Worker RESULTS Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/3117
Last Updated: November 7, 2025

Sponsored by

Sen. Cassidy, Bill [R-LA]

ID: C001075

Follow the money

The bill

Worker RESULTS Act

S. 3117, 119th Congress — read as touching Labor Unions.

The sponsor

Sen. Cassidy, Bill [R-LA]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$162,500 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Labor and Related Agencies" section, p. 636-638 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Committee Review

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Passed Senate

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Became Law

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1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of Senators Cassidy and Tuberville. The Worker RESULTS Act - because who doesn't love a good acronym? Let's dissect this mess.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The bill's primary objective is to amend the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) regarding labor organization elections. In other words, it's an attempt to "reform" the process by which workers choose their union representatives. Or, as I like to call it, a thinly veiled effort to undermine worker rights and empower corporate interests.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill introduces several changes:

1. **Certification Bar**: The bill extends the recertification window for unions, making it easier for employers to challenge union representation. 2. **Decertification Window Period**: A new 90-day period is introduced during which employees can file a petition to decertify their union representative if they feel the union is not bargaining in good faith. 3. **Secret Ballot Elections**: The bill requires secret ballot elections for union representation, because apparently, workers can't be trusted to make informed decisions without being shielded from scrutiny. 4. **Quorum Requirements**: A two-thirds majority of employees must vote in a secret ballot election for a union to be certified as the exclusive representative.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The usual suspects:

1. **Employers**: They'll love this bill, as it gives them more opportunities to challenge union representation and exert control over their workforce. 2. **Unions**: They'll hate this bill, as it undermines their ability to effectively represent workers and makes it harder for employees to organize. 3. **Workers**: The ones who will ultimately suffer from this legislation, as it erodes their rights and protections under the NLRA.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

This bill is a classic case of " wolf in sheep's clothing" - it masquerades as a pro-worker reform while actually serving the interests of corporate America. By making it harder for unions to organize and represent workers, this legislation will:

1. **Weaken Worker Protections**: By limiting union representation, workers will have fewer safeguards against exploitation and mistreatment by employers. 2. **Increase Corporate Power**: Employers will gain more control over their workforce, allowing them to dictate terms and conditions without fear of reprisal from organized labor. 3. **Undermine Collective Bargaining**: The bill's changes to the NLRA will make it harder for unions to negotiate fair wages, benefits, and working conditions on behalf of workers.

In conclusion, the Worker RESULTS Act is a cynical attempt to dismantle worker protections and empower corporate interests. It's a legislative disease that requires a strong dose of skepticism and critical thinking to diagnose its true intentions.

Related Topics

Labor & Employment Policy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Cassidy, Bill [R-LA]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$162,500
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$162,500

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
YAWITZ, JESS B. MR.
1 transaction
$14,000
2
MANDELBLATT, DANIELLE
1 transaction
$9,900
3
MANDELBLATT, ERIC
1 transaction
$9,900
4
JAYASINGHE, SAMAN K. DR.
1 transaction
$9,900
5
KARP, ALEXANDER C.
1 transaction
$9,900
6
OBERNDORF, SUSAN
1 transaction
$9,900
7
OBERNDORF, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$9,900
8
YAWITZ, ALICE G.
1 transaction
$9,900
9
GRIGSBY, BOBBI F. MRS.
1 transaction
$6,600
10
GRIGSBY, L. LANE MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
11
GOLDEN, GRADY CARLTON MR. JR.
1 transaction
$6,600
12
MYERS, GINGER
1 transaction
$6,600
13
MYERS, KEITH MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
14
GATES, MELINDA FRENCH
1 transaction
$6,600
15
MEHLMAN, KENNETH B.
1 transaction
$6,600
16
HAGER, SUSAN
1 transaction
$6,600
17
PANDE, VIJAY
1 transaction
$6,600
18
ROM, COLIN
1 transaction
$6,600
19
KAPLAN, JONATHAN L.
1 transaction
$6,600
20
KAY, ALISON
1 transaction
$6,600

Donor Network - Sen. Cassidy, Bill [R-LA]

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Showing 52 nodes and 20 connections (46 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $162,500

Top Donors - Sen. Cassidy, Bill [R-LA]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.

  • +Labor Unionsconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(a)(1)(B)(i) extends the period during which a union's certification is protected from decertification petitions until a collective bargaining agreement is in effect, strengthening union stability. Section 2(a)(1)(B)(ii) creates a decertification window only if the union is not bargaining in good faith, adding a procedural hurdle for decertification. Section 2(a)(1)(C) bars election petitions during active collective bargaining agreements, further protecting unions. Section 2(b) adds a

  • +Teachers Unionsconfidence 0.85

    The bill amends the National Labor Relations Act, which governs labor relations for private-sector employees, including those in private schools and potentially some charter school employees. While public-sector teachers are generally covered by state laws, the NLRA applies to private education institutions. The provisions strengthening union certification and protecting bargaining units would benefit teachers' unions in the private sector. The bill's focus on protecting collective bargaining ag

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Labor and Related Agencies

Very Strong
Vector: 73%
Pages: 636-638AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Worker RESULTS Act directly implements key Project 2025 policy objectives by mandating secret ballot elections for union recognition, eliminating the contract bar to allow more frequent decertification efforts, and restricting NLRB authority to block such elections—aligning precisely with the policy’s goals of increasing employee choice and reducing union entrenchment."

Key themes:secret ballot electionseliminate contract bardecertification rightsNLRB authority limitsemployee choice in union representation

— 603 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies decision-making is required under the law, basing this theory on an old NLRB case, Joy Silk, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected mandatory card-check recognition. l Discard “card check.” Congress should discard “card check” as the basis of union recognition and mandate the secret ballot exclusively. Contract Bar Rule. Although current labor law allows a union to establish itself at a workplace at more or less any time, the calendar for any attempt to decertify a union is considerably more constrained. If a union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent, then employees may not decertify it or substitute another union for it for at least one year under federal law (the “certification bar”). Similarly, when a union reaches a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, it is immune from a decertification election for up to three years (the “contract bar”). A typical consequence of these rules is that employees must often wait four years before they are allowed a chance at decertification. Employees then have only a 45-day window to file a decertification petition; if the employer and union sign a successor contract, then the contract bar comes into play once again—meaning employees with an interest in decertification must wait another three years. l Eliminate the contract bar rule. NLRB should eliminate the contract bar rule so that employees with an interest in decertification have a reasonable chance to achieve their goal. Tailoring National Employment Rules. National employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)21 and the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act22 set out one-size-fits-all “floors” regulating the employment rela- tionship. These substantive worker protections often do not mesh well with the procedural worker protections offered through the NLRA’s collective bargaining process. Unions could play a powerful role in tailoring national employment rules to the needs of a particular workplace if, in unionized workplaces, national rules were treated as negotiable defaults rather than non-negotiable floors. l Congress should amend the NLRA to authorize collective bargaining to treat national employment laws and regulations as negotiable defaults. For example, this reform would allow a union to bless a relaxed overtime trigger (e.g., 45 hours a week, or 80 hours over two weeks) in exchange for firm employer commitments on predictable scheduling. Alternative Policy. While some conservatives (including the author of this chap- ter) believe that it would be a mistake to antagonize unions’ core interests, others

Department of Labor and Related Agencies

Very Strong
Vector: 71%
Pages: 636-638AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Worker RESULTS Act directly implements key Project 2025 objectives by mandating secret ballot elections for union recognition, eliminating barriers to decertification (including the contract bar), and limiting NLRB interference in election processes—aligning precisely with the policy’s emphasis on employee choice, transparency, and reducing union coercion."

Key themes:secret ballot mandateeliminate contract bardiscard card checklimit NLRB authorityemployee decertification rights

— 603 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies decision-making is required under the law, basing this theory on an old NLRB case, Joy Silk, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected mandatory card-check recognition. l Discard “card check.” Congress should discard “card check” as the basis of union recognition and mandate the secret ballot exclusively. Contract Bar Rule. Although current labor law allows a union to establish itself at a workplace at more or less any time, the calendar for any attempt to decertify a union is considerably more constrained. If a union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent, then employees may not decertify it or substitute another union for it for at least one year under federal law (the “certification bar”). Similarly, when a union reaches a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, it is immune from a decertification election for up to three years (the “contract bar”). A typical consequence of these rules is that employees must often wait four years before they are allowed a chance at decertification. Employees then have only a 45-day window to file a decertification petition; if the employer and union sign a successor contract, then the contract bar comes into play once again—meaning employees with an interest in decertification must wait another three years. l Eliminate the contract bar rule. NLRB should eliminate the contract bar rule so that employees with an interest in decertification have a reasonable chance to achieve their goal. Tailoring National Employment Rules. National employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)21 and the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act22 set out one-size-fits-all “floors” regulating the employment rela- tionship. These substantive worker protections often do not mesh well with the procedural worker protections offered through the NLRA’s collective bargaining process. Unions could play a powerful role in tailoring national employment rules to the needs of a particular workplace if, in unionized workplaces, national rules were treated as negotiable defaults rather than non-negotiable floors. l Congress should amend the NLRA to authorize collective bargaining to treat national employment laws and regulations as negotiable defaults. For example, this reform would allow a union to bless a relaxed overtime trigger (e.g., 45 hours a week, or 80 hours over two weeks) in exchange for firm employer commitments on predictable scheduling. Alternative Policy. While some conservatives (including the author of this chap- ter) believe that it would be a mistake to antagonize unions’ core interests, others — 604 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise argue that the next Administration should end Project Labor Agreement require- ments and repeal the Davis–Bacon Act. And while some conservatives have chosen not to address massive federal subsidies for unionized labor, others believe that current laws and regulations that pick winners and losers to the detriment of the majority of construction workers and to all taxpayers should not be ignored. Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) are short-term collective bargaining agreements that apply to construction projects. There are a few reasons that con- struction projects may benefit from a PLA, and there are many reasons that even when actively encouraged to do so public construction projects have declined to use PLAs. Among the consequences: The majority of construction firms and construction workers are not unionized and their temporary forced unionization results in large-scale wage theft; construction companies are significantly less likely to bid on projects with PLAs; and PLAs consistently drive up construction costs by 10 percent to 30 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act23 requires federally financed construction projects to pay “prevailing wages.” In theory, these wages should reflect going market rates for construction labor in the relevant area. However, both the Government Account- ability Office and the Department of Labor’s Inspector General have repeatedly criticized the Labor Department for using self-selected, statistically unrepresenta- tive samples to calculate the prevailing-wage rates that drive up the cost of federal construction by about 10 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act redistributes wealth from hardworking Americans to those that benefit from government-funded construc- tion projects. Repealing the Davis–Bacon Act would increase worker freedom and end a longstanding effective tax on American families. l End PLA requirements. Agencies should end all mandatory Project Labor Agreement requirements and base federal procurement decisions on the contractors that can deliver the best product at the lowest cost. l Repeal Davis–Bacon. Congress should enact the Davis–Bacon Repeal Act and allow markets to determine market wages. THE STATES Worker-led Benefits Experimentation. Workers depend on unemployment benefits to navigate inevitable market frictions and seek new employment oppor- tunities. But existing unemployment insurance (UI) is bureaucratic, ineffective, and unaccountable. The outdated system’s myriad failures during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for innovations that respond to recipients’ needs. The most promising avenue for innovation is to involve workers and private-sec- tor organizations more directly, freed from unnecessary bureaucratic strictures. Americans take for granted that unemployment benefits must be administered by

Department of Labor and Related Agencies

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 633-635AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Worker RESULTS Act aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on promoting secret ballot elections over card check, increasing transparency in labor organizing, and limiting NLRB overreach in union certification processes, reflecting shared goals of protecting employee choice and reducing coercion in unionization efforts."

Key themes:secret ballot electionsNLRB authority limitsemployee choice in unionizationtransparency in labor organizingopposition to card check

— 601 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies The NLRB has issued extreme interpretations of these activities, such as deter- mining that a business’s requiring its employees to be courteous to customers and one another is an unlawful infringement on the free speech rights implicit in the protected concerted activity protections in the NLRA. l Reverse unreasonable interpretations of “protected concerted activity.” The NLRB should return to the 2019 Alstate Maintenance interpretation of what does and does not constitute protected concerted activity, including listing eight instances of lawful actions by employers. Injunctive Relief and Worker Organizing Activities. Within the confines of the more reasonable definition of protected concerted activity described above, the NLRB should increase its pursuit of reinstatement injunctions. Firing work- ers engaged in concerted activity has an immediate chilling effect on organizing, but remedies under the NLRA typically come only much later and amount only to backpay. In NLRA section 10(j), Congress empowered the NLRB to obtain temporary injunctions that immediately reinstate workers to their jobs in these circumstances. This provides a more meaningful remedy to the worker and creates a significant deterrent to unfair labor practices, because prompt reinstatement will tend to reinforce the legitimacy of the organizing effort. The NLRB overwhelmingly prevails when pursuing an injunction, succeeding 100 percent of the time in 2020 and 91 percent of the time in 2021. l Increase the use of 10(j) injunctive relief. The NLRB should increase its use of 10(j) and should articulate guidelines for situations in which it intends to seek injunctive relief; the board should delegate authority to pursue such injunctions to the general counsel and the general counsel should establish a policy of considering them expeditiously in all retaliation cases identified by regional offices. Dues-Funded Worker Centers. Under current law, both labor unions and unionized employers must file financial disclosures with DOL on an annual basis to ward off potential fraud and corruption of the sort that has been seen recently within the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). However, worker centers, which have grown in number and influ- ence enormously over the past decade, are not required to file these disclosures. l Investigate worker centers and require financial disclosures. DOL should investigate worker centers that look and act like unions and bring enforcement actions to require them to file the same financial disclosures. — 602 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Office of Labor-Management Standards Initiative. Currently, the Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS) may investigate potential employer mal- feasance with regard to union funds in the absence of any complaint by a worker or union but may not do the same with regard to potential union malfeasance. If OLMS has evidence that a union may be violating the law based on information available to the agency (such as annual financial disclosure reports, information developed during an audit of a union’s books and records, or information obtained from other government agencies) it should be permitted to open an investigation. It should have the same enforcement tools available for both employers and unions. l Revise investigation standards. The Office of Labor-Management Standards should revise its investigation standards to authorize investigations without receiving a formal complaint. Persuader Rule. During the Obama Administration, DOL created significant regulatory burdens for employers with respect to the advice that employers receive about union activity. As a general matter, employers who hire lawyers or other con- sultants to advise employees about union issues must file disclosure forms with the department, as must the lawyers and consultants themselves. Prior to the Obama Administration, advice provided solely to the employer required no disclosure. The Obama Administration attempted to eliminate this “advice exemption” with a directive known as the “persuader rule,” which was successfully challenged in court. In 2018, the Trump Administration formally rescinded the persuader rule. l DOL should rescind the persuader rule once again should the Biden Administration revive it. Unionizing the Workplace: Card Check vs. Secret Ballot. Under the NLRA, instead of having a secret ballot election about the decision to unionize a workplace, a union may instead collect signed pro-union cards from a majority of the employees it wishes to represent and then ask the employer and National Labor Relations Board for voluntary union recognition. That request gives the employer the option to hold a secret-ballot election or to recognize the union with- out any such election. This “card check” procedure is likely to induce employees to provide their signed cards in ways that do not accurately reflect their true pref- erences—ranging from a desire not to offend the signature requestor to a wish to avoid intimidation and coercion to signing based on false information provided by union organizers. In short, the card check procedure sidesteps many aspects of democratic decision-making that free and fair elections conducted by secret ballot are supposed to accomplish. Notably, the general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has recently proposed an esoteric legal theory that card-check

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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