Critical Materials Future Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/s/596
Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Hickenlooper, John W. [D-CO]

ID: H000273

Follow the money

The bill

Critical Materials Future Act of 2025

S. 596, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Sen. Hickenlooper, John W. [D-CO]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$69,400 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 443-445 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Hearings held. Hearings printed: S.Hrg. 119-46.

March 11, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of Senators Hickenlooper, Graham, Coons, and Young. Let's dissect this masterpiece, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Critical Materials Future Act of 2025 aims to establish a pilot program to support domestic critical material processing, because, you know, the US can't rely on those pesky foreign nations for its strategic interests. The objectives are to provide financial stability, attract private investment, and reduce supply chain vulnerabilities. How original.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a pilot program within the Department of Energy, which will support at least three domestic critical material processing projects. It also defines various terms, such as "country of risk," "critical material," and "reliable source." Oh, and it gives the Secretary of Energy some fancy new powers to enter into "other transactions" and appoint temporary personnel without regard to those pesky civil service rules.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: mining and critical material processing industry representatives, financial experts, academic researchers, and, of course, the Department of Energy. I'm sure they'll all have a say in how this pilot program is implemented, because that's exactly what we need – more bureaucratic input.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "solution in search of a problem." The real issue here is not the lack of domestic critical material processing, but rather the fact that it's often cheaper and more efficient to import these materials from other countries. By creating this pilot program, the government is essentially subsidizing an industry that can't compete on its own merits.

The potential impact? A bunch of taxpayer dollars will be wasted on a program that might not even work as intended. The implications? More bureaucratic red tape, more opportunities for corruption and cronyism, and a further erosion of the US's competitive edge in the global market.

In short, this bill is a perfect example of legislative malpractice. It's a Band-Aid solution to a non-existent problem, designed to appease special interests rather than address any real issues. Bravo, Senators! You've managed to create a bill that's both pointless and counterproductive. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do – like diagnosing the terminal stupidity of our elected officials.

Related Topics

Energy Production & ConservationFederal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Hickenlooper, John W. [D-CO]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$69,400
16 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$3,400
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000

No PAC contributions found

1
THE CHICKASAW NATION
3 transactions
$3,400

No committee contributions found

1
SANKAR, SHYAM
2 transactions
$6,600
2
CARSON, RUSSELL
2 transactions
$6,600
3
GATES, WILLIAM H. III
2 transactions
$6,600
4
JAIN, AKASH
2 transactions
$6,600
5
BROWN, SAM WINFRED
2 transactions
$6,600
6
ALLHASSANI, MEHDI
1 transaction
$3,300
7
KELLEY, JIM
1 transaction
$3,300
8
KARP, ALEXANDER
1 transaction
$3,300
9
DODSON, DEWEY
1 transaction
$3,300
10
WARNER, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300
11
LOGAN, HAROLD R.
1 transaction
$3,300
12
LENZMEIER, CHARLES
1 transaction
$3,300
13
LOGAN, ANN M.
1 transaction
$3,300
14
GOLDBERG, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300
15
ARSENAULT, MARCEL
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Graham, Lindsey [R-SC]

ID: G000359

Top Contributors

31

1
WINRED PAC
PACARLINGTON, VA
$3,833
Oct 15, 2024
2
CATAWBA INDIAN NATION
OrganizationROCK HILL, SC
$3,300
May 21, 2024
3
BEVERLY B GROSSMAN TRUST
OrganizationENCINO, CA
$1,550
Jul 12, 2024
4
BELL FAMILY TRUST
OrganizationINDIAN WELLS, CA
$1,000
Mar 1, 2024
5
BEVERLY B GROSSMAN TRUST
OrganizationENCINO, CA
$230
Oct 2, 2024
6
BEVERLY B GROSSMAN TRUST
OrganizationENCINO, CA
$200
Jul 30, 2024
7
BEVERLY B GROSSMAN TRUST
OrganizationENCINO, CA
$150
Aug 14, 2024
8
ALFRED SEYMOUR BASSLER TR
RETIRED • RETIRED
OrganizationWOODBINE, MD
$100
Jul 26, 2024
9
ALFRED SEYMOUR BASSLER TR
RETIRED • RETIRED
OrganizationWOODBINE, MD
$100
Jul 26, 2024
10
BEVERLY B GROSSMAN TRUST
OrganizationENCINO, CA
$100
Jul 30, 2024

Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE]

ID: C001088

Top Contributors

22

1
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$3,300
Dec 27, 2023
2
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,700
Dec 27, 2023
3
CHEN, YU
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
4
MIRZAIE, REZA
RUSS AUGUST & KABAT LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$3,300
Oct 7, 2024
5
CHEN, YU
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
6
WASSERMAN, CASEY
WASSERMAN • CEO
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
7
ZHAO, PENG
CITADEL SECURITIES • CEO
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
8
WASSERMAN, CASEY
WASSERMAN • CEO
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
9
ZHAO, PENG
CITADEL SECURITIES • CEO
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
10
MIRZAIE, REZA
RUSS AUGUST & KABAT LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$3,300
Oct 7, 2024

Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]

ID: Y000064

Top Contributors

20

1
HESS, DANIEL L.
CORNERSTONE INDUSTRIES CORP. • PRESIDENT/ OWNER
IndividualZIONSVILLE, IN
$10,000
Jul 1, 2024
2
SHUBLAK, MARK I.
ICE MILLER LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$6,600
Oct 20, 2023
3
MCLEAN, SUZZY
SAGESURE • INSURANCE
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$6,600
Oct 23, 2024
4
MCLEAN, TERRENCE
SAGESURE • INSURANCE
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$6,600
Oct 23, 2024
5
BESSENT, SCOTT K.
KEY SQUARE GROUP • INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
IndividualCHARLESTON, SC
$6,600
Mar 28, 2024
6
PATRICELLI, ROBERT E.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSIMSBURY, CT
$6,600
Mar 1, 2024
7
ANDREESSEN, MARC L.
ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ • CO-FOUNDER
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$6,600
Sep 30, 2024
8
BRALY, DOUGLAS A. MR.
SELF EMPLOYED • ACCOUNTANT
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$6,600
Sep 4, 2024
9
DIXON, CHRISTOPHER
ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ • GENERAL PARTNER
IndividualPALO ALTO, CA
$6,600
Sep 30, 2024
10
HESS, LEANNA
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualZIONSVILLE, IN
$6,600
Aug 19, 2024

Donor Network - Sen. Hickenlooper, John W. [D-CO]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 34 nodes and 58 connections

Total contributions: $58

Top Donors - Sen. Hickenlooper, John W. [D-CO]

Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount

1 Org15 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 helped.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90

    Section 4(e)(2) coordinates with the Secretary of Defense to incorporate insights from DARPA's Open Price Exploration for National Security program, directly linking the bill to defense supply chain needs.

  • Critical materials are essential for semiconductor manufacturing; Section 4(a) establishes a pilot program to support domestic processing, enhancing supply chain security for chipmakers.

  • +Chemicals & Plasticsconfidence 0.80

    Section 4(b)(2) aims to support a sufficient domestic critical materials processing industry, which benefits chemical manufacturers that use critical materials as feedstock.

  • Section 4(b)(3) aims to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities and enhance energy security, which benefits midstream energy infrastructure involved in critical materials transport and storage.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Hickenlooper, John W. [D-CO])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Very Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 443-445AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's focus on expanding domestic critical material processing to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities and enhance energy and national security directly supports Project 2025's objectives of securing the bulk-power system, strengthening grid resilience, and ensuring reliable critical minerals supply for clean energy and defense needs."

Key themes:critical materialsenergy securitynational securitygrid securitysupply chain resilience

— 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52. — 412 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 41. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 3, 6, 12, 19, 21, and 23. 42. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1975, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 43. H.R. 6, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-58, 109th Congress, August 8, 2005, https://www. congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-109publ58.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 44. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “About the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/about-office-energy-efficiency-and- renewable-energy (accessed February 28, 2023). 45. Ibid. 46. See note 41, supra. 47. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 23, 43, and 49. 48. See U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/gdo/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 49. U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “Building a Better Grid Initiative,” https://www.energy. gov/gdo/building-better-grid-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 50. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 2, 19, 21, 23, and 84. “The FY 2023 Budget Request to Congress proposes to split the Electricity appropriation account into two accounts: Electricity and Grid Deployment Office (GDO). Had the proposed FY 2023 structure been in place in FY 2021 and FY 2022, the $7,000,000 shown under the Electricity account’s Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance (TPTA) program would have appeared under Grid Technical Assistance in GDO and the $3,000,000 shown under Program Direction in the Electricity account represents the estimated share of Electricity PD funding associated with TPTA and would have appeared under Program Direction in GDO.” Ibid., p. 84, note. 51. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Mission,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 52. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 6. 53. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Story,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 28, 2023). 54. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “OCED Project Portfolio,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/office-clean-energy-demonstrations (accessed February 28, 2023). 55. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 3, Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Federal Energy Management Program, Grid Deployment Office, Indian Energy Policy & Programs, Loan Programs, Manufacturing & Energy Supply Chains, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, Petroleum Reserves, Power Marketing Administrations, State and Community Energy Programs, April 2022, p. 104, https://www.energy. gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-3-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 56. See, for example, ibid., pp. 104 and 107. 57. U.S. Department of Energy, Loan Program Office, “LPO Year in Review 2022: New Legislation,” January 5, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpo-year-review-2022 (accessed February 28, 2023). Emphases in original. 58. H.R. 6256, To Ensure That Goods Made with Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China Do Not Enter the United States Market, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 117-78, 117th Congress, December 23, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ78/PLAW-117publ78.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 59. H.R. 2272, America COMPETES Act, Public Law 110–69, 110th Congress, August 9, 2007, § 5012, https://www. congress.gov/110/plaws/publ69/PLAW-110publ69.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 60. Ibid., § 5012(c)(1). 61. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, p. 103.

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Strong
Vector: 62%
Pages: 410-412AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on enhancing energy security through domestic critical material processing, particularly by reducing reliance on foreign sources like China and Russia, and supports innovation in fossil fuel-derived resources, which overlaps with Project 2025's emphasis on fossil fuels and energy security."

Key themes:energy securitydomestic critical materialsreducing foreign dependencefossil fuel innovationmarket stability

— 377 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions majority of critical materials are mined or processed (or both) in Russia and China.36 The processing of critical materials from fossil fuel waste products (primarily coal) has shown some potential and, in view of our vast domestic reserves of coal and abundant waste from coal mining and combustion, should be pursued. New Policies l Eliminate FECM. The next Administration should work with Congress to eliminate all of DOE’s applied energy programs, including those in FECM (with the possible exception of those that are related to basic science for new energy technology). Taxpayer dollars should not be used to subsidize preferred businesses and energy resources, thereby distorting the market and undermining energy reliability. l Rename FECM (if it cannot be eliminated) under its original designation as the Office of Fossil Energy and with its original mission: increasing energy security and supply through fossil fuels. l Focus on energy security and supply. Absent elimination of FECM, Congress should direct FECM appropriations toward increasing energy security and supply. Congress has already directed these goals (including the reduction of costs).37 l Ensure that LNG export approvals are reviewed and processed in a timely manner. In particular: 1. Ensure that LNG export applications are reviewed and approved expeditiously. 2. Maintain the categorical exclusion from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)38 for LNG exports that was established by the Trump Administration39 or (if it is revoked by the Biden Administration) reinstate it. 3. Work with Congress to expand automatic approvals to include allies such as NATO as well as nations that have free trade agreements with the U.S. l Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The Biden Administration moved responsibility for the SPR to CESER. Regardless of where the responsibility lies, the new DESAS should ensure that the SPR is maintained for national strategic purposes and not misused for political gain. — 378 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Budget The FY 2023 budget request for FECM was approximately $893.2 million.40 FECM’s requested appropriation can be compared to the more than $4.0 billion requested for the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy.41 The disparity in funding demonstrates how DOE’s research activities and substantial portions of its organizational structure are now focused entirely on the reduction of CO2 emissions rather than energy access or energy security. OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY (EERE) Mission/Overview The Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy traces its roots to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,42 but most of its programs today are rooted in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.43 Under the Biden Administration, EERE’s mission is “to accelerate the research, development, demonstration, and deployment of technologies and solutions to equitably transition America to net- zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions economy-wide by no later than 2050” and “ensure [that] the clean energy economy benefits all Americans.”44 The office is made up of three “pillars”: energy efficiency, renewable energy, and sustainable transportation. Needed Reforms l End the focus on climate change and green subsidies. Under the Biden Administration, EERE is a conduit for taxpayer dollars to fund progressive policies, including decarbonization of the economy and renewable resources. EERE has focused on reducing carbon dioxide emissions to the exclusion of other statutorily defined requirements such as energy security and cost. For example, EERE’s five programmatic priorities during the Biden Administration are all focused on decarbonization of the electricity sector, the industrial sector, transportation, buildings, and the agricultural sector.45 l Eliminate energy efficiency standards for appliances. Pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 as amended, the agency is required to set and periodically tighten energy and/or water efficiency standards for nearly all kinds of commercial and household appliances, including air conditioners, furnaces, water heaters, stoves, clothes washers and dryers, refrigerators, dishwashers, light bulbs, and showerheads. Current law and regulations reduce consumer choice, drive up costs for consumer appliances, and emphasize energy efficiency to the exclusion of other important factors such as cycle time and reparability.

Small Business Administration

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 789-791AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 SBA section aim to strengthen domestic manufacturing and improve access to capital for industrial projects, but the bill does not specifically target small businesses or SBA programs, resulting in moderate thematic overlap."

Key themes:domestic manufacturingcapital accesssupply chain resiliencecritical materials processingfinancial support mechanisms

— 756 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Domestic Manufacturing and Small Business. Small businesses in the manufacturing sector face shortfalls in access to capital.61 As manufacturing employment, domestic business investment, and non–information technology output have declined,62 expectations for market returns and the capital available to small manufacturing enterprises have diminished. This is especially true for capital-intensive sectors like transportation and energy that require large up-front investments and relatively lower-margin sectors like plastics, textiles, furniture, and agriculture. Yet these industries and others like them traditionally have been the backbone of American manufacturing employment. They also are sources of self-sufficiency and resilience at a time when global supply chains are increas- ingly uncertain. The public policy problems that are caused by declining small manufacturing are especially acute when it comes to the production of advanced technologies. Other agencies and programs invest immense taxpayer resources in basic science and research. Over time, that research results in some breakthrough technologies, but when it is time to put these breakthroughs into practice by manufacturing goods and services, much of the necessary productive capacity is offshore.63 For many technologies, the American economy lacks the capacity to “scale up” inno- vations that might not be immediately profitable. Instead, those technologies are put into practice abroad. In this way, foreign companies and foreign productive sites buy and implement taxpayer-funded American technologies. The SBA’s existing programs should be reformed to expand the private market for capital in small-manufacturer expansion. The next Administration should: l Ask Congress to make available a category of Section 7(a) loans with a larger available principal that is used to finance manufacturing facility construction and equipment upgrading. The proposed SBA Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2019, for example, would have increased the maximum loan principal to $50 million for advanced manufacturing construction and upgrading.64 The Section 7(a) loan program operates through private lenders and guarantees a portion of private-sector loans made to qualifying small businesses. The maximum principal available is $5 million, but small businesses in capital-intensive sectors require significantly larger amounts of capital to finance up-front capital costs. l Reform the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program to refocus its support on small businesses rather than technology startups only. The SBIC program operates through private venture capital and private equity funds by providing eligible funds with guaranteed debt financing to support investments in small businesses. However, the program — 757 — Small Business Administration largely duplicates private-sector venture capital to the extent that the sector receiving much of its support is software and information technology, which already receive the lion’s share of venture capital investment.65 In addition, Congress should reform the SBIC program to make its financing more favorable to capital-intense investments and small manufacturers. The Health, Economic Assistance, Liability Protection, and Schools (HEALS) Act, introduced in 2020,66 and American Innovation and Manufacturing Act, introduced in 2021,67 would allow SBIC to offer longer-term financing to manufacturers and make the program more fiscally sustainable. Small-Business Size Standard Modernization. Many small-business pro- grams both inside and outside the SBA use the SBA’s definition of “small business.” Under the Small Business Act, the SBA is tasked with defining what counts as a small business and ensuring that the definition varies from industry to industry to reflect differences in regular size by industry. However, the SBA’s small-business size standards reflect a one-size-fits-all approach under which all businesses within its size standard are considered small businesses for all eligible purposes, from gov- ernment contracting preferences to eligibility for SBA loans through private banks. At the same time, the SBA is an outlier among competing economies in not considering medium-sized enterprises along with small businesses, often referred to collectively as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Medium-sized and regional businesses are increasingly critical to maintaining competition. The next Administration should: l Encourage Congress to create a “medium-sized business” classification with its eligibility for programs confined to access to capital programs from projects for which credit elsewhere does not exist. SBA POLICY PRIORITIES FOR 2025 AND BEYOND Legislation. The new Administration can support SBA reform legislation pro- posed in Congress that aligns with key measures outlined in this chapter. It also can support legislative initiatives that would help SBA to focus on its core statutory activities such as capital access, federal contracting opportunities, and regulatory advocacy. For example: l The IMPROVE the SBA Act68 would strengthen accountability, transparency, and oversight of the SBA and aligns with many of the reforms outlined in this chapter.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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