Dismissing the election contest relating to the office of Representative from the Fourteenth Congressional District of Florida.
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Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]
ID: S001213
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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Latest Action
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
December 9, 2025
Introduced
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of HRES 308 is to dismiss an election contest in Florida's 14th Congressional District. But don't be fooled – this isn't about upholding democracy or ensuring fair elections. No, no, no. This is about protecting the status quo and maintaining the power dynamics that keep our beloved politicians in office.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The resolution cites Section 2(1) of the Federal Contested Election Act, which conveniently limits the House's jurisdiction to general and special elections, excluding primary elections, caucuses, or conventions. How convenient! This provision is a cleverly crafted escape clause that allows Congress to wash its hands of any messy election disputes.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include the contestants in the disputed election, the voters of Florida's 14th Congressional District, and – most importantly – the politicians who benefit from this resolution. Let's not forget the real stakeholders here: the donors, lobbyists, and special interest groups that have invested heavily in these politicians.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of this resolution is twofold. Firstly, it sets a precedent for Congress to dismiss election contests without proper investigation or oversight. Secondly, it reinforces the notion that our elected officials are more interested in maintaining their grip on power than in ensuring fair and transparent elections.
Now, let's take a look at the patient's chart – I mean, the bill's sponsors and cosponsors. Ah, yes! Mr. Steil, the primary sponsor, has received generous donations from various PACs, including those representing big business and special interest groups. What a coincidence!
Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of " Politician-itis" – a disease characterized by an excessive desire for power, a lack of accountability, and a blatant disregard for the democratic process.
Treatment: A healthy dose of transparency, accountability, and term limits might help alleviate some of these symptoms. However, given the entrenched nature of this disease, I'm afraid the prognosis is grim.
In conclusion, HRES 308 is just another example of Congress's creative ways to avoid doing its job. It's a masterclass in legislative sleight-of-hand, designed to protect the interests of those in power while leaving the voters in the dark. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to make a mockery of democracy once again.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide
Introduction
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
Introduction
— 563 — Department of Justice Voter fraud includes unlawful practices concerning voter registration and ballot correction. When state legislatures are silent as to procedures for absentee ballot curing or provide specific rules governing that curing, neither counties nor courts may create a cure right where one does not exist, may not modify the law on curing, and certainly cannot engage in creating consent orders with the force of law that are inconsistent with the orders of other similarly situated counties. The DOJ has ceded substantial discretion concerning voter suppression to the Civil Rights Division. Since the Bush Administration, DOJ leadership has determined that using the Election Crimes Branch to prosecute fraudulent voter registration, including mail-in ballot fraud, was too politically costly.78 The Crim- inal Division’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses handbook advised that schemes that violated equal protection constituted “voter suppression” prosecut- able under 18 U.S. Code § 241 as part of the guidelines for which the department’s criminal prosecutors were trained.79 State-based investigations of election crimes are supposed to be referred to the Public Integrity Section for review. Historically, 18 U.S. Code § 241 (conspiracy against rights) was used as a basis for investigating state officials whose statements or orders violated the equal protection rights of voters or deliberately misinformed voters concerning the eligibility of their ballots. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has formalized the Civil Rights Divi- sion’s (as opposed to the Criminal Division’s) jurisdiction over 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions. The Criminal Division is no longer involved in consultation or review of 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations.80 The Criminal Division has accordingly advised states that “[i]n the case of a crime of violence or intimida- tion,” they should “call 911 immediately and before contacting federal authorities” because “[s]tate and local police have primary jurisdiction over polling places,”81 despite clearly applicable federal law. This is a mistake. With respect to the 2020 presidential election, there were no DOJ investigations of the appropriateness or lawfulness of state election guidance. Consider the state of Pennsylvania. The Secretary of State sent guidance to the counties stating that: This revised guidance addresses the issuance, voting and examination of provisional ballots under the Election Code. Provisional ballots were originally mandated by section 302 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 77 of 2019 went into effect for the 2020 Primary election. Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 12 of 2020 go into effect for the first time on November 3, 2020.82 HAVA, however, mandates provisional ballots only for eligible voters who were not on a state’s voter registration list.83 It does not apply to those who registered for mail-in voting but whose ballots were rejected due to some form of spoliation. — 564 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Pennsylvania Act 12 (amended in 2020) does not authorize curing by providing provisional ballots for mail-in voters whose ballots were rejected. Act 12 requires, as part of the mail-in application process, an affidavit that: [The elector] shall not be eligible to vote at a polling place on election day unless the elector brings the elector’s mail-in ballot to the elector’s polling place, remits the ballot and the envelope containing the declaration of the elector to the judge of elections to be spoiled and signs a statement subject to the penalties under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities) to the same effect.84 The law in Pennsylvania clearly states that no county may affirmatively provide provisional ballots: The mail-in voter must vote in person and sign a new affidavit. In the 2020 election, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that “the Election Code contains no requirement that voters whose ballots are deemed inadequately verified be apprised of this fact. Thus, unlike in-person voters, mail-in or absentee voters are not provided any opportunity to cure perceived defects in a timely man- ner.”85 Given the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s use of guidance to circumvent state law, the Pennsylvania Secretary of State should have been (and still should be) investigated and prosecuted for potential violations of 18 U.S. Code § 241. Investigations and prosecutions under 18 U.S. Code § 241 are currently within the jurisdictional oversight of the Civil Rights Division, not the Criminal Division.86 Only by moving authority for 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions back to the Criminal Division will the rule of law be appropriately enforced. Rejecting Third-Party Requests for Politically Motivated Investigations or Prosecutions. The DOJ should reject demands from third-party groups that ask it to threaten politically motivated investigation or prosecution of those engag- ing in lawful and, in many cases, constitutionally protected activity. By acceding to such demands, the department risks diminishing its credibility with the American public. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that communications between govern- ment officials and third-party groups are generally unprotected by privilege and subject to disclosure, whether via subpoena to the third-party group or via request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. These communications can even be made public voluntarily by the third-party group. A recent example illustrates the risks posed by such activity. On October 4, 2021, Attorney General Merrick Garland issued a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, calling on the FBI to work with each U.S. Attorney to “con- vene meetings with federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial leaders” to discuss strategies for addressing “threats against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff.”87 Subsequent reporting and investigation revealed that the
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.