The bill
Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026
S. 3249, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
Sponsored by
Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
ID: S001181
Follow the money
The bill
S. 3249, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 885-887 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 327.
February 9, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the real motivations behind the "Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026."
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's stated purpose is to enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea fiber-optic cables. How noble. In reality, this is a thinly veiled attempt to justify increased government control over private sector activities, while pretending to address a non-existent national security threat.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes an interagency committee to "coordinate" (read: micromanage) the efforts of various federal agencies and private sector entities involved in subsea cable operations. It also imposes sanctions on individuals or entities that damage subsea cables, because we all know how effective sanctions are at deterring malicious behavior (sarcasm alert). The bill also requires reports on subsea fiber-optic cable activities by China and Russia, because who doesn't love a good game of "let's pretend to care about national security"?
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, and other federal agencies that can't get enough of meddling in private sector affairs. Oh, and let's not forget the private sector entities that will be forced to comply with this bureaucratic nightmare.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "solution in search of a problem." The real impact will be increased regulatory burdens on private sector companies, stifling innovation and competition in the subsea cable industry. The government will use this legislation as an excuse to expand its surveillance state, all while pretending to protect national security. Meanwhile, China and Russia will continue to do what they do best: ignore our sanctions and laugh at our ineptitude.
In conclusion, this bill is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to justify government overreach, wrapped in a thin veneer of national security concerns. The real disease here is the insatiable appetite for power and control that afflicts our elected officials. Time to prescribe some strong medicine: a healthy dose of skepticism and a strict regimen of critical thinking.
Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 8 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: B001261
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ID: R000584
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ID: C001088
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ID: M001243
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ID: K000384
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ID: C001113
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ID: G000555
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ID: L000571
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 44 nodes and 36 connections (45 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $126,550
Showing top 13 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
The bill enhances coordination, information sharing, and protection of subsea telecommunications infrastructure, which benefits telecommunications companies that own and operate these cables (Sec. 301, Sec. 302, Sec. 103, Sec. 107).
The bill includes subsea energy infrastructure (pipelines, cables) within its definition of 'critical undersea infrastructure' and aims to improve its security and resilience, benefiting energy infrastructure companies (Sec. 3 definitions, Sec. 101 findings, Sec. 103, Sec. 104).
The bill involves interagency coordination with DoD and intelligence agencies, potentially leading to contracts for surveillance, threat detection, and response capabilities related to undersea infrastructure (Sec. 301, Sec. 302, Sec. 104, Sec. 106).
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on securing subsea fiber-optic cables through international coordination, sanctions, and threat assessments, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on securing communications infrastructure from foreign adversaries, particularly China and Russia. However, the bill does not directly address FCC-specific actions like publishing a foreign adversary transparency list, funding rip and replace, or clean standards initiatives, resulting in moderate rather than strong alignment."
— 852 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Publish a foreign adversary transparency list. As part of the FCC’s ongoing work to secure our networks from entities that would do the bidding of our foreign adversaries, the FCC should do more to shine the light of transparency on the scope of the problem. To this end, the FCC should compile and publish a list of all entities that hold FCC authorizations, licenses, or other grants of authority with more than 10 percent ownership by foreign adversarial governments, including the governments of China, Russia, Iran, Syria, or North Korea. A bipartisan bill that would require the FCC to publish this type of list has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Elise Stefanik (R–NY), Ro Khanna (D– CA), and Mike Gallagher (R–WI).24 l Fully fund the federal “rip and replace” program. In 2019, Congress established a $1.9 billion Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program (known colloquially as the “rip and replace” program) to reimburse communications providers for the reasonable expenses they would incur to remove, replace, and dispose of insecure Huawei and ZTE gear. However, $1.9 billion is about $3 billion short of the total amount of funding needed to complete the rip and replace process. A new Administration should ensure that the program is fully funded and should look first at repurposing and applying unused COVID-era emergency funds for this purpose. l Launch a Clean Standards Initiative. During the Trump Administration, the U.S. government launched a worldwide Clean Networks program.25 As a result of this initiative, many of the U.S. government’s allies started the process of ending their relationships with Huawei. It is time for an Administration to build and expand on this groundbreaking work by taking a similar approach to the standard-setting process. Right now, the CCP is seeking to extend its influence by exerting control over the development of standards in a variety of areas, including technology and telecommunications. It is vital that the United States meet this threat with a comprehensive clean standards initiative. l Stop aiding the CCP’s authoritarian approach to artificial intelligence. The CCP has set itself a goal of becoming the global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030. Beijing is bent on using this technology to exert authoritarian control domestically and export its authoritarian governance model overseas. U.S. businesses are aiding Beijing in this effort— often unwittingly—by feeding, training, and improving the AI datasets of companies that are beholden to the CCP. One way that U.S. companies — 853 — Federal Communications Commission are doing this is by giving Beijing access to their high-powered cloud computing services. Therefore, it is time for an Administration to put in place a comprehensive plan that aims to stop U.S. entities from directly or indirectly contributing to China’s malign AI goals. Unleashing Economic Prosperity. The FCC needs to advance a pro-growth agenda that gives every American a fair shot at next-generation connectivity. This is vital for economic opportunity and prosperous communities. The current Administration has appropriated a lot of money for broadband infrastructure proj- ects, but it has failed to pair that spending with reforms that free more airwaves for wireless connectivity or streamline the permitting processes for broadband builds. That failure is holding back America’s hardworking telecommunications crews and leaving Americans stuck waiting on the wrong side of the digital divide. It is time for a return to the successful spectrum and infrastructure policies that prevailed during the Trump Administration—policies that enabled the U.S. to lead the world in 5G. l Refill America’s spectrum pipeline. From 2017 through 2020, the FCC took unprecedented steps to free the airwaves needed to power 5G and other next-generation wireless services. This work not only helped to secure America’s wireless leadership and bolster competition, but also enabled the private sector to create jobs and grow the economy. Recently, the FCC has failed to match the pace and cadence of those spectrum actions. Therefore, the FCC and a new Administration should work together to develop a national spectrum strategy that both identifies the specific airwaves that the FCC can free for commercial wireless services and sets an aggressive timeline for agency action. l Facilitate coordination on spectrum issues. Wireless services now play a central role in advancing America’s economic and national security interests. Over the past few years, this dynamic has led to an increasing number of headline-level disputes between the commercial wireless sector and federal agencies. These disputes are often framed in zero-sum terms as commercial wireless and federal agency stakeholders argue over the appropriate types and amount of airwaves that the government should allocate for various purposes. On the one hand, America’s global economic leadership depends on its ability to free spectrum that will power the U.S. commercial wireless industry. On the other hand, we must ensure that America’s national security and other federal agencies have access to the spectrum resources that they need to carry out their vital missions.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on securing subsea cables and assessing threats from China and Russia, which aligns with the Intelligence Community's goal of protecting critical infrastructure and sharing threat intelligence, though it does not directly implement intelligence‑sharing or declassification measures."
— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on protecting subsea cable infrastructure through coordination, sanctions, and reporting, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on cyber resilience and defending critical infrastructure from foreign threats, particularly from China and Russia. However, it does not directly address cyber-effects operations, USCYBERCOM reforms, or irregular warfare as outlined in the DoD section of Project 2025."
— 120 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Expand defensive cyber-effects operations authorized by President Trump's classified National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, “United States Cyber Operations Policy.”36 4. End USCYBERCOM’s participation in federal efforts to “fortify” U.S. elections to eliminate the perception that DOD is engaging in partisan politics. l Increase USCYBERCOM’s effectiveness. 1. Accelerate the integration of cyber and electronic warfare (EW) doctrine and capabilities, abiding by the time-tested norms of combined-arms warfare. 2. Mandate that development teams will include both coders and soldiers, aircrew, and sailors with kinetic experience at the platoon level. 3. Break the paradigm of cyber authorities held at the strategic level. 4. Increase cyber resilience by, for example, protecting the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Network and the Air Force’s Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS). 5. Expand coordination of joint operations with allies. 6. Implement the Government Accountability Office’s recommendation that the DOD Chief Information Officer, Commander of USCYBERCOM, and Commander of Joint Force Headquarters–DOD Information Network “align policy and system requirements to enable DOD to have enterprise-wide visibility of cyber incident reporting to support tactical, strategic, and military strategies for response.”37 l Rationalize strategy and doctrine. 1. Update the October 2022 National Security Strategy to define DOD roles and responsibilities beyond existing platitudes. 2. Apply traditional deterrence strategies and principles for using cyber/ EW in retaliation for foreign cyberattacks and/or EW actions against U.S. infrastructure and citizens. — 121 — Department of Defense SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Even though America’s conventional war in Afghanistan was a failure, Special Operations Forces of the United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) executed an extremely effective counterterrorism campaign: There has not been another major attack on the homeland, global terrorist threats are reduced and managed, collaboration with international partners is effective, and units under USSOCOM are the most capable and experienced warfighters in two generations. There is a movement to reduce the scope and scale of USSOCOM’s mission in favor of other service priorities in great-power competition. This would be a mis- take because USSOCOM can be employed effectively in great-power competition. It makes sense to capitalize on USSOCOM’s experience and repurpose its mis- sion to include irregular warfare within the context of great-power competition, thereby providing a robust organization that is capable of achieving strategic effects that are critical both to our national defense and to the defense of our allies and partners around the globe. Irregular warfare should be used proactively to prevent state and nonstate actors from negatively affecting U.S. policies and objectives while simultaneously strengthening our regional partnerships. If we maintain irregular warfare’s traditional focus on nonstate actors, we limit ourselves to addressing only the symptoms (nonstate actors), not the problems themselves (China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran). Needed Reforms l Make irregular warfare a cornerstone of security strategy. The U.S. can project strength through unified action with our Interagency,38 allies, and partners by utilizing irregular warfare capabilities synchronized with elements of national power. Broadly redefining irregular warfare to address current state and nonstate actors is critical to countering irregular threats that range from the Chinese use of economic warfare to Russian disinformation and Islamist terrorism. A broad definition of irregular warfare in the National Security Strategy would allow for a whole-of- government approach, thereby providing resources and capabilities to counter threats and ultimately serve as credible deterrence at the strategic and tactical levels. 1. Define irregular warfare as “a means by which the United States uses all elements of national power to project influence abroad to counter state adversaries, defeat hostile nonstate actors, deter wider conflict, and maintain peace in great-power competition.” 2. Characterize the state and nonstate irregular threats facing the U.S. by region in the National Security Strategy.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.