The bill
Drone Espionage Act
S. 1809, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Sen. Moody, Ashley [R-FL]
ID: M001244
Follow the money
The bill
S. 1809, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 257-259 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 316.
February 8, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Drone Espionage Act (S 1809) claims to prohibit taking or transmitting video of defense information. Wow, how original. It's not like we've seen this same song and dance before with every other "national security" bill that's actually just a thinly veiled attempt to expand government surveillance powers.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 793 of Title 18, United States Code, by inserting the word "video" after "photographic negative." Oh, what a bold move. I'm sure this will have a profound impact on... well, nothing, really. It's just a cosmetic change to make it seem like they're doing something about national security.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: the military-industrial complex, defense contractors, and the surveillance state apparatus. They'll all be thrilled to know that this bill will further solidify their grip on our civil liberties. Meanwhile, the rest of us will just have to deal with more erosion of our privacy rights.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "legislative lupus" – it's a symptom of a deeper disease: the government's insatiable hunger for power and control. By expanding the definition of "defense information," they're essentially giving themselves carte blanche to prosecute anyone who dares to question their actions or expose their wrongdoing.
In reality, this bill is just a Trojan horse for more surveillance and censorship. It's designed to intimidate whistleblowers, journalists, and anyone else who might dare to challenge the status quo. The real purpose of S 1809 is to further entrench the national security state and silence dissenting voices.
Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Patriot-itis" – a chronic condition characterized by an excessive reliance on fear-mongering, xenophobia, and authoritarianism. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism, critical thinking, and a strong immune system to resist the toxic effects of government propaganda.
Prognosis: This bill will likely pass with flying colors, as our esteemed lawmakers are too busy genuflecting to their corporate overlords to bother with actual oversight or accountability. The rest of us will just have to suffer through another round of "security theater" and pretend that this bill actually makes a difference in the grand scheme of things.
In conclusion, S 1809 is just another example of Congress's boundless creativity when it comes to crafting legislation that serves only to further erode our civil liberties. Bravo, folks. You've managed to create yet another masterpiece of Orwellian doublespeak.
No campaign finance data available for Sen. Moody, Ashley [R-FL]
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C001095
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ID: L000577
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ID: B001305
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ID: M001242
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ID: T000476
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ID: S001208
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ID: W000437
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ID: C001098
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ID: B001243
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ID: T000278
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Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 2 amends 18 U.S.C. § 793 to prohibit taking or transmitting video of defense information, which strengthens protection of defense information and benefits defense contractors by reducing espionage risks.
The prohibition on taking or transmitting video of defense information aids law enforcement and surveillance tech firms by providing a legal basis to prosecute unauthorized video capture of defense information, supporting tools like surveillance cameras and biometric ID used in secure facilities.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section aim to protect sensitive national security information from exploitation by adversaries using modern surveillance technologies, reflecting shared concerns about technological threats from countries like China and Russia."
— 225 — Intelligence Community Cover in the Digital Age. Even in the public domain, it is becoming increas- ingly clear that protecting the identities of undercover intelligence officers is difficult in the digital age.41 The truth is that as our daily activities are conducted predominantly in the digital domain, our antiquated system for providing cover to undercover officers has lagged woefully behind the threat from foreign adversaries. The DIA, CIA, and FBI are increasingly aware of this threat and are devoting resources to the problem. Their back-office infrastructure, however, is such that they are still using methods for providing cover from decades past that put valuable intelligence officers at unnecessary risk. How intelligence officers and their fami- lies are taught to use smartphones and social media, travel, conduct banking, and take and share pictures—even how and when they are paid—can make it difficult to protect identities.42 Legends, fake backstories, and identities are often weak, incomplete, and unable to stand up to a basic Google search.43 Officers operat- ing under nonofficial cover are offered even less protection and training to help them succeed. In addition, ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) techniques being refined by technologies emanating from the regimes in China and Russia will continue to be highly challenging for intelligence officers. An incoming Administration will need to double down on resourcing and training so that members of the IC will have the expertise they need to operate clandestinely (and successfully) against hard targets. Privacy Shield. For many years, the European Union (EU) has tried to force U.S. companies operating in Europe to follow its data privacy regulations. Misleading claims in the 2013 Snowden leaks destroyed the initial Safe Harbor Framework44 that allowed American companies to transfer data across the Atlantic; its succes- sor, the Privacy Shield Framework,45 was struck down by European courts on the grounds that it provides insufficient protections for EU citizens against hypothet- ical U.S. government surveillance. Those same European courts exempted the intelligence services of EU member states from the standards applied to the U.S., suggesting that trade protectionism may be the real motive behind data privacy regulations. In 2022, the Biden Administration negotiated a new agreement, the Trans-At- lantic Data Privacy Framework,46 intended to withstand European legal challenges. Given the fate of its predecessors, it is not certain that it will survive. Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activi- ties,”47 implements this new framework by attempting to align signals intelligence collection practices with European privacy regulations. At most, the executive order’s changes will be helpful support for the framework in future European litigation; at worst, they could throw sand in the gears of important intelli- gence programs. An incoming conservative President should reset Europe’s expectations. Brus- sels has always arbitraged the difference between being a military ally against, for — 226 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise example, Russia and conducting a full-blown trade conflict with the United States. Restrictions on data exports have been part of the trade conflict, but now they could seriously harm our military and intelligence capabilities. Moreover, restrictions on U.S. intelligence collection hurt the Europeans themselves, especially as the United States shares unprecedented amounts of intelligence on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with Europeans.48 Europe is telling the United States to meet intelligence oversight standards that no European country meets. At the same time, exports of data to China are unexamined and (so far) free from legal challenges. That violates World Trade Organization agreements as an arbitrary and discriminatory data protection stan- dard. It is a betrayal by a nominally allied jurisdiction. European court rulings that struck down prior data privacy frameworks were grounded not in constitutional law but in a treaty among European nations. If the EU accepted an international agreement that data may flow to the United States under a more reasonable stan- dard than the one adopted by the court, that interpretation would be binding, at least as a gloss on the earlier treaty. The United States has never seriously pushed back against the EU; now is the time. An incoming President should ask for an immediate study of the implemen- tation of Executive Order 14086 and suspend any provisions that unduly burden intelligence collection. At the same time, in negotiations with the Europeans, the United States should make clear that the continued sharing of intelligence with EU member states depends on successful resolution of this issue within the first two years of a President’s term. It is time for a real solution, not the 30 years of stopgaps imposed by Brussels. President’s Daily Brief (PDB). An incoming conservative President should make clear what the President’s Daily Brief is and is not. The PDB should be for the President specifically, with a much narrower distribution and addressing areas of strategic concern. During the transition, the future National Security Advisor, along with the DNI, should conduct a review of current PDB recipients and deter- mine which should remain recipients when the President’s term begins. Instead of being used as the statement of record for the agencies, the PDB often misses the areas of interest for Presidents and their senior advisers. The President should want the PDB to focus on providing the information needed for the often imperfect and complex decisions that a President needs to make, which should always be based on the best intelligence that can be gathered. Where consensus and agreement are possible, an IC-coordinated product is excellent, but insights provided by properly channeled dissent can lead a President to ask relevant ques- tions of his DNI and IC. A future DNI determines the PDB briefer based on recommendations made by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration (MI). His- torically, briefers have come from the CIA, but a future President and DNI should
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on enhancing national security by criminalizing the transmission of video of defense information, which aligns broadly with defense and security objectives. However, it does not directly address the specific Project 2025 DoD priorities such as nuclear modernization, counterterrorism posture, economic warfare, or the 'name and shame' approach."
— 123 — Department of Defense 3. Employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding the names of entities that target democratic processes and international norms available in a transparent manner. 4. Work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors. 5. Maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism posture against threats to the homeland. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Nuclear deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security, as it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. Every operational plan relies on the assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first acquired nuclear weapons, Administrations of both parties have pursued a strategy designed to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employ- ment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. Today, however, America’s ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing nuclear threats posed by our adversaries. l China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. to learn how to deter two nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first time in its history. l Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine. l North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities. l Iran is inching closer to nuclear capability. Meanwhile, all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next Admin- istration will need to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad while updating our strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges presented by a more threatening nuclear environment. Needed Reforms l Prioritize nuclear modernization. All components of the nuclear triad are far beyond their intended lifetimes and will need to be replaced over the next — 124 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise decade. This effort is required for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear triad—and will be the bare minimum needed to maintain U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence. 1. Accelerate the timelines of critical modernization programs including the Sentinel missile, Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, B-21 bomber, and F-35 Dual Capable Aircraft. 2. Reject any congressional proposals that would further extend the service lives of U.S. capabilities such as the Minuteman III ICBM. 3. Ensure sufficient funding for warhead life extension programs (LEP), including the B61-12, W80-4, W87-1 Mod, and W88 Alt 370. l Develop the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N). In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed restoring the SLCM-N to help fill a growing gap in U.S. nonstrategic capabilities and improve deterrence against limited nuclear attack.39 The Biden Administration canceled this program in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).40 The next President should support and accelerate funding for development of the SLCM-N with the goal of deployment by the end of the decade. l Account for China’s nuclear expansion. To ensure its ability to deter both Russia and the growing Chinese nuclear threat, the U.S. will need more than the bare minimum of nuclear modernization. President Biden’s 2022 NPR described the problem but proposed no recommendations to restore or maintain nuclear deterrence. 1. Consider procuring more modernized nuclear systems (such as the Sentinel missile or LRSO) than currently planned. 2. Improve the ability of the U.S. to utilize the triad’s upload capacity in case of a crisis. 3. Review what capabilities in addition to the SLCM-N (for example, nonstrategic weapons or new warhead designs) are needed to deter the unique Chinese threat. l Restore the nuclear infrastructure. The United States must restore its necessary nuclear infrastructure so that it is capable of producing and maintaining nuclear weapons.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 excerpt concern Department of Justice enforcement of federal criminal statutes under Title 18, but they address distinct subjects—espionage/defense information versus election-related voter suppression—resulting only a tangential connection."
— 563 — Department of Justice Voter fraud includes unlawful practices concerning voter registration and ballot correction. When state legislatures are silent as to procedures for absentee ballot curing or provide specific rules governing that curing, neither counties nor courts may create a cure right where one does not exist, may not modify the law on curing, and certainly cannot engage in creating consent orders with the force of law that are inconsistent with the orders of other similarly situated counties. The DOJ has ceded substantial discretion concerning voter suppression to the Civil Rights Division. Since the Bush Administration, DOJ leadership has determined that using the Election Crimes Branch to prosecute fraudulent voter registration, including mail-in ballot fraud, was too politically costly.78 The Crim- inal Division’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses handbook advised that schemes that violated equal protection constituted “voter suppression” prosecut- able under 18 U.S. Code § 241 as part of the guidelines for which the department’s criminal prosecutors were trained.79 State-based investigations of election crimes are supposed to be referred to the Public Integrity Section for review. Historically, 18 U.S. Code § 241 (conspiracy against rights) was used as a basis for investigating state officials whose statements or orders violated the equal protection rights of voters or deliberately misinformed voters concerning the eligibility of their ballots. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has formalized the Civil Rights Divi- sion’s (as opposed to the Criminal Division’s) jurisdiction over 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions. The Criminal Division is no longer involved in consultation or review of 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations.80 The Criminal Division has accordingly advised states that “[i]n the case of a crime of violence or intimida- tion,” they should “call 911 immediately and before contacting federal authorities” because “[s]tate and local police have primary jurisdiction over polling places,”81 despite clearly applicable federal law. This is a mistake. With respect to the 2020 presidential election, there were no DOJ investigations of the appropriateness or lawfulness of state election guidance. Consider the state of Pennsylvania. The Secretary of State sent guidance to the counties stating that: This revised guidance addresses the issuance, voting and examination of provisional ballots under the Election Code. Provisional ballots were originally mandated by section 302 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 77 of 2019 went into effect for the 2020 Primary election. Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 12 of 2020 go into effect for the first time on November 3, 2020.82 HAVA, however, mandates provisional ballots only for eligible voters who were not on a state’s voter registration list.83 It does not apply to those who registered for mail-in voting but whose ballots were rejected due to some form of spoliation. — 564 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Pennsylvania Act 12 (amended in 2020) does not authorize curing by providing provisional ballots for mail-in voters whose ballots were rejected. Act 12 requires, as part of the mail-in application process, an affidavit that: [The elector] shall not be eligible to vote at a polling place on election day unless the elector brings the elector’s mail-in ballot to the elector’s polling place, remits the ballot and the envelope containing the declaration of the elector to the judge of elections to be spoiled and signs a statement subject to the penalties under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities) to the same effect.84 The law in Pennsylvania clearly states that no county may affirmatively provide provisional ballots: The mail-in voter must vote in person and sign a new affidavit. In the 2020 election, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that “the Election Code contains no requirement that voters whose ballots are deemed inadequately verified be apprised of this fact. Thus, unlike in-person voters, mail-in or absentee voters are not provided any opportunity to cure perceived defects in a timely man- ner.”85 Given the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s use of guidance to circumvent state law, the Pennsylvania Secretary of State should have been (and still should be) investigated and prosecuted for potential violations of 18 U.S. Code § 241. Investigations and prosecutions under 18 U.S. Code § 241 are currently within the jurisdictional oversight of the Civil Rights Division, not the Criminal Division.86 Only by moving authority for 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions back to the Criminal Division will the rule of law be appropriately enforced. Rejecting Third-Party Requests for Politically Motivated Investigations or Prosecutions. The DOJ should reject demands from third-party groups that ask it to threaten politically motivated investigation or prosecution of those engag- ing in lawful and, in many cases, constitutionally protected activity. By acceding to such demands, the department risks diminishing its credibility with the American public. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that communications between govern- ment officials and third-party groups are generally unprotected by privilege and subject to disclosure, whether via subpoena to the third-party group or via request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. These communications can even be made public voluntarily by the third-party group. A recent example illustrates the risks posed by such activity. On October 4, 2021, Attorney General Merrick Garland issued a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, calling on the FBI to work with each U.S. Attorney to “con- vene meetings with federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial leaders” to discuss strategies for addressing “threats against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff.”87 Subsequent reporting and investigation revealed that the
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.