Expel Illegal Chinese Police Act of 2025
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Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
ID: C001095
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
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7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed Senator Cotton and his cohorts. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "Expel Illegal Chinese Police Act of 2025" is a masterclass in grandstanding, masquerading as a genuine attempt to address China's alleged police presence in the United States. The bill's primary objective is to impose sanctions on Chinese police departments and individuals associated with them, while also prohibiting U.S. agencies from participating in investigations initiated by foreign governments.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces several provisions that are as vague as they are toothless:
1. Sanctions: The President can block property transactions and impose visa restrictions on Chinese police departments and individuals associated with them. 2. Waiver: The President can waive these sanctions for up to 30 days, citing national security interests. 3. Implementation: The bill authorizes the President to use existing authorities under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to enforce these provisions.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are affected:
1. Chinese police departments and individuals associated with them (the alleged "bad guys"). 2. U.S. agencies, which will be prohibited from participating in foreign-initiated investigations. 3. Aliens seeking visas or admission to the United States (because who needs due process, anyway?). 4. The President, who gets to play dictator with waiver powers.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a Potemkin village of legislation – all show and no substance. Its impact will be negligible, but its implications are telling:
1. China will likely retaliate with similar sanctions, escalating tensions. 2. The bill's vague language and broad authorities will lead to arbitrary enforcement and potential human rights abuses. 3. U.S. agencies will be hamstrung in their ability to cooperate with foreign governments on legitimate investigations. 4. This bill serves as a distraction from more pressing issues, like the actual influence of Chinese money and interests in U.S. politics.
In conclusion, this bill is a cynical exercise in xenophobic posturing, designed to appease the Senator's base rather than address any genuine concerns about China's activities. It's a legislative placebo, meant to make voters feel better while doing nothing to actually improve national security or protect human rights.
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception? — 217 — Intelligence Community Some Members of Congress have said that intelligence relationships such as the Five Eyes28 should be expanded to include other allies in the Asia–Pacific in, for example, a “Nine Eyes” framework. This fails to take into account the fact that any blanket expansion would necessarily involve protecting the sources and methods of a larger and quite possibly more diverse group of member countries that might or might not have congruent interests. That being said, however, a future conservative President should consider what resources and information-sharing relationships could be included in an ad hoc or quasi-formal intelligence expansion (for example, with the Quad) among nations trying to counter the threat from China. Significant technology, language skills, and financial intelligence resources are needed to counter China’s capabilities.29 The IC was caught flat-footed by the recent discovery of China’s successful test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. No longer can America’s information and technological dominance be assumed. China’s gains and intense focus on emerging technologies have taken it in some areas from being a near-peer competitor to probably being ahead of the United States. China’s centralized government allocates endless resources (sometimes inefficiently) to its strategic “Made in China 2025” and military apparatuses, which combine government, military, and private-sector activities on quantum infor- mation sciences and technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, biotechnologies, and advanced robotics. The IC must do more than understand these advancements: It must rally non- government and allied partners and inspire unified action to counter them. In addition, to combat China’s economic espionage, authorities and loopholes in the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)30 will have to be examined and addressed in conjunction with the Attorney General. Many issues within the broader government can be tied back to a more general congressional understanding of the threat due to the compartmentalization of committee jurisdictions and the responsibilities of executive agencies to brief on the nature of the threat. Broader committee jurisdictions should receive additional intelligence from IC agencies as necessary to inform China’s unique and more com- prehensive threat across layers of the U.S. government bureaucracy and economy. Former DNI John Ratcliffe increased the intelligence budget as it related to China by 20 percent. “When people ask me why I did that,” he explained in an interview, “I say, ‘Because no one would let me increase it by 40%.’ I had an $85 billion combined annual budget for both the national intelligence program and military intelligence program. My perspective was, ‘Whatever we’re spending on countering China, it isn’t enough.’”31 From an intelligence standpoint, the need to understand Chinese motivations, capabilities, and intent will be of paramount importance to a future conservative President. It is therefore also of paramount importance that the “whole of government” be rowing together.
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.