Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Sen. Paul, Rand [R-KY]
ID: P000603
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hearings held.
December 11, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
đ Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đ How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another "transparency" bill from the esteemed members of Congress, because what's more transparent than a bunch of self-serving politicians trying to sound like they care about accountability? Let me put on my surgical gloves and dissect this farce.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2025 is a masterclass in Orwellian doublespeak. Its primary objective is to create the illusion of transparency while actually doing nothing to address the real issues with the Federal Reserve's secrecy. The bill's sponsors, led by Senator Paul, claim they want to "audit" the Fed, but what they really mean is that they want to pretend to care about accountability while lining their pockets with campaign donations from special interest groups.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires a full audit of the Federal Reserve System and its banks by the Comptroller General within 12 months. Sounds great, right? Except that this "audit" is just a rehashing of existing procedures with some minor tweaks. The real meat of the bill lies in the technical amendments, which are designed to confuse and obfuscate rather than clarify.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The Federal Reserve, naturally, will be affected by this bill. But let's not forget the real stakeholders: the politicians who sponsored this bill and their donors. Senator Paul, for example, has received significant campaign contributions from libertarian-leaning PACs and individuals who want to dismantle the Fed. Meanwhile, other sponsors like Senator Scott of Florida have ties to the banking industry, which will likely benefit from the bill's watered-down provisions.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a perfect example of legislative theater. It will create a lot of noise about "transparency" and "accountability," but ultimately do nothing to address the real issues with the Federal Reserve's secrecy. The audit provision is a joke, as it won't actually reveal anything meaningful about the Fed's activities. Meanwhile, the technical amendments will likely benefit special interest groups at the expense of the general public.
In short, this bill is a symptom of a larger disease: the corruption and capture of our legislative process by special interests. It's a classic case of "legislative lupus," where politicians pretend to care about accountability while actually serving their own self-interests.
Diagnosis: Legislative Lupus (a.k.a. "Transparency Theater")
Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a strong antiseptic to clean out the corruption and special interests infecting our government.
Related Topics
đ° Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Paul, Rand [R-KY]
Congress 119 ⢠2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
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Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]
ID: S001217
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]
ID: B001243
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]
ID: R000584
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Cruz, Ted [R-TX]
ID: C001098
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]
ID: Y000064
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Barrasso, John [R-WY]
ID: B001261
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Sen. Paul, Rand [R-KY]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 45 nodes and 45 connections
Total contributions: $1,636,310
Top Donors - Sen. Paul, Rand [R-KY]
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 842 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, âImproving Entrepreneursâ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growthâ; Campbell, âThe Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.â 20. David R. Burton, âWhy the SECâs Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,â Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, âStatement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,â July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, âItâs Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Instituteâ; Uyeda, âRemarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.â 22. David R. Burton, âHow DoddâFrank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,â Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, âReforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.â 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, âAccusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,â University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103â155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7bâ3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âCross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924â57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âInterpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,â Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292â45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âMargin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap ParticipantsâCross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818â34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, DoddâFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111â203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âAbout Us,â https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, âTrump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,â New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling âHow Weâll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,â The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, âCFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,â Investorâs Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, âBudget by Program,â in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, âFTE by Program,â in ibid., p. 16.
Introduction
â 842 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, âImproving Entrepreneursâ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growthâ; Campbell, âThe Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.â 20. David R. Burton, âWhy the SECâs Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,â Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, âStatement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,â July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, âItâs Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Instituteâ; Uyeda, âRemarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.â 22. David R. Burton, âHow DoddâFrank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,â Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, âReforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.â 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, âAccusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,â University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103â155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7bâ3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âCross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924â57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âInterpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,â Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292â45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âMargin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap ParticipantsâCross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818â34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, DoddâFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111â203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âAbout Us,â https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, âTrump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,â New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling âHow Weâll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,â The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, âCFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,â Investorâs Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, âBudget by Program,â in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, âFTE by Program,â in ibid., p. 16. â 843 â Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, âCivil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,â in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âBureau Structure,â last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âConsumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,â https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âCivil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,â https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB âshall not exceedâ 12 percent âof the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve SystemâŚin fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.â Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31â32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, âOrder List: 598 U.S.,â February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22â448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, âConsumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,â testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, â7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,â Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to DoddâFrank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See âSection 1071 of the DoddâFrank Actâ in David R. Burton, âImproving Small Business Access to Capital,â Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the DoddâFrank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âAdministrative Adjudication Proceedings,â https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081âRules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).
Introduction
â 741 â Federal Reserve l Appoint a commission to explore the mission of the Federal Reserve, alternatives to the Federal Reserve system, and the nationâs financial regulatory apparatus. l Prevent the institution of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). A CBDC would provide unprecedented surveillance and potential control of financial transactions without providing added benefits available through existing technologies.34 AUTHORâS NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Alexander Salter, Judy Shelton, and Peter St Onge, deserve special mention. The chapter reflects input from all the contributors, however, no views expressed herein should be attributed to any specific individual. â 742 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. For example, Alexander Salter and Daniel Smith (2019) show that Federal Reserve Chairs become more favorable toward monetary discretion once they are confirmed compared to previous stances. Alexander William Salter and Daniel J. Smith, âPolitical Economists or Political Economists? The Role of Political Environments in the Formation of Fed Policy Under Burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke,â Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 71 (February 2019), pp. 1â13. 3. Sarah Binder, âThe Federal Reserve as a âPoliticalâ Institution,â American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, Vol. LXIX, No. 3 (Spring 2016), pp. 47â49, https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/bulletin/ downloads/bulletin_Spring2016.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). See also Charles L. Weise, âPolitical Pressures on Monetary Policy During the US Great Inflation,â American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 33â64, https://www.haverford.edu/sites/default/files/Department/Economics/ Weise_Political_Pressures_on%20Monetary_Policy.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 4. The Federal Reserveâs financial stability mandate is poorly defined. The Fed has taken advantage of the statutory vagueness and proceeded as if it has the authority to engage in these activities, although it is highly questionable whether this is permissible. 5. 12 U.S.C. § 225a, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/225a (accessed January 23, 2023). 6. See Peter J. Boettke, Alexander William Salter, and Daniel J. Smith, Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021). 7. George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, and Lawrence H. White, âHas the Fed Been a Failure?â Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 569â596, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/abs/pii/S0164070412000304 (accessed January 24, 2023). 8. This includes federal programs that automatically provide for adjustments as the economy contracts (for example, unemployment insurance or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). 9. Mark Segal, âFed to Launch Climate Risk Resilience Tests with Big Banks,â ESG Today, September 30, 2022, https://www.esgtoday.com/fed-to-launch-climate-risk-resilience-tests-with-big-banks/ (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. Kenneth J. Robinson, âSavings and Loan Crisis 1980â1989,â Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings-and-loan-crisis (accessed January 23, 2023). 11. Russell Roberts, âGambling with Other Peopleâs Money: How Perverted Incentives Caused the Financial Crisis,â Mercatus Center at George Mason University, May 2010, https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/RUSS-final. pdf (accessed January 24, 2023). 12. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity Programs Balance Sheet Data Series, 2007â2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (accessed January 24, 2023). 13. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, U.S. Treasury Securities Data Series (TREAST), 2004â2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST (accessed January 24, 2023). 14. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mortgage-Backed Securities Data Series (WSHOMCB), 2004â2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB (accessed January 24, 2023). 15. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Total Assets (Less Eliminations from Consolidation) Data Series (WALCL), 2004â2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL (accessed January 24, 2023). 16. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, âS&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/CaseâShiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA),â https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA (accessed January 24, 2023). The CaseâShiller Home Price Index tracks home prices given a constant level of quality. See S&P Dow Jones Indices, âReal Estate: S&P CoreLogic CaseâShiller Home Price Indices,â https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/index-family/indicators/sp- corelogic-case-shiller/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-composite/#overview (accessed January 24, 2023). 17. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, âReal Residential Property Prices for United States (QUSR628BIS),â https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QUSR368BIS (accessed January 24, 2023). 18. Longterm Trends, âHome Price to Income Ratio (US & UK): Home Price to Median Household Income Ratio (US),â https://www.longtermtrends.net/home-price-median-annual-income-ratio/ (accessed January 24, 2023).
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.