The bill
Fallen Servicemembers Religious Heritage Restoration Act
S. 1318, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
Sponsored by
Sen. Moran, Jerry [R-KS]
ID: M000934
Follow the money
The bill
S. 1318, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Reserve" section, p. 773-775 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Motion to proceed to consideration of the House message to accompany S. 1318 rejected in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 47 - 52. Record Vote Number: 164.
June 4, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the same geniuses who think they can fool us with their cleverly crafted bill titles and amendments. Let's dissect this monstrosity, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Fallen Servicemembers Religious Heritage Restoration Act? Please, don't make me laugh. This bill has about as much to do with restoring religious heritage as I have to do with being a compassionate and empathetic human being (i.e., nothing). The real purpose of this bill is to sneak in some "reforms" to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, because who needs transparency or accountability when it comes to government surveillance, right?
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** Oh boy, where do I even start? This bill is a Frankenstein's monster of amendments and changes to existing law. It's like they took every bad idea from the past decade, threw them into a blender, and hit puree. We've got new "civil liberties reviews" that will surely be as effective as a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. And because who doesn't love a good game of bureaucratic musical chairs, we've got new roles and responsibilities for the Civil Liberties Protection Officer and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. Yay, more red tape!
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Ah, the usual suspects: the FBI, the Intelligence Community, and of course, the American people (who will be blissfully unaware of the surveillance state's continued expansion). But let's not forget the real stakeholders here: the politicians who get to grandstand about "reform" while actually doing nothing to address the underlying issues.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** Well, if this bill passes, we can expect more of the same: erosion of civil liberties, increased surveillance, and a further entrenchment of the national security state. But hey, at least we'll have some nice new titles and amendments to impress our friends at cocktail parties. The real impact will be felt by those who actually care about privacy and transparency – i.e., not the politicians or their corporate sponsors.
In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in legislative obfuscation, a testament to the boundless creativity of politicians when it comes to hiding their true intentions behind a veil of bureaucratic jargon. So, let's give it up for S. 1318: the ultimate example of how to take a bad idea, make it worse, and then sell it to the public as "reform." Bravo, Congress. Bravo.
Sen. Moran, Jerry [R-KS]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: R000608
Top Contributors
42
ID: B001277
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20
ID: C001056
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ID: S001208
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ID: S001150
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ID: T000476
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ID: B001236
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ID: C001035
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ID: C001098
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52
ID: W000790
Top Contributors
26
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 46 nodes and 46 connections
Total contributions: $46
Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.
Title II (Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act) prohibits Federal Reserve banks from offering, issuing, or testing central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) or similar digital assets, directly or indirectly, and bars the Fed from using CBDCs for monetary policy. This directly harms the crypto & fintech industry by blocking a potential regulatory pathway for CBDCs that could have intersected with or influenced stablecoins, digital payment platforms, and blockchain-based financial services.
Title II prohibits the Federal Reserve from developing, testing, or implementing a central bank digital currency or using it for monetary policy. While not directly regulating big tech, this limits the potential for a government-backed digital payment system that could have competed with or regulated private digital wallets and payment systems offered by big tech firms (e.g., Apple Pay, Google Wallet), thus representing a regulatory constraint on their financial services expansion.
Title I expands civil liberties oversight and accountability for FBI queries under FISA Section 702, including monthly reviews, attorney approval requirements, and GAO audits. While not directly regulating telecoms, these provisions increase compliance burdens on entities that assist in surveillance (including telecom providers subject to FISA directives), potentially limiting their cooperation or increasing legal risk, thus imposing indirect costs.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill directly prohibits the Federal Reserve from issuing or facilitating a central bank digital currency (CBDC), which aligns with Project 2025's explicit objective to prevent CBDC implementation due to surveillance and control concerns. While the bill includes additional FISA oversight provisions not mentioned in the Project 2025 excerpt, the CBDC prohibition represents a significant and direct policy overlap."
— 741 — Federal Reserve l Appoint a commission to explore the mission of the Federal Reserve, alternatives to the Federal Reserve system, and the nation’s financial regulatory apparatus. l Prevent the institution of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). A CBDC would provide unprecedented surveillance and potential control of financial transactions without providing added benefits available through existing technologies.34 AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Alexander Salter, Judy Shelton, and Peter St Onge, deserve special mention. The chapter reflects input from all the contributors, however, no views expressed herein should be attributed to any specific individual. — 742 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. For example, Alexander Salter and Daniel Smith (2019) show that Federal Reserve Chairs become more favorable toward monetary discretion once they are confirmed compared to previous stances. Alexander William Salter and Daniel J. Smith, “Political Economists or Political Economists? The Role of Political Environments in the Formation of Fed Policy Under Burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 71 (February 2019), pp. 1–13. 3. Sarah Binder, “The Federal Reserve as a ‘Political’ Institution,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, Vol. LXIX, No. 3 (Spring 2016), pp. 47–49, https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/bulletin/ downloads/bulletin_Spring2016.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). See also Charles L. Weise, “Political Pressures on Monetary Policy During the US Great Inflation,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 33–64, https://www.haverford.edu/sites/default/files/Department/Economics/ Weise_Political_Pressures_on%20Monetary_Policy.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 4. The Federal Reserve’s financial stability mandate is poorly defined. The Fed has taken advantage of the statutory vagueness and proceeded as if it has the authority to engage in these activities, although it is highly questionable whether this is permissible. 5. 12 U.S.C. § 225a, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/225a (accessed January 23, 2023). 6. See Peter J. Boettke, Alexander William Salter, and Daniel J. Smith, Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021). 7. George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, and Lawrence H. White, “Has the Fed Been a Failure?” Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 569–596, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/abs/pii/S0164070412000304 (accessed January 24, 2023). 8. This includes federal programs that automatically provide for adjustments as the economy contracts (for example, unemployment insurance or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). 9. Mark Segal, “Fed to Launch Climate Risk Resilience Tests with Big Banks,” ESG Today, September 30, 2022, https://www.esgtoday.com/fed-to-launch-climate-risk-resilience-tests-with-big-banks/ (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. Kenneth J. Robinson, “Savings and Loan Crisis 1980–1989,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings-and-loan-crisis (accessed January 23, 2023). 11. Russell Roberts, “Gambling with Other People’s Money: How Perverted Incentives Caused the Financial Crisis,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, May 2010, https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/RUSS-final. pdf (accessed January 24, 2023). 12. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity Programs Balance Sheet Data Series, 2007–2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (accessed January 24, 2023). 13. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, U.S. Treasury Securities Data Series (TREAST), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST (accessed January 24, 2023). 14. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mortgage-Backed Securities Data Series (WSHOMCB), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB (accessed January 24, 2023). 15. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Total Assets (Less Eliminations from Consolidation) Data Series (WALCL), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL (accessed January 24, 2023). 16. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA),” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA (accessed January 24, 2023). The Case–Shiller Home Price Index tracks home prices given a constant level of quality. See S&P Dow Jones Indices, “Real Estate: S&P CoreLogic Case–Shiller Home Price Indices,” https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/index-family/indicators/sp- corelogic-case-shiller/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-composite/#overview (accessed January 24, 2023). 17. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Real Residential Property Prices for United States (QUSR628BIS),” https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QUSR368BIS (accessed January 24, 2023). 18. Longterm Trends, “Home Price to Income Ratio (US & UK): Home Price to Median Household Income Ratio (US),” https://www.longtermtrends.net/home-price-median-annual-income-ratio/ (accessed January 24, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill directly enacts several reforms sought by Project 2025 for the Intelligence Community, including enhanced FISA oversight, civil liberties protections, and accountability mechanisms to prevent abuses and politicization of intelligence authorities."
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include:
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns closely with Project 2025's focus on FISA reform, civil liberties protections, and preventing politicization of intelligence, particularly through enhanced oversight, accountability measures, and prohibitions on politically motivated surveillance."
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.