End-of-Year Fiscal Responsibility Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/4059
Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

ID: E000295

Follow the money

The bill

End-of-Year Fiscal Responsibility Act

S. 4059, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$383,500 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 875-878 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.

March 17, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed Senator Ernst. The "End-of-Year Fiscal Responsibility Act" - because nothing says "fiscal responsibility" like a bill that's essentially a Trojan horse for pork-barrel spending.

Let's dissect this farce:

**Total funding amounts and budget allocations:** Ah, the grand total? A whopping $0. That's right; this bill doesn't actually allocate any funds. It's all about "requirements" and "reporting" - code words for "we're going to pretend to be responsible while doing nothing."

**Key programs and agencies receiving funds:** None. Zilch. This bill is a shell game, folks. The real money will be hidden in the fine print of future appropriations bills or slipped into omnibus packages like a bad habit.

**Notable increases or decreases from previous years:** Ha! Don't make me laugh. This bill doesn't touch actual funding levels; it's all about "averages" and "exceptions." It's like trying to diagnose a patient by only looking at their symptoms, not the underlying disease.

**Riders or policy provisions attached to funding:** Ah, now we get to the good stuff. The exception for national security-related activities and disaster relief efforts is a cleverly crafted loophole big enough to drive a truck through. It's like saying, "We're going to be fiscally responsible... unless it's an emergency, in which case, all bets are off."

**Fiscal impact and deficit implications:** Oh boy, this is where the magic happens. By not actually allocating funds or addressing the underlying budget issues, this bill ensures that our national debt will continue to balloon like a patient on a ventilator. It's a fiscal time bomb, and we're just waiting for it to go off.

Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Fiscal Irresponsibility Syndrome" (FIS), characterized by grandiose language, empty promises, and a complete lack of actual fiscal discipline. The symptoms are clear: politicians trying to look responsible while doing nothing, voters too apathetic or ignorant to care, and a system that rewards pork-barrel spending over actual governance.

Treatment? A healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for the inevitable consequences, and a willingness to call out these charlatans for what they are. But hey, who needs actual fiscal responsibility when you can just pass a bill with a catchy title and pretend to be doing something?

Related Topics

Federal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$383,500
22 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$7,700
Committees
$0
Individuals
$375,800

No PAC contributions found

1
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA
2 transactions
$6,700
2
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
ABEL, ANDREA MS.
1 transaction
$50,000
2
MCINERNEY, THOMAS E. MR.
1 transaction
$50,000
3
NICOLLS, BOB MR.
1 transaction
$25,000
4
GRAY, C. BOYDEN
1 transaction
$25,000
5
CATSIMATIDIS, JOHN A. MR.
1 transaction
$25,000
6
KOTICK, ROBERT MR.
1 transaction
$16,600
7
VINCZE, CHRISTOPHER
1 transaction
$15,800
8
FRANCE, BRIAN Z. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
9
BAKER, BERNARD J. MR. III
1 transaction
$15,000
10
HEGYI, ALBERT P. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
11
DAVISON, JAMES E. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
12
BROIN, JEFF MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
13
SHERRILL, STEPHEN C. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
14
GLEESON, JOHN W. MR.
1 transaction
$12,500
15
RAY-GLEESON, KAREN S. MRS.
1 transaction
$12,500
16
POPOLO, JOE
1 transaction
$11,800
17
PFAUTCH, ROY MR.
1 transaction
$11,600
18
GOLDMAN, MARC STANLEY
1 transaction
$10,000
19
SCHLOEMER, JAMES H. MR.
1 transaction
$10,000
20
SABIN, ANDREW MR.
1 transaction
$10,000

Donor Network - Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 42 nodes and 39 connections

Total contributions: $39

Top Donors - Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped, 2 harmed.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90

    Section 3(c) provides an exception for national security-related activities, which may benefit defense contractors by allowing them to continue receiving discretionary appropriations without restrictions.

  • Section 3(a) imposes restrictions on Executive agency spending at the end of a fiscal year, which may limit investment opportunities for private equity and hedge funds in government contracts and projects.

  • −Commercial Banksconfidence 0.70

    Section 3(a) reduces government spending, which may decrease the demand for banking services and loans from commercial banks.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

  • from 6 contributions
    • ROWAN, MARC J. MR.$9,900
    • FRIEDMAN, SCOTT$2,500
    • ALHADI, AYAD$2,000
    • KIRBY, ANDREW$1,000
    • NOVA, RIA$500
  • from 22 contributions
    • ROHRBAUGH, TROY$3,300
    • DIMON, JAMIE$3,300
    • LOPATA, BENJAMIN$2,000
    • BEER, ALLISON$1,000
    • MESACK, MICHELLE$500

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Moderate
Vector: 65%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy emphasize transparency, accountability, and responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars, though the bill applies broadly to all executive agencies while the Project 2025 section focuses on specific financial regulatory agencies like the CFPB and FCC."

Key themes:transparencyaccountabilityfiscal responsibilitytaxpayer stewardshipoversight

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Moderate
Vector: 65%
Pages: 866-868AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 financial regulatory reforms emphasize transparency, accountability, and oversight of agency spending, though the bill applies broadly to all executive agencies while Project 2025 targets specific SEC and CFTC practices."

Key themes:transparencyaccountabilityspending oversightreporting requirementsfiscal responsibility

— 833 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Eliminate all administrative proceedings (APs) within the SEC except for stop orders related to defective registration statements. The SEC enforcement system does not need to have both district court cases and APs. Alternatively, respondents should be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in the SEC’s administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.24 l End the practice of delegating the decision to initiate an enforcement case. The SEC Chairman—and possibly the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)—should study whether other Commission delegation of authority to staff should be narrowed and whether sunsetting of such delegation of authority should be required. Congress should: l Require an Inspector General’s (or possibly a GAO) report regarding SEC information technology spending and contracting. Spending appears to be much too high, and IT contracting is poorly managed. l Statutorily limit the time for an investigation to two years with no extensions. Long investigations harm private parties and the quality of justice. With adequate management processes, the SEC should not need more than two years even for complicated matters. The SEC Chairman should: l Dramatically reduce the number of direct reports to the SEC Chairman. l Merge SEC offices that are performing similar functions. l Reduce the number of managers per employee. CFTC ADMINISTRATION AND IMPROVED COMMODITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS Congress should: l Modernize the definition of commodity (which is now largely a laundry list of agricultural commodities)25 and clarify the treatment of digital assets. l Clarify through an express amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)26 the circumstances that require a foreign swap trading platform to — 834 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as a swap execution facility (SEF) under Sections 2(i)27 and 5h28 of the CEA. Currently, it is not clear whether having one or a small number of U.S. participants would require SEF registration under prior staff guidance, which has led foreign swap trading platforms to exclude all U.S. persons from their platforms or to go through the process of seeking an exemption from registration. l Amend Section 2 of the CEA to authorize the CFTC Chairman to remove the agency’s Executive Director without a Commission vote. l To augment Commissioners’ independence, establish funding amounts for the Commissioners’ offices by statute with adjustments for inflation, with no requirement for a Commissioner to obtain budget or expense approvals from the Chairman or the agency’s administrative staff. The CFTC should: l Allocate more resources to core agency functions rather than ancillary and support operations. l Replace the existing position limits rule, which reduces liquidity and makes markets more volatile, with further delegation of authority to the exchanges to set position limits and position accountability levels where appropriate for the relevant market. l Reduce overly prescriptive rules implementing the CFTC’s core principles. l Apply the definitions of “U.S. Person” and “Guarantee” in the CFTC’s 2020 rule on cross-border application of swaps regulations (2020 Cross-Border Rule)29 to the regulatory requirements that remain covered by the CFTC’s 2013 guidance on the subject (2013 Guidance).30 Currently, the definition of each of these foundational terms differs depending on whether the requirement in question is covered by the 2020 Cross-Border Rule or the 2013 Guidance. l Remove the regulatory categories of “affiliate conduit” and “foreign consolidated subsidiary” from the 2013 Guidance and the CFTC’s cross- border rule on margin for uncleared swaps,31 respectively. These categories were replaced by the concept of a “Significant Risk Subsidiary” for purposes of the 2020 Cross-Border Rule because of widespread market confusion and compliance difficulties arising from their broad and vague scope.

Small Business Administration

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 783-785AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's emphasis on spending limits, reporting requirements, and accountability aligns with Project 2025's push for SBA performance metrics and safeguarding taxpayer dollars, but it does not address small‑business advocacy or regulatory reform specifics."

Key themes:accountabilitytransparencyperformance metricswaste reductionmanagerial oversight

— 751 — Small Business Administration implement relevant initiatives to reach small businesses. Programs would be nonduplicative and implemented on a first-come, first-served basis. l A modern, revamped, and streamlined SBA that better utilizes current technology and platforms for operations, for reporting, and in its programs to reach, service, and engage small businesses. l An Office of Advocacy that is strengthened by a renewed mandate and additional resources to protect against overregulation along with a research agenda that includes measuring the total cost that federal regulation imposes on small businesses. Accountability and Managerial Practice. The SBA lacks accountability and managerial practices to measure the effectiveness, success, and integrity of its various programs. As a future Administration evaluates agency structure and the particulars of how the SBA is spending appropriated funds, it should immediately require actions and procedures to compel a culture of accountability and perfor- mance. Specifically: l Require performance metrics and internal procedures to safeguard taxpayer dollars and program integrity. As noted in an October 2022 IG report, failure to adopt procedures that would reliably capture data and information for various programs, coupled with significant challenges and weaknesses regarding IT investments, systems development, and security controls, presents significant risks to program integrity and increased risk of waste, fraud, and abuse.34 Addressing these shortcomings and risks should be a priority challenge and action item for the next Administration. As underscored by the Inspector General in his introduction to the report, “Pandemic response has, in many instances, magnified the challenging systemic issues in SBA’s mission-related work.”35 l Review all internal government watchdog recommendations and require that SBA management implement or address outstanding and ongoing OIG and GAO recommendations within a specified time frame (ideally within 90 days of a recommendation) and on an ongoing basis. Strengthening the Office of Advocacy. The SBA Office of Advocacy (Advo- cacy) is “an independent office” within the SBA.36 It accounts for about one one-thousandth of SBA spending and 0.75 percent of SBA personnel. Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, both under its current authority and with suggested — 752 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise reforms, the Office of Advocacy could be a powerful weapon against the adminis- trative state’s regulatory extremism. l Amend the RFA so that all agencies are required to provide a copy of any proposed rule (other than bona fide emergency rules) along with initial regulatory flexibility analysis to the Office of Advocacy at least 60 days before a notice of proposed rulemaking is submitted for publication in the Federal Register. The Office of Advocacy would submit comments to agencies within 30 days, and each agency would have to consider these comments, make changes in the proposed rule based on those comments, or explain in a revised regulatory flexibility analysis why it chose not to change the proposed rule. The Office of Advocacy’s pre-proposing comments would be published on the agencies’ and its own websites. RFA economic analysis should be expanded to include indirect costs along with direct costs. In addition, the next Administration should require other agencies to seek Advocacy’s input. Currently, other agencies deny Advocacy the ability to enforce their duty to consider the effect of regulations on small entities by construing their regulations as not having significant economic impact, which would otherwise serve as a trigger for Advocacy’s input. Congress should presumptively exempt small businesses from new agency rules to force agencies to seek Advocacy’s input and permit new rules to apply to small businesses only with Advocacy signoff under specified criteria. l Increase the Office of Advocacy’s budget by at least 50 percent ($4.6 million). This would allow Advocacy to hire approximately 25 attorneys, economists, and scientists and enhance its role in the regulatory process. l Explicitly direct federal agencies to comply with the RFA. This would be similar to the approach adopted by President Trump in his January and February 2017 executive orders directing agencies to relieve the cost and burden of regulation on business.37 Advocacy should organize regional roundtables, onsite small-business visits, and an online platform to hear directly from small businesses and entities as it did from June 2017 through September 2018.38 This activity produced 26 letters to federal agencies and highlighted specific regulations that need reform and how Congress had addressed the most burdensome rules through the Congressional Review Act.39

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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