The bill
Recognizing the strategic value of the historical partnership between the United States and India.
HRES. 880, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.
Sponsored by
Rep. Bera, Ami [D-CA-6]
ID: B001287
Follow the money
The bill
HRES. 880, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 220-222 of the Mandate for Leadership.
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7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another meaningless resolution from our esteemed Congress, designed to make everyone feel good about the "strategic partnership" between the US and India. Because, you know, that's exactly what we need – more empty words and handshakes.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** This resolution is a masterclass in stating the obvious: the US and India have a long-standing relationship, and it's good for regional stability, economic growth, and global security. Wow, who wouldn't want to acknowledge that? The main purpose is to reaffirm this partnership, because apparently, our politicians need to be reminded of something they already know.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** There are no actual provisions or changes to existing law in this resolution. It's a feel-good exercise, where Congress gets to pat itself on the back for being friends with India. The only "provision" is a reaffirmation of the partnership, which is about as binding as a promise from a politician during an election campaign.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** This resolution affects no one and nothing, except perhaps the egos of the politicians involved. Indian Americans might feel good about being acknowledged, but that's about it. The real stakeholders – those with actual interests in the US-India relationship, like defense contractors, tech companies, or human rights organizations – will continue to operate as usual, unaffected by this empty gesture.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** Zero. Zilch. Nada. This resolution is a non-event, a waste of time and resources. It won't change the course of US-India relations, nor will it address any real issues or challenges facing the partnership. If anything, it might make some politicians feel good about themselves for a few minutes, but that's about it.
In conclusion, this resolution is a perfect example of legislative theater – all show, no substance. It's a cynical exercise in self-congratulation, designed to distract from real issues and actual problems. So, let's give our politicians a round of applause for this meaningless gesture, shall we?
Rep. Bera, Ami [D-CA-6]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Total contributions: $81,700
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Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 7 helped.
Whereas, in 2005, the United States and India issued the joint statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation leading to the passage of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 and the subsequent conclusion of the United States-India 123 Agreement in 2008; (9) recognizes India's growing energy needs as an essential component of its economic development, and applauds India for increasing its purchases of United States energy resources, which enhance mutual ener
Whereas the United States designated India as a Major Defense Partner in 2016, and a strong United States-India defense partnership is critical for United States and Indian interests in the Indo-Pacific region; Whereas the United States and India subsequently signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, Strategic Trade Authorization Tier 1, Industrial Security Agreement, and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement to deepen defense
Whereas the two countries launched the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies in 2023 to cover cooperation in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and space which was renamed United States-India Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology to focus on artificial intelligence infrastructure; (6) affirms the importance of technology cooperation between the United States and India, including through the United States-India Transforming the Relatio
Whereas the two countries launched the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies in 2023 to cover cooperation in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and space which was renamed United States-India Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology to focus on artificial intelligence infrastructure; (6) affirms the importance of technology cooperation between the United States and India, including through the United States-India Transforming the Relatio
Whereas both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cybercrime Investigations in January 2025 to enhance cooperation in cybercrime investigations, digital forensics, and intelligence;
(9) recognizes India's growing energy needs as an essential component of its economic development, and applauds India for increasing its purchases of United States energy resources, which enhance mutual energy security, economic prosperity, and bilateral cooperation;
+ 1 more industry not shown.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HRES 880 explicitly recognizes and reaffirms the strategic U.S.-India partnership, which directly supports the Project 2025 objective of advancing the bilateral relationship with India to mutual benefit, countering Chinese influence, and strengthening Indo‑Pacific security."
— 187 — Department of State United States, but at least some of them would eventually try if allowed to consolidate their operations and plan such attacks. The immediate threat they pose lies in their abilities and willingness to strike American targets in their regions of operation or to harm U.S. interests in other ways. The U.S. should support capable African military and security operations through the State Department and other federal agencies responsible for granting foreign military education, training, and security assistance. l Build a coalition of the cooperative. Rather than thinning limited federal resources by spreading funds across all countries (including some that are unsupportive or even hostile to the United States,) the next Administration should focus on those countries with which the U.S. can expect a mutually beneficial relationship. After being designated focus countries by the State Department, such nations should receive a full suite of American engagement. That said, the next Administration should still maintain a baseline level of contact even with those countries with which it has less- than-fruitful relationships in order to encourage positive developments and to be in position to seize unexpected diplomatic opportunities as they arise. l Focus on core diplomatic activities, and stop promoting policies birthed in the American culture wars. African nations are particularly (and reasonably) non-receptive to the U.S. social policies such as abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives being imposed on them. The United States should focus on core security, economic, and human rights engagement with African partners and reject the promotion of divisive policies that hurt the deepening of shared goals between the U.S. and its African partners. Europe American foreign policy has long benefited from cooperation with the countries of Europe (generally, the EU), and any conservative Administration should build on this resource. Yet the transatlantic relationship is complex, with security, trade, and political dimensions. First, the Europe, Eurasia, and Russia region is made up of relatively wealthy and technologically advanced societies that should be expected to bear a fair share of both security needs and global security architecture: The United States cannot be expected to provide a defense umbrella for countries unwilling to contribute appropriately. At stake after 2024 will be examining the status of the Wales Pledge of 2 percent of gross domestic product toward defense by NATO members. The new Administration will also want to encourage nations to exceed that pledge. Second, transatlantic trade is a significant part of the global economy, and it is in the U.S. national interest to amplify it, especially because this means weaning — 188 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Europe of its dependence on China. However, there are also transatlantic trade tensions that disturb the U.S.–EU relationship and that have been evident across Administrations. The U.S. must undertake a comprehensive review of trade arrangements between the EU and the United States to assure that U.S. businesses are treated fairly and to build productive reciprocity. Outside the EU, trade with the post-Brexit U.K. needs urgent development before London slips back into the orbit of the EU. Third, in the wake of Brexit, EU foreign policy now takes place without U.K. input, which disadvantages the United States, given that the U.K. has historically been aligned with many U.S. positions. Therefore, U.S. diplomacy must be more attentive to inner-EU developments, while also developing new allies inside the EU—especially the Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU, which are most vulnerable to Russian aggression. South and Central Asia Many key American interests and responsibilities are found in South and Central Asia. Specifically, continuing to advance the bilateral relationship with India to mutual benefit is a crucial objective for U.S. policy. India plays a crucial role in countering the Chinese threat and securing a free and open Indo–Pacific. It is a critical security guarantor for the key routes of air and sea travel linking East and West and an important emerging U.S. economic partner. For instance, the 2019 Department of Defense Indo–Pacific Strategy Report noted that the Indian Ocean area “is at the nexus of global trade and commerce, with nearly half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes. The region boasts some of the fastest-growing economies on Earth.”14 Meanwhile, the threat of transnational terrorism remains acute. The humiliat- ing withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan after a 20-year military campaign has created new challenges. It has provided an opportunity to reset the deeply troubled U.S.–Pakistan relationship and reassess U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region. The long-standing India–Pakistan rivalry and tensions regarding the disputed territory of Kashmir continue to pose risks to regional stability, especially because both countries are nuclear powers. The State Department’s role in strengthening the regional security and eco- nomic framework linking the U.S and India is crucial. In addition, the department has important functional responsibilities in dealing with a range of threats from nuclear proliferation to transnational proliferation. While American statecraft should also seek to improve bilateral relations throughout the region, U.S. policy must be clear-eyed and realistic about the perfidiousness of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the military–political rule in Pakistan. There can be no expecta- tion of normal relations with either.
AI Analysis:
"HRES 880 focuses on strengthening the U.S.-India strategic partnership, while the Project 2025 State Department excerpt emphasizes Africa and Europe, particularly security cooperation, burden-sharing, and avoiding cultural policy imposition. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address African or European partnerships, defense burden-sharing, or culture war policies."
— 187 — Department of State United States, but at least some of them would eventually try if allowed to consolidate their operations and plan such attacks. The immediate threat they pose lies in their abilities and willingness to strike American targets in their regions of operation or to harm U.S. interests in other ways. The U.S. should support capable African military and security operations through the State Department and other federal agencies responsible for granting foreign military education, training, and security assistance. l Build a coalition of the cooperative. Rather than thinning limited federal resources by spreading funds across all countries (including some that are unsupportive or even hostile to the United States,) the next Administration should focus on those countries with which the U.S. can expect a mutually beneficial relationship. After being designated focus countries by the State Department, such nations should receive a full suite of American engagement. That said, the next Administration should still maintain a baseline level of contact even with those countries with which it has less- than-fruitful relationships in order to encourage positive developments and to be in position to seize unexpected diplomatic opportunities as they arise. l Focus on core diplomatic activities, and stop promoting policies birthed in the American culture wars. African nations are particularly (and reasonably) non-receptive to the U.S. social policies such as abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives being imposed on them. The United States should focus on core security, economic, and human rights engagement with African partners and reject the promotion of divisive policies that hurt the deepening of shared goals between the U.S. and its African partners. Europe American foreign policy has long benefited from cooperation with the countries of Europe (generally, the EU), and any conservative Administration should build on this resource. Yet the transatlantic relationship is complex, with security, trade, and political dimensions. First, the Europe, Eurasia, and Russia region is made up of relatively wealthy and technologically advanced societies that should be expected to bear a fair share of both security needs and global security architecture: The United States cannot be expected to provide a defense umbrella for countries unwilling to contribute appropriately. At stake after 2024 will be examining the status of the Wales Pledge of 2 percent of gross domestic product toward defense by NATO members. The new Administration will also want to encourage nations to exceed that pledge. Second, transatlantic trade is a significant part of the global economy, and it is in the U.S. national interest to amplify it, especially because this means weaning
AI Analysis:
"HRES 880 focuses on strengthening the US-India partnership in areas like counterterrorism and cybercrime, which tangentially relate to intelligence community functions, but it does not address the internal reforms, workforce diversity, politicization, oversight, or technology competition themes central to the Project 2025 Intelligence Community policy."
— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023). — 234 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 36. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 37. “Independent IC Analytic Ombudsman’s [Report] on Politicization of Intelligence,” attached to January 6, 2021, Zulauf letter. 38. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 2 (January 5, 2010), pp. 707–731, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-2010-01-05/pdf/E9-31418.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 39. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Classified Information,” November 4, 2010, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 216 (November 9, 2010), pp. 68675–68677, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 40. Agathe Demarais, “How the U.S.–Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war- semiconductors-export-controls-biden/ (accessed February 28, 2023). 41. Scott Stewart, “The Risk to Undercover Operatives in the Digital Age,” Stratfor Worldview, October 29, 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/risk-undercover-operatives-digital-age (accessed February 24, 2023). 42. Lauren Pitruzzello, “Human Intelligence: Former CIA Officer Talks About Espionage in the Digital Age, University of Delaware UDaily, March 22, 2012, https://www1.udel.edu/udaily/2012/mar/global-agenda- grenier-032212.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 43. Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman, “‘Shattered’: Inside the Secret Battle to Save America’s Undercover Spies in the Digital Age,” Yahoo News, December 30, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/shattered-inside- the-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-age-100029026.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 44. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, “U.S.–Safe Harbor Framework,” https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/ privacy-security/us-eu-safe-harbor-framework (accessed March 11, 2023). 45. “Fact Sheet: Overview of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield Network,” U.S. Department of Commerce, https://2014-2017.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-us_privacy_shield_fact_ sheet.pdf (accessed March 11, 2023). 46. “Fact Sheet: United States and European Commission Announce Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,” The White House, March 25, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/25/ fact-sheet-united-states-and-european-commission-announce-trans-atlantic-data-privacy-framework/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 47. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities,” October 7, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 198 (October 14, 2022), pp. 62283– 62297, (accessed March 7, 2023). 48. Warren P. Strobel, “Release of Ukraine Intelligence Represents New Front in U.S. Information War with Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, updated April 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-represents- new-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001 (accessed February 24, 2023). 49. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security- memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks- to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/#:~:text=To%20mitigate%20this%20risk%2C%20the%20United%20 States%20must,the%20quantum%20risk%20as%20is%20feasible%20by%202035 (accessed March 12, 2023). See also President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14073, “Enhancing the National Quantum Initiative Advisory Committee,” May 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 89 (May 9, 2022), pp. 27909–27911, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-09/pdf/2022-10076.pdf (accessed March 12, 2023); and “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces Two Presidential Directives Advancing Quantum Technologies,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/fact- sheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/ (accessed March 12, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation Act
119/hr/3429
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 3817 Marysville Boulevard in Sacramento, California, as the "Grantland Johnson Post Office".
119/hr/2488
To require the Secretary of State to submit a report on participation in educational and cultural exchange programs.
119/hr/6428