The bill
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025
S. 524, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Sen. Cruz, Ted [R-TX]
ID: C001098
Follow the money
The bill
S. 524, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 186-188 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Held at the Desk
March 9, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
(sigh) Alright, let's dissect this bloated monstrosity of a bill. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 is a perfect example of how our esteemed lawmakers can take a simple concept – authorizing funds for the Coast Guard – and turn it into a Frankenstein's monster of pork-barrel spending, bureaucratic busywork, and blatant attempts to curry favor with special interest groups.
First off, let's look at the total funding amounts. The bill authorizes a whopping $13.4 billion in appropriations for the Coast Guard, which is a 3.5% increase from last year's budget. (Wow, I'm sure that extra $450 million will be put to good use... not.) Broken down, this includes:
* $6.8 billion for operations and maintenance * $2.4 billion for acquisition, construction, and improvements * $1.3 billion for personnel costs * $1.2 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation
Now, let's see who the real beneficiaries of this largesse are:
* The Coast Guard itself gets a nice chunk of change for its various programs, including icebreaking operations in the Great Lakes (Sec. 114) and the acquisition of new tactical maritime surveillance systems (Sec. 139). * Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and other defense contractors will be thrilled to know that their pet projects are being funded, such as the Polar Security Cutter program (Sec. 115) and the procurement of floating drydocks for Coast Guard Yard (Sec. 116). * The shipping industry gets a few goodies too, like changes to merchant mariner credentialing requirements (Sec. 201) and the establishment of safety zones for special activities in the exclusive economic zone (Sec. 219).
Notable increases from previous years include:
* A $100 million boost for Coast Guard Academy infrastructure improvements * An additional $50 million for research, development, test, and evaluation
And what about those pesky riders? Oh boy, there are plenty of them. Some highlights include:
* Sec. 141: Modification of authority for special purpose facilities – a.k.a. more pork-barrel spending on "special" projects that benefit specific lawmakers' districts. * Sec. 166: Reinstatement of training course on workings of Congress; Coast Guard Museum – because what the Coast Guard really needs is to waste time and resources on Congressional boot-licking exercises.
Fiscal impact? Ha! Don't make me laugh. This bill will only add to our already-bloated deficit, which is projected to reach $1 trillion by 2025. But hey, who cares about fiscal responsibility when there are votes to be bought and special interests to be appeased?
In conclusion, this bill is a textbook example of how our government's priorities are completely out of whack. We're more concerned with lining the pockets of defense contractors and shipping industry lobbyists than
Sen. Cruz, Ted [R-TX]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
No individual contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C000127
Top Contributors
70
ID: S001198
Top Contributors
75
ID: B001230
Top Contributors
72
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 31 nodes and 37 connections
Total contributions: $37
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 7 helped, 1 harmed.
Sec. 115 requires regular updates on Polar Security Cutter acquisition, which involves defense contractors like Huntington Ingalls Industries (builder of Polar Security Cutters). This supports defense contractors through continued funding and oversight of major acquisition programs.
Section 154 expands family leave policies for Coast Guard personnel, which could increase utilization of health insurance benefits for covered family members, indirectly benefiting health insurers through higher claims volume.
Section 116 authorizes the acquisition, procurement, or construction of a floating drydock for the Coast Guard Yard, directly benefiting construction and engineering firms involved in such projects.
Section 158 establishes an embedded behavioral health technician program in Coast Guard clinics, increasing demand for behavioral health services that may be supported by or coordinated with hospital systems, particularly for referrals and higher-level care.
Section 220 improves vessel traffic service monitoring near pipelines, which could enhance safety and efficiency for maritime shipping and logistics operations, benefiting surface transportation firms that rely on waterways.
Section 154's expansion of family leave policies includes provisions for long-term foster care and adoption support, which may increase demand for long-term care services and related benefits for Coast Guard personnel and their families.
+ 2 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Cruz, Ted [R-TX])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's focus on strengthening the Coast Guard's role in protecting U.S. waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone, enhancing maritime security, and improving operational efficiency through targeted funding and policy provisions."
— 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners — 155 — Department of Homeland Security and (2) national coordination of critical infrastructure security and resilience. Yet CISA has rapidly expanded its scope into lanes where it does not belong, the most recent and most glaring example being censorship of so-called misinformation and disinformation. CISA’s funding and resources should align narrowly with the foregoing two mission requirements. The component’s emergency communications and Chem- ical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) roles should be moved to FEMA; its school security functions should be transferred to state homeland security offices; and CISA should refrain from duplicating cybersecurity functions done elsewhere at the Department of Defense, FBI, National Security Agency, and U.S. Secret Service. Of the utmost urgency is immediately ending CISA’s counter-mis/disinforma- tion efforts. The federal government cannot be the arbiter of truth. CISA began this work because of alleged Russian misinformation in the 2016 election, which in fact turned out to be a Clinton campaign “dirty trick.” The Intelligence Commu- nity, including the NSA or DOD, should counter foreign actors. At the time of this writing, release of the Twitter Files has demonstrated that CISA has devolved into an unconstitutional censoring and election engineering apparatus of the political Left. In any event, the entirety of the CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee should be dismissed on Day One. For election security, CISA should help states and localities assess whether they have good cyber hygiene in their hardware and software in preparation for an election—but nothing more. This is of value to smaller localities, particularly by flagging who is attacking their websites. CISA should not be significantly involved closer to an election. Nor should it participate in messaging or propaganda. U.S. COAST GUARD (USCG) Needed Reforms The U.S. Coast Guard fleet should be sized to the needs of great-power compe- tition, specifically focusing efforts and investment on protecting U.S. waters, all while seeking to find (where feasible) more economical ways to perform USCG missions. The scope of the Coast Guard’s mission needs to be focused on protecting U.S. resources and interests in its home waters, specifically its Exclusive Economic Zone (200 miles from shore). USCG’s budget should address the growing demand for it to address the increasing threat from the Chinese fishing fleet in home waters as well as narcotics and migrant flows in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Doing this will require reversing years of shortfalls in shipbuilding, maintenance, and upgrades of shore facilities as well as seeking more cost-effective ship and facility designs. In wartime, the USCG supports the Navy, but it has limited capability and capacity to support wartime missions outside home waters.
AI Analysis:
"The bill provides increased funding for Coast Guard operations and maintenance, which aligns with Project 2025's call for enhanced maritime domain awareness and operational readiness, but it does not implement the specific structural reforms, long-range shipbuilding planning, or Pacific-focused resource prioritization outlined in the policy."
— 156 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise New Policies The Coast Guard’s mission set should be scaled down to match congressio- nal budgeting in the long term, with any increased funding going to acquisitions based on an updated Fleet Mix Analysis. The current shipbuilding plan is insuf- ficient based on USCG analysis, and the necessary numbers of planned Offshore Patrol Cutters and National Security Cutters are not supported by congressional budgets. The Coast Guard should be required to submit to Congress a long-range shipbuilding plan modeled on the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. Ideally this should become part of the Navy plan in a new comprehensive naval long-range shipbuilding plan to ensure better coherency in the services’ requirements. Outside of home waters, and following the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, the Coast Guard should prioritize limited resources to the nation’s expansive Pacific waters to counter growing Chinese influence and encroachment. Expansion of facilities in American Samoa and basing of cutters there is one clear step in this direction and should be accelerated; looking to free association states (Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) for enhanced and persistent presence, assuming adequate congressional funding, is another such step. The Secretary of the Navy should convene a naval board to review and reset requirements for Coast Guard wartime mission support. To inform and validate these updated requirements, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Coast Guard Commandant should execute dedicated annual joint wartime drills focused on USCG’s wartime missions in the Pacific (the money for these activities should be allocated from DOD). An interagency maritime coordination office focused on developing and overseeing comprehensive efforts to advance the nation’s mari- time interests and increase its military and commercial competitiveness should be established. Given the USCG’s history of underfunded missions, if the Coast Guard is to con- tinue to maintain the Arctic mission, money to do so adequately will be required over and above current funding levels. Consideration should be given to shifting the Arctic mission to the Navy. Either way, the Arctic mission should be closely coordinated with our Canadian, Danish, and other allies. Personnel USCG is facing recruitment challenges similar to those faced by the military services. The Administration should stop the messaging on wokeness and diversity and focus instead on attracting the best talent for USCG. Simultaneously, consis- tent with the Department of Defense, USCG should also make a serious effort to re-vet any promotions and hiring that occurred on the Biden Administration’s watch while also re-onboarding any USCG personnel who were dismissed from service for refusing to take the COVID-19 “vaccine,” with time in service credited — 157 — Department of Homeland Security to such returnees. These two steps could be foundational for any improvements in the recruiting process. U.S. SECRET SERVICE (USSS) Needed Reforms The U.S. Secret Service must be the world’s best protective agency. Currently, the agency is distracted by its dual mission of protection and financial investigations. The result has been a long series of high-profile embarrassments and security fail- ures, perhaps most notably its allowing of then-Vice President-elect Kamala Harris to be inside the Democratic National Committee office on January 6, 2021, while a pipe bomb was outside. Despite the great size and scope of the January 6 inves- tigation, this high-profile incident of danger to a protectee remains unresolved. The failures of the USSS protective mission are too numerous to list here. A December 2015 bipartisan report from the House Oversight Committee listed dozens of such incidents as well as needed recommendations for reform.14 This chapter adopts those findings and recommendations in whole, especially the finding that USSS’s dual-mission structure detracts from the agency’s protective capabilities. At the time of that report, USSS agents spent only one-third of their work hours on protection-related activities as opposed to investigative activities. USSS was established initially to investigate counterfeit currency, but its mission has evolved over the decades to prioritize electronic financial crimes. For example, as this chap- ter was being written, all 15 of the USSS’s most wanted individuals were wanted for financial crimes, many of them international in nature. Notably, the last head of the agency left not for a protection-related job, but to be the Chief Security Officer of social media company SnapChat. This is a pattern that has developed over the years, with agents seeking to burnish their online financial crimes credentials to secure corporate security jobs. Coupled with some of the lowest morale in the federal government, the agency has completely lost sight of the primacy of its protective mission. New Policies USSS should transfer to the Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury all investigations that are not related to its protective function. It should begin the logistical operation of closing all field offices throughout the country and internationally to the extent they are not taken over by Treasury or Justice. USSS agents stationed outside of Washington, D.C., should be transferred to work in Immigration and Customs Enforcement field offices where they would continue to be the “boots on the ground” to follow up on threat reports throughout the country and liaise with local law enforcement for visits by protectees.
AI Analysis:
"The bill increases funding for Coast Guard operations and includes provisions for maritime domain awareness and acquisition reforms, which partially align with Project 2025's emphasis on strategic resource allocation, fleet modernization, and Pacific-focused missions. However, it does not explicitly address long-range shipbuilding planning, Arctic mission reassessment, or personnel policies related to diversity or vaccine mandates as outlined in the policy."
— 156 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise New Policies The Coast Guard’s mission set should be scaled down to match congressio- nal budgeting in the long term, with any increased funding going to acquisitions based on an updated Fleet Mix Analysis. The current shipbuilding plan is insuf- ficient based on USCG analysis, and the necessary numbers of planned Offshore Patrol Cutters and National Security Cutters are not supported by congressional budgets. The Coast Guard should be required to submit to Congress a long-range shipbuilding plan modeled on the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. Ideally this should become part of the Navy plan in a new comprehensive naval long-range shipbuilding plan to ensure better coherency in the services’ requirements. Outside of home waters, and following the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, the Coast Guard should prioritize limited resources to the nation’s expansive Pacific waters to counter growing Chinese influence and encroachment. Expansion of facilities in American Samoa and basing of cutters there is one clear step in this direction and should be accelerated; looking to free association states (Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) for enhanced and persistent presence, assuming adequate congressional funding, is another such step. The Secretary of the Navy should convene a naval board to review and reset requirements for Coast Guard wartime mission support. To inform and validate these updated requirements, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Coast Guard Commandant should execute dedicated annual joint wartime drills focused on USCG’s wartime missions in the Pacific (the money for these activities should be allocated from DOD). An interagency maritime coordination office focused on developing and overseeing comprehensive efforts to advance the nation’s mari- time interests and increase its military and commercial competitiveness should be established. Given the USCG’s history of underfunded missions, if the Coast Guard is to con- tinue to maintain the Arctic mission, money to do so adequately will be required over and above current funding levels. Consideration should be given to shifting the Arctic mission to the Navy. Either way, the Arctic mission should be closely coordinated with our Canadian, Danish, and other allies. Personnel USCG is facing recruitment challenges similar to those faced by the military services. The Administration should stop the messaging on wokeness and diversity and focus instead on attracting the best talent for USCG. Simultaneously, consis- tent with the Department of Defense, USCG should also make a serious effort to re-vet any promotions and hiring that occurred on the Biden Administration’s watch while also re-onboarding any USCG personnel who were dismissed from service for refusing to take the COVID-19 “vaccine,” with time in service credited
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
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Establishing the congressional budget for the United States Government for fiscal year 2025 and setting forth the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2026 through 2034.
HELP Response and Recovery Act