The bill
Kids Online Safety Act
S. 1748, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
Sponsored by
Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]
ID: B001243
Follow the money
The bill
S. 1748, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Trade Commission" section, p. 908-910 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
August 4, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The full Senate will vote on whether to pass the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Kids Online Safety Act (S. 1748) – A Cynical Analysis**
**Main Purpose & Objectives** Presented as a noble crusade to shield children from the horrors of the internet, the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) is, in reality, a legislative Band-Aid slapped onto a gaping wound of parental neglect and corporate greed. Its stated goal—forcing platforms to exercise a “duty of care” to prevent harm to minors—sounds virtuous until you realize it’s less about protecting kids and more about politicians looking like they’re doing something while avoiding the harder truth: no law can fix what happens when parents hand a tablet to a toddler and walk away. The bill’s true objective? To create the illusion of action while shifting blame from caregivers to tech companies—because it’s easier to sue Meta than to admit Junior’s 8-hour TikTok binge is your fault.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** KOSA imposes a vague, subjective “duty of care” on “covered platforms” (social media, gaming, streaming services) to prevent and mitigate harms like compulsive usage, sexual exploitation, and mental health disorders. It mandates default safety settings for minors, parental controls, transparent algorithmic disclosures, and annual audits. Crucially, it empowers state attorneys general to enforce the law—a provision ripe for ideological weaponization, allowing attorneys general in red states to target content they deem “harmful” (think: LGBTQ+ resources, reproductive health info) under the guise of child safety. The bill also mandates an age verification study—a polite way of admitting they have no idea how to actually verify age without destroying privacy or creating a surveillance state. Notably, it exempts email, broadband providers, and educational institutions—because apparently, harm only happens on platforms that make money, not the ones that actually host predators.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Tech Companies:** Forced to spend billions on compliance, age-gating, and content moderation—while being blamed for societal failures they didn’t create. - **Parents:** Given a false sense of security, encouraged to outsource parenting to algorithms and federal mandates. - **Minors:** Subjected to infantilizing restrictions, privacy-invasive age checks, and potential censorship of vital information under vague “harm” standards. - **State AGs:** Handed a new tool for culture-war crusades, able to sue platforms over ideological disagreements masked as child protection. - **Lobbyists & Consultants:** Already salivating at the compliance-industrial complex this will spawn. - **The Public:** Treated like idiots who believe a Senate bill can override developmental psychology, capitalist incentives, and the fact that kids will always find a way around the rules.
**Potential Impact & Implications** KOSA will not make children safer. It will, however: - Spark costly litigation as platforms challenge vague standards and overbroad enforcement. - Accelerate the balkanization of the internet, with platforms adopting state-by-state compliance nightmares. - Chill access to legitimate health, identity, and support resources for vulnerable youth, all in the name of “safety.” - Distract from real solutions: digital literacy, parental engagement, and holding *actual* predators accountable—not punishing platforms for hosting content someone’s kid didn’t like. In short, it’s a feel-good placebo for a society that refuses to admit its own role in the problem. The real disease isn’t online harms—it’s our collective refusal to parent, regulate meaningfully, or tolerate complexity. KOSA treats the symptom while ignoring the cancer. And like most legislative placebos, it’ll come with nasty side effects we won’t admit were predictable.
Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: B001277
Top Contributors
20
ID: T000250
Top Contributors
20
ID: S000148
Top Contributors
24
ID: K000367
Top Contributors
25
ID: H000273
Top Contributors
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ID: K000377
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ID: H001076
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20
ID: H001046
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71
ID: S001194
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44
ID: M001198
Top Contributors
24
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 47 nodes and 55 connections
Total contributions: $55
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 6 harmed.
Section 103 imposes new requirements on covered platforms, including social media services and online platforms, to provide safeguards for minors, which may increase costs and regulatory burdens for big tech platforms.
Section 103(h) mentions the security of a platform or service, and Section 105(f) discusses privacy safeguards, which may relate to cybersecurity.
Section 103(d) prohibits the advertising of tobacco products to minors.
Section 103(d) prohibits the advertising of alcohol to minors.
Section 105(e) mentions video streaming services, which may relate to entertainment streaming.
Section 103(d) prohibits the advertising of gambling to minors.
+ 2 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The Kids Online Safety Act directly implements the Project 2025 policy objective by expanding FTC authority to protect children online through duty-of-care requirements, parental consent mechanisms, and enforcement against unfair trade practices involving minors, addressing the limitations of COPPA highlighted in the policy."
— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority.
AI Analysis:
"The Kids Online Safety Act aligns strongly with Project 2025's FTC policy objective of protecting children online by expanding the FTC's enforcement authority, addressing harms from platform contracts with minors, and advocating for parental consent and oversight—core themes in both documents."
— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority. — 876 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Other conservatives are more skeptical concerning the effect of online expe- rience on the young, comparing the concern about social media to concern about video games, television, and bicycle safety. They point out, as does Cato fellow Jeffrey A. Singer, that the psychiatric profession has yet to designate “internet addiction” or “social media addiction” as a mental disorder in the authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR).21 These con- servatives also maintain that calling for regulation undermines conservatives’ calls for parental empowerment on education or vaccines as well as personal parenting responsibility. In addition, some of the methods used to regulate children’s internet access pose the risk of unintended harms. For instance, age verification regulations would inevitably increase the amount of data collection involved, increasing privacy con- cerns. Users would have to submit to platforms proof of their age, which raises the risks of data breach or illegitimate data usage by the platforms or bad actors. Limited-government conservatives would prefer the FTC play an educational role instead. That might include best practices or educational programs to empower parents online. Antitrust Enforcement. As is evidenced by a relentless focus on bringing Big Tech lawsuits, state attorneys general (AGs) are far more responsive to their con- stituents than is the FTC. Such a “boots on the ground” approach would benefit the FTC enormously. Practically, this would mean establishing a distinct role in the FTC Chairman’s office focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, D.C., to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth. FTC regional offices are substantially more in touch with local issues. Over the past few decades, the reach and influence of regional offices has shrunk dramati- cally. The FTC should consider returning authority to these offices. Some conservatives however are less supportive of this idea. Conservative enthusiasm for the idea of adding regional FTC offices to the states is a break from the majority conservative position. Endorsing the federal government as a pre- mier job creator runs counter to decades of conservative opinion that holds that New Deal agencies and subsequent government bodies should never have been created in the first place, and that their red tape and interference is a dominant cause of economic inefficiency. Republicans used to seethe when Democrats tried to move federal offices into the states. In the early 1990s, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich fumed about Senator Robert Byrd’s campaign to transfer certain national intelligence facilities to West Virginia, calling it a “pure abuse of power.” Some contributors to this chapter would remind conservatives that the unseen mechanics of redistribution—by which taxpayer money paid to state employees is taken from taxpayers nationwide—is a drag on the economy of the entire country. Many conservatives fear that it would be impossible to uproot or even prune back
AI Analysis:
"KOSA shares Project 2025's focus on increasing platform accountability, transparency, and user empowerment, particularly regarding content moderation and protecting minors online. However, KOSA centers on child safety and duty of care rather than Section 230 reform or viewpoint-based discrimination, which are core to the Project 2025 FCC section."
— 849 — Federal Communications Commission Big Tech, and it should look to Section 230 and the Consolidated Reporting Act as potential sources of authority.19 In acting, the FCC could require these platforms to provide greater specificity regarding their terms of service, and it could hold them accountable by prohibiting actions that are inconsistent with those plain and particular terms. Within this framework, Big Tech should be required to offer a transparent appeals process that allows for the challenging of pretextual takedowns or other actions that violate clear rules of the road. l Support legislation that scraps Section 230’s current approach. The FCC should work with Congress on more fundamental Section 230 reforms that go beyond interpreting its current terms. Congress should do so by ensuring that Internet companies no longer have carte blanche to censor protected speech while maintaining their Section 230 protections. As part of those reforms, the FCC should work with Congress to ensure that antidiscrimination provisions are applied to Big Tech—including “back-end” companies that provide hosting services and DDoS protection. Reforms that prohibit discrimination against core political viewpoints are one way to do this and would track the approach taken in a social media law passed in Texas, which was upheld on appeal in late 2022 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.20 In all of this, Congress can make certain points clear. It could focus legislation on dominant, general-use platforms rather than specialized ones. This could include excluding comment sections in online publications, specialized message boards, or communities within larger platforms that self-moderate. Similarly, Congress could legislate in a way that does not require any platform to host illegal content; child pornography; terrorist speech; and indecent, profane, or similar categories of speech that Congress has previously carved out. l Support efforts to empower consumers. The FCC and Congress should work together to formulate rules that empower consumers. Section 230 itself codifies “user control” as an express policy goal and encourages Internet platforms to provide tools that will “empower” users to engage in their own content moderation. As Congress takes up reforms, it should therefore be mindful of how we can return to Internet users the power to control their online experiences. One idea is to empower consumers to choose their own content filters and fact checkers, if any. The FCC should also work with Congress to ensure stronger protections against young children accessing social media sites despite age restrictions that generally prohibit their use of these sites.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.