The bill
NLRB Stability Act
S. 3115, 119th Congress — read as touching Labor Unions.
Sponsored by
Sen. Cassidy, Bill [R-LA]
ID: C001075
Follow the money
The bill
S. 3115, 119th Congress — read as touching Labor Unions.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Labor and Related Agencies" section, p. 633-635 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
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7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of Senators Cassidy and Tuberville. The "NLRB Stability Act" - because what the National Labor Relations Board really needed was a stability injection... of corporate-friendly steroids.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, who are we kidding? This bill's primary objective is to further entrench the interests of big business at the expense of workers' rights. The sponsors claim it's about "enhancing stability" and "limiting nonacquiescence," but let's translate that into plain English: they want to make it harder for workers to challenge unfair labor practices and easier for corporations to get away with exploiting their employees.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the National Labor Relations Act by adding a new section (10(n)) that prohibits NLRB orders from conflicting with court of appeals decisions in the same circuit. Sounds innocuous, right? Wrong. This provision effectively gives corporations a second bite at the apple, allowing them to appeal NLRB decisions to a more business-friendly court. The bill also "simplifies" venue rules by limiting where petitions can be filed, making it harder for workers to access justice.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Workers, unions, and anyone who cares about fair labor practices will be negatively impacted by this bill. On the other hand, corporations, their lobbyists, and the politicians they own (ahem, Senators Cassidy and Tuberville) will be thrilled with this gift-wrapped present.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the systemic corruption of our political system by corporate interests. By further tilting the playing field in favor of big business, this legislation will exacerbate income inequality, erode workers' rights, and embolden corporations to engage in even more egregious labor practices.
In short, the "NLRB Stability Act" is a farce, a thinly veiled attempt to rig the system against workers. It's a legislative equivalent of prescribing a placebo to a patient with a terminal illness - it might make the symptoms look better on paper, but it won't address the underlying disease. And we all know how that usually ends...
Sen. Cassidy, Bill [R-LA]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 2(a) adds subsection (n) to NLRA Section 10, requiring NLRB orders not to conflict with circuit court decisions, which strengthens union ability to enforce NLRB orders and reduces Board nonacquiescence, benefiting labor unions.
Teachers unions are covered under NLRA for private-sector and some public-sector employees; the bill's stabilization of NLRB orders enhances enforceability of union rights, benefiting teachers unions similarly to other labor unions.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on NLRB order stability and venue procedures, while Project 2025 emphasizes NLRB enforcement actions, duty of fair representation, and interpretations of protected concerted activity—both address NLRB functions but with different priorities."
— 600 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise of state or local employees are exempt from this filing requirement. These dis- closure requirements help workers and the public understand how union leaders are raising and spending union dues; they also can serve as a vital source of infor- mation that helps workers decide if the unions they are asked to join are good stewards of the funds they collect. DOL, under both George W. Bush and Donald Trump, tried rulemakings (known as the Intermediate Bodies Rule) that would require some government unions to file the same information that is required of private-sector unions. Under President Trump, OLMS required unions to disclose involvement in trusts that they either own a majority stake in or control. In the past, union trust spending has been hidden, and it appears that trust assets have occasionally been corruptly spent for the benefit of private interests in union leadership— such as $30,000 spent on a private party, $37,500 spent on a Montblanc pen, condominiums for those in power, golf outings, and a Ferrari.20 But the Biden DOL eliminated a transparency rule requiring the filing of the T-1 Trust Annual Report. More generally, OLMS, which is charged with enforcing the law of union dis- closure, has historically been underfunded when compared to other DOL agencies. This relative lack of funding has made ensuring disclosure more difficult. l Enact transparency rules. The substance of the Intermediate Bodies Rule should pass into law, either through rulemaking or through legislation. The T-1 Trust Annual Report annual filing requirement should be restored. l Increase funding levels. Congress should expand the funding of the Office of Labor-Management Standards. Duty of Fair Representation. Unions have a duty of fair representation to their members, yet they too often abuse that duty to use their members’ resources on left-wing culture-war issues that are unrelated, and in fact often harmful, to union members’ own interests. l The NLRB should take enforcement or amicus action advancing the position that political conflicts of interest by union leadership can support claims for breach of the duty of fair representation in a manner analogous to financial conflicts of interest and analogous to breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in other areas of law. Interpreting “Protected Concerted Activity.” In an effort to prevent employers from retaliating against workers who express a desire to unionize, cer- tain activities are deemed “protected concerted activity” (under §7 of the NLRA). — 601 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies The NLRB has issued extreme interpretations of these activities, such as deter- mining that a business’s requiring its employees to be courteous to customers and one another is an unlawful infringement on the free speech rights implicit in the protected concerted activity protections in the NLRA. l Reverse unreasonable interpretations of “protected concerted activity.” The NLRB should return to the 2019 Alstate Maintenance interpretation of what does and does not constitute protected concerted activity, including listing eight instances of lawful actions by employers. Injunctive Relief and Worker Organizing Activities. Within the confines of the more reasonable definition of protected concerted activity described above, the NLRB should increase its pursuit of reinstatement injunctions. Firing work- ers engaged in concerted activity has an immediate chilling effect on organizing, but remedies under the NLRA typically come only much later and amount only to backpay. In NLRA section 10(j), Congress empowered the NLRB to obtain temporary injunctions that immediately reinstate workers to their jobs in these circumstances. This provides a more meaningful remedy to the worker and creates a significant deterrent to unfair labor practices, because prompt reinstatement will tend to reinforce the legitimacy of the organizing effort. The NLRB overwhelmingly prevails when pursuing an injunction, succeeding 100 percent of the time in 2020 and 91 percent of the time in 2021. l Increase the use of 10(j) injunctive relief. The NLRB should increase its use of 10(j) and should articulate guidelines for situations in which it intends to seek injunctive relief; the board should delegate authority to pursue such injunctions to the general counsel and the general counsel should establish a policy of considering them expeditiously in all retaliation cases identified by regional offices. Dues-Funded Worker Centers. Under current law, both labor unions and unionized employers must file financial disclosures with DOL on an annual basis to ward off potential fraud and corruption of the sort that has been seen recently within the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). However, worker centers, which have grown in number and influ- ence enormously over the past decade, are not required to file these disclosures. l Investigate worker centers and require financial disclosures. DOL should investigate worker centers that look and act like unions and bring enforcement actions to require them to file the same financial disclosures.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on NLRB order stability and venue procedures, while Project 2025 emphasizes reversing expansive interpretations of protected concerted activity, increasing 10(j) injunctions, and regulating worker centers—topics not addressed in the bill."
— 601 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies The NLRB has issued extreme interpretations of these activities, such as deter- mining that a business’s requiring its employees to be courteous to customers and one another is an unlawful infringement on the free speech rights implicit in the protected concerted activity protections in the NLRA. l Reverse unreasonable interpretations of “protected concerted activity.” The NLRB should return to the 2019 Alstate Maintenance interpretation of what does and does not constitute protected concerted activity, including listing eight instances of lawful actions by employers. Injunctive Relief and Worker Organizing Activities. Within the confines of the more reasonable definition of protected concerted activity described above, the NLRB should increase its pursuit of reinstatement injunctions. Firing work- ers engaged in concerted activity has an immediate chilling effect on organizing, but remedies under the NLRA typically come only much later and amount only to backpay. In NLRA section 10(j), Congress empowered the NLRB to obtain temporary injunctions that immediately reinstate workers to their jobs in these circumstances. This provides a more meaningful remedy to the worker and creates a significant deterrent to unfair labor practices, because prompt reinstatement will tend to reinforce the legitimacy of the organizing effort. The NLRB overwhelmingly prevails when pursuing an injunction, succeeding 100 percent of the time in 2020 and 91 percent of the time in 2021. l Increase the use of 10(j) injunctive relief. The NLRB should increase its use of 10(j) and should articulate guidelines for situations in which it intends to seek injunctive relief; the board should delegate authority to pursue such injunctions to the general counsel and the general counsel should establish a policy of considering them expeditiously in all retaliation cases identified by regional offices. Dues-Funded Worker Centers. Under current law, both labor unions and unionized employers must file financial disclosures with DOL on an annual basis to ward off potential fraud and corruption of the sort that has been seen recently within the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). However, worker centers, which have grown in number and influ- ence enormously over the past decade, are not required to file these disclosures. l Investigate worker centers and require financial disclosures. DOL should investigate worker centers that look and act like unions and bring enforcement actions to require them to file the same financial disclosures. — 602 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Office of Labor-Management Standards Initiative. Currently, the Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS) may investigate potential employer mal- feasance with regard to union funds in the absence of any complaint by a worker or union but may not do the same with regard to potential union malfeasance. If OLMS has evidence that a union may be violating the law based on information available to the agency (such as annual financial disclosure reports, information developed during an audit of a union’s books and records, or information obtained from other government agencies) it should be permitted to open an investigation. It should have the same enforcement tools available for both employers and unions. l Revise investigation standards. The Office of Labor-Management Standards should revise its investigation standards to authorize investigations without receiving a formal complaint. Persuader Rule. During the Obama Administration, DOL created significant regulatory burdens for employers with respect to the advice that employers receive about union activity. As a general matter, employers who hire lawyers or other con- sultants to advise employees about union issues must file disclosure forms with the department, as must the lawyers and consultants themselves. Prior to the Obama Administration, advice provided solely to the employer required no disclosure. The Obama Administration attempted to eliminate this “advice exemption” with a directive known as the “persuader rule,” which was successfully challenged in court. In 2018, the Trump Administration formally rescinded the persuader rule. l DOL should rescind the persuader rule once again should the Biden Administration revive it. Unionizing the Workplace: Card Check vs. Secret Ballot. Under the NLRA, instead of having a secret ballot election about the decision to unionize a workplace, a union may instead collect signed pro-union cards from a majority of the employees it wishes to represent and then ask the employer and National Labor Relations Board for voluntary union recognition. That request gives the employer the option to hold a secret-ballot election or to recognize the union with- out any such election. This “card check” procedure is likely to induce employees to provide their signed cards in ways that do not accurately reflect their true pref- erences—ranging from a desire not to offend the signature requestor to a wish to avoid intimidation and coercion to signing based on false information provided by union organizers. In short, the card check procedure sidesteps many aspects of democratic decision-making that free and fair elections conducted by secret ballot are supposed to accomplish. Notably, the general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has recently proposed an esoteric legal theory that card-check
AI Analysis:
"The bill addresses NLRB order stability and venue procedures, whereas the Project 2025 policy focuses on union recognition, contract bar elimination, and making national employment rules negotiable defaults; they share a labor law context but differ in substantive objectives."
— 603 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies decision-making is required under the law, basing this theory on an old NLRB case, Joy Silk, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected mandatory card-check recognition. l Discard “card check.” Congress should discard “card check” as the basis of union recognition and mandate the secret ballot exclusively. Contract Bar Rule. Although current labor law allows a union to establish itself at a workplace at more or less any time, the calendar for any attempt to decertify a union is considerably more constrained. If a union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent, then employees may not decertify it or substitute another union for it for at least one year under federal law (the “certification bar”). Similarly, when a union reaches a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, it is immune from a decertification election for up to three years (the “contract bar”). A typical consequence of these rules is that employees must often wait four years before they are allowed a chance at decertification. Employees then have only a 45-day window to file a decertification petition; if the employer and union sign a successor contract, then the contract bar comes into play once again—meaning employees with an interest in decertification must wait another three years. l Eliminate the contract bar rule. NLRB should eliminate the contract bar rule so that employees with an interest in decertification have a reasonable chance to achieve their goal. Tailoring National Employment Rules. National employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)21 and the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act22 set out one-size-fits-all “floors” regulating the employment rela- tionship. These substantive worker protections often do not mesh well with the procedural worker protections offered through the NLRA’s collective bargaining process. Unions could play a powerful role in tailoring national employment rules to the needs of a particular workplace if, in unionized workplaces, national rules were treated as negotiable defaults rather than non-negotiable floors. l Congress should amend the NLRA to authorize collective bargaining to treat national employment laws and regulations as negotiable defaults. For example, this reform would allow a union to bless a relaxed overtime trigger (e.g., 45 hours a week, or 80 hours over two weeks) in exchange for firm employer commitments on predictable scheduling. Alternative Policy. While some conservatives (including the author of this chap- ter) believe that it would be a mistake to antagonize unions’ core interests, others
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.