Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes on Imported Goods Act of 2025
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Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
ID: S001181
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Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes on Imported Goods Act of 2025" is a cleverly crafted title designed to deceive the gullible masses. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to limit the President's authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The sponsors, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Wyden, and Mr. Kaine, are trying to restrict the President's ability to impose duties and tariff-rate quotas on imported goods. But don't be fooled – this is not about protecting Americans from tax hikes; it's about shielding special interest groups and corporations from accountability.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 203 of IEEPA by inserting a new subsection (c), which excludes the authority to impose duties and tariff-rate quotas on imported goods. This change is a cleverly worded attempt to handcuff the President's ability to respond to economic emergencies or unfair trade practices. The language is deliberately vague, allowing for creative interpretations that will undoubtedly benefit the bill's true beneficiaries – corporate lobbyists and their congressional puppets.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved in this legislative charade:
* Corporate interests: Companies with significant imports will rejoice at the prospect of reduced tariffs and quotas. * Lobbyists: The real architects behind this bill, who have cleverly manipulated the language to serve their clients' interests. * Congressional sponsors: Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Wyden, and Mr. Kaine, who are either naive or complicit in this farce.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease – the corrupting influence of corporate money on our legislative process. By limiting the President's authority under IEEPA, Congress is effectively surrendering its constitutional duty to regulate commerce and protect American interests. The consequences will be:
* Increased trade deficits * Job losses in industries affected by unfair trade practices * Weakened national security due to reduced economic leverage
In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in legislative deception. It's a cleverly crafted attempt to serve corporate interests while masquerading as a protectionist measure. The sponsors and lobbyists behind this bill should be ashamed of themselves – but they won't be, because they're too busy counting their campaign contributions and laughing all the way to the bank.
Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with symptoms of corruption, cowardice, and greed. Prognosis: Poor, unless the American people wake up and demand better from their elected officials.
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đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Donor Network - Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 795 — Trade against trade cheaters who dump products below cost into American markets or unfairly subsidize their exports. In fact, much of the cheating that does take place in the global trading arena can be addressed through such antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases. Within the West Wing itself, it is equally critical that the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and the Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) all be aligned on trade policy. During the Trump Administration, with the notable exception of the President’s third National Security Adviser, Robert O’Brien, and third CEA Chairman, Tyler Goodspeed, this regrettably was not the case. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, the Secretary of Defense plays a key role in trade policy, at least when it comes to advancing Section 232 cases. Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,40 the President has the authority, through tariffs or other means, to reduce imports from other countries “if the President determines that such reduction or elimination would threaten to impair the national security.” As a practical matter, the Secretary of Commerce spearheads any Section 232 cases, but in order to proceed with a Section 232 case, Commerce must obtain signoff from the Secretary of Defense. When President Trump wanted to implement steel and aluminum tariffs, he had a willing servant in Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. However, Secretary of Defense James Mattis resisted. Mattis simply did not understand a key tenet of the Trump Administration: Economic security is also national security. Without vibrant steel and aluminum industries, it will be difficult for America to provide the Pentagon with the kind of weapons it needs to defend the homeland. CONCLUSION A Harvard professor once told me during my doctoral thesis days that “if I tell you how it is, I’ve told you why it can’t change.” Despite the obvious exploitation of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers by the international trading system and Communist Chinese aggression, powerful political forces none- theless exist that profit from the status quo. The stark lesson of this chapter is that America gets fleeced every day in the global marketplace both by a predatory Communist China and by an institution- ally unfair and nonreciprocal WTO. Addressing these two challenges would go a long way toward restoring American greatness, both economically and militarily. Ignoring these two challenges will simply continue the parasitic draining of the American manufacturing and defense industrial base. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. However, the author would particularly like to thank Joanna Miller for her dedicated work and significant contribution to the chapter. — 796 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE Kent Lassman Trade policy is about more than goods and services: It is a statement of Amer- ican identity. Our trade policy choices reveal America’s values and where we put our trust. Do we place our trust in Washington elites to revive a declining coun- try, or do we trust in America’s tradition of entrepreneurs and everyday people blazing new trails? Do we follow China by copying its strong-arm trade policies, or do we lead China and the rest of the world by forging our own path? Our trade policy decisions will tell you what we Americans really think of ourselves. A CONSERVATIVE VISION FOR TRADE The policy recommendations in this chapter reflect a belief in the strength of America’s founding institutions, its economy, and its people. They are based on data showing decades of American progress with all that this implies. They also reflect a realistic understanding of the fact that trade policy has limited capabilities and is vulnerable to mission creep and regulatory capture. Policymakers should be modest about what they can accomplish through trade policy and need to exercise constant vigilance against abuses. For example: l Trade can lower consumer prices for ordinary Americans and open new markets for American businesses and their goods. l Trade can help American workers and businesses to specialize in what they do best—which is how they outcompete the rest of the world in technology, manufacturing, agriculture, and other areas. l In foreign policy, trade can help to preserve and strengthen alliances. At the same time, sound trade policy requires humility. It is not a panacea for every policy problem. Trade policy cannot favor one sector over another without causing tradeoffs that outweigh the benefits.41 Neither free trade nor protectionism will create jobs. Trade affects the types of jobs people have, but it has no long-run effect on the number of jobs. Labor force size is tied to population size more than anything else. The American people are smart and sophisticated enough to hear these truths. It is not just conservatives who overestimate the power of trade policy. Recent progressive attempts to use trade policy to advance whole-of-government initia- tives on climate, equity, and other issues will fail for the same reason that a hammer cannot turn a screw: It is the wrong tool for the job. Conservatives should be sim- ilarly skeptical of recent attempts on the Right to use progressive trade policy to punish political opponents, remake manufacturing, or accomplish other objectives
Introduction
— 795 — Trade against trade cheaters who dump products below cost into American markets or unfairly subsidize their exports. In fact, much of the cheating that does take place in the global trading arena can be addressed through such antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases. Within the West Wing itself, it is equally critical that the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and the Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) all be aligned on trade policy. During the Trump Administration, with the notable exception of the President’s third National Security Adviser, Robert O’Brien, and third CEA Chairman, Tyler Goodspeed, this regrettably was not the case. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, the Secretary of Defense plays a key role in trade policy, at least when it comes to advancing Section 232 cases. Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,40 the President has the authority, through tariffs or other means, to reduce imports from other countries “if the President determines that such reduction or elimination would threaten to impair the national security.” As a practical matter, the Secretary of Commerce spearheads any Section 232 cases, but in order to proceed with a Section 232 case, Commerce must obtain signoff from the Secretary of Defense. When President Trump wanted to implement steel and aluminum tariffs, he had a willing servant in Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. However, Secretary of Defense James Mattis resisted. Mattis simply did not understand a key tenet of the Trump Administration: Economic security is also national security. Without vibrant steel and aluminum industries, it will be difficult for America to provide the Pentagon with the kind of weapons it needs to defend the homeland. CONCLUSION A Harvard professor once told me during my doctoral thesis days that “if I tell you how it is, I’ve told you why it can’t change.” Despite the obvious exploitation of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers by the international trading system and Communist Chinese aggression, powerful political forces none- theless exist that profit from the status quo. The stark lesson of this chapter is that America gets fleeced every day in the global marketplace both by a predatory Communist China and by an institution- ally unfair and nonreciprocal WTO. Addressing these two challenges would go a long way toward restoring American greatness, both economically and militarily. Ignoring these two challenges will simply continue the parasitic draining of the American manufacturing and defense industrial base. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. However, the author would particularly like to thank Joanna Miller for her dedicated work and significant contribution to the chapter.
Introduction
— 802 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise response to four rounds of tariffs plus an attempted Phase One agreement. The Biden Administration has left the tariffs in place and is expanding them to pursue progressive policy goals. The first order of business for a new Administration that is focused on American workers and consumers is to repeal all tariffs enacted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 196251 and Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.52 The President can do this unilaterally, and Congress can do it through legislation. The second order of business requires Congress to pass legislation repealing Sections 232, 201, and 301. The U.S. Constitution places all taxing authority with Congress53 and none with the President. Congress used those provisions of law to delegate some of its taxing authority to the President because it was having trouble passing “clean” tariff legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. Unless and until this constitutional question about delegation is addressed, important reforms are available to the next Congress and the next President. Congress faced a problem of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s. As a whole, Members generally wanted to lower tariffs, but few individual Members were will- ing to remove tariffs that benefited special interests in their districts. Trade bills were invariably watered down through amendments and logrolling. The thinking was that the President, whose constituency is the entire nation, would be less prone to special-interest pleading than Members of Congress would be, so Congress del- egated some of its tariff-making authority to the President in 1962 and 1974 trade legislation. Delegating tariff-making might have worked in the short run, but in the long run, it was both constitutionally dubious and ripe for abuse. That came to pass in 2018. The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, invoked in 2018 against Canada, Europe, and other allies on national security grounds, raised car prices by an aver- age of $250 per vehicle and gave America the world’s highest steel prices. They also harmed the construction, canned food and beverage, and other metal-us- ing industries. While this may have benefited the steel industry itself, each steel job saved cost an average of $650,000 per year that had been taken from elsewhere in the econo- my.54 That is no way to strengthen American manufacturing. The New York Federal Reserve estimated in 2019 that the Section 301 China tariffs cost the average house- hold $831 per year,55 a figure that has likely increased with inflation. The new tariffs have a clear record of failure—as conservative economists almost unanimously warned would be the case. Job number one for the next Administration is to return to sensible trade policies and eliminate the destruc- tive Trump–Biden tariffs. Strengthening American Manufacturing. The decline of American manu- facturing is a common political trope in both parties, typically invoked before a call for more government intervention. This narrative has several problems. One is that — 803 — Trade American manufacturing output is currently at an all-time high. The record was not set during World War II and not during the 1950s boom. Output did not peak when manufacturing employment peaked in 1979 or during the Reagan economic revival in the 1980s. It is actually higher now than it has ever been. American manufacturing is buoyant because each manufacturing worker’s pro- ductivity is also at an all-time high. The key to prosperity is doing more with less. The next President should ignore special interests and populist ideologues who want government to do the opposite through industrial policy, trade protectionism, and other failed progressive policies. It takes surprisingly few people to achieve America’s record-high manufac- turing output—currently about 13 million people out of a workforce of more than 160 million, compared to the 1979 peak of 19.5 million people out of a workforce of 104 million.56 Productivity growth has freed the time and talents of millions of people for other, additional uses. The belief that manufacturing has to shrink for services to grow is the zero- sum fallacy against which sensible economists often warn. It is anathema to the optimism, hope, and confidence that are the natural birthright of conservatives. Growing productivity enables more output of both manufacturing and services. That is why America continues to have sustained booms and record-setting real GDP despite the long-run decline in manufacturing employment. Economists distinguish between two types of growth: extensive and intensive. Extensive growth is the Soviet and Chinese model for manufacturing: If you have more people use more resources, they will create more output. Extensive growth is doing more with more; intensive growth is doing more with less. That is where America’s superpower lies. The story of American manufacturing is one of intensive growth dating back to our agricultural origins. Conservative leaders should draw on this history to position America for continued success. With intensive growth, it is not manufacturing or services; it is manufacturing and services. Retaliatory Tariffs. Raising tariffs on another country almost always invites retaliatory tariffs against the U.S. The latter tend to be directed at politically sen- sitive American exports. Retaliatory tariffs by both China and American allies in response to the 2018 steel tariffs were targeted primarily at American agriculture. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, those tariffs cost farmers $27 billion with losses concentrated particularly in heartland states.57 Retaliatory tariffs also targeted U.S. industries that were not protected by tar- iffs. Many imports become inputs into U.S. manufacturing. The motorcycle maker Harley-Davidson was already facing higher production costs as domestic steel producers raised their prices to accommodate the new steel tariff. A retaliatory tariff on its motorcycles imposed by the European Union further raised its prices and hurt its export business. Harm to such innocent bystanders was another unin- tended (though foreseen) consequence.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.