The bill
Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes on Imported Goods Act of 2025
S. 151, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.
Sponsored by
Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
ID: S001181
Follow the money
The bill
S. 151, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 828-830 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
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📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes on Imported Goods Act of 2025" is a cleverly crafted title designed to deceive the gullible masses. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to limit the President's authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The sponsors, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Wyden, and Mr. Kaine, are trying to restrict the President's ability to impose duties and tariff-rate quotas on imported goods. But don't be fooled – this is not about protecting Americans from tax hikes; it's about shielding special interest groups and corporations from accountability.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 203 of IEEPA by inserting a new subsection (c), which excludes the authority to impose duties and tariff-rate quotas on imported goods. This change is a cleverly worded attempt to handcuff the President's ability to respond to economic emergencies or unfair trade practices. The language is deliberately vague, allowing for creative interpretations that will undoubtedly benefit the bill's true beneficiaries – corporate lobbyists and their congressional puppets.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved in this legislative charade:
* Corporate interests: Companies with significant imports will rejoice at the prospect of reduced tariffs and quotas. * Lobbyists: The real architects behind this bill, who have cleverly manipulated the language to serve their clients' interests. * Congressional sponsors: Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Wyden, and Mr. Kaine, who are either naive or complicit in this farce.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease – the corrupting influence of corporate money on our legislative process. By limiting the President's authority under IEEPA, Congress is effectively surrendering its constitutional duty to regulate commerce and protect American interests. The consequences will be:
* Increased trade deficits * Job losses in industries affected by unfair trade practices * Weakened national security due to reduced economic leverage
In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in legislative deception. It's a cleverly crafted attempt to serve corporate interests while masquerading as a protectionist measure. The sponsors and lobbyists behind this bill should be ashamed of themselves – but they won't be, because they're too busy counting their campaign contributions and laughing all the way to the bank.
Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with symptoms of corruption, cowardice, and greed. Prognosis: Poor, unless the American people wake up and demand better from their elected officials.
Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 28 nodes and 21 connections (45 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $72,850
Showing top 13 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 17 helped.
Section 2(c)(1) excludes the President's authority to impose duties or tariff-rate quotas on imported goods under IEEPA, which would benefit oil and gas importers by preventing tariffs on foreign crude oil, natural gas, or refined products.
Section 2(c)(1) removes the President's power to impose duties or tariff-rate quotas on imported articles, which would benefit coal importers by preventing tariffs on foreign coal entering the U.S.
Section 2(c)(1) blocks the President from imposing duties or tariff-rate quotas on imported goods, which could benefit renewable energy importers (e.g., solar panels, wind turbine components) by avoiding tariffs on foreign-made equipment.
Section 2(c)(1) removes the President's authority to impose duties or tariff-rate quotas on imported goods, which could benefit electric utilities that import fuel (coal, natural gas, oil) or equipment by avoiding tariffs on such imports.
Section 2(c)(1) excludes the President's authority to impose duties or tariff-rate quotas on imported goods, which would benefit big-box retailers that rely on imported merchandise (e.g., electronics, apparel, home goods) by preventing tariffs on such imports.
Section 2(c)(1) prevents the President from imposing duties or tariff-rate quotas on imported articles, which could benefit nuclear power importers (e.g., uranium, fuel assemblies, reactor components) by avoiding tariffs on foreign nuclear materials.
+ 11 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 795 — Trade against trade cheaters who dump products below cost into American markets or unfairly subsidize their exports. In fact, much of the cheating that does take place in the global trading arena can be addressed through such antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases. Within the West Wing itself, it is equally critical that the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and the Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) all be aligned on trade policy. During the Trump Administration, with the notable exception of the President’s third National Security Adviser, Robert O’Brien, and third CEA Chairman, Tyler Goodspeed, this regrettably was not the case. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, the Secretary of Defense plays a key role in trade policy, at least when it comes to advancing Section 232 cases. Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,40 the President has the authority, through tariffs or other means, to reduce imports from other countries “if the President determines that such reduction or elimination would threaten to impair the national security.” As a practical matter, the Secretary of Commerce spearheads any Section 232 cases, but in order to proceed with a Section 232 case, Commerce must obtain signoff from the Secretary of Defense. When President Trump wanted to implement steel and aluminum tariffs, he had a willing servant in Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. However, Secretary of Defense James Mattis resisted. Mattis simply did not understand a key tenet of the Trump Administration: Economic security is also national security. Without vibrant steel and aluminum industries, it will be difficult for America to provide the Pentagon with the kind of weapons it needs to defend the homeland. CONCLUSION A Harvard professor once told me during my doctoral thesis days that “if I tell you how it is, I’ve told you why it can’t change.” Despite the obvious exploitation of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers by the international trading system and Communist Chinese aggression, powerful political forces none- theless exist that profit from the status quo. The stark lesson of this chapter is that America gets fleeced every day in the global marketplace both by a predatory Communist China and by an institution- ally unfair and nonreciprocal WTO. Addressing these two challenges would go a long way toward restoring American greatness, both economically and militarily. Ignoring these two challenges will simply continue the parasitic draining of the American manufacturing and defense industrial base. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. However, the author would particularly like to thank Joanna Miller for her dedicated work and significant contribution to the chapter. — 796 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE Kent Lassman Trade policy is about more than goods and services: It is a statement of Amer- ican identity. Our trade policy choices reveal America’s values and where we put our trust. Do we place our trust in Washington elites to revive a declining coun- try, or do we trust in America’s tradition of entrepreneurs and everyday people blazing new trails? Do we follow China by copying its strong-arm trade policies, or do we lead China and the rest of the world by forging our own path? Our trade policy decisions will tell you what we Americans really think of ourselves. A CONSERVATIVE VISION FOR TRADE The policy recommendations in this chapter reflect a belief in the strength of America’s founding institutions, its economy, and its people. They are based on data showing decades of American progress with all that this implies. They also reflect a realistic understanding of the fact that trade policy has limited capabilities and is vulnerable to mission creep and regulatory capture. Policymakers should be modest about what they can accomplish through trade policy and need to exercise constant vigilance against abuses. For example: l Trade can lower consumer prices for ordinary Americans and open new markets for American businesses and their goods. l Trade can help American workers and businesses to specialize in what they do best—which is how they outcompete the rest of the world in technology, manufacturing, agriculture, and other areas. l In foreign policy, trade can help to preserve and strengthen alliances. At the same time, sound trade policy requires humility. It is not a panacea for every policy problem. Trade policy cannot favor one sector over another without causing tradeoffs that outweigh the benefits.41 Neither free trade nor protectionism will create jobs. Trade affects the types of jobs people have, but it has no long-run effect on the number of jobs. Labor force size is tied to population size more than anything else. The American people are smart and sophisticated enough to hear these truths. It is not just conservatives who overestimate the power of trade policy. Recent progressive attempts to use trade policy to advance whole-of-government initia- tives on climate, equity, and other issues will fail for the same reason that a hammer cannot turn a screw: It is the wrong tool for the job. Conservatives should be sim- ilarly skeptical of recent attempts on the Right to use progressive trade policy to punish political opponents, remake manufacturing, or accomplish other objectives
— 795 — Trade against trade cheaters who dump products below cost into American markets or unfairly subsidize their exports. In fact, much of the cheating that does take place in the global trading arena can be addressed through such antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases. Within the West Wing itself, it is equally critical that the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and the Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) all be aligned on trade policy. During the Trump Administration, with the notable exception of the President’s third National Security Adviser, Robert O’Brien, and third CEA Chairman, Tyler Goodspeed, this regrettably was not the case. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, the Secretary of Defense plays a key role in trade policy, at least when it comes to advancing Section 232 cases. Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,40 the President has the authority, through tariffs or other means, to reduce imports from other countries “if the President determines that such reduction or elimination would threaten to impair the national security.” As a practical matter, the Secretary of Commerce spearheads any Section 232 cases, but in order to proceed with a Section 232 case, Commerce must obtain signoff from the Secretary of Defense. When President Trump wanted to implement steel and aluminum tariffs, he had a willing servant in Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. However, Secretary of Defense James Mattis resisted. Mattis simply did not understand a key tenet of the Trump Administration: Economic security is also national security. Without vibrant steel and aluminum industries, it will be difficult for America to provide the Pentagon with the kind of weapons it needs to defend the homeland. CONCLUSION A Harvard professor once told me during my doctoral thesis days that “if I tell you how it is, I’ve told you why it can’t change.” Despite the obvious exploitation of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers by the international trading system and Communist Chinese aggression, powerful political forces none- theless exist that profit from the status quo. The stark lesson of this chapter is that America gets fleeced every day in the global marketplace both by a predatory Communist China and by an institution- ally unfair and nonreciprocal WTO. Addressing these two challenges would go a long way toward restoring American greatness, both economically and militarily. Ignoring these two challenges will simply continue the parasitic draining of the American manufacturing and defense industrial base. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. However, the author would particularly like to thank Joanna Miller for her dedicated work and significant contribution to the chapter.
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.