Dismissing the election contest relating to the office of Representative from the Fourteenth Congressional District of Florida.

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Bill ID: 119/hres/308

Last Updated: December 9, 2025

Dismissing the election contest relating to the office of Representative from the Fourteenth Congressional District of Florida.

HRES. 308, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$154,506 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Election Commission" section, p. 898-900 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

December 8, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Bill Analysis: HRES 308**

This resolution is a trivial exercise in bureaucratic housekeeping, dismissing an election contest in Florida's 14th Congressional District. I'll summarize the key points, but let's be clear: this bill has no material impact on my interests or the broader economic landscape.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of HRES 308 is to dismiss an election contest filed under the Federal Contested Election Act. The resolution asserts that the House of Representatives lacks jurisdiction over primary elections, caucuses, or conventions, thereby rendering the contest moot.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** There are no significant changes to existing law in this resolution. It's a narrow, procedural decision that reinforces the current framework for election contests.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The immediate stakeholders are the contestants involved in the disputed election and their respective parties. However, the broader implications are negligible, as this resolution doesn't alter the underlying dynamics of campaign finance or electoral politics.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** From a strategic perspective, this bill is a non-event. It won't influence my investment decisions or affect the trajectory of my business interests. The real action lies in bills that shape regulatory environments, tax policies, or trade agreements – not in minor election disputes.

In terms of campaign finance, I'd categorize the PACs and donors backing the sponsors of this resolution as "inefficient rent-seekers." Their efforts are misallocated, as this bill won't yield meaningful returns on investment. Smart capital allocation would focus on bills with more substantial economic implications.

Committee capture is not a significant concern in this case, as the House Administration Committee's actions are largely procedural. However, I do note that the committee's chair, Mr. Steil, has received contributions from various industry groups and donors who might be seeking to curry favor. This could be seen as "synergistic alignment" – a mutually beneficial arrangement where politicians and special interests collaborate to advance their respective agendas.

Ultimately, HRES 308 is a minor distraction from the more pressing issues that shape our economy and society. As a visionary entrepreneur, I'll continue to focus on driving innovation and growth, unencumbered by the petty squabbles of electoral politics.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$154,506

21 donors

PACs

Organizations

$26,600

Committees

Individuals

$127,906

No PAC contributions found

FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMUNITY

2 transactions

$6,600

HO CHUNK NATION

2 transactions

$6,200

ONEIDA NATION

3 transactions

$4,000

OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA

1 transaction

$3,300

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

2 transactions

$3,000

CHEROKEE NATION

1 transaction

$2,500

THE CHICKASAW NATION

1 transaction

$1,000

No committee contributions found

MAYER, SCOTT A.

3 transactions

$33,000

ADAMANY, KIMBERLY K.

2 transactions

$13,636

MAYER, SUSANNE

2 transactions

$13,200

G, DAVID

1 transaction

$6,870

WHITE, MICHAEL

1 transaction

$6,600

ADAMANY, MICHAEL

1 transaction

$6,600

BUHOLZER, GLENDA

1 transaction

$6,600

WILEY, LADD

1 transaction

$6,600

MOORE, NOEL G.

1 transaction

$6,600

BUSH, KATHLEEN M.

1 transaction

$6,600

BUSH, MARK F.

1 transaction

$6,600

MURESIANU, ANDREI

1 transaction

$5,000

BARRETT, BRAD

1 transaction

$5,000

SUZMAN, ANDREW

1 transaction

$5,000

Donor Network - Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Show Also Donated To

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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 52 nodes and 30 connections (68 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $154,506

Top Donors - Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

7 Orgs14 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Election Commission

Weak

Vector: 62%

Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HRES 308 concerns the House's jurisdiction over contested congressional elections under the Federal Contested Election Act, while the Project 2025 FEC section focuses on reforming the Federal Election Commission's litigating authority, term limits, and campaign finance rules. Both touch on federal election oversight but address distinct mechanisms, resulting only a weak thematic connection."

Key themes:election lawfederal jurisdictioncongressional oversight

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Federal Election Commission

Weak

Vector: 62%

Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HRES 308 concerns the House's jurisdictional authority to dismiss an election contest, whereas the Project 2025 policy focuses on reforming the FEC's litigating authority, commissioner terms, and guidance processes; the two address different aspects of election oversight with only a tangential connection to election law."

Key themes:election lawjurisdictionfederal oversight

Federal Communications Commission

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 895-897AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HRES 308 concerns the House's jurisdictional authority to dismiss an election contest under the Federal Contested Election Act, whereas the Project 2025 policy focuses on directing the DOJ and FEC to avoid overenforcement of FECA and protect political speech. Both touch on election law, but their substantive objectives and mechanisms differ significantly."

Key themes:election lawFederal Contested Election Actjurisdictional limitsenforcement oversight

— 863 — Federal Election Commission l The President assuming office in 2025 must ensure, if the three Republican commissioners do not wish to remain on the FEC past their terms, that nominees for these positions share the views of those commissioners. l Also, to the extent that the President has the ability to negotiate with the Democratic Party leader in the Senate, he should try to temper any choice of the opposition party to ensure that this individual does not have extreme views on aggressive overenforcement that would severely restrict political speech and protected party, campaign, and associational activities. U.S. Department of Justice/FEC-Related Activities. The President does have control of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Thus, he has authority as Presi- dent, primarily through his choice of attorney general and other political appointees, to direct the prosecutorial functions of the DOJ regarding criminal enforcement of FECA. Such investigations and prosecutions are carried out by the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, with the assistance, coordination, and help of the Offices of U.S. Attorneys in whatever state an alleged violation occurs. l The President must ensure that the DOJ, just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear violations of FECA. The department must not construe ambiguous provisions against the public instead of the government or apply FECA in a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity. It should be but is not always obvious to overzealous government prosecutors that if a federal law is confusing, it would be unjust to prosecute individuals who are unable to determine if they are violating the law. l The President should direct the DOJ and the attorney general not to prosecute individuals under an interpretation of the law with which the FEC—the expert agency designated by Congress to enforce the law civilly and issue regulations establishing the standards under which the law is applied—does not agree. l In making prosecution decisions, DOJ should be instructed to consult and consider all official actions by the FEC that interpret the law including prior enforcement actions, regulatory pronouncements, and advisory opinions, just as private practitioners, the public, and political actors must do. — 864 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It is fundamentally unfair for the DOJ to prosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situ- ated individual has not violated the law. Furthermore, this rule should apply even when there is a tied or three-to-three vote by the FEC commissioners whether in an enforcement action or an advisory opinion since under the statute, the FEC cannot take any action unless there are four affirmative votes. Again, it seems obvious that if the commissioners designated by Congress to interpret the law are unable to determine what the law requires, then it is unfair to prosecute a citizen for violating that law. The DOJ should not engage in crim- inal prosecutions that stretch legal theories and defy FEC interpretations and regulations. Another issue directly related to what has often been a contentious relationship between the FEC and the DOJ is the conduct of litigation. The vast majority of federal agencies are defended by the DOJ, which also represents them when the agency is pursuing litigation as a plaintiff. The FEC, however, is one of the few federal agencies with independent litigating authority.10 The FEC’s lawyers represent the agency in federal court up through the federal courts of appeal. If a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, then the Office of the Solicitor General of the Justice Department represents the FEC. In recent years, the FEC has failed to defend itself against litigation filed by political allies of certain Democrat commissioners. It takes four votes to authorize the general counsel of the FEC to defend a lawsuit filed against the agency, and those commissioners have refused to provide that fourth vote, so “the public was treated to the scandalous spectacle of the Commission—an independent agency of the United States government—defaulting in litigation before federal courts.”11 These cases involved enforcement matters in which the commissioners dis- agreed on whether a violation of the law had occurred. Accordingly, the final votes of the commissioners did not approve moving forward with enforcement because there were not four affirmative votes that a violation of the law occurred. When private plaintiffs then sued the FEC for failing to take action, Democrat commissioners refused to authorize the defense of the FEC in litigation as a way of circumventing the prior final action of the FEC and the FECA four-vote requirement to authorize an enforcement action. Such defaults in litigation are unacceptable. l The President should direct the attorney general to defend the FEC in all litigation when there is a failure of the commissioners to authorize the general counsel of the agency to defend it. No legislation would be needed to accomplish this; the DOJ has the general authority to defend the government and its agencies in all litigation.

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Minimal

Vector: 60%

Pages: 542-544AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill addresses election contest jurisdiction and has no substantive connection to HUD housing policy objectives in Project 2025."

— 509 — Department of Housing and Urban Development 3. Repeal the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) regulation reinstituted under the Biden Administration30 and any other uses of special-purpose credit authorities to further equity.31 4. Eliminate the new Housing Supply Fund.32 l The Office of the Secretary should recommence proposed regulation put forward under the Trump Administration that would prohibit noncitizens, including all mixed-status families, from living in all federally assisted housing.33 HUD’s statutory obligations include providing housing for American citizens who are in need. HUD reforms must also ensure alignment with reforms implemented by other federal agencies where immigration status impacts public programs, certainly to include any reforms in the Public Charge regulatory framework administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Local welfare organizations, not the federal government, should step up to provide welfare for the housing of noncitizens. l The Office of the Secretary should execute regulatory and subregulatory guidance actions, across HUD programs and applicable to all relevant stakeholders, that would restrict program eligibility when admission would threaten the protection of the life and health of individuals and fail to encourage upward mobility and economic advancement through household self-sufficiency. Where admissible in regulatory action, HUD should implement reforms reducing the implicit anti-marriage bias in housing assistance programs,34 strengthen work and work-readiness requirements,35 implement maximum term limits for residents in PBRA and TBRA programs,36 and end Housing First37 policies so that the department prioritizes mental health and substance abuse issues before jumping to permanent interventions in homelessness.38 Notwithstanding administrative reforms, Congress should enact legislation that protects life and eliminates provisions in federal housing and welfare benefits policies that discourage work, marriage, and meaningful paths to upward economic mobility. l The AS or PDAS for the Office of Policy Development and Research should suspend all external research and evaluation grants in the Office of Policy Development and Research and end or realign to another office any functions that are not involved in the collection and use of data and survey administration functions and do not facilitate the execution of regulatory impact analysis studies. — 510 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l FHA leadership should increase the mortgage insurance premium (MIP) for all products above 20-year terms and maintain MIP for all products below 20-year terms and all refinances. FHA should encourage wealth-building homeownership opportunities, which can be accomplished best through shorter-duration mortgages.39 Ideally, Congress would contemplate a fundamental revision of FHA’s statutory restriction of single-family housing mortgage insurance to first-time homebuyers.40 This would include (with support from HUD leadership): 1. Moving the Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECM) program once again to its own special risk insurance fund. 2. Revising loan limit determinations. 3. Providing statutory flexibility for shorter-term products that amortize principal earlier and faster. l Statutorily restricting eligibility for first-time homebuyers and abandoning the affirmative obligation authorities erected for the single-family housing programs across federal agencies and government-sponsored enterprises.41 l The HUD Secretary should move the HUD Real Estate Assessment Center (REAC) from PIH to the Office of Housing, which already implements property standards in its multifamily housing lending programs through the multifamily accelerated processing (MAP) lending guidelines. Giving HUD the authority to streamline the enforcement of compliance with housing standards across the federal government and flexibility for physical inspections through private accreditation should also be considered. l HUD should maintain its requested budget authority for modernization initiatives that are applicable to the Office of the Chief Information Officer and program offices across the department. LONGER-TERM POLICY REFORM CONSIDERATIONS42 Congress has charged HUD principally with mandates for construction of the nation’s affordable housing stock in addition to setting and enforcing standards for decent housing and fair housing enforcement. Regardless of intent, HUD’s efforts have yielded mixed results at best. Even today, more than a half-century after Congress put enforcement of so-called fair housing in the hands of the HUD bureaucracy, implementation of this policy is muddled by the repeated applica- tion of affirmative race-based policies. Also, the production mandate for HUD’s

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Minimal

Vector: 59%

Pages: 545-547AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HRES 308 addresses jurisdictional limits of congressional election contests, while the Project 2025 HUD section focuses on housing policy reforms, administrative changes, and program oversight; there is no substantive thematic or policy overlap between the two."

Key themes:none

— 513 — Department of Housing and Urban Development ENDNOTES 1. At a 1998 Senate hearing, then-HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo acknowledged that the department “faced a competence gap” and had “the dubious distinction of being the only federal agency designated as ‘high risk’ by the General Accounting [now Government Accountability] Office (GAO),” even referencing the Section 8 rental subsidy as “on the brink of becoming the next savings and loan scandal,” and explained how the department was stepping up enforcement efforts “focused on closing the competence gap by eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.” See “Testimony of Secretary Andrew Cuomo before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies,” March 25, 1998, https://archives.hud.gov/ testimony/1998/tst32598.cfm (accessed March 4, 2023). 2. H.R. 7984, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-117, 89th Congress, August 10, 1965, https://www.congress.gov/89/statute/STATUTE-79/STATUTE-79-Pg451.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 3. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Budget in Brief, pp. 2 and 7, https://www.hud.gov/ sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/2023_BudgetInBriefFINAL.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 4. For example, the Special Applications Center (SAC) located in Chicago, Illinois, was established in 1998 as a division of the Office of Public and Indian Housing to accept, review, and approve all nonfunded, noncompetitive applications and plans for demolition, disposition, and conversion of land subject to an annual contributions contract (ACC) in public housing. 5. The Secretary has delegated full authority for the Administration and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity but also has delegated limited assignment and decision-making authority to the General Counsel. 6. Effectively the HUD Chief Operating Officer and appointed by the President with Senate advice and consent. 7. The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is an independent adjudicatory office within the Office of the Secretary. Led by a Director who is appointed by the Secretary, it supervises the Administrative Judges of the Office of Appeals, the administrative law judges of the Office of Administrative Law Judges, and the OHA support staff. The HUD Secretary appoints administrative judges and administrative law judges in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/ chapter-5 (accessed March 4, 2023). 8. HUD currently has a Departmental Equity Assessment Working Group, supported with five FTEs funded by the OSDBU, “as part of the President’s Executive Order 13985, Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government.” See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-15, https://www.hud.gov/sites/ dfiles/CFO/documents/2023HUDCongressionalJustificationsFINALelectronicversion.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023), and President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 13985, “Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government,” January 20, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 14 (January 25, 2021), pp. 7009–7013, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021- 01753.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 9. Interestingly, “[t]he 2023 President’s Budget requests $748 thousand for CFBNP, which is $436 thousand less than the 2022 Annualized CR level. The Budget reflects total funding (carryover and new authority) of $1.2 million, $448 thousand less than 2022 total funding.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-16. 10. See H.R. 558, Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Public Law No. 100-77, 100th Congress, July 22, 1987, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-101/pdf/STATUTE-101-Pg482.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). Later renamed the McKinney–Vento Homeless Assistance Act. 11. Established under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq., https:// www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 12. S. 566, Cranston–Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Public Law No. 101-625, 101st Congress, November 28, 1990, Title II, https://www.congress.gov/101/statute/STATUTE-104/STATUTE-104-Pg4079.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 13. S. 1, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Public Law No. 91-646, 91st Congress, January 2, 1971, https://www.congress.gov/91/statute/STATUTE-84/STATUTE-84-Pg1894.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). “The URA establishes the minimum Federal requirements for the acquisition of real property for Federally-funded programs and projects, and for the relocation of persons who must move from — 514 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise their homes, businesses, or farms as a direct result of acquisition, rehabilitation, or demolition for a Federally- funded program or project.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD Exchange, “49 CFR Part 24–URA Regulations,” published February 2005, https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/804/ura-and- real-property-acquisition-policies-act-49-cfr-part-24/ (accessed March 4, 2023). HUD is one of the 18 federal departments and agencies that “are subject to the Uniform Act.” U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, “Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs,” Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 243 (December 18, 2019), pp. 69466–69521, esp. p. 69484, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-12-18/pdf/2019-25558.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 14. H.R. 3219, Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-330, 104th Congress, October 26, 1996, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ330/PLAW-104publ330.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 15. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 6-1. The U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Wagner–Steagall Act) established the origins of locally chartered housing agencies that administer federal funding for various rental assistance programs—a quintessentially progressive New Deal–era policy that expanded the administrative state’s powers to the housing market—with the primary legislative intent of eradicating slum housing in urban areas, boosting jobs, and providing housing for the working poor. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). A decade later, the Housing Act of 1949 codified federal standards for housing livability—a rationale that HUD and federal legislators have continued to use to justify federal intervention in housing—establishing as a national policy objective the provision of a minimum standard of housing quality for all Americans. This legislation also statutorily established many of the rural housing programs that are administered at USDA and expanded programs facilitating the removal of slum housing in urban areas. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441 et seq., https:// www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 16. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, pp. 1-2 and 2-2. 17. The National Housing Act of 1934 established the FHA and the statutory authority for the secondary market. The main stated premise was to stimulate jobs and facilitate the housing and construction sector during the Great Depression. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12 (accessed March 4, 2023). 18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29 (accessed March 4, 2023). 20. HUD’s Departmental Enforcement Center (DEC) is led by a Director. It was established in 1998 as part of a broader effort to streamline and consolidate functions at HUD and was later merged with the Office of General Counsel. The DEC “is comprised of the Office of the Director, the Compliance Division, the Operations Division and five Satellite Offices” and describes its mission as “assuring the highest standards of ethics, management and accountability in the resolution of HUD's troubled properties.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Departmental Enforcement Center, “Program Offices: Departmental Enforcement Center,” https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/enforcement (accessed March 4, 2023). 21. H.R. 5334, Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Public Law No. 102-1017, 102nd Congress, October 28, 1992, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/102/statute/STATUTE-106/STATUTE-106-Pg3672.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 22. H.R. 8588, Inspector General Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-452, 95th Congress, October 12, 1978, https://www. congress.gov/95/statute/STATUTE-92/STATUTE-92-Pg1101.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 23. Guiding questions: What immediate administrative reforms of HUD and its programs can be made with high probability of success? What short-term legislative reforms can be proposed that, in tandem with administrative reforms, would achieve the HUD vision/mission objective? What HUD offices should be eliminated and/or realigned to reduce any redundancy that may persist in programmatic functions? 24. Wholly aside from reforms that would require legislation, the next Administration must ensure that key political appointees are able to acquit themselves as change agents to execute administrative reforms. Otherwise, whether because of a sheer lack of skill and expertise or simply a lack of will and philosophical alignment with reforms, staff may frustrate the efforts of committed political appointee staff and leadership to execute substantive administrative reforms. To achieve the policy and regulatory reforms outlined in this chapter, political appointees must be carefully placed in positions that reflect not only technical, market/ industry, and operational expertise, but also a shared will and commitment.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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Dismissing the election contest relating to the office of Representative from the Fourteenth Congressional District of Florida.