The bill
Countering Threats and Attacks on Our Judges Act
S. 2379, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
Sponsored by
Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]
ID: C001056
Follow the money
The bill
S. 2379, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Justice" section, p. 584-586 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Held at the desk.
November 19, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another brilliant example of congressional theater, designed to make you feel like something is being done while actually accomplishing nothing. Let's dissect this farce.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Countering Threats and Attacks on Our Judges Act (CTAOJA) claims to establish a State judicial threat intelligence and resource center to protect judges and court staff from threats. How noble. In reality, it's just another excuse for politicians to pretend they care about the judiciary while lining their pockets with special interest money.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the State Justice Institute Act of 1984 to authorize awards to "eligible organizations" (read: well-connected nonprofits) to establish a threat intelligence center. This center will supposedly provide technical assistance, training, and resources for judicial security. Because, clearly, what judges need is more bureaucratic red tape and "expertise" from national nonprofit organizations.
The bill also creates a national database for reporting threats and incidents against judicial officers and court staff. Because nothing says "security" like a centralized database of sensitive information just waiting to be hacked or leaked.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Judges, court staff, law enforcement agencies, and the usual suspects in the nonprofit industrial complex will all benefit from this boondoggle. Meanwhile, taxpayers will foot the bill for another ineffective program designed to make politicians look good.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater." It's a feel-good measure that won't actually improve judicial security but will create new opportunities for corruption and waste. The threat intelligence center will likely become a dumping ground for unqualified, well-connected individuals who will produce meaningless reports and recommendations.
The national database will be a treasure trove for hackers and identity thieves. And the "technical assistance" and "training" provided by these "eligible organizations" will be nothing more than a way to funnel money to their friends and allies.
In short, this bill is a perfect example of how politicians use fear-mongering and bureaucratic jargon to justify their own incompetence and corruption. It's a disease, and the only cure is a healthy dose of skepticism and ridicule.
Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
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This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C001088
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ID: M000934
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ID: H001089
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ID: W000802
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ID: S001181
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ID: B001261
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ID: W000790
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ID: R000605
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ID: Y000064
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 32 nodes and 34 connections
Total contributions: $34
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 3 provides financial and technical support to establish a State judicial threat intelligence and resource center, which will coordinate with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to mitigate threats to the safety of State and local judges and court staff.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on enhancing judicial safety through threat intelligence, training, and law enforcement coordination, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on reducing violent crime and strengthening state‑local partnerships, though it does not address the specific FBI reforms, term limits, or speech‑firewall provisions outlined in the policy."
— 551 — Department of Justice The DOJ needs a hard firewall between its legitimate activities (monitoring online activity for potential threats in its mission space, looking at social media profiles for evidence of intent or other criminal activity, etc.) and those in which it must not engage (asking or demanding public forums or publishers to remove material based on the content and/or viewpoints expressed or itself censoring speech). l Streamline the non–law enforcement functions within the FBI, such as its Office of General Counsel, and obtain those services from other offices within the department. The next conservative Administration should eliminate any offices within the FBI that it has the power to eliminate without any action from Congress.34 For example, few Americans know that the FBI maintains a core of approximately 300 attorneys within its Office of General Counsel, an office that has been involved in some of the FBI’s most damaging recent scandals.35 These attorneys are not necessary to the functioning of the FBI in their current capacity. Legal advice should come from attorneys at the DOJ, whether those attorneys are within the Criminal Division, the National Security Division, the Justice Management Division, or the Office of Legal Counsel. Moving legal review outside the FBI would serve as a crucial check on an agency that has recently pushed past legal boundary after legal boundary. Similarly, the FBI does not need its own Office of Congressional Affairs separate and apart from the DOJ Office of Legislative Affairs, nor does it need its own Office of Public Affairs. l Emphasize, fund, and reward field offices while shrinking headquarters staff. While the FBI has essential headquarters functions that must be fulfilled and should likely be fulfilled by a team in Washington, D.C., the next conservative Administration should make a priority of deploying, funding, and rewarding the work of the field offices to the greatest extent possible. The Department of Justice must value badges over bureaucracy, must rethink its internal reporting structures, and should aim to realign the FBI’s resources accordingly. l Submit a legislative proposal to Congress to eliminate the 10-year term for the Director. After J. Edgar Hoover’s decades-long term as FBI Director came to an end following his death in 1972, and in light of oversight conducted by Congress into alleged Intelligence Community and FBI abuses in the 1970s, Congress limited the Director’s tenure to one “ten- year term.”36 The realities of the FBI’s abuses and overreach in recent years demonstrate that further reform is still necessary. — 552 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The Director of the FBI must remain politically accountable to the President in the same manner as the head of any other federal department or agency. To ensure prompt political accountability and to rein in perceived or actual abuses, the next conservative Administration should seek a legislative change to align the FBI Director’s position with those of the heads of all other major departments and agencies. RENEWING THE DEPARTMENT’S FOCUS ON VIOLENT CRIME Despite the DOJ’s pronouncements that violent crime continues to be a top pri- ority, it has increased across the United States. The department’s leadership must make actually reducing violent crime a priority across the United States—and it must do so in partnership with state and local officials in a manner that is tailored to the needs and conditions in those states and localities. Targeting Violent and Career Criminals, Not Parents. The next conserva- tive Administration must ensure that the Department of Justice devotes significant effort to reducing violent crime nationwide. The Attorney General should require all U.S. Attorneys to develop a jurisdictional-specific plan—whenever possible in coordination with state and local law enforcement—to reduce violent crime within each of their districts. Then the Attorney General should hold each U.S. Attorney accountable for achieving actual results. In recent years, federal and state officials have succumbed to calls from anti–law enforcement advocates for so-called criminal justice reform. The pleas- ant-sounding terminology of reform masks the darker reality of this movement, which is one that has supported dismantling effective federal, state, and local law enforcement and stripped away some of the most fundamental tools that law enforcement has long had at its disposal. This campaign is not just ill-advised; it has clearly had real-world consequences in the form of catastrophic increases in crime—particularly violent crime—nationwide. As discussed in the next section, the Department of Justice has a special obligation to restore law and order in such districts.37 Juxtaposed against this increase in violent crime are things like Attorney Gen- eral Merrick Garland’s October 4, 2021, memorandum directing the commitment of significant resources and energies to combating imaginary, politically conve- nient threats of violence toward members of school boards and their staffs during the heat of the Virginia gubernatorial race.38 There was no similar effort to inves- tigate elected officials and other public officers who conspired with outside allies to target and harass parents who were merely exercising their constitutional and statutory rights.39 If we are to continue to have informed and civil dialogue in the United States on issues of public concern, the DOJ must enforce applicable civil rights laws in an even-handed way when citizens’ livelihoods are threatened merely because they have exercised their rights.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 NCSC section emphasize threat intelligence gathering, coordination with law enforcement, and standardized reporting/database systems, but the bill focuses on domestic judicial safety while the NCSC policy addresses foreign counterintelligence and economic espionage threats."
— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasize threat intelligence gathering, monitoring, coordination with law enforcement, and centralized data tracking, though the bill focuses on judicial safety while Project 2025 targets national security counterintelligence."
— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts. — 219 — Intelligence Community The NCSC was created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat Integra- tion Center (TTIC), which later became the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) pursuant to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13354.33 The NCTC was an organization of approximately three dozen detainees from across the U.S. government with a mandate to integrate counterterrorism intelligence and missions, including terrorist screening. Eventually: In November 2014 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established NCSC by combining [the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] with the Center for Security Evaluation, the Special Security Center and the National Insider Threat Task Force, to effectively integrate and align counterintelligence and security mission areas under a single organizational construct. The Director of NCSC serves in support of the DNI’s role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) to develop, implement, oversee and integrate personnel security initiatives throughout the U.S. Government.34 NCSC has added value in such areas as fusing cross-community intelligence for terrorism watchlisting purposes and improving information sharing while carrying roughly half of the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration should focus NCTC on integrative tasks, many of which cannot be carried out elsewhere in the IC, but should not use personnel and resources for redundant analyses that duplicate the work of such other IC entities as the FBI and CIA. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR REFORM Analytical Integrity. The “tradecraft” of intelligence analysis is mostly a col- lection of lessons learned over decades about what works and does not work in a profession whose high-stakes work is performed by thousands but that also bears little outside scrutiny and provides few metrics by which to gauge success or failure on a regular basis. These lessons have accumulated from: l The perceived misuse of intelligence by consumers as was the case with respect to war-related assessments in the Johnson and Bush Administrations; l Failures such as the failures to warn of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the specific threat of 9/11; l Successes in piecing together tactical and often technical puzzles such as estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and l Strategic victories such as anticipating critical geopolitical developments that have been years in the making.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
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To make technical amendments to update statutory references to provisions reclassified to title 34, United States Code, and to correct related technical errors.