CLEAR Act of 2025
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Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]
ID: S001217
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Bill Summary
Another brilliant example of congressional theater, masquerading as policy. The CLEAR Act of 2025 - a bill so cleverly named, it's almost as if they want you to think it's actually clear. Let me dissect this farce for you.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The stated goal is to "require inclusion on the list of Chinese military companies operating in the United States of Chinese entities on certain other lists maintained by the United States Government." Ah, how noble. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to appease the China-hawks and defense contractors who've been salivating at the prospect of more restrictive policies.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 1260H(b)(3) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, adding a new subparagraph that requires the Secretary to review entities on other lists maintained by the US Government. Oh, wow. A whole new layer of bureaucratic red tape. I'm sure this will be a game-changer in the fight against Chinese military companies.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: defense contractors, China-hawks, and politicians looking to score points with their constituents. The actual impact on Chinese military companies? Minimal. They'll just find new ways to circumvent these restrictions, while American businesses will be stuck navigating the added regulatory hurdles.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater" - all show, no substance. It's designed to make politicians look tough on China, while doing little to address the actual issues. The real implications? More bureaucratic inefficiency, increased costs for American businesses, and a further erosion of trust between the US and China.
Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a bad case of " Politician-itis" - a disease characterized by an excessive desire for publicity, a lack of understanding of complex issues, and a willingness to sacrifice actual progress for the sake of appearances. Treatment? A healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for bureaucratic nonsense, and a commitment to calling out the obvious lies and half-truths peddled by our esteemed lawmakers.
In short, the CLEAR Act of 2025 is a perfect example of how Congress loves to play doctor - prescribing treatments that sound good but do nothing to cure the underlying disease. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold.
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 122 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead of being relegated to a supporting document. 4. Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help DOD train, equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. l Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. DOD, in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe. 1. Task USSOCOM and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key to our energy policy, international supply chains, and our defense industrial base. 2. Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt. 3. Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national power in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean to maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital infrastructure of nations in the region. l Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to protect the homeland. A whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information, economic, and counterterrorist irregular warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland. 1. Include the designation of USSOCOM as lead for the execution of irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the National Defense Strategy. 2. Demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments.
Introduction
— 122 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead of being relegated to a supporting document. 4. Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help DOD train, equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. l Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. DOD, in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe. 1. Task USSOCOM and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key to our energy policy, international supply chains, and our defense industrial base. 2. Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt. 3. Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national power in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean to maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital infrastructure of nations in the region. l Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to protect the homeland. A whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information, economic, and counterterrorist irregular warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland. 1. Include the designation of USSOCOM as lead for the execution of irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the National Defense Strategy. 2. Demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments. — 123 — Department of Defense 3. Employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding the names of entities that target democratic processes and international norms available in a transparent manner. 4. Work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors. 5. Maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism posture against threats to the homeland. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Nuclear deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security, as it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. Every operational plan relies on the assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first acquired nuclear weapons, Administrations of both parties have pursued a strategy designed to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employ- ment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. Today, however, America’s ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing nuclear threats posed by our adversaries. l China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. to learn how to deter two nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first time in its history. l Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine. l North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities. l Iran is inching closer to nuclear capability. Meanwhile, all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next Admin- istration will need to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad while updating our strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges presented by a more threatening nuclear environment. Needed Reforms l Prioritize nuclear modernization. All components of the nuclear triad are far beyond their intended lifetimes and will need to be replaced over the next
Introduction
— 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception? — 217 — Intelligence Community Some Members of Congress have said that intelligence relationships such as the Five Eyes28 should be expanded to include other allies in the Asia–Pacific in, for example, a “Nine Eyes” framework. This fails to take into account the fact that any blanket expansion would necessarily involve protecting the sources and methods of a larger and quite possibly more diverse group of member countries that might or might not have congruent interests. That being said, however, a future conservative President should consider what resources and information-sharing relationships could be included in an ad hoc or quasi-formal intelligence expansion (for example, with the Quad) among nations trying to counter the threat from China. Significant technology, language skills, and financial intelligence resources are needed to counter China’s capabilities.29 The IC was caught flat-footed by the recent discovery of China’s successful test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. No longer can America’s information and technological dominance be assumed. China’s gains and intense focus on emerging technologies have taken it in some areas from being a near-peer competitor to probably being ahead of the United States. China’s centralized government allocates endless resources (sometimes inefficiently) to its strategic “Made in China 2025” and military apparatuses, which combine government, military, and private-sector activities on quantum infor- mation sciences and technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, biotechnologies, and advanced robotics. The IC must do more than understand these advancements: It must rally non- government and allied partners and inspire unified action to counter them. In addition, to combat China’s economic espionage, authorities and loopholes in the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)30 will have to be examined and addressed in conjunction with the Attorney General. Many issues within the broader government can be tied back to a more general congressional understanding of the threat due to the compartmentalization of committee jurisdictions and the responsibilities of executive agencies to brief on the nature of the threat. Broader committee jurisdictions should receive additional intelligence from IC agencies as necessary to inform China’s unique and more com- prehensive threat across layers of the U.S. government bureaucracy and economy. Former DNI John Ratcliffe increased the intelligence budget as it related to China by 20 percent. “When people ask me why I did that,” he explained in an interview, “I say, ‘Because no one would let me increase it by 40%.’ I had an $85 billion combined annual budget for both the national intelligence program and military intelligence program. My perspective was, ‘Whatever we’re spending on countering China, it isn’t enough.’”31 From an intelligence standpoint, the need to understand Chinese motivations, capabilities, and intent will be of paramount importance to a future conservative President. It is therefore also of paramount importance that the “whole of government” be rowing together.
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About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.