Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
ID: B001302
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
January 3, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed Mr. Biggs from Arizona. Let's dissect this farce and expose the real disease beneath.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2025 is a cleverly crafted bill that pretends to address the issue of national injunctions. But, as we all know, politicians are masters of misdirection. The true purpose of this bill is to limit the power of the judiciary and consolidate authority in the hands of the executive branch. It's a classic case of "I'm not a dictator, I just want to streamline the process."
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Chapter 155 of title 28, United States Code, by adding a new section (2285) that prohibits courts from issuing orders restraining enforcement against non-parties unless they are represented by a party acting in a representative capacity. Sounds innocuous enough, but let's not be fooled. This provision is designed to restrict the ability of courts to issue national injunctions, which have been a thorn in the side of the current administration.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved here: politicians, lobbyists, and special interest groups. The bill's sponsors claim it will "clarify" the law, but we all know that's just code for "we want to limit judicial oversight." The real stakeholders are the ones who stand to benefit from this power grab: corporations, government agencies, and other entities that want to avoid accountability.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a larger disease – the erosion of checks and balances in our system. By limiting the judiciary's ability to issue national injunctions, the executive branch gains more control over policy implementation. It's a subtle but significant shift in power that will have far-reaching consequences.
In conclusion, HR 97 is a masterclass in legislative deception. It's a bill designed to consolidate power, restrict judicial oversight, and further entrench the interests of special groups. As I always say, "Everyone lies." In this case, the sponsors of this bill are lying about their true intentions. But hey, what's new?
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Weber, Randy K. Sr. [R-TX-14]
ID: W000814
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]
ID: O000175
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Boebert, Lauren [R-CO-4]
ID: B000825
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Perry, Scott [R-PA-10]
ID: P000605
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 42 nodes and 42 connections
Total contributions: $170,419
Top Donors - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide
Introduction
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
Introduction
— 560 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next conservative Administration should embrace the Constitution and understand the obligation of the executive branch to use its independent resources and authorities to restrain the excesses of both the legislative and judicial branches. This will mean ensuring that the leadership of the Department of Justice and its components understand the separation of powers, that pushback among the branches is a positive feature and not a defect of our system, and that the federal system is strengthened, not weakened, by disagreement among the branches. One example includes potentially seeking the overruling of Humphrey's Exec- utor v. United States.62 This case approved so-called independent agencies whose directors are not removable by the President at will. The Supreme Court has chipped away at Humphrey's Executor in cases like Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,63 but the precedent remains. The next conservative Adminis- tration should formally take the position that Humphrey's Executor violates the Constitution's separation of powers. Zealously Guarding Other Constitutional Protections. The next conserva- tive Administration must ensure that the DOJ zealously guards the constitutional rights of all Americans in all that it does. This extends not only to rights implicated in the department’s criminal activities, but to all rights enjoyed by the American people—such as the First Amendment. The department should reject any invi- tation to limit these fundamental promises based on the political ideology of the speech at issue. A recent Supreme Court case illustrates the problems that arise when the DOJ takes a cramped interpretation of the First Amendment in service of a political ideology. In 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, the department argued in favor of the government’s ability to coerce and compel what the lower courts all found to be pure speech.64 The oral argument made clear the department’s view that it was the viewpoint expressed that gave the government power to censor and compel speech. During oral argument, the United States took the remarkable position that government can compel a Christian website designer to imagine, create, and publish a custom website celebrating same-sex marriage but cannot compel an LGBT person to design a similar website celebrating opposite-sex marriage.65 In the government’s view, declining to create the latter website was based on an objec- tion to the message, while the former was based on status rather than message, but this argument inevitably turns on the viewpoint expressed. It means that the government gets to decide which viewpoints are protected and which are not—a frightening and blatantly unconstitutional proposition. Just as troubling, the government’s arguments against free speech are not lim- ited to the facts of 303 Creative. As Colorado admitted to the lower courts, all sorts of artists and speakers like speechwriters, photographers, and videographers can be compelled to design custom messages that violate their most fundamental convic- tions as long as it serves a certain viewpoint that the government wants to promote. — 561 — Department of Justice In fact, it was only a few years ago, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, that the govern- ment acknowledged the constitutional problems involved in compelling artists to speak government-favored messages. In that case, the United States acknowl- edged “a basic First Amendment principle that ‘freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.’”66 The department had it right when it argued that the government may not “compel the dissemination of its own preferred message,” because the First Amendment protects the “individual freedom of mind.”67 It was also correct when it argued that “[a]n artist cannot be forced to paint, a musician cannot be forced to play, and a poet cannot be forced to write.”68 The United States’ directly contrary position in 303 Creative is hard to explain based on anything other than its support for the message the State of Colorado was attempting to compel. It is black letter law that no official “can prescribe what shall be orthodox…or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”69 Rather, the First Amendment places “the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity.”70 As the Supreme Court has noted, government officials have frequently sought to “coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and country.”71 In the face of such attempts to coerce orthodoxy, the DOJ should maintain its commitment to upholding the Constitution’s neutral principles of free speech, which commit the government “to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”72 Pursuing Equal Protection for All Americans by Vigorously Enforcing Applicable Federal Civil Rights Laws in Government, Education, and the Private Sector. Entities across the private and public sectors in the United States have been besieged in recent years by an unholy alliance of special interests, rad- icals in government, and the far Left. This unholy alliance speaks in platitudes about advancing the interests of certain segments of American society, but that advancement comes at the expense of other Americans and in nearly all cases vio- lates long-standing federal law. Even though numerous federal laws prohibit discrimination based on notable immutable characteristics such as race and sex,73 the Biden Administration— through the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division and other federal entities—has enshrined affirmative discrimination in all aspects of its operations under the guise of “equity.” Federal agencies and their components have established so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) offices that have become the vehicles for this unlawful discrim- ination, and all departments and agencies have created “equity” plans to carry out these invidious schemes.74 To reverse this trend, the next conservative Adminis- tration should:
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.