1071 Repeal to Protect Small Business Lending Act
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Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
ID: W000816
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Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
The "1071 Repeal to Protect Small Business Lending Act" is a bill that claims to repeal data collection requirements for small business loans under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Oh, how noble! They're trying to "protect" small businesses from the horrors of... reporting loan data.
In reality, this bill is a gift to the banking lobby, wrapped in a veneer of concern for small businesses. The real beneficiaries are the financial institutions that will no longer have to bother with pesky compliance costs. It's a classic case of regulatory capture, where industries use their influence to water down or repeal regulations that might actually hold them accountable.
Let's examine the "findings" section, which is essentially a laundry list of talking points crafted by the banking lobby:
* Section 704B of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act imposes data collection and reporting requirements on financial institutions. (Oh no, the horror!) * These requirements have resulted in increased compliance costs for financial institutions. (Boo-hoo, poor banks!) * The regulatory burdens created by these requirements disproportionately impact smaller financial institutions. (Aww, community banks are struggling!)
What's missing from this narrative is any mention of the actual purpose of Section 704B: to collect data on small business lending and identify potential discriminatory practices. You see, the banking lobby doesn't want anyone looking too closely at their lending habits, lest they be forced to confront the possibility that they might be engaging in discriminatory behavior.
The bill's sponsors claim that repealing these requirements will "reduce regulatory barriers" and support greater access to credit for small businesses. What a load of nonsense! This is simply a way to gut regulations that might actually hold banks accountable for their lending practices.
In terms of compliance requirements, the bill is remarkably light on details. It simply repeals Section 704B without providing any guidance on what will replace it or how financial institutions will be expected to comply with new regulations (if any).
As for enforcement mechanisms and penalties, don't bother looking â they're nonexistent. This bill is a free pass for banks to do whatever they want, without fear of reprisal.
The economic and operational impacts of this bill are clear: it will make it easier for banks to engage in discriminatory lending practices, while also reducing transparency and accountability in the financial sector. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to create a bill that's both morally reprehensible and economically disastrous.
In conclusion, HR 976 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to gut regulations that might actually hold banks accountable for their actions, all while pretending to "protect" small businesses. Don't be fooled â this bill is a wolf in sheep's clothing, designed to benefit the banking lobby at the expense of everyone else.
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Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
Congress 119 ⢠2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 837 â Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHORâS NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the DoddâFrank Act.32 Since the Bureauâs inception, its status as an âinde- pendentâ agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investorâs Business Daily accused the CFPB of âdiverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Partyâ and plan- ning âto create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutionsâ that would use âramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigationsâ to âbankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.â34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as âa victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.â39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of DoddâFrank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and â 838 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite âconsumer educationâ and âfinancial literacyâ programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what âconsumer educationâ or âfinancial literacy programsâ to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPBâs leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because â[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.â46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPBâs âperpetual insulation from Congressâs appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau âno longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountableâ to Congress and, ultimately, to the peopleâ48 and that â[b]y abandoning its âmost complete and effectualâ check on âthe overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the governmentââindeed, by enabling them in the Bureauâs caseâCongress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.â49 The Court further remarked that the CFPBâs âcapacious portfolio of authority acts âas a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.ââ50
Introduction
â 715 â Department of the Treasury 67. On banks, credit unions, broker-dealers, and other financial institutions as normally understood, but note that 31 U.S. Code §5312(a)(2) also defines âfinancial institutionsâ to include money service businesses; insurance companies; jewelers; pawnbrokers; travel agencies; dealers in automobiles, airplanes, and boats; persons involved in real estate closings and settlements; casinos; and telegraph companies. 68. David R. Burton, âThe Corporate Transparency Act and the ILLICIT CASH Act,â Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3449, November 7, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/BG3449_0. pdf, and David R. Burton to AnnaLou Tirol, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, âRe: Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements,â Comment, May 5, 2021 http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/ Regulatory_Comments/FINCEN-2021-0005-0132_attachment_1.pdf (accessed March 19, 2023). 69. Burton comment, ibid. 70. Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 189, September 30, 2022, pp. 59498â59596. 71. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2022â2026 Strategic Plan. 72. Ibid. 73. United Nations, âParis Agreement,â 2015, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/ application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 74. United Nations, âUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,â GE.5â62220, 1992, https://unfccc. int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 75. âWhat Is ESG?â ESG Hurts, https://esghurts.com/ (accessed March 22, 2023), and Samuel Gregg, âWhy Business Should Dispense with ESG,â American Institute for Economic Research, December 4, 2022, https:// www.aier.org/article/why-business-should-dispense-with-esg/ (accessed March 22, 2023). 76. PRI Association, âWhat are the Principles for Responsible Investment?â https://www.unpri.org/about-us/ what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment (accessed March 22, 2023). The PRI Association is a U.N.- affiliated non-governmental organization. See also PRI Association, âArticles of Association of PRI Association,â Art. 9, November 14, 2016, https://d8g8t13e9vf2o.cloudfront.net/Uploads/g/e/r/2016-11-14-Articles-of- Association-of-PRI-Association-.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023). â 717 â 23 EXPORTâIMPORT BANK THE EXPORTâIMPORT BANK SHOULD BE ABOLISHED Veronique de Rugy The ExportâImport Bank of the United States (EXIM or the Bank) is a federal agency that was established in 1934 to provide export subsidies through tax- payer-backed financing to private exporting corporations, as well as to foreign companies buying U.S. exports, with the ostensible purpose of promoting American exports, creating jobs, supporting small businesses, improving U.S. competitive- ness, and protecting U.S. taxpayers. In 1986, David Stockman, who served as Director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Ronald Reagan, wrote that: Export subsidies are a mercantilist illusion, based on the illogical proposition that a nation can raise its employment and GNP by giving away its goods for less than what it costs to make them.⌠Export subsidies subtract from GNP and jobs, not expand themâŚ. Moreover, in 1981, the EXIMâs practice was to bestow about two thirds of its subsidies on a handful of giant manufacturers, including Boeing aircraft, General Electric, and Westinghouse.1 Since then, very little has changed. EXIM operates in effect as a protectionist agency that picks winners and losers in the market by providing political privi- leges to firms that are already well-financed. By doing so, it risks taxpayer funds as it stymies economic growth. This reality is not altered by the argument that the Bank could be a weapon to fight Chinaâan argument that rests on a misguided
Introduction
â 715 â Department of the Treasury 67. On banks, credit unions, broker-dealers, and other financial institutions as normally understood, but note that 31 U.S. Code §5312(a)(2) also defines âfinancial institutionsâ to include money service businesses; insurance companies; jewelers; pawnbrokers; travel agencies; dealers in automobiles, airplanes, and boats; persons involved in real estate closings and settlements; casinos; and telegraph companies. 68. David R. Burton, âThe Corporate Transparency Act and the ILLICIT CASH Act,â Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3449, November 7, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/BG3449_0. pdf, and David R. Burton to AnnaLou Tirol, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, âRe: Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements,â Comment, May 5, 2021 http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/ Regulatory_Comments/FINCEN-2021-0005-0132_attachment_1.pdf (accessed March 19, 2023). 69. Burton comment, ibid. 70. Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 189, September 30, 2022, pp. 59498â59596. 71. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2022â2026 Strategic Plan. 72. Ibid. 73. United Nations, âParis Agreement,â 2015, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/ application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 74. United Nations, âUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,â GE.5â62220, 1992, https://unfccc. int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 75. âWhat Is ESG?â ESG Hurts, https://esghurts.com/ (accessed March 22, 2023), and Samuel Gregg, âWhy Business Should Dispense with ESG,â American Institute for Economic Research, December 4, 2022, https:// www.aier.org/article/why-business-should-dispense-with-esg/ (accessed March 22, 2023). 76. PRI Association, âWhat are the Principles for Responsible Investment?â https://www.unpri.org/about-us/ what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment (accessed March 22, 2023). The PRI Association is a U.N.- affiliated non-governmental organization. See also PRI Association, âArticles of Association of PRI Association,â Art. 9, November 14, 2016, https://d8g8t13e9vf2o.cloudfront.net/Uploads/g/e/r/2016-11-14-Articles-of- Association-of-PRI-Association-.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.