Future of Artificial Intelligence Innovation Act of 2026

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Bill ID: 119/s/3952

Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Future of Artificial Intelligence Innovation Act of 2026

S. 3952, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.

The sponsor

Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$124,500 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 137-139 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Star Print ordered on the bill.

March 18, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Future of Artificial Intelligence Innovation Act of 2026. A bill that attempts to establish artificial intelligence standards, metrics, and evaluation tools, while also promoting innovation in the industry. How quaint.

Let's cut through the noise and focus on what truly matters: the implications for my wealth and influence.

**New Regulations:** The bill creates a Center for Artificial Intelligence Standards and Innovation within the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This center will develop voluntary standards, metrics, and evaluation tools for artificial intelligence systems. Additionally, it establishes an interagency coordination program to facilitate artificial intelligence testbeds.

**Affected Industries and Sectors:** The bill primarily affects the technology sector, particularly companies involved in artificial intelligence research, development, and deployment. However, its impact may also be felt by industries that rely heavily on AI, such as healthcare, finance, and transportation.

**Compliance Requirements and Timelines:** The bill requires federal agencies to develop and implement standards for artificial intelligence systems within two years of the bill's enactment. Private companies are encouraged to adopt these voluntary standards, but there is no explicit timeline for compliance.

**Enforcement Mechanisms and Penalties:** There are no specific enforcement mechanisms or penalties outlined in the bill. However, it does require the Comptroller General of the United States to identify regulatory barriers to innovation and provide recommendations for improvement.

**Economic and Operational Impacts:** The bill's economic impact is difficult to quantify, but it may lead to increased investment in AI research and development, as well as job creation in related fields. However, the lack of clear enforcement mechanisms and penalties may limit its effectiveness in promoting widespread adoption of AI standards.

From my perspective, this bill presents both opportunities and challenges. On one hand, the establishment of voluntary standards for AI systems could help to reduce regulatory uncertainty and promote innovation. On the other hand, the bill's focus on "voluntary" standards may not go far enough in addressing the need for more robust regulation in this space.

As a self-serving billionaire, I will be closely monitoring the development of these standards and their potential impact on my business interests. If necessary, I will leverage my influence to shape the regulatory landscape in ways that benefit my empire.

**Projected Economic Impact:** $10 billion - $50 billion over the next 5-10 years, depending on the level of adoption and implementation of AI standards.

**Recommendations:**

1. Encourage private companies to adopt voluntary AI standards through incentives such as tax breaks or subsidies. 2. Establish a clear timeline for compliance with AI standards, including penalties for non-compliance. 3. Provide additional funding for AI research and development initiatives, particularly those focused on developing more robust and secure AI systems.

By taking these steps, we can ensure that the Future of Artificial Intelligence Innovation Act of 2026 has a meaningful impact on the industry, while also protecting and promoting my business interests.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$124,500

20 donors

PACs

Organizations

Committees

Individuals

$124,500

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

HESS, DANIEL L.

1 transaction

$10,000

SHUBLAK, MARK I.

1 transaction

$6,600

MCLEAN, SUZZY

1 transaction

$6,600

MCLEAN, TERRENCE

1 transaction

$6,600

BESSENT, SCOTT K.

1 transaction

$6,600

PATRICELLI, ROBERT E.

1 transaction

$6,600

ANDREESSEN, MARC L.

1 transaction

$6,600

BRALY, DOUGLAS A. MR.

1 transaction

$6,600

DIXON, CHRISTOPHER

1 transaction

$6,600

HESS, LEANNA

1 transaction

$6,600

HOROWITZ, BEN

1 transaction

$6,600

MANDELBLATT, DANIELLE

1 transaction

$6,600

MANDELBLATT, ERIC

1 transaction

$6,600

ANDREESSEN, LAURA ARRILLAGA

1 transaction

$5,100

HOROWITZ, FELICIA

1 transaction

$5,100

SILENOK, ELENA

1 transaction

$5,100

SIMON, HERBERT MR.

1 transaction

$5,000

PAUGH, JOHN N. MR.

1 transaction

$5,000

PETRIE, MICHAEL F. MR.

1 transaction

$5,000

RICKER, JAY B. MR.

1 transaction

$5,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Cantwell, Maria [D-WA]

ID: C000127

Top Contributors

SAC FOX TRIBE

OrganizationTAMA, IA

$5,000

Oct 29, 2024

LOWER ELWHA KLALLAM TRIBE

OrganizationPORT ANGELES, WA

$3,360

Mar 31, 2023

SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationHIGHLAND, CA

$3,300

Oct 28, 2023

SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationHIGHLAND, CA

$3,300

Dec 21, 2023

SAN PABLO LYTTON TRIBE

OrganizationSAN PABLO, CA

$3,300

Nov 16, 2023

SAN PABLO LYTTON TRIBE

OrganizationSAN PABLO, CA

$3,300

Nov 16, 2023

SAULT STE MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS

OrganizationSAULT SAINTE MARIE, MI

$3,300

Dec 14, 2023

SENECA NATION OF INDIANS

OrganizationSALAMANCA, NY

$3,300

Dec 14, 2023

MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE

OrganizationAUBURN, WA

$3,300

May 12, 2023

NISQUALLY INDIAN TRIBE

OrganizationOLYMPIA, WA

$3,300

Jun 30, 2023

Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]

ID: B001243

Top Contributors

FRIENDS OF COMMUNITY ONCOLOGY PAC

PACVIRGINIA BEACH, VA

$5,000

Apr 12, 2023

THE COGGIN GROUP

OrganizationMURFREESBORO, TN

$2,900

Mar 9, 2023

THE COGGIN GROUP

OrganizationMURFREESBORO, TN

$2,500

Mar 9, 2023

DOSS BROTHERS FARM

OrganizationLAWRENCEBURG, TN

$1,000

Apr 17, 2024

DOSS BROTHERS FARM

OrganizationLAWRENCEBURG, TN

$1,000

Mar 18, 2024

BL PARTNERS GROUP LLC

OrganizationARLINGTON, VA

$500

Mar 17, 2023

KING, RODNEY W.

SELF-EMPLOYED • ATTORNEY

IndividualGERMANTOWN, TN

$13,200

Apr 4, 2024

BEAN, BILL G.

HANNING & BEAN ENTERPRISES INC. • REAL ESTATE INVESTOR

IndividualCOLUMBIA CITY, IN

$10,000

May 1, 2024

SMITH, THOMAS

PRESCOTT INVESTORS INC. • INVESTOR

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$10,000

May 13, 2024

GAMBLE, KATHRYN

UNAKA CO • BUSINESS EXECUTIVE

IndividualDALLAS, TX

$9,900

Jul 15, 2024

Sen. Hickenlooper, John W. [D-CO]

ID: H000273

Top Contributors

THE CHICKASAW NATION

OrganizationADA, OK

$1,300

Dec 12, 2023

THE CHICKASAW NATION

OrganizationADA, OK

$1,200

Dec 12, 2023

THE CHICKASAW NATION

OrganizationADA, OK

$900

Dec 31, 2023

ALLHASSANI, MEHDI

PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES • OPERATIONS

IndividualPALO ALTO, CA

$3,300

Nov 25, 2023

SANKAR, SHYAM

PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES • DIRECTOR

IndividualGREENWOOD VILLAGE, CO

$3,300

Nov 25, 2023

CARSON, RUSSELL

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualNEW YORK, NY

$3,300

Nov 17, 2023

SANKAR, SHYAM

PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES • DIRECTOR

IndividualGREENWOOD VILLAGE, CO

$3,300

Nov 25, 2023

CARSON, RUSSELL

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualNEW YORK, NY

$3,300

Nov 17, 2023

GATES, WILLIAM H. III

BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION • PHILANTHROPIST

IndividualREDMOND, WA

$3,300

Oct 19, 2023

JAIN, AKASH

PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES • EXECUTIVE

IndividualOAKLAND, CA

$3,300

Nov 26, 2023

Donor Network - Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 50 nodes and 48 connections

Total contributions: $48

Top Donors - Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 12 helped.

+AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.90
The bill establishes AI standards, testbeds, and research programs that directly benefit AI and cloud infrastructure providers by supporting development, testing, and deployment of AI systems, including foundation models and cloud-based AI training/inference (see Sec. 101(c)(E), (F), (I), (O); Sec. 102(b)-(i); Sec. 201-202).
+Semiconductors & Hardwareconfidence 0.85
The bill includes provisions to examine semiconductor supply chain vulnerabilities and support AI hardware development, which benefits semiconductor manufacturers (see Sec. 101(c)(O): 'Examining, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, the vulnerabilities in the supply chain of hardware, including semiconductors and microelectronics...').
+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.85
The bill explicitly supports AI red-teaming, blue-teaming, vulnerability assessments, and cybersecurity toolkits for AI systems, directly benefiting cybersecurity firms (see Sec. 101(c)(B), (C), (D), (E), (J), (L); Sec. 102(c)(7)(B); Sec. 102(d)).
+Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.80
Large tech platforms (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Amazon) are likely beneficiaries of AI research funding, testbed access, and standards development that could improve their AI offerings and cloud services (see Sec. 101(c)(I), (F); Sec. 102; Sec. 201-202).
+Hospitals & Health Systemsconfidence 0.80
Section 101(c)(1)(I) mentions convening meetings with Federal agencies and private sector to accelerate development and adoption of national standards for AI systems in sectors including biotechnology, agriculture, and health care. This indicates support for health care sector, which includes hospitals and health systems.
+Biotech & Researchconfidence 0.80
Section 101(c)(1)(I) explicitly includes biotechnology as a sector for which the Center will convene meetings to accelerate development and adoption of national standards for AI systems, indicating support for the biotech industry.

+ 6 more industries not shown.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Big Tech Platforms$3,300
from 1 contribution
- WALKER, KENT$3,300
Biotech & Research$1,500
from 2 contributions
- EPPARD, JOHN W. MR.$1,500

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Moderate

Vector: 60%

Pages: 137-139AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's focus on AI innovation, standards, and testbeds aligns with Project 2025's call to exploit AI and machine learning for intelligence analysis and improve data exploitation, though it lacks direct ties to defense intelligence reform or national security objectives."

Key themes:artificial intelligencemachine learningdata exploitationinnovationstandards development

— 105 — Department of Defense DOD INTELLIGENCE Our national defense establishment must evolve to meet the rapid, pro- found, and dynamic change in the global landscape, but absent significant effort to evaluate and retool in critical areas—including our intelligence and security portfolios—America’s competitive advantage against rivals and adversaries is at serious risk. However, for any structural changes to succeed, the crisis in our Intel- ligence Community (IC)/Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) leadership must be addressed.16 The DIE accounts for the bulk of the Intelligence Community’s personnel and a significant portion of its budget. Of the IC’s 17 elements, eight are within DOD,17 two are independent,18 and seven belong to various other departments and agencies.19 Overall, “[t]he DoD provides 86 percent of the personnel who conduct intelligence activities, both military and civilian.”20 The Defense Intelligence Enterprise must deliver accurate, unbiased, and timely insights consistently and with clarity, objectivity, and independence. If they continue on their current path, however, both the DIE and the Intelligence Com- munity writ large will continue to provide inaccurate and politicized intelligence assessments that mislead policymakers. Needed Reforms l Improve the intelligence process. Defense intelligence assets have been committed to the prosecution of operational campaigns since September 11, 2001, at the expense of our strategic objectives, and this has led to increased risk.21 Further, the DIE has evolved into a “customer-based” model with the DIE/IC trying to be supportive of policy direction at the expense of analytical integrity. The result has been a significant politicization of intelligence. 1. Establish unbiased intelligence reporting from DIE/IC senior leaders. As the leader of the DIE, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security should provide a top-line, dissenting, or clarifying view of DIE and IC assessments as needed. 2. Align collection and analysis with vital national interests (countering China and Russia). 3. Establish an effective global federated intelligence framework with allies and partners and our Combatant Commands. Avoid the temptation to neglect areas that appear less pertinent but that support a convergence of threats and the critical requirements to sustain those threats. — 106 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 4. Establish and sustain feedback loops to provide insight and direction for continuous improvement and accountability.22 We must revisit our assessments and understand where we got it right and where we got it wrong. 5. Better exploit publicly available information (PAI) data and foster innovation to improve collection and analysis. We must end the practice of multiple DIE organizations paying to acquire the same PAI data and invest more in machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) to exploit open-source and classified intelligence data. 6. Remove policy obstacles that impede available technical solutions and tailored approaches in order to preclude corruption at the point of collection. 7. Develop statistical discrimination techniques based on relative value to deal with the volume and velocity of available data and information, which are rapidly exceeding our ability to exploit and analyze available data and information efficiently. l Expand the integration of intelligence activities. The prevalence of asymmetric warfare requires Defense Intelligence to leverage the unique authorities and capabilities of U.S. departments and agencies, as well as our partners and allies, to competitive advantage. 1. Create an improved cyber defense and capability. We must reevaluate the dual-hat structure between the National Security Agency (NSA) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). 2. Resurrect economic analysis capability to improve our ability to counter Chinese whole-of-government strategies that combine security with predatory economic objectives. 3. Resurrect critical thinking to provide true strategic intelligence that will enable the U.S. to counter global adversaries and emerging technologies (such as adversary advances in hypersonics, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), cyber domain, advanced fighter aircraft, and advanced undersea capabilities) more effectively. 4. Rebuild human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) and improve their integration with defensive and offensive cyber operations.

Trade

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 852-854AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on voluntary AI standards, testbeds, and international cooperation to promote innovation and trustworthiness in AI, while the Project 2025 Trade section emphasizes tariff powers, reciprocal trade agreements, and countering China's technology transfer and intellectual property practices. There is minimal direct overlap, though both touch on technology and international engagement."

Key themes:international cooperationtechnologyinnovation

— 819 — Trade 14. Adam Behsudi, “Duffy Finds 18 Co-sponsors for Bill to Increase Trump’s Tariff Powers,” Politico, January 24, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/24/duffy-finds-18-co-sponsors-for-bill-to-increase-trumps- trade-powers-2555509 (accessed February 26, 2023). 15. FTAs like NAFTA represent a carve-out from the WTO’s unconditional MFN rule and generally lead to tariffs that tend to be set at more reciprocal levels. 16. H.R.764, United States Reciprocal Trade Act, § 3(b)(1) and (b)(2). 17. Damian Paletta, “Speaker Ryan Admits Defeat, Giving up on Border Adjustment Tax,” The Washington Post, July 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/27/paul-ryan-admits-defeat-giving- up-on-border-adjustment-tax/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 18. This section draws on analyses in White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology- Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 19. Bloomberg News, “Xi’s Vow of World Dominance by 2049 Sends Chill Through Markets,” October 26, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-26/xi-s-vow-of-world-dominance-by-2049-sends-chill- through-markets?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed February 25, 2023). 20. Executive Office of the President, United States Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, January 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20 WTO%20Report.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 21. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World. 22. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development Plan (2006–2020): An Outline, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, p. [55], https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 23. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy, February 2017, pp. 2, 11, and 12, http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 24. The laws, which have been put in place for national security purposes, have been promulgated under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. Ch. 39, §§ 2751–2756, 2761–2781, 2785, and 2791–27999aa-2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/chapter-39 (accessed February 25, 2023) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. Ch. 35, §§ 1701–1708, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ uscode/text/50/chapter-35 (accessed February 25, 2023). 25. Ministry of Education, People’s Republic of China, “Statistics on Studying in China in 2018,” http://www.moe. gov.cn/was5/web/search?searchword=Statistics+on+Studying+in+China+in+2018&channelid=254028&page=1 (accessed March 21, 2023). 26. Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), January 2018, https://admin.govexec. com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). The DIUx describes itself as “the only DOD Organization focused on accelerating the adoption of commercial and dual- use technology to solve operational challenges at speed and scale.” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, “About,” https://www.diu.mil/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 27. Brown and Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” p. 18. 28. Ingrid Lunden, “Huawei Puts $1M into a New AI Research Partnership with UC Berkeley,” TechCrunch, October 11, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/11/huawei-puts-1m-into-a-new-ai-research-partnership-with- ucberkeley/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 29. Press release, “President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China’s Unfair Trade,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/ press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong (accessed February 25, 2023).

Intelligence Community

Weak

Vector: 59%

Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on establishing voluntary AI standards, testbeds, and international cooperation to promote AI innovation and trustworthiness, while the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasizes strategic intelligence analysis, objectivity, dissenting viewpoints, cyber threat sharing, and real-time auditing. Overlap is limited to indirect connections where AI standards could support intelligence community tools and cybersecurity sharing."

Key themes:artificial intelligencecybersecurityinformation sharingstandards developmenttrustworthiness

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

Small Business Administration

Weak

Vector: 59%

Pages: 795-797AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on AI innovation, standards, and testbeds through NIST, while the Project 2025 SBA section emphasizes regulatory reform, faith-based organization eligibility, and oversight of loan programs like PPP and SBIR/STTR. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address small business lending, SBA operations, or religious eligibility criteria central to the cited policy."

Key themes:innovationtechnology sectorfederal programs

— 763 — Small Business Administration 40. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Small Business Administration in Fiscal Year 2023, p. iv. 41. H.R. 748, CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security) Act, Public Law No. 116-136, 116th Congress, March 27, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ136/PLAW-116publ136.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 42. Sarah McCammon, “Planned Parenthood Asked to Return Funds from Paycheck Protection Program,” NPR, May 21, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/05/21/859991359/planned-parenthood-asked-to-return-funds- from-paycheck-protection-program (accessed February 18, 2023). 43. Letter from William Manger, Associate Administrator, U.S. Small Business Administration, to Laura Meyers, Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, “Re: Notice of Investigation and Request for Records,” May 19, 2020, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6922122/SBA-Letter-Planned-Parenthood-DC.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 44. Press release, “Lankford, HSGAC Republicans Demand Details on Illegal PPP Loans to Planned Parenthood Affiliates,” Office of U.S. Senator James Lankford, April 28, 2022, https://www.lankford.senate.gov/news/press- releases/lankford-hsgac-republicans-demand-details-on-illegal-ppp-loans-to-planned-parenthood-affiliates (accessed February 18, 2023). 45. Press release, “Romney, Colleagues Request Information from SBA Administrator Guzman on Illegal PPP Loans Given to Planned Parenthood Affiliates,” Office of U.S. Senator Mitt Romney, April 28, 2022, https:// www.romney.senate.gov/romney-colleagues-request-information-from-sba-administrator-guzman-on- illegal-ppp-loans-given-to-planned-parenthood-affiliates/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 46. 13 C.F.R. §§ 109.400(b)(11), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/109.400; 123.301(g), https://www.law. cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.301; 123.502(n), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.502; and 123.702(b)(6), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.702 (all accessed February 19, 2023). 47. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Religious Eligibility Worksheet for all 7(a) and 504 Loan Programs” SBA Form 1971, http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-11/sba-form-1971.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 48. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Ensuring Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations in SBA’s Loan and Disaster Assistance Program.” 49. See, for example, Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 50. 28 U.S. Code § 530d, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/530D (accessed February 19, 2023). 51. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Ensuring Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations in SBA’s Loan and Disaster Assistance Program.” 52. 13 CFR 120.110(k), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/120.110 (accessed February 19, 2023). 53. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Regulatory Reform Initiative: Streamlining and Modernizing the 7(a), Microloan, and 504 Loan Programs to Reduce Regulatory Burden,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 125 (June 30, 2022), pp. 38900–38910, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/30/2022-13483/ regulatory-reform-initiative-streamlining-and-modernizing-the-7a-microloan-and-504-loan-programs-to (accessed February 18, 2023). 54. Ibid. 55. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel “Religious Restrictions on Capital Financing for Historically Black Colleges and Universities,” Memorandum Opinion for the Acting General Counsel, Department of Education, August 15, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/ attachments/2021/01/01/2019-08-15-hbcu-capfin-2.pdf. (accessed February 18, 2023). 56. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Investment and Innovation, SBIR and STTR Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2019, p. 8, https://www.sbir.gov/sites/default/files/SBA_Final_FY19_SBIR_STTR_Annual_Report.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 57. S. 4900, SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022, Public Law No. 117–183, 117th Congress, September 30, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ183/PLAW-117publ183.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 58. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Investment and Innovation, SBIR and STTR Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2019, pp. 6, 40, and 108. — 764 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 59. Peter L. Singer, “Federally Supported Innovations: 22 Examples of Major Technology Advances that Stem from Federal Support,” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, February 2014, https://wrnjradio.com/ bipartisan-call-to-crack-down-on-covid-19-ppp-eidl-fraud-prosecute-fraudsters-to-the-fullest-extent-of-the- law/ (accessed March 21, 2023). 60. Wells King, “Uncle Sam’s Top-Performing Venture Fund,” American Compass Case Study, November 2022, https://americancompass.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AC-Case-Study_SBIR_final2.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 61. Elisabeth B. Reynolds, Hiram M. Samel, and Joyce Lawrence, “Learning by Building: Complementary Assets and the Migration of Capabilities in U.S. Innovative Firms,” MIT Industrial Performance Center Working Paper No. MIT-IPC-13-001, March 2013, https://ipc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2019-01/13-001.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 62. American Compass, “Where’s The Growth? Assessing the Results of the Globalization Experiment,” March 2022, pp. 3–5, https://americancompass.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/AC-Atlas-Wheres-the-Growth.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 63. Sridhar Kota and Tom Mahoney, “Innovation Should Be Made in the U.S.A.,” The Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/innovation-should-be-made-in-the-u-s-a-11573833987 (accessed February 18, 2023). 64. S. ___, SBA Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2019, 116th Congress, 1st Session, Title III, § 303, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/80533629-2905-433f-a588-7c4e032f7347/ C096ED9C1EBA68E041CFDA143E01C66C.mir19891.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 65. David Adler, “Financing Advanced Manufacturing: Why VCs Aren’t the Answer,” American Affairs, Vol. III, No. 2 (Summer 2019), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/05/financing-advanced-manufacturing-why-vcs- arent-the-answer/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 66. National Association of Manufacturers, “Overview of the Senate HEALS Act,” July 28, 2020, https://documents. nam.org/comm/HEALSActInfo.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). See also remarks by Senator Mitch McConnell, “HEALS Act,” Congressional Record, Vol. 166, No. 132 (July 27, 2020), pp. S4491–S4492, https:// www.congress.gov/116/crec/2020/07/27/CREC-2020-07-27-pt1-PgS4491-7.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 67. S. 1059, American Innovation and Manufacturing Act, 117th Congress, introduced March 25, 2021, https:// www.crfb.org/blogs/whats-11-trillion-heals-act https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s1059/BILLS-117s1059is.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 68. H.R. 7628, IMPROVE (Improve Management, Programs, Resources, and Oversight for Vital Entrepreneurs) the SBA Act, 117th Congress, introduced April 28, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr7628/BILLS- 117hr7628ih.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 69. S. 1120, Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act, 116th Congress, introduced April 10, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1120/BILLS-116s1120is.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 70. H.R. 3136, Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-121, 104th Congress, March 29, 1996, Title II, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ121/PLAW-104publ121.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 71. S. 403, Fair and Open Competition Act, 117th Congress, introduced February 24, 2021, https://www. congress.gov/117/bills/s403/BILLS-117s403is.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023), and H.R. 1284, Fair and Open Competition Act, 117th Congress, introduced February 24, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr1284/ BILLS-117hr1284ih.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023. 72. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14063, “Use of Project Labor Agreements for Federal Construction Projects,” February 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 27 (February 9, 2022), pp. 7363–7366, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-09/pdf/2022-02869.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 73. “The JOBS Act 4.0: Section-by-Section,” Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/the_jobs_act_4.0sectionbysection.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 74. Press release, “Luetkeymeyer: SBA Lacks Infrastructure and Expertise to Expand Number of Small Business Lending Companies,” Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives, November 7, 2022, https:// smallbusiness.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=404376 (accessed February 18, 2023).

Agency for International Development

Weak

Vector: 59%

Pages: 312-314AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on voluntary AI standards, testbeds, and international cooperation on AI innovation, while the Project 2025 USAID section centers on ideological realignment of foreign assistance, training changes, and veteran recruitment. The only modest connection is the bill's emphasis on international cooperation, which tangentially relates to USAID's overseas mission."

Key themes:international cooperationcapacity buildingstandards developmentinnovation promotion

— 279 — Agency for International Development clearances, and other components of the hiring process that are necessary for immediate onboarding while coordinating with the White House to bring in new appointees and make internal career employee changes. On Day One, USAID should halt all agencywide training and replace it with training modules to advance the President’s agenda. The Administration should appoint a Senior Accountable Official (SAO) to report on the agency’s adherence to Administration policy priorities, including on Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance, critical race theory, climate change, gender, and diversity and inclusion. It should also create a program to staff hard-to-fill positions overseas. Finally, the Administration should create a recruiting program for veterans and other groups to participate in career job opportunities at USAID. Former mis- sionaries, veterans, members of diasporas, and faith community stakeholders with overseas experience should be recruited to work at USAID on Schedule A appoint- ments, as Institutional Services Contractors, as Personal Services Contractors, and as Foreign Service Officers. CONCLUSION The next conservative Administration will have a unique opportunity to realign U.S. foreign assistance with American national interests and the principles of good governance and more accurately reflect the U.S. taxpayer’s unmatched charita- ble desire to help those in need. It can build on a strong baseline of conservative reforms undertaken by the Trump Administration to counter Communist China’s strategy of world domination. However, this will require that bold steps are taken on Day One to undo the gross misuse of foreign aid by the current Administration to promote a radical ideology that is politically divisive at home and harms our global standing. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Dr. William Steiger, Bethany Kozma, and Dr. Alma Golden deserve special mention. The author assumes full responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed therein should be attributed to any other individual. — 280 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. S. 1983, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law No. 87-195, 87th Congress, September 4, 1961, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-75/pdf/STATUTE-75-Pg424-2.pdf (accessed January 19, 2023). 2. U.S. Agency or International Development, “Journey to Self-Reliance Fact Sheet,” June 3, 2020, https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/documents/1870/journey-self-reliance-fact-sheet#:~:text=WHAT%20 IS%20THE%20JOURNEY%20TO%20SELF-RELIANCE%3F%20USAID%20is,greater%20 developmentoutcomesandworktowardatimewhenforeignassistanceisnolongernecessary.%20 It%E2%80%99s%20called%20the%20Journey%20to%20Self-Reliance (accessed March 17, 2023). 3. News release, “U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Mark Green’s Interview with C-Span’s ‘Newsmakers’ Host Susan Swain and Washington Post’s Carl Morello and Wall Street Journal’s Ben Kesling,” U.S. Agency for International Development, November 26, 2018, https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/news- information/press-releases/nov-26-2018-administrator-mark-green-interview-cspan-newsmakers (accessed March 17, 2023). 4. U.S. Agency for International Development, Digital Strategy 2020–2024, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-05/USAID_Digital_Strategy.pdf.pdf://www.usaid.gov/digital-development/usaid-digital-strategy (accessed March 17, 2023). 5. “U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific,” declassified in part by Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert C. O’Brien, January 5, 2021, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp- content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023), and Robert C. O’Brien, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” January 5, 2021, https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/OBrien-Expanded-Statement.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023). 6. News Release, “Fact Sheet: Prioritizing Climate in Foreign Policy and National Security,” The White House, October 21, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/21/fact-sheet- prioritizing-climate-in-foreign-policy-and-national-security/ (accessed January 28, 2023). 7. U.S. Agency for International Development, Climate Strategy 2020–2030, April 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/ sites/default/files/2022-11/USAID-Climate-Strategy-2022-2030.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023). 8. Adva Saldinger, “USAID Steps Up ‘Languishing’ Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Effort,” Devex.com, December 15, 2021, http://www.devex.com/news/usaid-steps-up-languishing-diversity-equity-and-inclusion- effort-102316 (accessed January 28, 2021). 9. U.S. Agency for International Development, “Gender Equity and Women Empowerment,” https://www.usaid. gov/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment (accessed January 30, 2023). 10. U.S. Agency for International Development, “Integrating Gender Equality and Female Empowerment in USAID’s Program Cycle,” ADS Chapter 25, partial revision date January 22, 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/ default/files/2022-12/205.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023). 11. S. 137, Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance Act, 117th Congress, introduced January 28, 2021, https:// www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/137#:~:text=Protecting%20Life%20in%20Foreign%20 Assistance%20Act.%20This%20bill,support%20for%20an%20entity%20that%20conducts%20 such%20activities (accessed January 20, 2023), and H.R. 534, Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance Act, 117th Congress, introduced January 28, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house- bill/534?s=1&r=450 (accessed January 20, 2023). 12. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Memorandum on Protecting Women’s Health at Home and Abroad,” Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, The White House, January 28, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/28/memorandum- on-protecting-womens-health-at-home-and-abroad/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 13. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13926, “Advancing International Religious Freedom,” June 2, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 109 (June 5, 2020), pp. 34951–34953, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-2020-06-05/pdf/2020-12430.pdf (accessed January 20, 2023). 14. 22 Code of Federal Regulations § 205.1, https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-II/part-205 (accessed March 18, 2023). 15. Contributor’s notes from internal USAID meetings.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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