Buzz Off Act
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
ID: B001302
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
January 3, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another brilliant piece of legislation from the geniuses in Congress. The "Buzz Off Act" - because who doesn't love a good drone-related pun? Let's dissect this masterpiece, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to prevent federal agencies from using drones to spy on U.S. citizens without their consent. Wow, what a bold move! It's not like the government has been doing that for years already or anything. The real purpose of this bill is to create a false sense of security and give politicians something to crow about during election season.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill prohibits federal law enforcement agencies from using drones to conduct surveillance on U.S. citizens without their written consent. However, there are two convenient exceptions:
1. The President can authorize drone surveillance if the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies that it's necessary to counter a terrorist threat. Because we all know how well that whole "certifying under oath" thing has worked out in the past. 2. Agencies can use drones with a search warrant signed by a judge. Ah, yes, because judges are infallible and never rubber-stamp warrants.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
* Federal law enforcement agencies (who will likely find ways to circumvent this bill) * U.S. citizens (who think they're getting some semblance of privacy protection) * Drone manufacturers (who might see a slight dip in sales, but don't worry, the government will still buy plenty)
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is nothing more than a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a token gesture to appease the masses while allowing the government to continue its surveillance state antics. The exceptions are so broad that they render the entire bill meaningless.
In conclusion, the "Buzz Off Act" is a farce, a joke, a pathetic attempt at pretending to care about citizens' privacy. It's a legislative placebo designed to make people feel better without actually changing anything. Congratulations, Congress, you've managed to waste more taxpayer money on a bill that will have zero impact on the surveillance state.
Diagnosis: Terminal naivety, acute stupidity, and a severe case of "we're going to pretend to care about your privacy but really we don't" syndrome. Prognosis: More of the same old, same old from our esteemed lawmakers.
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đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 826 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise moderate content in good faith—“in a way that eliminates the expansive, non-tex- tual immunities that courts have read into the statute.” In addition to taking unilateral action, Carr says, the FCC should work with Congress on legislative changes to ensure that “Internet companies no longer have carte blanche to censor protected speech while maintaining their Section 230 protections.” Carr writes that during the Trump Administration, the FCC took an “appro- priately strong approach to the national security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party.” The FCC put Huawei on its Covered List of entities—its list of those posing “an unacceptable risk” to U.S. national security. Carr writes that TikTok also poses a “serious and unacceptable” risk to U.S. national security, while providing “Beijing with an opportunity to run a foreign influence campaign by determining the news and information that the app feeds to millions of Americans,” and the next Administration should ban it. What’s more, Carr writes, “U.S. busi- nesses are aiding Beijing—often unwittingly”—in its effort to become, by 2030, “the global leader in artificial intelligence.” In part, they are doing so by providing “Bei- jing access to their high-powered cloud computing services.” Carr asserts that “it is time for an Administration to put in place a comprehensive plan that aims to stop U.S. entities from directly or indirectly contributing to China’s malign AI goals .” Former Federal Election Commissioner Hans von Spakovsky writes in Chap- ter 29 that while “the authority of the President over the actions of” the Federal Election Commission “is extremely limited,” the President “must ensure that the [Justice Department], just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear viola- tions” of the Federal Election Campaign Act. “The department must not construe ambiguous provisions…in a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity,” he writes. The FEC has six members, three from each party, and its determinations require a majority—so, they require the support of at least one member of each party. DOJ should not “prosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situated individual has not violated the law,” writes von Spakovsky. Moreover, he writes that the “President should vigorously oppose all efforts”—such as the language in the “For the People Act of 2021”—“to change the structure of the FEC” so that it would have an “odd number” of members. The current structure “ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being weaponized.” In Chapter 27, David R. Burton writes that the Securities and Exchange Com- mission (SEC) “should be reducing impediments to capital formation, not radically increasing them” by pushing a costly “climate change” agenda, as it is doing under the Biden Administration. Discussing the Federal Trade Commission, Adam Can- deub writes in Chapter 30, “Antitrust law can combat dominant firms’ baleful effects on democratic” notions—“such as free speech, the marketplace of ideas, shareholder control, and managerial accountability as well as collusive behavior
Introduction
— 826 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise moderate content in good faith—“in a way that eliminates the expansive, non-tex- tual immunities that courts have read into the statute.” In addition to taking unilateral action, Carr says, the FCC should work with Congress on legislative changes to ensure that “Internet companies no longer have carte blanche to censor protected speech while maintaining their Section 230 protections.” Carr writes that during the Trump Administration, the FCC took an “appro- priately strong approach to the national security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party.” The FCC put Huawei on its Covered List of entities—its list of those posing “an unacceptable risk” to U.S. national security. Carr writes that TikTok also poses a “serious and unacceptable” risk to U.S. national security, while providing “Beijing with an opportunity to run a foreign influence campaign by determining the news and information that the app feeds to millions of Americans,” and the next Administration should ban it. What’s more, Carr writes, “U.S. busi- nesses are aiding Beijing—often unwittingly”—in its effort to become, by 2030, “the global leader in artificial intelligence.” In part, they are doing so by providing “Bei- jing access to their high-powered cloud computing services.” Carr asserts that “it is time for an Administration to put in place a comprehensive plan that aims to stop U.S. entities from directly or indirectly contributing to China’s malign AI goals .” Former Federal Election Commissioner Hans von Spakovsky writes in Chap- ter 29 that while “the authority of the President over the actions of” the Federal Election Commission “is extremely limited,” the President “must ensure that the [Justice Department], just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear viola- tions” of the Federal Election Campaign Act. “The department must not construe ambiguous provisions…in a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity,” he writes. The FEC has six members, three from each party, and its determinations require a majority—so, they require the support of at least one member of each party. DOJ should not “prosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situated individual has not violated the law,” writes von Spakovsky. Moreover, he writes that the “President should vigorously oppose all efforts”—such as the language in the “For the People Act of 2021”—“to change the structure of the FEC” so that it would have an “odd number” of members. The current structure “ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being weaponized.” In Chapter 27, David R. Burton writes that the Securities and Exchange Com- mission (SEC) “should be reducing impediments to capital formation, not radically increasing them” by pushing a costly “climate change” agenda, as it is doing under the Biden Administration. Discussing the Federal Trade Commission, Adam Can- deub writes in Chapter 30, “Antitrust law can combat dominant firms’ baleful effects on democratic” notions—“such as free speech, the marketplace of ideas, shareholder control, and managerial accountability as well as collusive behavior — 827 — Section 5: Independent Regulatory Agencies with government.” Under the Biden FTC, he writes, firms try “to get out of anti- trust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings.” Candeub says that state AGs “are far more responsive to their constituents” than the federal government generally is, and he recommends that the FTC establish a position in the chairman’s office that is “focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, DC, to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth.”
Introduction
— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.