A bill to waive the 60-day notice requirement for the posthumous honorary promotion of Captain Cody Khork, United States Army.

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Bill ID: 119/s/4138
Last Updated: July 17, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Wicker, Roger F. [R-MS]

ID: W000437

Follow the money

The bill

A bill to waive the 60-day notice requirement for the posthumous honorary promotion of Captain Cody Khork, United States Army.

S. 4138, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Sen. Wicker, Roger F. [R-MS]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$682,800 raised

25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 161-163 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Became Public Law No: 119-80.

March 19, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed Senate

House Review

Passed Congress

Presidential Action

Became Law

📍 Current Status

This bill has become law!

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

The bill in question, S 4138, is a shining example of bureaucratic busywork, masquerading as a heartfelt tribute to Captain Cody Khork, United States Army. The "posthumous honorary promotion" is nothing more than a feel-good gesture, a Band-Aid on the festering wound of congressional incompetence.

New regulations? Ha! This bill creates none, merely waiving a trivial 60-day notice requirement for a single individual. A drop in the ocean of regulatory red tape. Affected industries and sectors? Please, this is a non-event, a tempest in a teapot. The only sector impacted is the ego of Captain Khork's family and the politicians who sponsored this bill.

Compliance requirements and timelines? Oh, the arduous task of waiving a notice requirement! I'm sure the congressional staff worked tirelessly to draft this 100-word bill. Enforcement mechanisms and penalties? Don't make me laugh. This is a toothless tiger, a symbolic gesture with no teeth or consequences.

The economic and operational impacts? Zilch. Zero. Nada. This bill is a rounding error on the federal budget, a microscopic blip on the radar of fiscal responsibility. But hey, it's a great photo op for the politicians involved! They get to pretend they're doing something meaningful while actually accomplishing nothing.

Diagnosis: Congressional Narcissistic Personality Disorder (CNPD), characterized by an excessive need for self-aggrandizement, a lack of substance, and a penchant for meaningless gestures. Treatment: a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach, and a willingness to call out the blatant hypocrisy. Prognosis: terminal stupidity, with a high likelihood of recurrence.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Wicker, Roger F. [R-MS]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$682,800
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$44,500
Committees
$0
Individuals
$638,300

No PAC contributions found

1
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
1 transaction
$25,000
2
MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
1 transaction
$15,000
3
WT CONSULTANTS LLC
1 transaction
$2,500
4
WAYPOINT CONSULTING, LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
5
HEDERMAN BROTHERS, LLC
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
HALE, ROBERT T. JR.
2 transactions
$150,000
2
CHOUEST, GARY
1 transaction
$100,000
3
DUFF, THOMAS M.
2 transactions
$75,000
4
BLUE, J. NEAL
1 transaction
$50,000
5
GOLDING, STEPHEN D.
2 transactions
$50,000
6
ELLIOTT, MAC
1 transaction
$25,000
7
GOLDING, MELODY
1 transaction
$25,000
8
YATES, WILLIAM G. JR.
1 transaction
$25,000
9
ACKERMAN, FORREST
1 transaction
$25,000
10
VAN DEVENDER, WILLIAM J.
2 transactions
$25,000
11
TURNAGE, BEN O.
1 transaction
$19,900
12
MCRAE, DAVID
1 transaction
$18,400
13
GREEN, JOHNSON M.
1 transaction
$15,000
14
HURST, PAUL
1 transaction
$12,500
15
BARBOUR, HALEY
1 transaction
$12,500
16
CHOUEST AUSTIN, DIONNE
1 transaction
$10,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Reed, Jack [D-RI]

ID: R000122

Top Contributors

20

1
KHAMIEES, MOHAMMAD D.
SELF-EMPLOYED • PHYSICIAN
IndividualCUMBERLAND, RI
$3,300
May 7, 2023
2
MEZZALINGUA, JOHN
JMA WIRELESS • CEO
IndividualSKANEATELES, NY
$3,300
Apr 8, 2024
3
MEZZALINGUA, JOHN
JMA WIRELESS • CEO
IndividualSKANEATELES, NY
$3,300
Apr 8, 2024
4
MEZZALINGUA, KIM
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualSKANEATELES, NY
$3,300
Apr 8, 2024
5
MEZZALINGUA, KIM
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualSKANEATELES, NY
$3,300
Apr 8, 2024
6
GRANIERI, ROBERT A.
JANE STREET CAPITAL • MANAGER
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Sep 29, 2023
7
GRANIERI, ROBERT A.
JANE STREET CAPITAL • MANAGER
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Sep 29, 2023
8
BOYCE, KATHARINE
KRBR CONSULTING • PRESIDENT
IndividualALEXANDRIA, VA
$2,900
Mar 28, 2023
9
SLOANE, CANDACE LAPIDUS
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualNEEDHAM, MA
$2,900
Mar 22, 2024
10
BONDERMAN, DAVID
TEXAS PACIFIC GROUP • FOUNDER
IndividualFORT WORTH, TX
$2,500
Feb 27, 2023

Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]

ID: S001217

Top Contributors

22

1
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Aug 22, 2023
2
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Aug 12, 2024
3
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$90,795
May 31, 2024
4
SCOTT, RICK SEN
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$77,714
May 31, 2023
5
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$69,607
Apr 30, 2024
6
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$68,538
Aug 31, 2023
7
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$53,187
Sep 30, 2023
8
SCOTT, RICK SEN
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$49,992
Jun 30, 2023
9
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$39,695
Jun 30, 2024
10
SCOTT, RICK
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$34,494
Jan 31, 2023

Donor Network - Sen. Wicker, Roger F. [R-MS]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 36 nodes and 40 connections

Total contributions: $40

Top Donors - Sen. Wicker, Roger F. [R-MS]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

5 Orgs16 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Weak
Vector: 54%
Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill provides a one‑time, symbolic waiver for a posthumous honorary promotion of an individual soldier, which does not meaningfully advance the broader Department of Defense objectives outlined in Project 2025 such as defense readiness, acquisition reform, intelligence oversight, or systemic support for military families."

Key themes:military honorsposthumous promotionArmy personnel

— 128 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Preamble, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/preamble/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 3. U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 2, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Established pursuant to S. 1605, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law No. 117-81, 117th Congress, December 27, 2021, Division A, Title X, § 1004, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ81/ PLAW-117publ81.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division G, Title IX, §§ 70901–70953, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. S. 2943, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 114-328, 114th Congress, December 23, 2016, Division A, Title IX, § 901, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg2000. pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. H.R. 3622, Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-433, 99th Congress, October 1, 1986, https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Historical Sales Book, Fiscal Years 1950–2021, p. 7, https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/dsca_historical_sales_book_FY21.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL31675, updated June 10, 2022, p. 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/ RL31675.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 10. Keith Webster, “How to Reform America’s Military Sales Process,” The Hill Congress Blog, October 6, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3675933-how-to-reform-americas-military-sales-process/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 11. See Thomas W. Spoehr, “The Administration and Congress Must Act Now to Counter the Worsening Military Recruiting Crisis, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5283, July 28, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/ default/files/2022-07/IB5283.pdf. 12. Ibid. 13. Ronald Reagan Institute, “Reagan National Defense Survey,” conducted November 2021, p. 4, https://www. reaganfoundation.org/media/358085/rndf_survey_booklet.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 14. See Paul J. Larkin, “Protecting the Nation by Employing Military Spouses,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 6, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/protecting-the-nation-employing- military-spouses. 15. See Jude Schwalbach, “Military Families Deserve Flexible Education Options,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 14, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/military-families-deserve- flexible-education-options. 16. See Chapter 7, “The Intelligence Community,” infra. 17. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the military services: U.S. Air Force Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence, and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, which also receive guidance and oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). 18. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 19. The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. — 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023).

Department of Defense

Minimal
Vector: 58%
Pages: 134-136AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill concerns a one-time waiver for a posthumous honorary promotion, which is unrelated to Project 2025's DOD objectives of exportability, arms sales reform, contracting efficiency, or recruiting and retention."

Key themes:Department of Defensemilitary personnel

— 101 — Department of Defense 1. Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense systems that are both available and interoperable with our partners and allies. 2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions. l End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9 1. End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process. 2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification. l Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the United States alone. 1. Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States. 2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute. l Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing.10 — 102 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 1. Immediately fund more contracting capacity in all services to decrease the contracting timeline and improve the delivery of defense articles to our global partners. 2. Rationalize and speed arms sales decision-making to preclude our enemies from exploiting bureaucratic slothfulness and allow us to manage the development of indigenous defense industrial bases. DOD PERSONNEL The men and women of America’s armed forces are the most critical component of our national defense strategy, but in recent years, they have been overextended, undervalued, and insufficiently resourced. Their families help them to carry the burden of service, but the assistance they receive is disproportionately less than the sacrifices they make. Young civilians who would thrive in a military environ- ment are disenfranchised when educators and influencers discourage them from learning about military service and preparing for the honor of wearing Ameri- ca’s uniform. The United States military is an extraordinary institution, staffed by exceptional people who have defended our nation and changed the course of history, but the Biden Administration, through word and deed, has treated the armed forces as just another place to work. We must restore our military to a place of honor and respect and recruit and retain the individuals who will meet the rigorous standards of excellence that are required for membership in the world’s greatest fighting force. Needed Reforms l Rescue recruiting and retention. Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it has been in two generations and is expected to be even worse in 2023. Some of the problems are self-inflicted and ongoing. The recruiting problem is not service-specific: It affects the entire Joint Force. 1. Appoint a Special Assistant to the President who will maintain liaison with Congress, DOD, and all other interested parties on the issue of recruiting and retention. 2. Improve recruiting by suspending the use of the recently introduced MHS Genesis system that uses private medical records of potential recruits at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), creating unnecessary delays and unwarranted rejections.11 3. Improve military recruiters’ access to secondary schools and require completion of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery

Department of Defense

Minimal
Vector: 55%
Pages: 134-136AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill S 4138 concerns a posthumous honorary promotion for an individual service member and does not address defense exportability, FMS processes, ITAR reform, or defense industrial base collaboration as outlined in the Project 2025 DoD policy objectives."

— 101 — Department of Defense 1. Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense systems that are both available and interoperable with our partners and allies. 2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions. l End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9 1. End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process. 2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification. l Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the United States alone. 1. Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States. 2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute. l Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing.10

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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