Federal Worker Mortgage Forbearance Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/3156
Last Updated: November 12, 2025

Sponsored by

Sen. Alsobrooks, Angela D. [D-MD]

ID: A000382

Follow the money

The bill

Federal Worker Mortgage Forbearance Act

S. 3156, 119th Congress — read as touching Real Estate.

The sponsor

Sen. Alsobrooks, Angela D. [D-MD]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$82,760 raised

27 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "24" section, p. 767-769 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Committee Review

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Floor Action

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Passed Senate

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House Review

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Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

(sigh) Oh joy, another bill that's just a Band-Aid on the festering wound of government incompetence. Let's dissect this mess.

The Federal Worker Mortgage Forbearance Act (S 3156) is a masterclass in legislative doublespeak. On the surface, it appears to be a benevolent measure to help federal employees struggling with mortgage payments during government shutdowns. But, as always, the devil lies in the details.

This bill doesn't actually provide any funding for mortgage assistance; instead, it allows federal employees to request forbearance on their Federally backed mortgage loans. In other words, it's a temporary reprieve from making payments, not a solution to the underlying problem. It's like giving a patient with terminal cancer a painkiller and calling it a cure.

The bill's sponsors, Alsobrooks, Van Hollen, Kaine, and Warner, are either naive or deliberately misleading the public. They're touting this as a way to "support" federal employees during shutdowns, but in reality, they're just kicking the can down the road. The real issue is the chronic instability of government funding, which this bill doesn't address.

Now, let's look at the fiscal implications. This bill doesn't provide any new funding; it simply rearranges existing mortgage terms. However, it does create a potential liability for taxpayers if these loans default or require additional assistance in the future. It's like playing a game of financial Jenga – we're just adding more instability to an already precarious system.

In conclusion, this bill is a classic example of legislative malpractice. It's a superficial fix that ignores the underlying disease: government dysfunction and fiscal irresponsibility. The sponsors should be ashamed of themselves for peddling this as a solution. (muttering to himself) And voters will probably swallow it hook, line, and sinker...

Related Topics

Federal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Alsobrooks, Angela D. [D-MD]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$82,760
27 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$9,350
Committees
$0
Individuals
$72,550

No PAC contributions found

1
CHEROKEE NATION
1 transaction
$3,300
2
LAKEWOOD HEALTHCARE ASSOC LLC
1 transaction
$3,300
3
TYSON PROJECT MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC
1 transaction
$2,500
4
MASTER PRODUCTIONS, LLC.
1 transaction
$250

No committee contributions found

1
ADOLPH, GWENDOLYN
1 transaction
$6,600
2
THOMAS, TORI
1 transaction
$5,800
3
JAMAR, STEVEN
1 transaction
$3,700
4
WILLIAMS, ELIZABETH
1 transaction
$3,550
5
HAMMERSCHLAG, ALAN
1 transaction
$3,400
6
ABRAMSON, ANNE
1 transaction
$3,300
7
BARRY, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,300
8
SULLIVAN, ANNE
1 transaction
$3,300
9
BOLES, HOWARD
1 transaction
$3,300
10
BUTTON, LINDA K.
1 transaction
$3,300
11
BUTTON, KENNETH R.
1 transaction
$3,300
12
CAIN, VICKI
1 transaction
$3,300
13
COHEN, JANET
1 transaction
$3,300
14
COLOMBEL, ERIC
1 transaction
$3,300
15
CONVERSE, ROBERT E
1 transaction
$3,300
16
CONVERSE, MARILYN
1 transaction
$3,300
17
DESJARDINS, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
18
DONHAM, CHRISTOPHER
1 transaction
$3,300
19
FINLEY, SHANNON
1 transaction
$3,300
20
GENET, BENJAMIN
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Sen. Alsobrooks, Angela D. [D-MD]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 61 nodes and 27 connections (60 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $82,760

Top Donors - Sen. Alsobrooks, Angela D. [D-MD]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

4 Orgs3 Committees20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • +Real Estateconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(b)(1) allows covered individuals to request forbearance on federally backed mortgage loans during a lapse in appropriations, which supports homeowners and indirectly benefits real estate by reducing foreclosure risk and maintaining housing market stability.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Alsobrooks, Angela D. [D-MD])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 2 contributions
    • RITCHEY, RAY$2,000
    • SOKOLOV, RICK$1,000

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

24

Weak
Vector: 66%
Pages: 767-769AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on providing mortgage forbearance to federal employees during shutdowns, while Project 2025's Section 24 seeks to limit Federal Reserve purchases of mortgage-backed securities and reduce its influence on the housing market. Both involve the mortgage/housing sector, but their objectives and mechanisms are unrelated."

Key themes:mortgagehousing marketfederal workforce

— 734 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise to influence monetary policy.12 Since then, these assets have exploded, and the Federal Reserve now owns nearly $9 trillion of mainly federal debt ($5.5 trillion)13 and mortgage-backed securities ($2.6 trillion).14 There is currently no government oversight of the types of assets that the Federal Reserve purchases. These purchases have two main effects: They encourage federal deficits and support politically favored markets, which include housing and even corporate debt. Over half of COVID-era deficits were monetized in this way by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of Treasuries, and housing costs were driven to historic highs by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of mortgage securities. Together, this policy subsidizes government debt, starving business borrowing, while rewarding those who buy homes and certain corporations at the expense of the wider public. Federal Reserve balance sheet purchases should be limited by Congress, and the Federal Reserve’s existing balance sheet should be wound down as quickly as is prudent to levels similar to what existed historically before the 2008 global financial crisis.15 l Limit future balance sheet expansions to U.S. Treasuries. The Federal Reserve should be prohibited from picking winners and losers among asset classes. Above all, this means limiting Federal Reserve interventions in the mortgage-backed securities market. It also means eliminating Fed interventions in corporate and municipal debt markets. Restricting the Fed’s open market operations to Treasuries has strong economic support. The goal of monetary policy is to provide markets with needed liquidity without inducing resource misallocations caused by interfering with relative prices, including rates of return to securities. However, Fed intervention in longer-term government debt, mortgage- backed securities, and corporate and municipal debt can distort the pricing process. This more closely resembles credit allocation than liquidity provision. The Fed’s mortgage-related activities are a paradigmatic case of what monetary policy should not do. Consider the effects of monetary policy on the housing market. Between February 2020 and August 2022, home prices increased 42 percent.16 Residential property prices in the United States adjusted for inflation are now 5.8 percent above the prior all-time record levels of 2006.17 The home-price-to-median-income ratio is now 7.68, far — 735 — Federal Reserve above the prior record high of 7.0 set in 2005.18 The mortgage-payment-to- income ratio hit 43.3 percent in August 2022—breaking the highs of the prior housing bubble in 2008.19 Mortgage payment on a median-priced home (with a 20 percent down payment) jumped to $2,408 in the autumn of 2022 vs. $1,404 just one year earlier as home prices continued to rise even as mortgage rates more than doubled. Renters have not been spared: Median apartment rental costs have jumped more than 24 percent since the start of 2021.20 Numerous cities experienced rent increases well in excess of 30 percent. A primary driver of higher costs during the past three years has been the Federal Reserve’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Since March 2020, the Federal Reserve has driven down mortgage interest rates and fueled a rise in housing costs by purchasing $1.3 trillion of MBSs from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. The $2.7 trillion now owned by the Federal Reserve is nearly double the levels of March 2020. The flood of capital from the Federal Reserve into MBSs increased the amount of capital available for real estate purchases while lower interest rates on mortgage borrowing—driven down in part by the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchases— induced and enabled borrowers to take on even larger loans.21 The Federal Reserve should be precluded from any future purchases of MBSs and should wind down its holdings either by selling off the assets or by allowing them to mature without replacement. l Stop paying interest on excess reserves. Under this policy, also started during the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve effectively prints money and then “borrows” it back from banks rather than those banks’ lending money to the public. This amounts to a transfer to Wall Street at the expense of the American public and has driven such excess reserves to $3.1 trillion, up seventyfold since 2007.22 The Federal Reserve should immediately end this practice and either sell off its balance sheet or simply stop paying interest so that banks instead lend the money. Congress should bring back the pre-2008 system, founded on open-market operations. This minimizes the Fed’s power to engage in preferential credit allocation. MONETARY RULE REFORM OPTIONS While the above recommendations would reduce Federal Reserve manipulation and subsidies, none would limit the inflationary and recessionary cycles caused by the Federal Reserve. For that, major reform of the Federal Reserve’s core activity of manipulating interest rates and money would be needed. A core problem with government control of monetary policy is its exposure to two unavoidable political pressures: pressure to print money to subsidize

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Weak
Vector: 66%
Pages: 548-550AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill provides temporary mortgage forbearance for federal employees during government shutdowns, which touches on housing stability but does not address the Project 2025 HUD priorities of regulatory reform, eliminating DEI/CRT influences, countering foreign market manipulation, or increasing housing supply."

Key themes:mortgage reliefhousing stabilityfederal workforceforbearance

— 515 — Department of Housing and Urban Development 25. Process must prioritize where political leadership can implement administrative reforms through regulatory action and subregulatory guidance reforms. 26. China and other foreign nations should not be able to disrupt our nation’s housing markets, including by artificially driving up prices and reducing affordability and access to housing for Americans who are crowded out of the market by such market participation. 27. These initiatives are maintained under such designations as diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI); critical race theory (CRT); black, indigenous, Pacific Islander, and other people of color (BIPOC); and environmental, social, and governance (ESG). 28. At a minimum, these efforts duplicate what the federal government already collects and assesses; at worst, they institute arbitrary procedures in real estate appraisal practices that undermine integrity and perversely introduce arbitrary biases into what should be an unbiased system for determining financial value. 29. Revise regulatory and subregulatory guidance, where applicable within statutory authorities, that adds unnecessary delay and costs to the construction and development of new housing and has been estimated to account for about 40 percent of new housing unit costs in multifamily housing. 30. The Biden Administration has issued a proposed rule to replace the Trump Administration’s “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice” rule that had repealed earlier rules expanding AFFH enforcement. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Fair Housing, “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 153 (August 7, 2020), pp. 47899–47912, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-07/pdf/2020-16320.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023), and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 88, No. 27 (February 9, 2023), pp. 8516–8590, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-07-16/pdf/2015-17032.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 31. Certain pilot initiatives may encourage greater take-up of loan products designed for faster equity accumulation, including loans with shorter terms and accelerated amortization schedules. In concept, the FHA’s Home Equity Accelerator Loan (HEAL) and Good Neighbor Next Door (GNND) pilot initiatives might lead to meaningful wealth generation for first-time buyers, but they should be available to all eligible households only when they do not arbitrarily discriminate based on race or other characteristics. 32. Housing supply does remain a problem in the U.S., but constructing more units at the low end of the market will not solve the problem. Investors and developers can deliver at more efficient cost new units that will allow for greater upward mobility of rental and ownership housing stock and better target increased construction of mid-tier rental units. Further, and more fundamental to the housing supply challenge in markets across the U.S., localities can consider revising land use, zoning, and building regulations that constrict new housing development, adding time delays and costs that impede construction. Federal housing policy should get out of the way where possible and minimize the distortive impact that stimulating greater demand through loose lending can have in driving up housing prices for households that are looking for affordable entry into the housing market. 33. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Housing and Community Development Act of 1980: Verification of Eligible Status,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 91 (May 10, 2019), pp. 20589–20595, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-05-10/pdf/2019-09566.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 34. Reforms should contemplate rent payment flexibilities, allow escrow savings, and set maximum term limits that can reduce implicit penalties for increasing household incomes over eligibility terms for housing assistance and reweight waiting-list prioritization for two-parent households. 35. Some PHAs have been able to implement work requirements and term limit policies in various congressionally authorized demonstration programs, notably the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program established in 1996 for 39 PHAs (Congress has since authorized another 100 PHAs) in which participating MTW PHAs were given authority to implement rent reforms, work requirements and other experimental policies in rental assistance programs along with flexibilities in the use of capital and operating appropriations. 36. The FSS program has a general five-year term with a possible two-year extension, which could be applied at the term limit for overall benefits, and certain PHAs have imposed five-year to seven-year term limits. Families in these programs build escrow savings during their term eligibility that helps to facilitate successful transitions to family self-sufficiency and unassisted housing. — 516 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 37. HUD should implement administrative changes in regulation and guidance and seek statutory authority to end all Housing First directives of Continuum of Care (CoC) grantees and contract homelessness providers in addition to establishing restrictions on local Housing First policies where HUD grant funds are used. 38. The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) was established in the 1990s, and numerous Administrations have devoted enormous resources to the Housing First model, experimenting with various ways to provide federally financed rapid rehousing and permanent housing opportunities. Housing First is a far-left idea premised on the belief that homelessness is primarily circumstantial rather than behavioral. The Housing First answer to homelessness is to give someone a house instead of attempting to understand the underlying causes of homelessness. Federal intervention centered on Housing First has failed to acknowledge that resolving the issue of homelessness is often a matter of resolving mental health and substance abuse challenges. Instead of the permanent supportive housing proffered by Housing First, a conservative Administration should shift to transitional housing with a focus on addressing the underlying issues that cause homelessness in the first place. 39. The Senate Low-Income First-Time Homebuyers (LIFT) Act would address this policy goal. See S. 2797, Low-Income First-Time Homebuyers Act of 2021 (LIFT Homebuyers Act of 2021), 117th Congress, introduced September 22, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s2797/BILLS-117s2797is.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 40. FHA did not facilitate the widespread use of 30-year mortgages until the 1950s when, interacting with Federal Reserve policies, federal agencies began broader adoption of the mortgages, which, despite lowering the monthly repayment terms, result in slow equity accumulation and wealth-building opportunities. 41. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 fundamentally revised the scope of federal regulation in the nation’s housing finance system, placing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the purview of a newly established Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and establishing a Housing Trust Fund (HTF) that is administered in the HUD Office of Community Planning and Development. See H.R. 3221, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-289, 110th Congress, July 30, 2008, https://www.congress. gov/110/plaws/publ289/PLAW-110publ289.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 42. Guiding questions: What reforms should be proposed that could be accomplished within five years? What reforms can be done administratively, and what reforms would need legislative authorization? Are there functions that HUD administers that could be achieved more effectively at another department or agency? What big-picture reforms should be proposed that might take more than five years that would reorganize HUD and its programs to meet the objectives in the vision or mission? What would occur in the absence of these public finance subsidies? How much crowd-out do these subsidies create in the market? Would America be a seriously underhoused nation without these subsidies? Who are the policies intended to benefit? What organizational changes must be made? 43. The Faircloth Amendment (Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998) amended the Housing Act of 1937 to maintain public housing units at 1999 levels, preventing housing authorities from maintaining more public housing than they did then. H.R. 4194, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105-276, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Title V, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ276/PLAW-105publ276.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). In recent years, the statutory restriction on new construction of public housing units has been circumvented through some narrow uses of preservation programs such as the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, initially authorized in 2012 and reauthorized several times since under higher program unit conversion caps. Congress also provided paths for renewal and continuation of a portion of existing public housing; project/site-based housing stock (refinancing with long-term HAP contract commitments); and Section 8 units through the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 (MAHRA). H.R. 2158, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Public Law No. 105-65, 105th Congress, October 27, 1997, Title V, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ65/PLAW-105publ65.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 44. As the evolution of HUD rental assistance transitions away from the public housing model toward housing choice vouchers, there should be adequate landlord participation to ensure that the supply of housing units for rent in these programs meets the demand for rent among eligible tenants. This issue has been addressed in various ways, including by a task force instituted at the department during the Trump Administration, but could likely remain a challenge in the administration of the program.

Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy

Weak
Vector: 64%
Pages: 109-111AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill provides mortgage forbearance for federal employees during shutdowns, which addresses financial hardship but does not directly engage with Project 2025's focus on civil service reform, pay and benefits rationalization, or reducing bureaucratic inefficiencies. While both concern federal employees, the bill's relief measure contrasts with Project 2025's emphasis on scrutinizing and potentially reducing compensation and benefits."

Key themes:federal employeescompensation and benefitsgovernment workforce

— 76 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise to delay. With the proper limitation of labor union actions, the FLRA should have limited reason for appeals. The EEOC’s federal employee section should be transferred to the MSPB, and many of the OCS’s investigatory functions should be returned to the OPM. The MSPB could then become the main reviewer of adverse actions, greatly simplifying the burdensome appeal process. Making Civil Service Benefits Economically and Administratively Ratio- nal. In recent years, the combined wages and benefits of the executive branch civilian workforce totaled $300 billion according to official data. But even that amount does not properly account for billions in unfunded liability for retirement and other government reporting distortions. Official data also report employment as approximately 2 million, but this ignores approximately 20 million contractors who, while not eligible for government pay and benefits, do receive them indirectly through contracting (even if they are less generous). Official data also claim that national government employees are paid less than private-sector employees are paid for similar work, but several more neutral sources demonstrate that pub- lic-sector workers make more on average than their private-sector counterparts. All of this extravagance deserves close scrutiny. Market-Based Pay and Benefits. According to current law, federal workers are to be paid wages comparable to equivalent private-sector workers rather than compared to all private-sector employees. While the official studies claim that federal employees are underpaid relative to the private sector by 20 percent or more, a 2016 Heritage Foundation study found that federal employees received wages that were 22 percent higher than wages for similar private-sector workers; if the value of employee benefits was included, the total compensation premium for federal employees over their private-sector equivalents increased to between 30 percent and 40 percent.18 The American Enterprise Institute found a 14 percent pay premium and a 61 percent total compensation premium.19 Base salary is only one component of a federal employee’s total compensation. In addition to high starting wages, federal employees normally receive an annual cost-of-living adjustment (available to all employees) and generous scheduled raises known as step increases. Moreover, a large proportion of federal employ- ees are stationed in the Washington, D.C., area and other large cities and are entitled to steep locality pay enhancement to account for the high cost of living in these areas. A federal employee with five years’ experience receives 20 vacation days, 13 paid sick days, and all 10 federal holidays compared to an employee at a large private company who receives 13 days of vacation and eight paid sick days. Federal health benefits are more comparable to those provided by Fortune 500 employers with the government paying 72 percent of the weighted average premiums, but this is much higher than for most private plans. Almost half of private firms do not offer any employer contributions at all.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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