Better FDA Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Sen. Marshall, Roger [R-KS]
ID: M001198
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Invalid Date
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose its true intentions.
**Main Purpose & Objectives**
The Better FDA Act of 2025 is a cleverly crafted bill that purports to enhance food safety by requiring notifications to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding substances generally recognized as safe (GRAS). The real purpose, however, is to create a new regulatory framework that benefits certain industries at the expense of public health.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**
The bill amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by introducing a new section (409A) that requires manufacturers to notify the FDA about GRAS substances. The notification process is designed to be cumbersome, allowing the FDA to delay or reject applications at its discretion. This creates an opportunity for regulatory capture, where industries with deep pockets can influence the FDA's decisions.
The bill also redefines what constitutes a GRAS substance, making it easier for manufacturers to introduce new ingredients without thorough safety testing. This is a classic case of "regulatory relaxation," where the government appears to be strengthening regulations while actually weakening them.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**
The main beneficiaries of this bill are large food and chemical companies that can afford to navigate the complex regulatory landscape. These industries will enjoy reduced liability and increased flexibility in introducing new products, all while maintaining a veneer of safety.
On the other hand, small businesses, consumers, and public health advocates will be negatively impacted by this bill. The increased regulatory burden will stifle innovation among smaller companies, while the lack of transparency and accountability will put consumers at risk.
**Potential Impact & Implications**
The Better FDA Act of 2025 is a recipe for disaster. By allowing industries to self-regulate and introducing new substances without adequate safety testing, we can expect an increase in foodborne illnesses and environmental pollution.
This bill also sets a disturbing precedent for regulatory capture, where the interests of corporations are prioritized over public health. The FDA's ability to protect consumers will be compromised, and the agency will become even more beholden to industry lobbyists.
In conclusion, the Better FDA Act of 2025 is a masterclass in legislative deception. Behind its innocuous title and seemingly benevolent objectives lies a cynical attempt to undermine public health and safety. As with most congressional bills, this one requires a healthy dose of skepticism and a strong stomach to navigate its Byzantine provisions.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Marshall, Roger [R-KS]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
Donor Network - Sen. Marshall, Roger [R-KS]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 25 nodes and 30 connections
Total contributions: $194,300
Top Donors - Sen. Marshall, Roger [R-KS]
Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 452 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Unaccountable bureaucrats like Anthony Fauci should never again have such broad, unchecked power to issue health “guidelines” that will certainly be the basis for federal and state mandates. Never again should public health bureaucrats be allowed to hide information, ignore information, or mislead the public concerning the efficacy or dangers associated with any recommended health interventions because they believe it may lead to hesitancy on the part of the public. The only way to restore public trust in HHS as an institution capable of acting responsibly during a health emergency is through the best of disinfectants—light. Goal #5: Instituting Greater Transparency, Accountability, and Over- sight. The next Administration should guard against the regulatory capture of our public health agencies by pharmaceutical companies, insurers, hospital conglomer- ates, and related economic interests that these agencies are meant to regulate. We must erect robust firewalls to mitigate these obvious financial conflicts of interest. All National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Food and Drug Administration regulators should be entirely free from pri- vate biopharmaceutical funding. In this realm, “public–private partnerships” is a euphemism for agency capture, a thin veneer for corporatism. Funding for agencies and individual government researchers must come directly from the government with robust congressional oversight. We must shut and lock the revolving door between government and Big Pharma. Regulators should have a long “cooling off period” on their contracts (15 years would not be too long) that prevents them from working for companies they have regulated. Similarly, pharmaceutical company executives should be restricted from moving from industry into positions within regulatory agencies. Finally, HHS should adopt metrics across the agency that can objectively deter- mine the extent to which the agency’s policies and programs achieve desired health and welfare outcomes (not agency outputs). What is not measured is not achieved. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) COVID and Structural Reform. COVID-19 exposed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as perhaps the most incompetent and arrogant agency in the federal government. CDC continually misjudged COVID-19, from its lethality, transmissibility, and origins to treatments. We were told masks were not needed; then they were made mandatory. CDC botched the development of COVID tests when they were needed most. When it was too late, we were told to put our lives on hold for “two weeks to flatten the curve;” that turned into two years of interference and restrictions on the smallest details of our lives. Congress should ensure that CDC’s legal authorities are clearly defined and limited to prevent a recurrence of any such arbitrary and vacillating exercise of power. The CDC should be split into two separate entities housing its two distinct func- tions. On the one hand, the CDC is now responsible for collecting, synthesizing,
Introduction
— 452 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Unaccountable bureaucrats like Anthony Fauci should never again have such broad, unchecked power to issue health “guidelines” that will certainly be the basis for federal and state mandates. Never again should public health bureaucrats be allowed to hide information, ignore information, or mislead the public concerning the efficacy or dangers associated with any recommended health interventions because they believe it may lead to hesitancy on the part of the public. The only way to restore public trust in HHS as an institution capable of acting responsibly during a health emergency is through the best of disinfectants—light. Goal #5: Instituting Greater Transparency, Accountability, and Over- sight. The next Administration should guard against the regulatory capture of our public health agencies by pharmaceutical companies, insurers, hospital conglomer- ates, and related economic interests that these agencies are meant to regulate. We must erect robust firewalls to mitigate these obvious financial conflicts of interest. All National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Food and Drug Administration regulators should be entirely free from pri- vate biopharmaceutical funding. In this realm, “public–private partnerships” is a euphemism for agency capture, a thin veneer for corporatism. Funding for agencies and individual government researchers must come directly from the government with robust congressional oversight. We must shut and lock the revolving door between government and Big Pharma. Regulators should have a long “cooling off period” on their contracts (15 years would not be too long) that prevents them from working for companies they have regulated. Similarly, pharmaceutical company executives should be restricted from moving from industry into positions within regulatory agencies. Finally, HHS should adopt metrics across the agency that can objectively deter- mine the extent to which the agency’s policies and programs achieve desired health and welfare outcomes (not agency outputs). What is not measured is not achieved. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) COVID and Structural Reform. COVID-19 exposed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as perhaps the most incompetent and arrogant agency in the federal government. CDC continually misjudged COVID-19, from its lethality, transmissibility, and origins to treatments. We were told masks were not needed; then they were made mandatory. CDC botched the development of COVID tests when they were needed most. When it was too late, we were told to put our lives on hold for “two weeks to flatten the curve;” that turned into two years of interference and restrictions on the smallest details of our lives. Congress should ensure that CDC’s legal authorities are clearly defined and limited to prevent a recurrence of any such arbitrary and vacillating exercise of power. The CDC should be split into two separate entities housing its two distinct func- tions. On the one hand, the CDC is now responsible for collecting, synthesizing, — 453 — Department of Health and Human Services and publishing epidemiological data from the individual states—a scientific data-gathering function. This information is crucial for medical and public health researchers around the country. On the other hand, the CDC is also responsible for making public health recommendations and policies—an inescapably political function. At times, these two functions are in tension or clear conflict. In February 2022, for example, it was reported that “[t]wo full years into the pandemic, the agency leading the country’s response to the public health emergency has pub- lished only a tiny fraction of the data it has collected,” much of which “could [have helped] state and local health officials better target their efforts to bring the virus under control.” A CDC spokesman said that one of the reasons was “fear that the information might be misinterpreted.”4 These distinct functions should be separated into two entirely separate agen- cies with a firewall between them. We need a national epidemiological agency responsible only for publishing data and required by law to publish all of the data gathered from states and other sources. A separate agency should be responsible for public health with a severely confined ability to make policy recommendations. The CDC can and should make assessments as to the health costs and benefits of health interventions, but it has limited to no capacity to measure the social costs or benefits they may entail. For example, how much risk mitigation is worth the price of shutting down churches on the holiest day of the Christian calendar and far beyond as happened in 2020? What is the proper balance of lives saved versus souls saved? The CDC has no business making such inherently political (and often unconstitutional) assessments and should be required by law to stay in its lane. The CDC’s initial COVID-19 testing failures were largely the result of that agen- cy’s prioritizing its own development and production of tests using its internal staff and facilities. The private sector is much better positioned to tackle the chal- lenges inherent in developing and manufacturing novel products, as illustrated by the relative success of the alternative approach to facilitating the development of COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics by private companies that was adopted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). When it comes to testing, the CDC’s role should similarly be to facilitate rather than supplant the efforts of private test developers, academic laboratories, state public health laboratories, and clinical testing providers. When responding to a novel pathogen, the CDC should focus on gathering and disseminating information, including specimens needed for development of positive controls and reference panels, and ensuring that test developers can develop and validate diagnostic tests. These changes will require a shift in priorities and culture at the CDC—and throughout HHS more broadly.5 Most problematically, the CDC presented itself as a kind of “super-doctor” for the entire nation. The CDC is a public health institution, not a medical institution. According to its mission statement, the agency focuses on “disease prevention and
Introduction
— 309 — Department of Agriculture Eliminate or Reform the Dietary Guidelines. The USDA, in collaboration with HHS, publishes the Dietary Guidelines every five years.125 For more than 40 years, the federal government has been releasing Dietary Guidelines,126 and during this time, there has been constant controversy due to questionable recommenda- tions and claims regarding the politicization of the process. In the 2015 Dietary Guidelines process, the influential Dietary Guidelines Advi- sory Committee veered off mission and attempted to persuade the USDA and HHS to adopt nutritional advice that focused not just on human health, but the health of the planet.127 Issues such as climate change and sustainability infiltrated the process. Fortunately, the 2020 process did not get diverted in this manner. How- ever, the Dietary Guidelines remain a potential tool to influence dietary choices to achieve objectives unrelated to the nutritional and dietary well-being of Americans. There is no shortage of private sector dietary advice for the public, and nutrition and dietary choices are best left to individuals to address their personal needs. This includes working with their own health professionals. As it is, there is constantly changing advice provided by the government, with insufficient qualifications on the advice, oversimplification to the point of miscommunicating important points, questionable use of science, and potential political influence. The Dietary Guidelines have a major impact because they not only can influence how private health providers offer nutritional advice, but they also inform federal programs. School meals are required to be consistent with the guidelines.128 The next Administration should: l Work with lawmakers to repeal the Dietary Guidelines. The USDA should help lead an effort to repeal the Dietary Guidelines. l Minimally, the next Administration should reform the Dietary Guidelines. The USDA, with HHS, should develop a more transparent process that properly considers the underlying science and does not overstate its findings. It should also ensure that the Dietary Guidelines focus on nutritional issues and do not veer off-mission by focusing on unrelated issues, such as the environment, that have nothing to do with nutritional advice. In fact, if environmental concerns supersede or water down recommendations for human nutritional advice, the public would be receiving misleading health information. The USDA, working with lawmakers, should codify these reforms into law. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES Based on the recommended reforms identified as ideal solutions, the USDA would look different in many respects. One of the biggest changes would be a USDA that is not focused on welfare, given that means-tested welfare programs would — 310 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise be moved to HHS. The Food and Nutrition Service that administers the food and nutrition programs would be eliminated. The Farm Service Agency, which administers many of the farm subsidy pro- grams, would be significantly smaller in size if the ideal farm subsidy reforms were adopted. Most important, a conservative USDA, as envisioned, would not be used as a governmental tool to transform the nation’s food system, but instead would respect the importance of efficient agricultural production and ensure that the government does not hinder farmers and ranchers from producing an abundant supply of safe and affordable food. For a conservative USDA to become a reality, and for it to stay on course with the mission as outlined, the White House must strongly support these reforms and install strong USDA leaders. These individuals almost certainly will be faced with opposition from some in the agricultural community who would fight changing subsidies in any fashion, although many of the reforms would likely be embraced by those in agriculture. There would be strong opposition from environmental groups and others who want the federal government to transform American agriculture to meet their ideo- logical objectives. Finally, there would be opposition from left-of-center groups who do not want to reform SNAP and would expand welfare and dependency—such as through universal free school meals—as opposed to reducing dependency. Reducing the scope of government and promoting individual freedom may not always be easy, but it is something that conservatives regularly should strive for. The listed reforms to the U.S. Department of Agriculture would help to accom- plish these objectives and are well worth fighting for to achieve a freer and more prosperous nation. CONCLUSION This chapter started with a discussion of the incredible success of American farmers and American agriculture in general. This is how the chapter should close as well. Americans are blessed with an agricultural sector, and a food system in general, which are worthy of incredible respect. A conservative USDA should appreciate this while recognizing that its role is to serve the interests of all Amer- icans, not special interests. By being a champion of unleashing the potential of American agriculture, a conservative USDA would help to ensure a future with an abundant supply of safe and affordable food for individuals and families in the United States and across the globe. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author would like to thank all the contributors for their assistance, expertise, and insight into the development of this chapter. In addition, special thanks are due to Rachael Wilfong, who was instrumental in getting the chapter ready for submission.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.