financed firm. At best, it could be said that the Bank redistributes employment from unsubsidized firms to subsidized firms. However, with very rare exceptions, most exports financed by EXIM would have taken place without government support. Many companies have said so themselves;13 the procurement happens before the decision to get government support; and, as noted above, most EXIM deals go to large companies with easy access to capital. Thus, the agency is taking credit for jobs that would have existed in any event. The Bank does not promote exports. EXIM presidents commonly claim that the agency’s mission is to support U.S. jobs by facilitating American exports through its export-financing tools. However, trade economists have long known that export credit subsidies merely redistribute exporting opportunities to subsi- dized firms instead of increasing the net number of exports—something that also slows economic growth.14 Even more telling is the performance of the U.S. economy and American exports during the four years when EXIM lacked a board quorum (2015–2019) and was barred from finalizing deals in excess of $10 million. During that time, EXIM autho- rizations fell from $21 billion in FY 2014 to $3.6 billion in FY 2018 (adjusted for inflation).15 However, also during that time, regular big-ticket EXIM beneficiaries continued to benefit from their easy access to capital markets and still had the ability to finance their export activities. Further, U.S. exports were utterly unaffected by the reductions in the Bank’s activities.16 U.S. unemployment fell to a level not seen in half a century, but exports soared with financing provided by commercial lenders. The only negative eco- nomic impact from EXIM’s lack of a board quorum was its effect on the Bank itself. This contradicts EXIM’s claim that its activities are crucial for the success of U.S. exporters and economic growth. Instead, it shows that economic growth is the best booster of U.S. exports and job creation and that it does not depend on EXIM subsidies. Subsidy-boosted exports do not boost economic growth. EXIM’s primary reason for existing is to increase exports, as if more exports themselves represent more jobs and economic growth. Recent expressions of this fallacious belief can be found in a book by former EXIM President Fred Hochberg. According to Hochberg, “We know that trade, and exports in particular, can have a big impact on jobs.”17 While this is a common misconception about exports, it is one worth correcting. As trade economists know, exports are a cost to the economy: They subtract from GDP. Imports, on the other hand, add to GDP. If the U.S. could acquire all of the imports that it currently gets without exporting anything in exchange, that would be the best of all worlds. Unfortunately, one reason that foreigners are so eager — 720 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise to sell us their goods is that they want our dollars to buy our debt, invest in the country, and buy our exports. That is why exports drop when overall imports drop. Exports promote U.S. economic growth only if the value of the resources used to produce them is less than the value of what we receive as imports in exchange for those exports. By subsidizing American exports, EXIM causes too many resources to be devoted to producing exports. As a result, the total value of our exports is made larger than it would otherwise be to obtain any given amount of imports. In other words, EXIM thus compels American taxpayers to subsidize foreigners’ standards of living at no appreciable benefit to the U.S. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding and the constant glamorization of exports and their impact on jobs and growth are used to justify government sup- port for some exports (on average, 98 percent of exports are not backed by EXIM financing). It also is extremely unfair. Because capital will tend to shift from unsub- sidized companies to subsidized companies (taxpayers foot the bill if companies backed by the Bank default), unsubsidized export companies face higher borrowing costs, which could translate into fewer jobs in unsubsidized companies or lower pay for their workers. The Bank does not promote growth by leveling the playing field. EXIM’s charter stipulates that one of its missions is to support U.S. exports with the goal of creating jobs and promoting economic growth through the provision of export financing via its loan-guarantee and insurance programs. In particular, EXIM is to intervene in cases “where such support is necessary to level the competitive playing field for U.S. exporters due to financing provided by foreign governments to their exporters.”18 As a result, EXIM for years has been focused primarily on what other countries’ ECAs are doing and how much financing they are providing.19 A reading of any of EXIM’s Competitiveness Reports shows that the Bank frames the “competitive- ness” of the U.S. economy and exporters in extremely narrow terms—specifically, as the amount of business that foreign ECAs are doing relative to EXIM. The report for 2020 features striking evidence of this mindset. For instance, lamenting the “nearly four-year hiatus” during which the Bank lacked a board quorum to approve large deals, EXIM’s leadership maintains that these years “severely hindered EXIM’s ability to support the competitiveness of U.S. export- ers.” During that time, foreign ECAs “fundamentally evolved their philosophy and substantively expanded their roles,” and “the United States must work hard to keep pace.” The Bank goes on to promise that it will “re-emerge from the years of being out of the long-term export finance business and restore its standing as one of the world’s most competitive ECAs.”20 In other words, EXIM bureaucrats appear to believe that economic growth and jobs result not from a favorable tax and regulatory environment, but from a victory in hand-to-hand subsidy combat between government banks. The Bank’s

Export-Import Bank

Weak

Vector: 66%

Pages: 755-757AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill seeks to strengthen EXIM's role in countering Chinese economic influence, while Project 2025 argues that using EXIM as a weapon against China is misguided and advocates abolishing the agency. Both texts discuss EXIM, China, and export financing, but they pursue opposing policy directions."

Key themes:Export-Import BankChina competitionexport financingcountering Chinese influence

— 723 — Export-Import Bank has been making its most important investments. Instead, its obsession with other ECAs has caused EXIM to direct the vast majority of its funding to large foreign companies in higher-income nations. Data available on the OECD website show that the level of ECA financing in high-income countries in 2019 was more than double the amount in low-income countries.29 The same was true for previous years. In other words, EXIM and the ECAs of the OECD are competing in markets where commercial lending is abundant—a trend that continues today. The failure to deliver on its congressionally imposed obligation—however mis- guided that obligation may be—is also noticeable in the fact that EXIM’s China and Transformation Exports Program (CTEP) extended only $141.3 million in financing in FY 2022—a fraction of the $27 billion it is supposed to deliver by the end of 2026.30 The Bank’s efforts have also included a misplaced focus on emerging technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, which do not need EXIM financing because their foreign sales attract commercial financing without government support. The lack of demand for EXIM products could also be reflected in the Bank’s authorization of $5.2 billion in loan guarantees and sup- port in FY 2022,31 down from its FY 2012 peak of “over $35.7 billion” during the Obama Administration.32 This lack of activity also extends to the semiconductor industry, which has been picked as a focal point for a governmentwide industrial policy effort to counter China’s ambition to dominate that industry. Ironically, at the same time that some want to become more like China to fight China, China’s leaders are realizing that their heavy-handed semiconductor subsidies are weakening the Chinese economy. According to Bloomberg News: Top [Chinese] officials are discussing ways to move away from costly subsidies that have so far borne little fruit and encouraged both graft and American sanctions, people familiar with the matter said. While some continue to push for incentives of as much as 1 trillion yuan ($US145 billion), other policymakers have lost their taste for an investment-led approach that’s not yielded the results anticipated, the people said.33 This development is not surprising to those who understand basic economics. The goal of using EXIM as a weapon against China was a bad idea in the first place. Even if it were a good idea, for it to succeed would have required that EXIM stop serving the clients it has been serving for decades. That has not happened, and it will not happen. CONCLUSION The Export–Import Bank should be abolished because it wastes taxpayer money, adversely affects American businesses, and does not promote economic growth — 724 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise effectively. Furthermore, any attempts to reorient the agency and make it a weapon with which to fight against China are going to fail. Economic fights and national security fights are not won with subsidies. THE CASE FOR THE EXPORT–IMPORT BANK Jennifer Hazelton In 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed a bill extending the charter of the Export–Import Bank (EXIM) by an additional six years. In a signing statement attached to the bill, the President declared that “[t]his sends an important signal to both our exporting community and foreign suppliers that American exporters will continue to be able to compete vigorously for business throughout the world.”34 As a candidate for President, Ronald Reagan was opposed to EXIM, but as Pres- ident, he learned the challenges America’s businesses face when competing for opportunities overseas, and his position on EXIM evolved. As President Reagan once famously remarked, “Why would I want our businesses competing with two hands tied behind their backs?” On January 30, 1984, the President said, “Exports create and sustain jobs for millions of American workers and contribute to the growth and strength of the United States economy. The Export–Import Bank con- tributes in a significant way to our nation’s export sales.” President Reagan was exactly right. EXIM provides a mechanism that American companies can use to vie for projects that would otherwise be out of reach, notably deals that the banking industry won’t finance because of the risk associated with the host country or because the host nation itself requires a sovereign guarantee in order to submit a bid. EXIM is the only American vehicle that can provide that sovereign guarantee. Since Reagan’s presidency, the global economic order has shifted dramatically, and a rising China has completely disrupted the export credit sector. l In Reagan’s era, export credit financing was a means for nations to compete for and win projects overseas in order to create more jobs at home. It was a benign tool for economic expansion. China, however, has morphed export credit financing into a weapon of national security. l Where most nations have just one export credit agency (ECA), China has three, all targeted for specific stages of economic and industrial development. The amount of money China has put behind these three instruments is staggering. l It is estimated that in 2018, China provided more than $500 billion in export credit, approaching in that one year the total amount of financing EXIM has provided in its 90-year history.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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