A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to end the tax subsidy for employer efforts to influence their workers' exercise of their rights around labor organizations and engaging in collective actions.
Sponsored by
Sen. Lujan, Ben Ray [D-NM]
ID: L000570
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Bill Summary
Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "No Tax Breaks for Union Busting (NTBUB) Act" claims to aim at ending tax subsidies for employers who attempt to influence their workers' decisions regarding labor organizations and collective actions. How noble. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to curry favor with unions and appease the progressive base.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill proposes to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by denying tax deductions for employers who spend money on activities aimed at influencing their employees' opinions on labor organizations or collective actions. This includes captive audience meetings, workplace surveillance, and other tactics used to sway workers' decisions.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Employers, particularly those with a history of union-busting activities, will be directly affected by this bill. Unions and labor organizations, on the other hand, will likely benefit from this legislation, as it aims to reduce employers' ability to influence workers' decisions.
**Potential Impact & Implications:**
* Employers may find alternative ways to exert their influence, such as through more subtle or covert means. * Unions may gain an upper hand in labor disputes and collective bargaining negotiations, potentially leading to increased unionization rates and more favorable contracts for workers. * The bill's impact on the broader economy is uncertain, but it could lead to increased costs for employers and potentially affect their competitiveness.
Now, let's diagnose the underlying disease:
This bill suffers from a severe case of "Progressive Posturing Syndrome" (PPS), characterized by grandiose language, vague objectives, and a complete disregard for the complexities of labor relations. The sponsors of this bill are more concerned with scoring political points than addressing the root causes of union-busting activities.
The real motivation behind this bill is to appease the progressive base and curry favor with unions, rather than genuinely addressing the issues at hand. It's a classic case of "legislative theater," where politicians pretend to take action while actually doing nothing meaningful.
In conclusion, this bill is a farce, a mere Band-Aid on a festering wound. It fails to address the underlying issues driving union-busting activities and instead focuses on scoring cheap political points. The American people deserve better than this kind of cynical posturing.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Lujan, Ben Ray [D-NM]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 604 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise argue that the next Administration should end Project Labor Agreement require- ments and repeal the Davis–Bacon Act. And while some conservatives have chosen not to address massive federal subsidies for unionized labor, others believe that current laws and regulations that pick winners and losers to the detriment of the majority of construction workers and to all taxpayers should not be ignored. Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) are short-term collective bargaining agreements that apply to construction projects. There are a few reasons that con- struction projects may benefit from a PLA, and there are many reasons that even when actively encouraged to do so public construction projects have declined to use PLAs. Among the consequences: The majority of construction firms and construction workers are not unionized and their temporary forced unionization results in large-scale wage theft; construction companies are significantly less likely to bid on projects with PLAs; and PLAs consistently drive up construction costs by 10 percent to 30 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act23 requires federally financed construction projects to pay “prevailing wages.” In theory, these wages should reflect going market rates for construction labor in the relevant area. However, both the Government Account- ability Office and the Department of Labor’s Inspector General have repeatedly criticized the Labor Department for using self-selected, statistically unrepresenta- tive samples to calculate the prevailing-wage rates that drive up the cost of federal construction by about 10 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act redistributes wealth from hardworking Americans to those that benefit from government-funded construc- tion projects. Repealing the Davis–Bacon Act would increase worker freedom and end a longstanding effective tax on American families. l End PLA requirements. Agencies should end all mandatory Project Labor Agreement requirements and base federal procurement decisions on the contractors that can deliver the best product at the lowest cost. l Repeal Davis–Bacon. Congress should enact the Davis–Bacon Repeal Act and allow markets to determine market wages. THE STATES Worker-led Benefits Experimentation. Workers depend on unemployment benefits to navigate inevitable market frictions and seek new employment oppor- tunities. But existing unemployment insurance (UI) is bureaucratic, ineffective, and unaccountable. The outdated system’s myriad failures during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for innovations that respond to recipients’ needs. The most promising avenue for innovation is to involve workers and private-sec- tor organizations more directly, freed from unnecessary bureaucratic strictures. Americans take for granted that unemployment benefits must be administered by — 605 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies government agencies, but other Western market democracies feature effective and popular benefits administered by non-public worker organizations. The next conservative Administration should encourage UI innovation by capi- talizing on a key feature of the system and principle of conservative policymaking: federalism. State governments already administer unemployment benefits and have broad discretion over their programs. Existing statutory language in the Social Security Act24 does not prohibit non-public organizations from administering the program, nor does it specifically authorize states to do so. Further, the Adminis- tration can replicate state-level experiments in welfare programs and empower state officials to adapt UI to local conditions and needs. l Approve non-public worker organizations as UI administrators. DOL should approve, pursuant to § 303(a)(2) of the Social Security Act, non- public worker organizations as administrators. l Offer waivers for suitable alternatives. DOL should offer waivers from the standard requirements imposed on unemployment compensation by § 303(a) and § 303(d) of the Social Security Act to states that propose suitable alternatives. l Require organizations to comply with restrictions on political spending. DOL should establish as a precondition for receiving any public funds a requirement that an organization comply with restrictions on political spending as applied to 501(c)(3) charitable organizations. Labor Law. The federal laws governing labor-management relations have barely changed in generations, and reforms on the federal level have been almost impossible to get through Congress. To modernize labor law, the Congress should: l Pass legislation allowing waivers for states and local governments. To encourage experimentation and reform efforts at the state and local levels, Congress should pass legislation allowing waivers from federal labor laws like the NLRA and FLSA under certain conditions. State and local governments seeking waivers would be required to demonstrate that their reforms would accomplish the purpose of the underlying law, and not take away any current rights held by workers or employers. In addition, waivers would be limited to a five-year period, after which time they could be modified, canceled, or renewed. Excessive Occupational Regulation. Excessive occupational regulation— most typically encountered as occupational licensing—creates underemployment
Introduction
— 603 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies decision-making is required under the law, basing this theory on an old NLRB case, Joy Silk, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected mandatory card-check recognition. l Discard “card check.” Congress should discard “card check” as the basis of union recognition and mandate the secret ballot exclusively. Contract Bar Rule. Although current labor law allows a union to establish itself at a workplace at more or less any time, the calendar for any attempt to decertify a union is considerably more constrained. If a union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent, then employees may not decertify it or substitute another union for it for at least one year under federal law (the “certification bar”). Similarly, when a union reaches a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, it is immune from a decertification election for up to three years (the “contract bar”). A typical consequence of these rules is that employees must often wait four years before they are allowed a chance at decertification. Employees then have only a 45-day window to file a decertification petition; if the employer and union sign a successor contract, then the contract bar comes into play once again—meaning employees with an interest in decertification must wait another three years. l Eliminate the contract bar rule. NLRB should eliminate the contract bar rule so that employees with an interest in decertification have a reasonable chance to achieve their goal. Tailoring National Employment Rules. National employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)21 and the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act22 set out one-size-fits-all “floors” regulating the employment rela- tionship. These substantive worker protections often do not mesh well with the procedural worker protections offered through the NLRA’s collective bargaining process. Unions could play a powerful role in tailoring national employment rules to the needs of a particular workplace if, in unionized workplaces, national rules were treated as negotiable defaults rather than non-negotiable floors. l Congress should amend the NLRA to authorize collective bargaining to treat national employment laws and regulations as negotiable defaults. For example, this reform would allow a union to bless a relaxed overtime trigger (e.g., 45 hours a week, or 80 hours over two weeks) in exchange for firm employer commitments on predictable scheduling. Alternative Policy. While some conservatives (including the author of this chap- ter) believe that it would be a mistake to antagonize unions’ core interests, others — 604 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise argue that the next Administration should end Project Labor Agreement require- ments and repeal the Davis–Bacon Act. And while some conservatives have chosen not to address massive federal subsidies for unionized labor, others believe that current laws and regulations that pick winners and losers to the detriment of the majority of construction workers and to all taxpayers should not be ignored. Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) are short-term collective bargaining agreements that apply to construction projects. There are a few reasons that con- struction projects may benefit from a PLA, and there are many reasons that even when actively encouraged to do so public construction projects have declined to use PLAs. Among the consequences: The majority of construction firms and construction workers are not unionized and their temporary forced unionization results in large-scale wage theft; construction companies are significantly less likely to bid on projects with PLAs; and PLAs consistently drive up construction costs by 10 percent to 30 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act23 requires federally financed construction projects to pay “prevailing wages.” In theory, these wages should reflect going market rates for construction labor in the relevant area. However, both the Government Account- ability Office and the Department of Labor’s Inspector General have repeatedly criticized the Labor Department for using self-selected, statistically unrepresenta- tive samples to calculate the prevailing-wage rates that drive up the cost of federal construction by about 10 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act redistributes wealth from hardworking Americans to those that benefit from government-funded construc- tion projects. Repealing the Davis–Bacon Act would increase worker freedom and end a longstanding effective tax on American families. l End PLA requirements. Agencies should end all mandatory Project Labor Agreement requirements and base federal procurement decisions on the contractors that can deliver the best product at the lowest cost. l Repeal Davis–Bacon. Congress should enact the Davis–Bacon Repeal Act and allow markets to determine market wages. THE STATES Worker-led Benefits Experimentation. Workers depend on unemployment benefits to navigate inevitable market frictions and seek new employment oppor- tunities. But existing unemployment insurance (UI) is bureaucratic, ineffective, and unaccountable. The outdated system’s myriad failures during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for innovations that respond to recipients’ needs. The most promising avenue for innovation is to involve workers and private-sec- tor organizations more directly, freed from unnecessary bureaucratic strictures. Americans take for granted that unemployment benefits must be administered by
Introduction
— 603 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies decision-making is required under the law, basing this theory on an old NLRB case, Joy Silk, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected mandatory card-check recognition. l Discard “card check.” Congress should discard “card check” as the basis of union recognition and mandate the secret ballot exclusively. Contract Bar Rule. Although current labor law allows a union to establish itself at a workplace at more or less any time, the calendar for any attempt to decertify a union is considerably more constrained. If a union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent, then employees may not decertify it or substitute another union for it for at least one year under federal law (the “certification bar”). Similarly, when a union reaches a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, it is immune from a decertification election for up to three years (the “contract bar”). A typical consequence of these rules is that employees must often wait four years before they are allowed a chance at decertification. Employees then have only a 45-day window to file a decertification petition; if the employer and union sign a successor contract, then the contract bar comes into play once again—meaning employees with an interest in decertification must wait another three years. l Eliminate the contract bar rule. NLRB should eliminate the contract bar rule so that employees with an interest in decertification have a reasonable chance to achieve their goal. Tailoring National Employment Rules. National employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)21 and the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act22 set out one-size-fits-all “floors” regulating the employment rela- tionship. These substantive worker protections often do not mesh well with the procedural worker protections offered through the NLRA’s collective bargaining process. Unions could play a powerful role in tailoring national employment rules to the needs of a particular workplace if, in unionized workplaces, national rules were treated as negotiable defaults rather than non-negotiable floors. l Congress should amend the NLRA to authorize collective bargaining to treat national employment laws and regulations as negotiable defaults. For example, this reform would allow a union to bless a relaxed overtime trigger (e.g., 45 hours a week, or 80 hours over two weeks) in exchange for firm employer commitments on predictable scheduling. Alternative Policy. While some conservatives (including the author of this chap- ter) believe that it would be a mistake to antagonize unions’ core interests, others
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.