Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act
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Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV]
ID: C001113
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another bill, another exercise in futility. Let's dissect this farce.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act (S 101) claims to require the Secretary of Energy to obtain consent from affected state and local governments before spending money on a nuclear waste repository. How quaint. The real purpose, of course, is to create a veneer of accountability while allowing politicians to grandstand about "protecting" their constituents.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill demands that the Secretary get written agreements from various parties (Governors, local governments, Indian tribes) before spending Nuclear Waste Fund money. Because, you know, a piece of paper and some signatures will magically make nuclear waste disappear. This is nothing more than a bureaucratic speed bump designed to slow down the inevitable.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: politicians looking for soundbites, special interest groups angling for influence, and voters who think this bill actually means something. Meanwhile, the real stakeholders – the ones who'll be dealing with the radioactive fallout (literally) – are ignored. The affected Indian tribes, local governments, and nearby communities will still be stuck with the toxic legacy of nuclear waste.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a placebo, a symbolic gesture meant to placate the masses while doing nothing to address the underlying issues. It won't stop nuclear waste from being generated or stored; it just creates more red tape and opportunities for politicians to posture. The real impact will be on the wallets of taxpayers, who'll foot the bill for this farce.
Diagnosis: This bill is a classic case of "Legislative Theater-itis," a disease characterized by grandiose language, meaningless provisions, and a complete disregard for reality. Symptoms include:
* Overuse of buzzwords ("informed consent") * Excessive reliance on bureaucratic hurdles * Ignoring the root causes of the problem (nuclear waste generation) * Politicians pretending to care about constituents while actually serving special interests
Treatment: None required. This bill will die a quiet death in committee, only to be resurrected in some other form when the next election cycle rolls around. The disease will persist, and we'll all be left to suffer from its toxic consequences.
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đź’° Campaign Finance Network
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 375 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (NE) Mission/Overview The Office of Nuclear Energy’s “mission is to advance nuclear energy science and technology to meet U.S. energy, environmental, and economic needs.” It has five stated goals: “Enable continued operation of existing U.S. nuclear reactors,” “Enable deployment of advanced nuclear reactors,” “Develop advanced nuclear fuel cycles,” “Maintain U.S. leadership in nuclear energy technology,” and “Enable a high-performing organization.”29 Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,30 the Office of Nuclear Energy “has also been responsible for the DOE’s statutory requirements to collect and dispose of spent nuclear fuel…since the Obama Administration’s dissolution of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.”31 Needed Reforms NE is too influential in driving the business decisions of commercial nuclear energy firms. Instead of focusing on a limited set of basic research and devel- opment activities that solve foundational technical issues that apply broadly to energy production, NE intervenes in nearly all aspects of the commercial nuclear energy industry. Absent wholesale reforms that restructure the federal energy and science bureaucracy to eliminate such functional energy offices, the next Admin- istration should: l Substantially limit NE’s size and scope. l Adopt broader regulatory and energy policy reforms that reduce regulatory obstacles, allow all energy sources to compete fairly in the marketplace, and establish a predictable policy environment. This will avoid unfair bias against the nuclear industry. New Policies NE should transition to a more limited scope of responsibilities that focuses on basic research, solving broadly applicable technology challenges, and solving the nuclear waste management issue as it relates to the development and deployment of advanced next-generation reactors, which can include small modular reactors (SMR). While respecting existing contractual obligations, NE should not initi- ate any new civilian reactor demonstration and commercialization projects. NE also should: l Focus on overcoming technical barriers that are preventing commercial reactor demonstration projects from moving forward. Any activities in support of existing nuclear plants and any other projects — 376 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise directed toward commercialization, including licensing support, should be shouldered by the private sector. l Reorganize its remaining activities into three basic lines of responsibility: nuclear fuels across the fuel cycle, reactor technology, and civilian radioactive waste. Budget The above reforms would cost substantially less than the $1,675,060,000 requested for FY 2023.32 Legislation such as the IIJA placed additional funding for new reactor demonstration projects outside of NE. These responsibilities and their associated funds should be moved to NE as appropriate. NE should not simply add or subtract programs, as some programs may help to support NE’s new priorities. The better approach would be to build a new budget and program strategy that accounts for related DOE programs and submit a new budget request reflecting NE’s new priorities. OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY AND CARBON MANAGEMENT (FECM) Mission/Overview DOE is authorized by law to increase the conversion efficiency of all forms of fossil energy, reduce costs, improve environmental performance, and increase the energy security of the United States.33 In recent years, the Office of Fossil Energy (FE) has been transformed from its statutory role of improving fossil energy pro- duction to one that is focused primarily on reducing the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel extraction, transport, and combustion. This change is reflected in the office’s new name, the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management (FECM), effective as of July 2021, and FECM’s mission: “to minimize the environmental impacts of fossil fuels while working towards net-zero emissions.”34 Needed Reforms l Eliminate carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) programs. Despite the recent expansion of the 45Q tax credit for carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) to $87 per ton, most carbon capture technology remains economically unviable, although private-sector innovations are on the horizon. CCUS programs should be left to the private sector to develop.35 If the office continues any CCUS research, that research should be focused more on innovative utilization. l Pursue the processing of critical minerals. Development of domestic critical material sources is important for national security, as the vast
Introduction
— 398 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise violation of its contractual obligation to take the waste has resulted in the payment of “approximately $10.1 billion in settlements and judgments to contract holders.”99 l Develop new NWF funding and accounting mechanisms that allow licensed nuclear operators to guarantee resources for future nuclear waste disposal while also maintaining control of those resources. l Reconstitute OCRWM. OCRWM, as already established by statute, should be tasked with developing the next steps on Yucca Mountain and nuclear waste management. These steps should include initiating market reforms, including significant amendments to the NWPA, to allow additional industry responsibility for managing waste, market pricing and competition for waste services, and the opportunity for Nevadans to have more partnership involvement with any nuclear facility at Yucca Mountain. l Reestablish, consistent with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the position of Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Budget Within the Office of Nuclear Energy budget, approximately $100 million is set aside for fuel cycle and waste management activities.100 These funds should be transferred to the newly established OCRWM, which should also be responsible for managing the Nuclear Waste Fund and given access to the fund as necessary to carry out its responsibilities. NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NNSA) Mission/Overview NNSA’s primary mission is to provide and maintain a modern, safe, and effective nuclear deterrent for the United States. This includes the design and production of nuclear warheads, their integration with delivery systems, and their safe storage and decommissioning. NNSA’s responsibilities also include developing nuclear reactors for the U.S. Navy and “work[ing] to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation and reduce the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism around the world.”101 NNSA was established by the NNSA Act, which also defines its authority.102 Needed Reforms The United States, through the NNSA, needs to make the design, development, and deployment of new nuclear warheads a top priority. Existing warheads were — 399 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions designed and built during the Cold War, and the U.S. lacks sufficient plutonium production capabilities.103 Because this process will take time, NNSA and the NNSA Labs need to ensure that existing nuclear warheads are viable and provide an appropriate strategic deterrent. New Policies The expansion of Chinese nuclear forces, the continued nuclear threat from Russia, and active nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere require NNSA’s recommitment to the nuclear mission. A conservative Adminis- tration should: l Continue to develop new warheads for each branch of the triad (land, sea, and air defenses). If possible, reverse the Biden Administration’s decision to retire the B83 bomb (in order to maintain two aircraft-delivered warheads) and its decision to cancel the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM).104 Also undertake an evaluation of the need for nuclear antisubmarine and air defense weapons in light of emerging threats. l Maintain two production sites for plutonium pits (a key element of warhead production) at Los Alamos and Savannah River.105 l Reject ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and indicate a willingness to conduct nuclear tests in response to adversary nuclear developments if necessary. This will require that NNSA be directed to move to immediate test readiness to give the Administration maximum flexibility in responding to adversary actions. l Review all new Navy, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration construction programs. The review should be conducted by the Director of Naval Reactors (DNR) with an eye to the possible inclusion of advanced affordable nuclear reactor technology and extension of DNR authority over these agencies’ nuclear construction programs. l Review the non–national security portfolios at the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia labs and identify divestments to focus on nuclear deterrence. Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia provide unique capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and each lab maintains extensive non–national security research programs and commercial activities.
Introduction
— 398 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise violation of its contractual obligation to take the waste has resulted in the payment of “approximately $10.1 billion in settlements and judgments to contract holders.”99 l Develop new NWF funding and accounting mechanisms that allow licensed nuclear operators to guarantee resources for future nuclear waste disposal while also maintaining control of those resources. l Reconstitute OCRWM. OCRWM, as already established by statute, should be tasked with developing the next steps on Yucca Mountain and nuclear waste management. These steps should include initiating market reforms, including significant amendments to the NWPA, to allow additional industry responsibility for managing waste, market pricing and competition for waste services, and the opportunity for Nevadans to have more partnership involvement with any nuclear facility at Yucca Mountain. l Reestablish, consistent with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the position of Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Budget Within the Office of Nuclear Energy budget, approximately $100 million is set aside for fuel cycle and waste management activities.100 These funds should be transferred to the newly established OCRWM, which should also be responsible for managing the Nuclear Waste Fund and given access to the fund as necessary to carry out its responsibilities. NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NNSA) Mission/Overview NNSA’s primary mission is to provide and maintain a modern, safe, and effective nuclear deterrent for the United States. This includes the design and production of nuclear warheads, their integration with delivery systems, and their safe storage and decommissioning. NNSA’s responsibilities also include developing nuclear reactors for the U.S. Navy and “work[ing] to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation and reduce the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism around the world.”101 NNSA was established by the NNSA Act, which also defines its authority.102 Needed Reforms The United States, through the NNSA, needs to make the design, development, and deployment of new nuclear warheads a top priority. Existing warheads were
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.