The bill
No Fentanyl on Social Media Act
S. 3618, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
Sponsored by
Sen. Husted, Jon [R-OH]
ID: H001104
Follow the money
The bill
S. 3618, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Trade Commission" section, p. 908-910 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 561.
September 13, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of S. 3618: No Fentanyl on Social Media Act of 2026**
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of S. 3618 is to combat the growing crisis of minors accessing fentanyl via social media by mandating a federal study. The bill requires the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in coordination with HHS (FDA), DEA, and other agencies, to produce a comprehensive report within one year of enactment detailing how minors encounter, are targeted by, and obtain fentanyl—including pressed pills—on social media platforms. The stated goal is to inform Congress so it can “eliminate” this access. In reality, this is legislative theater: a performative response to a horrific problem that avoids actually regulating social media or holding platforms accountable. The bill’s true objective appears to be generating a report that lets politicians claim they “did something” while delaying meaningful action—like, say, forcing platforms to implement real age verification or penalizing them for enabling drug sales.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill does not ban fentanyl sales on social media, impose fines on platforms, or require proactive monitoring. It creates no new enforcement powers. Instead, it mandates a single interagency report covering: - Prevalence of minor fentanyl access via social media - Health and safety impacts on minors - How dealers use platforms to market, sell, and deliver fentanyl - Platform design features that facilitate access (e.g., algorithms, ephemeral messaging) - Current platform policies and their effectiveness - Law enforcement and public health responses - Congressional recommendations to eliminate the problem
The bill allows redaction of law enforcement-sensitive tactics (paras 3 and 6) and defines “social media platform” narrowly to exclude broadband providers, email, and sites with primarily curated content. Notably, it does *not* amend Section 230, impose duty-of-care standards, or require platforms to report illicit activity—leaving the core enabling environment untouched.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Social media platforms** (Meta, TikTok, Snap, etc.): Affected only insofar as they must cooperate with the FTC’s inquiry; no behavioral change is required. - **Minors and families**: Supposed beneficiaries, but the bill offers no direct protection, treatment access, or prevention funding. - **Law enforcement (DEA, DOJ)**: Gain a reporting obligation but no new tools; redaction clause protects investigative methods. - **Public health agencies (HHS, FDA)**: Tasked with consulting but receive no additional resources. - **Congress**: Gets a report to cite in press releases while avoiding hard votes on platform liability or funding for addiction services. - **Taxpayers**: Fund a study that will likely confirm what everyone already knows: kids find drugs online because platforms prioritize engagement over safety, and our drug policy is a failure.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** The impact will be minimal. This bill is a diagnostic placebo: it pretends to treat a symptom (fentanyl access) while ignoring the disease (profit-driven platform design, underfunded treatment, and the war on drugs’ failure). The report may offer useful data, but without enforcement teeth, it will gather dust. Platforms will make superficial tweaks, politicians will declare victory, and overdoses will continue. The real implication? Congress prefers studying crises to solving them—especially when solving them would require angering powerful tech lobbies or admitting that prohibitionist policies have failed. In short: another expensive, impotent gesture that treats the symptoms of societal rot while prescribing more paperwork as the cure. The patient dies; the report gets filed. Classic.
No campaign finance data available for Sen. Husted, Jon [R-OH]
This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: K000367
Top Contributors
25
ID: B001303
Top Contributors
36
ID: C001075
Top Contributors
20
ID: M001242
Top Contributors
32
ID: M001243
Top Contributors
32
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 2(a) requires the FTC to report on minors' ability to access fentanyl via social media platforms, including how platform design features affect access and what practices platforms have taken. This implies potential regulatory scrutiny or pressure on social media companies, which are core to big tech platforms.
Section 2(d)(6)(B)(i) explicitly excludes broadband internet access service providers from the definition of 'social media platform,' which may reflect a legislative distinction that could affect regulatory treatment of telecoms vs. platforms, though the bill does not impose direct obligations on them.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy seek to use the FTC's authority to protect minors from harms arising on social media platforms, emphasizing oversight, platform practices, and the need for stronger safeguards for children online."
— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's FTC policy objective of protecting children online by requiring the FTC to study and report on minors' access to fentanyl via social media, which falls under the broader goal of addressing harmful online practices affecting youth. Both emphasize the FTC's role in safeguarding children from exploitative or dangerous online activities, including deceptive or harmful platform designs and inadequate safeguards."
— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority. — 876 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Other conservatives are more skeptical concerning the effect of online expe- rience on the young, comparing the concern about social media to concern about video games, television, and bicycle safety. They point out, as does Cato fellow Jeffrey A. Singer, that the psychiatric profession has yet to designate “internet addiction” or “social media addiction” as a mental disorder in the authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR).21 These con- servatives also maintain that calling for regulation undermines conservatives’ calls for parental empowerment on education or vaccines as well as personal parenting responsibility. In addition, some of the methods used to regulate children’s internet access pose the risk of unintended harms. For instance, age verification regulations would inevitably increase the amount of data collection involved, increasing privacy con- cerns. Users would have to submit to platforms proof of their age, which raises the risks of data breach or illegitimate data usage by the platforms or bad actors. Limited-government conservatives would prefer the FTC play an educational role instead. That might include best practices or educational programs to empower parents online. Antitrust Enforcement. As is evidenced by a relentless focus on bringing Big Tech lawsuits, state attorneys general (AGs) are far more responsive to their con- stituents than is the FTC. Such a “boots on the ground” approach would benefit the FTC enormously. Practically, this would mean establishing a distinct role in the FTC Chairman’s office focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, D.C., to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth. FTC regional offices are substantially more in touch with local issues. Over the past few decades, the reach and influence of regional offices has shrunk dramati- cally. The FTC should consider returning authority to these offices. Some conservatives however are less supportive of this idea. Conservative enthusiasm for the idea of adding regional FTC offices to the states is a break from the majority conservative position. Endorsing the federal government as a pre- mier job creator runs counter to decades of conservative opinion that holds that New Deal agencies and subsequent government bodies should never have been created in the first place, and that their red tape and interference is a dominant cause of economic inefficiency. Republicans used to seethe when Democrats tried to move federal offices into the states. In the early 1990s, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich fumed about Senator Robert Byrd’s campaign to transfer certain national intelligence facilities to West Virginia, calling it a “pure abuse of power.” Some contributors to this chapter would remind conservatives that the unseen mechanics of redistribution—by which taxpayer money paid to state employees is taken from taxpayers nationwide—is a drag on the economy of the entire country. Many conservatives fear that it would be impossible to uproot or even prune back
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 FCC policy focus on regulating social media platforms to protect minors and increase platform accountability, though the bill addresses fentanyl access via a reporting requirement while the policy advocates broader Section 230 reforms and consumer empowerment."
— 849 — Federal Communications Commission Big Tech, and it should look to Section 230 and the Consolidated Reporting Act as potential sources of authority.19 In acting, the FCC could require these platforms to provide greater specificity regarding their terms of service, and it could hold them accountable by prohibiting actions that are inconsistent with those plain and particular terms. Within this framework, Big Tech should be required to offer a transparent appeals process that allows for the challenging of pretextual takedowns or other actions that violate clear rules of the road. l Support legislation that scraps Section 230’s current approach. The FCC should work with Congress on more fundamental Section 230 reforms that go beyond interpreting its current terms. Congress should do so by ensuring that Internet companies no longer have carte blanche to censor protected speech while maintaining their Section 230 protections. As part of those reforms, the FCC should work with Congress to ensure that antidiscrimination provisions are applied to Big Tech—including “back-end” companies that provide hosting services and DDoS protection. Reforms that prohibit discrimination against core political viewpoints are one way to do this and would track the approach taken in a social media law passed in Texas, which was upheld on appeal in late 2022 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.20 In all of this, Congress can make certain points clear. It could focus legislation on dominant, general-use platforms rather than specialized ones. This could include excluding comment sections in online publications, specialized message boards, or communities within larger platforms that self-moderate. Similarly, Congress could legislate in a way that does not require any platform to host illegal content; child pornography; terrorist speech; and indecent, profane, or similar categories of speech that Congress has previously carved out. l Support efforts to empower consumers. The FCC and Congress should work together to formulate rules that empower consumers. Section 230 itself codifies “user control” as an express policy goal and encourages Internet platforms to provide tools that will “empower” users to engage in their own content moderation. As Congress takes up reforms, it should therefore be mindful of how we can return to Internet users the power to control their online experiences. One idea is to empower consumers to choose their own content filters and fact checkers, if any. The FCC should also work with Congress to ensure stronger protections against young children accessing social media sites despite age restrictions that generally prohibit their use of these sites.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.