The bill
Stopping Foreign Influence in Elections Act of 2026
HR. 9771, 119th Congress.
Sponsored by
Rep. Malliotakis, Nicole [R-NY-11]
ID: M000317
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9771, 119th Congress.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Election Commission" section, p. 898-900 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 669.
August 26, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**HR 9771: Stopping Foreign Influence in Elections Act of 2026** *Or: How to Pretend You’re Fixing Democracy While Ignoring the Elephant (and the Koch Brothers) in the Room*
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated goal of HR 9771 is to deter foreign interference in U.S. elections by penalizing tax-exempt organizations that accept money from foreign nationals and then funnel it to political committees or 501(c)(4) “social welfare” groups. Sponsors Malliotakis and Fine frame this as a noble stand against Kremlin troll farms and Beijing-backed influence ops. In reality, it’s a legislative band-aid on a sucking chest wound—designed to look tough on foreign meddling while doing nothing about the domestic oligarchs, dark money, and Super PACs that actually buy elections. It’s less about safeguarding democracy and more about giving incumbents a shiny prop to wave during re-election ads: “See? I fought the Russkies!” while their campaigns swim in cash from Sheldon Adelson’s ghost and fossil fuel barons.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends the Internal Revenue Code to create a byzantine penalty regime for certain tax-exempt orgs (501(c)s with >$200k gross receipts or >$500k assets) that accept foreign donations and then contribute to political committees or other 501(c)(4)s. - First offense: 100% excise tax on the tainted contribution. - Second offense: 200% tax. - Third+ offense: 200% tax *plus* automatic loss of tax-exempt status for two years. It relies on donor self-reporting of nationality (with a wink-and-nod “unless you should’ve known” loophole) and only applies to contributions made *after* a one-year grace period—because nothing says “urgent national security threat” like waiting 12 months to start enforcing the law. It targets the *conduit*, not the *source*: foreign nationals giving to a 501(c)(4) that then gives to a Super PAC? Still legal. Foreign money laundered through a U.S. citizen? Also fine. This bill assumes foreign actors are too stupid to use cutouts—a generous assumption, given how often they’ve succeeded.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Affected:** Mid-sized 501(c)(4)s, trade associations, and ideological nonprofits that skim foreign cash (e.g., foreign-owned U.S. subsidiaries’ lobbying arms, diaspora groups with overseas donors). Think: the NRA if it took rubles, or Planned Parenthood if it took yuan—both already illegal under existing FECA, but this adds tax penalties for extra performative flair. - **Unaffected:** Super PACs, 527s, candidate committees, and dark money giants that take foreign money indirectly via U.S. intermediaries (which is *all* of them). Also unaffected: any foreign actor smart enough to launder cash through an American straw donor—which is, again, all of them. - **Stakeholders:** Lobbyists who’ll now charge extra to structure foreign donations to avoid the “testing period”; IRS agents tasked with proving orgs “should have known” a donor lied about their passport; and voters, who’ll be told this bill “protects elections” while their ballots continue to be drowned in untraceable, domestically sourced billions.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** Impact: Minimal. The bill addresses a microscopic slice of foreign influence—direct, traceable foreign donations to filing nonprofits that then directly give to political committees. Real foreign interference (see: 2016, 2020) uses hacked emails, social media bots, and opaque networks of U.S.-based cutouts. This bill wouldn’t have stopped a single Russian troll farm or Chinese propaganda outlet. Implications: It lets Congress claim action on foreign influence while ignoring the real corruption:
Rep. Malliotakis, Nicole [R-NY-11]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: F000484
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 32 nodes and 35 connections
Total contributions: $35
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on deterring foreign influence in elections through tax penalties on intermediaries, while the Project 2025 policy addresses FEC structural reforms, litigation authority, commissioner term limits, and regulatory clarity—there is minimal thematic overlap."
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on using tax penalties to deter foreign election interference, which tangentially relates to Project 2025's tax administration reform goals by expanding IRS enforcement duties, but it does not align with the core objectives of fundamental tax reform, reducing IRS size, or withdrawing from international tax organizations like the OECD."
— 698 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Fundamental Tax Reform. Achieving fundamental tax reform offers the prospect of a dramatic improvement in American living standards and an equally dramatic reduction in tax compliance costs. Lobbyists, lawyers, benefit consul- tants, accountants, and tax preparers would see their incomes decline, however. The federal income tax system heavily taxes capital and corporate income and discourages work, savings, and investment. The public finance literature is clear that a consumption tax would minimize government’s distortion of private economic decisions and thus be the least eco- nomically harmful way to raise federal tax revenues.28 There are several forms that a consumption tax could take, including a national sales tax, a business transfer tax, a Hall–Rabushka flat tax,29 or a cash flow tax.30 Supermajority to Raise Taxes. Treasury should support legislation instituting a three-fifths vote threshold in the U.S. House and the Senate to raise income or corporate tax rates to create a wall of protection for the new rate structure. Many states have implemented such a supermajority vote requirement. Tax Competition. Tax competition between states and countries is a positive force for liberty and limited government.31 The Biden Administration, under the direction of Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, has pushed for a global minimum corporate tax that would increase taxation and the size of government in the U.S. and around the world. This attempt to “harmonize” global tax rates is an attempt to create a global tax cartel to quash tax competition and to increase the tax burden globally. The U.S. should not outsource its tax policy to international organizations. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Organi- zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in conjunction with the European Union, has long tried to end financial privacy and impose regulations on countries with low (or no) income taxes. In fact, on tax, environmental, corpo- rate governance and employment issues, the OECD has become little more than a taxpayer-funded left-wing think tank and lobbying organization.32 The United States provides about one-fifth of OECD’s funding.33 The U.S. should end its finan- cial support and withdraw from the OECD. TAX ADMINISTRATION The Internal Revenue Service is a poorly managed, utterly unresponsive and increasingly politicized agency, and has been for at least two decades. It is time for meaningful reform to improve the efficiency and fairness of tax administration, better protect taxpayer rights, and achieve greater transparency and accountability. A substantial number of the problems attributed to the IRS are actually a function of congressional action that has made the Internal Revenue Code ridiculously complex, imposed tremendous administrative burdens on both the public and the IRS, and given massive non-tax missions to the IRS. But the culture, administrative practices, and management at the IRS need to change. — 699 — Department of the Treasury Doubling the IRS? The Inflation Reduction Act contains a radical $80 billion expansion of the IRS—enough to double the size of its workforce.34 Unless Congress reverses this policy, the IRS will become much more intrusive and impose still greater costs on the American people. The Biden Administration has also sought to make the tax system’s adminis- trative burden much worse in other ways. For example, it has proposed creating a comprehensive financial account information reporting regime that would apply to all business and personal accounts with more than $600. Banks would be required to collect the taxpayer identification numbers of and file a revised Form 1099-K for all affected payees, as well as provide additional information.35 This massive increase in the scope and breadth of information reporting should be unequivo- cally opposed. Management. The IRS has approximately 81,000 employees.36 Of those, only two are presidential appointments—the Commissioner and the Chief Counsel.37 As a practical matter, it is impossible for these two officials to overcome bureau- cratic inertia and to implement policy changes that the IRS bureaucracy wants to impede. That is why, notwithstanding decades of sound and fury, almost nothing has changed at the IRS. For the IRS to change and become more accountable, more transparent, and better managed, there is a need to increase the number of Presidential appoint- ments subject to Senate confirmation, and not subject to Senate confirmation, at the IRS. At the very least, Congress should ensure that the Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, the Deputy Commissioner for Operations Support, the National Taxpayer Advocate, the Commissioner of the Wage and Investment Division, the Commissioner of the Large Business and International Division, the Commissioner of the Small Business Self-Employed Division, and the Com- missioner of the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division are presidential appointees.38 Information Technology. Despite the investment of billions of dollars for at least two decades, IRS information technology (IT) systems remain deficient.39 The IRS inadequately protects taxpayer information, its IT systems do not ade- quately support operations or taxpayer services, and its matching and detection algorithms are antiquated. These problems are not primarily about resources. The IRS has spent approxi- mately $27 billion on IT during the past decade, with $7 billion of that designated as “development, modernization and enhancement.“40 The problem is one of man- agement. The bureaucracy is not up to the task, and neither Congress nor a long line of IRS commissioners has forced changes. A Deputy Commissioner for Operations Support with strong IT management skills should be appointed by the IRS Commissioner or the President (once the position is made a presidential appointment). The various subordinates to the
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on preventing foreign influence in elections through tax penalties on intermediaries, while the Project 2025 policy addresses voter fraud, ballot curing procedures, and DOJ jurisdiction over civil rights enforcement—topics with minimal thematic overlap."
— 563 — Department of Justice Voter fraud includes unlawful practices concerning voter registration and ballot correction. When state legislatures are silent as to procedures for absentee ballot curing or provide specific rules governing that curing, neither counties nor courts may create a cure right where one does not exist, may not modify the law on curing, and certainly cannot engage in creating consent orders with the force of law that are inconsistent with the orders of other similarly situated counties. The DOJ has ceded substantial discretion concerning voter suppression to the Civil Rights Division. Since the Bush Administration, DOJ leadership has determined that using the Election Crimes Branch to prosecute fraudulent voter registration, including mail-in ballot fraud, was too politically costly.78 The Crim- inal Division’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses handbook advised that schemes that violated equal protection constituted “voter suppression” prosecut- able under 18 U.S. Code § 241 as part of the guidelines for which the department’s criminal prosecutors were trained.79 State-based investigations of election crimes are supposed to be referred to the Public Integrity Section for review. Historically, 18 U.S. Code § 241 (conspiracy against rights) was used as a basis for investigating state officials whose statements or orders violated the equal protection rights of voters or deliberately misinformed voters concerning the eligibility of their ballots. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has formalized the Civil Rights Divi- sion’s (as opposed to the Criminal Division’s) jurisdiction over 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions. The Criminal Division is no longer involved in consultation or review of 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations.80 The Criminal Division has accordingly advised states that “[i]n the case of a crime of violence or intimida- tion,” they should “call 911 immediately and before contacting federal authorities” because “[s]tate and local police have primary jurisdiction over polling places,”81 despite clearly applicable federal law. This is a mistake. With respect to the 2020 presidential election, there were no DOJ investigations of the appropriateness or lawfulness of state election guidance. Consider the state of Pennsylvania. The Secretary of State sent guidance to the counties stating that: This revised guidance addresses the issuance, voting and examination of provisional ballots under the Election Code. Provisional ballots were originally mandated by section 302 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 77 of 2019 went into effect for the 2020 Primary election. Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 12 of 2020 go into effect for the first time on November 3, 2020.82 HAVA, however, mandates provisional ballots only for eligible voters who were not on a state’s voter registration list.83 It does not apply to those who registered for mail-in voting but whose ballots were rejected due to some form of spoliation. — 564 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Pennsylvania Act 12 (amended in 2020) does not authorize curing by providing provisional ballots for mail-in voters whose ballots were rejected. Act 12 requires, as part of the mail-in application process, an affidavit that: [The elector] shall not be eligible to vote at a polling place on election day unless the elector brings the elector’s mail-in ballot to the elector’s polling place, remits the ballot and the envelope containing the declaration of the elector to the judge of elections to be spoiled and signs a statement subject to the penalties under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities) to the same effect.84 The law in Pennsylvania clearly states that no county may affirmatively provide provisional ballots: The mail-in voter must vote in person and sign a new affidavit. In the 2020 election, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that “the Election Code contains no requirement that voters whose ballots are deemed inadequately verified be apprised of this fact. Thus, unlike in-person voters, mail-in or absentee voters are not provided any opportunity to cure perceived defects in a timely man- ner.”85 Given the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s use of guidance to circumvent state law, the Pennsylvania Secretary of State should have been (and still should be) investigated and prosecuted for potential violations of 18 U.S. Code § 241. Investigations and prosecutions under 18 U.S. Code § 241 are currently within the jurisdictional oversight of the Civil Rights Division, not the Criminal Division.86 Only by moving authority for 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions back to the Criminal Division will the rule of law be appropriately enforced. Rejecting Third-Party Requests for Politically Motivated Investigations or Prosecutions. The DOJ should reject demands from third-party groups that ask it to threaten politically motivated investigation or prosecution of those engag- ing in lawful and, in many cases, constitutionally protected activity. By acceding to such demands, the department risks diminishing its credibility with the American public. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that communications between govern- ment officials and third-party groups are generally unprotected by privilege and subject to disclosure, whether via subpoena to the third-party group or via request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. These communications can even be made public voluntarily by the third-party group. A recent example illustrates the risks posed by such activity. On October 4, 2021, Attorney General Merrick Garland issued a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, calling on the FBI to work with each U.S. Attorney to “con- vene meetings with federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial leaders” to discuss strategies for addressing “threats against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff.”87 Subsequent reporting and investigation revealed that the
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.