The bill
TRACE Act
S. 1038, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
Sponsored by
Sen. Tillis, Thomas [R-NC]
ID: T000476
Follow the money
The bill
S. 1038, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 177-179 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Held at the desk.
September 3, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. The TRACE Act, a bill so cleverly crafted that it's almost as if they're trying to distract us from its true purpose.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main objective of this bill is to create a new data field in the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs) to track whether missing persons were last seen on Federal land or in territorial waters. Wow, what a groundbreaking idea! I'm sure it has nothing to do with the fact that some politicians want to look like they're doing something about the issue of missing persons.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Attorney General to include this new data field in NamUs and submit an annual report to Congress on the number of cases involving Federal land or territorial waters. Oh, and it also defines some terms, because God forbid our lawmakers actually understand what they're voting on.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties are the usual suspects: the Attorney General, the National Institute of Justice, and various government agencies that manage Federal land and territorial waters. And, of course, the stakeholders are the families of missing persons, who will no doubt be thrilled to know that their loved ones' cases might get a slightly more detailed entry in a database.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact is minimal, but the implications are deliciously cynical. This bill is a classic example of "feel-good" legislation, designed to make politicians look like they're taking action without actually doing anything meaningful. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, a token gesture that will do little to address the underlying issues surrounding missing persons.
But hey, who needs substance when you can have a catchy acronym like TRACE? It's almost as if our lawmakers are trying to create a new disease: "TRACE-itis" – a condition characterized by an excessive focus on trivial details while ignoring the real problems. Symptoms include: pointless data collection, meaningless reporting requirements, and a severe lack of actual progress.
Diagnosis: Legislative Theater Syndrome (LTS), a chronic condition that afflicts politicians who prioritize appearances over substance. Treatment: a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for bureaucratic nonsense, and a willingness to call out the obvious lies and spin. Prognosis: poor, as this disease is highly contagious and often fatal to actual progress.
Sen. Tillis, Thomas [R-NC]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: P000145
Top Contributors
29
ID: C001047
Top Contributors
23
ID: B001277
Top Contributors
20
ID: M001169
Top Contributors
23
ID: C001088
Top Contributors
22
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 27 nodes and 40 connections
Total contributions: $40
Showing top 15 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 3 requires the Attorney General to include a data field in the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System, which may aid law enforcement in tracking and investigating missing persons cases, potentially benefiting the law enforcement and surveillance technology industry.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"Both the TRACE Act and the Project 2025 DHS section emphasize improving federal data collection, reporting, and inter‑agency coordination, but they address different substantive issues (missing persons vs. immigration enforcement)."
— 144 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise prosecuting criminal and civil denaturalization cases, in combination with the Department of Justice, for aliens who obtained citizenship through fraud or other illicit means. Additionally, USCIS should create a criminal enforcement compo- nent within the agency to investigate immigration benefits fraud under Title 8 (perhaps requiring additional legislative and regulatory authorities for the offi- cers themselves) and to prosecute cases through Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys (SAUSAs) with substantive knowledge in the field. Particular attention should be given to addressing increasing incidents of forced labor trafficking in temporary work visa programs. While the Biden regulatory agenda has focused on at least two major rules—the credible fear rule and the public charge rule—USCIS has utilized other policy and internal procedural mechanisms to extend employment authorization to large groups of people who are in the country without legal status. The agency has taken quiet steps to cut corners and lessen adjudicatory standards. During a tran- sition period, a complete audit of agency policies, memoranda, and management directives issued during the Biden Administration should be completed, and rescis- sion documents should be prepared for issuance within the first few days of the incoming Administration. Additionally, regulatory documents should be drafted to review or reverse all regulations promulgated during the Biden Administration. New Policies To advance the national interest, the three core immigration agencies—USCIS, ICE, and CBP—should remerge and have immigration elements outside of DHS (such as ORR of HHS) included. The fragmented immigration enforcement frame- work that developed in the wake of the Homeland Security Act has weakened each agency and should be remediated. Combining these critical agencies would strengthen their capabilities, ensure cooperation, and promote information-shar- ing. Agency responsibilities and the delineation of authorities, such as inconsistent use of deferred action and issuance of NTAs by each agency, have long been a point of contention that would be addressed much more easily if they were recombined into a single entity. Alternatively, new policies for USCIS as it currently exists should focus on mat- ters that can be addressed through administrative action. l The workforce should be realigned and, as necessary, retrained on base eligibility and fraud detection rather than speed in processing. l Training should be returned to Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), which would underscore the enforcement role of USCIS as a vetting agency, and be rebranded accordingly. — 145 — Department of Homeland Security l Management Directives and policies should realign to ensure that the workforce, while adaptable and able to handle the bulk of the USCIS mission, is not allowed to be pulled off mission work to focus on unlawful programs (DACA, mass parole for Afghans, Ukrainians, Venezuelans, etc.), which divert resources away from nuclear family and employment programs. The regulatory agenda should include the immediate submission of notices of proposed rulemaking for the Trump Administration’s public charge rule (includ- ing aspects from its original notice of proposed rulemaking), temporary work visa reform, employment authorization reform rules, asylum bars rule, and a third-country transit rule. At a minimum, an enhanced regulatory agenda should include rules strengthening the integrity of the asylum system, parole reform, and U visa reform that prioritizes relief for victims of heinous crimes and ensures that we protect the truest and most deserving victims of crime. Not all policy changes require formal rulemaking, however, as internal guidance documents are generally exempt under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7 In this subregulatory space, USCIS policy memos and operational guidance should reduce the validity of employment authorization documents and end the COVID flexibilities, including the reliance on biometrics reuse. USCIS should also enforce existing regulations by rejecting incomplete applications and petitions, ensuring both that they are completed before accepted for filing and that FDNS signs off on all approved applications and petitions before approval notices are sent to the alien or petitioner. Other efforts should be focused on adjudication standards returning to nearly 100 percent interview requirements for all appropriate cases. The incoming Administration should spearhead an immigration legislative agenda focused on creating a merit-based immigration system that rewards high- skilled aliens instead of the current system that favors extended family–based and luck-of-the-draw immigration. To that end, the diversity visa lottery should be repealed, chain migration should be ended while focusing on the nuclear family, and the existing employment visa program should be replaced with a system to award visas only to the “best and brightest.” Internal efforts to limit employment authorization should be matched by con- gressional action to narrow statutory eligibility to work in the United States and mitigate unfair employment competition for U.S. citizens. The oft-abused H-1B program should be transformed into an elite program through which employers are vying to bring in only the top foreign workers at the highest wages so as not to depress American opportunities. Additionally, Congress should: l Improve the integrity of the temporary work visa programs; l Repeal Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations;
AI Analysis:
"The TRACE Act focuses on improving missing persons data collection on federal lands, while the Project 2025 DHS section centers on immigration enforcement, denaturalization, forced labor trafficking, and agency restructuring; the only modest connection is a general concern for law enforcement coordination and data reporting."
— 144 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise prosecuting criminal and civil denaturalization cases, in combination with the Department of Justice, for aliens who obtained citizenship through fraud or other illicit means. Additionally, USCIS should create a criminal enforcement compo- nent within the agency to investigate immigration benefits fraud under Title 8 (perhaps requiring additional legislative and regulatory authorities for the offi- cers themselves) and to prosecute cases through Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys (SAUSAs) with substantive knowledge in the field. Particular attention should be given to addressing increasing incidents of forced labor trafficking in temporary work visa programs. While the Biden regulatory agenda has focused on at least two major rules—the credible fear rule and the public charge rule—USCIS has utilized other policy and internal procedural mechanisms to extend employment authorization to large groups of people who are in the country without legal status. The agency has taken quiet steps to cut corners and lessen adjudicatory standards. During a tran- sition period, a complete audit of agency policies, memoranda, and management directives issued during the Biden Administration should be completed, and rescis- sion documents should be prepared for issuance within the first few days of the incoming Administration. Additionally, regulatory documents should be drafted to review or reverse all regulations promulgated during the Biden Administration. New Policies To advance the national interest, the three core immigration agencies—USCIS, ICE, and CBP—should remerge and have immigration elements outside of DHS (such as ORR of HHS) included. The fragmented immigration enforcement frame- work that developed in the wake of the Homeland Security Act has weakened each agency and should be remediated. Combining these critical agencies would strengthen their capabilities, ensure cooperation, and promote information-shar- ing. Agency responsibilities and the delineation of authorities, such as inconsistent use of deferred action and issuance of NTAs by each agency, have long been a point of contention that would be addressed much more easily if they were recombined into a single entity. Alternatively, new policies for USCIS as it currently exists should focus on mat- ters that can be addressed through administrative action. l The workforce should be realigned and, as necessary, retrained on base eligibility and fraud detection rather than speed in processing. l Training should be returned to Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), which would underscore the enforcement role of USCIS as a vetting agency, and be rebranded accordingly.
AI Analysis:
"The TRACE Act focuses on improving missing persons data on federal land, while the Project 2025 excerpt centers on USDA agriculture, nutrition, and conservation policies; the only connection is the tangential involvement of USDA-managed federal lands and data reporting."
— 315 — Department of Agriculture 79. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “WIC Data Tables,” December 9, 2022, https:// www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wic-program (accessed December 16, 2022). 80. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, “Regulations and Information on the Manufacture and Distribution of Infant Formula,” May 16, 2022, https://www.fda.gov/food/infant-formula-guidance-documents-regulatory- information/regulations-and-information-manufacture-and-distribution-infant-formula (accessed December 14, 2022). 81. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “History of the National School Lunch Program,” January 17, 2008, https://www.fns.usda.gov/nslp/program-history (accessed December 14, 2022). 82. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “School Breakfast Program History,” July 24, 2013, https://www.fns.usda.gov/sbp/program-history (accessed December 14, 2022), and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “History of the National School Lunch Program.” 83. Crystal FitzSimons, “Free School Meals for All Is the Key to Supporting Education and Health Outcomes,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol 41, No. 1 (2022), pp. 358–364, https://econpapers.repec.org/ article/wlyjpamgt/v_3a41_3ay_3a2022_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a358-364.htm (accessed December 14, 2022). 84. Jonathan Butcher and Vijay Menon, “Returning to the Intent of Government School Meals: Helping Students in Need,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3399, March 22, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/ default/files/2019-03/BG3399.pdf. 85. Daren Bakst and Jonathan Butcher, “A Critical Fix to the Federal Overreach on School Meals,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4976, July 11, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/hunger-and-food-programs/report/ critical-fix-the-federal-overreach-school-meals. 86. Ibid., and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Community Eligibility Provision,” April 19, 2019, https://www.fns.usda.gov/cn/community-eligibility-provision (accessed December 16, 2022). 87. See Payment Accuracy, https://www.paymentaccuracy.gov/ (accessed December 16, 2022). 88. Payment Accuracy, “Payment Integrity Scorecard,” https://www.cfo.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/Q3/ FNS%20National%20School%20Lunch%20Program%20(NSLP)%20Payments%20Integrity%20Scorecard%20 FY%202022%20Q3.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 89. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “School Meals Programs: USDA Has Reported Taking Some Steps to Reduce Improper Payments But Should Comprehensively Assess Fraud Risks,” GAO–19–389, May 21, 2022, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-389 (accessed December 14, 2022). 90. Payment Accuracy, “Payment Integrity Scorecard.” 91. White House, “Fact Sheet: The American Families Plan,” April 28, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-the-american-families-plan/ (accessed December 14, 2022). 92. Universal School Meals Program Act of 2021, S. 1530, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., https://www.congress.gov/ bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1530 (accessed December 14, 2022). 93. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Find Meals for Kids When Schools Are Closed,” Food and Nutrition Service, September 22, 2022, https://www.fns.usda.gov/meals4kids (accessed December 16, 2022), and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Seamless Summer and Other Options for School,” July 16, 2013, https://www.fns.usda.gov/sfsp/seamless-summer-and-other-options-schools (accessed December 16, 2022). 94. Tom Driscoll, “From the Field: Farmers Are the Original Conservationists,” National Farmers Union, August 30, 2017, https://nfu.org/2017/08/30/from-the-field-farmers-are-the-original-conservationists/ (accessed December 16, 2022). 95. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, “Conservation Programs,” https://www.fsa.usda.gov/ programs-and-services/conservation-programs/index (accessed December 16, 2022), and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, “Programs and Initiatives,” https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/ programs-initiatives (accessed December 16, 2022). 96. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, “Conservation Reserve Program: About the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),” https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservation- programs/conservation-reserve-program/ (accessed December 16, 2022). — 316 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 97. American Bakers Association et al., letter to U.S. Department of Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, March 23, 2022, https://www.dropbox.com/s/yfyv04ilkom11zd/USDA%20Letter%20to%20Secretary%20Vilsack%20on%20 Tools%20to%20Address%20Global%20Commodity%20Supply%20Challenges%203.23.22_.pdf?dl=0 (accessed December 15, 2022). It is also necessary to increase food production to mitigate high food inflation. Approximately 25 percent of idled land is considered prime farmland. Therefore, one-quarter of idled land is merely idling, not producing food—and this does not include other land that may viably be used for food production. The Conservation Reserve Program should be eliminated. There are also two issues connected to property rights and fairness that should be addressed: challenging NRCS determinations and problems with USDA easements. To be eligible for many USDA programs, farmers must comply with certain conservation provisions enforced by NRCS. Conservation compliance of wetlands and highly erodible lands consist of federal restrictions that prevent farmers from using parts of their property. If farmers plant crops or modify the areas federal officials deem protected, farmers can lose all access to USDA programs and support. For farmers, there are real, practical concerns to challenging NRCS determinations, including the time and costs of challenging the federal bureaucracy. NRCS is empowered to declare areas wetlands and highly erodible areas, which are therefore off limits for farming. If these wetland-or-erodible-declared areas are used in a manner deemed unacceptable by federal officials, NRCS may revoke access to federal resources and subsidies by making technical determinations that carry potential penalties. There must be a fair and reasonable process for farmers to challenge such actions. See Daren Bakst, “Food Price Inflation Continues to Worsen. Here’s What Should Be Done About It,” The Daily Signal, April 25, 2022, https:// www.dailysignal.com/2022/04/25/food-price-inflation-continuing-to-worsen-heres-what-should-be-done- about-it/ (accessed December 15, 2022); American Bakers Association et.al., letter to Vilsack; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, “Conservation Compliance Appeals Process,” https://www. nrcs.usda.gov/getting-assistance/compliance/conservation-compliance-appeals-process (accessed December 15, 2022); and Chris Bennett, “Regulatory Hell: Farmer and Veteran Wins 10-Year Wetlands Fight With Government,” AG Web, August 30, 2021, https://www.agweb.com/news/crops/crop-production/regulatory-hell-farmer-and- veteran-wins-10-year-wetlands-fight (accessed December 15, 2022). 98. Fortunately, there are already resources available to help states establish their own wetlands conservation programs. One particular example, the American Legislative Exchange Council’s Wetlands Mapping and Protection Act model policy, is available for states to define the procedures, guidelines, and administration of wetlands programs. American Legislative Exchange Council, “Wetlands Mapping and Protection Act,” November 16, 2017, https://alec.org/model-policy/wetlands-mapping-and-protection-act/ (accessed December 16, 2022). The new Administration should focus on best practices instead of imposing prescriptive federal practices. It should support the policies contained within the “NRCS Wetland Compliance and Appeals Reform Act” and modify NRCS compliance rules to protect farmers and ranchers by adding protections against regulatory overreach—such as banning the practice of re-engaging farmers in new technical determinations appeals processes for the same areas of their farms. See NRCS Wetland Compliance and Appeals Reform Act, S. 4931, 117th Cong., 2nd Sess., https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4931?s=1&r=8 (accessed December 15, 2022). 99. Ibid 100. See, for example, Daren Bakst and Jeremy Dalrymple, “Reducing Federal Barriers for the Sale of Meat,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5078, June 1, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/agriculture/report/ reducing-federal-barriers-the-sale-meat, and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service, “State Inspection Programs,” updated January 12, 2023, https://www.fsis.usda.gov/inspection/state- inspection-programs (accessed December 15, 2022). 101. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service, “Cooperative Interstate Shipping Program,” September 7, 2022, https://www.fsis.usda.gov/inspection/state-inspection-programs/cooperative- interstate-shipping-program (accessed December 15, 2022). 102. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “State Inspection Programs.” 103. The Senate bill removes obstacles for both meat and poultry. The House version does not appear to cover poultry. New Markets for State-Inspected Meat and Poultry Act of 2021, S. 107, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., https:// www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/107#:~:text=This%20bill%20allows%20meat%20and,be%20 sold%20in%20interstate%20commerce (accessed December 15, 2022), and Expanding Markets for State- Inspected Meat Processors Act of 2021, H.R. 1998, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th- congress/house-bill/1998 (accessed December 15, 2022).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.