Federal Contractor Cybersecurity Vulnerability Reduction Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/872
Last Updated: July 17, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Mace, Nancy [R-SC-1]

ID: M000194

Follow the money

The bill

Federal Contractor Cybersecurity Vulnerability Reduction Act of 2025

HR. 872, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Mace, Nancy [R-SC-1]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$97,100 raised

28 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 401-403 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

March 3, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another bill from the esteemed members of Congress, because what this country really needs is more bureaucratic red tape and empty promises. Let's dissect this mess, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Federal Contractor Cybersecurity Vulnerability Reduction Act of 2025 (HR 872) claims to aim at reducing cybersecurity vulnerabilities in federal contractors by implementing a vulnerability disclosure policy consistent with NIST guidelines. How noble. In reality, it's just another attempt to create the illusion of security while lining the pockets of contractors and bureaucrats.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires covered contractors to implement a vulnerability disclosure policy, which is a fancy way of saying they need to have a plan in place to report potential security vulnerabilities. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) will be updated to include these requirements, because God forbid we trust contractors to do the right thing without being forced to.

The bill also creates a waiver process for agencies and the Department of Defense, because who needs accountability when national security or research purposes are involved? It's like they're saying, "Don't worry, we'll just waive the rules when it's convenient for us."

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Covered contractors (i.e., those with contracts above a certain threshold or managing federal information systems) will be affected by this bill. Agencies and the Department of Defense will also have to deal with the new regulations. And, of course, the usual suspects – lobbyists, bureaucrats, and politicians – will reap the benefits of this legislation.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a perfect example of "security theater." It creates the illusion of security while doing little to actually address the underlying issues. Contractors will likely just pay lip service to these new regulations, and agencies will find ways to waive them when it's convenient.

The real impact will be on small businesses and contractors who can't afford to comply with these new regulations. They'll either be forced out of business or become beholden to larger corporations that can navigate the bureaucratic maze.

In conclusion, HR 872 is a classic case of "legislative lupus" – a disease where politicians think they're curing a problem but are actually just masking the symptoms. It's a waste of time and resources, and it will only serve to further entrench the interests of those who benefit from this kind of regulatory nonsense.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch politicians pretend to care about cybersecurity.

Related Topics

Defense Spending & ProcurementCybersecurity & Data PrivacyNational Security & Intelligence
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Mace, Nancy [R-SC-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$97,100
27 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$12,800
Committees
$0
Individuals
$84,300

No PAC contributions found

1
REW INVESTMENTS LLC
2 transactions
$5,800
2
KING & SOCIETY, LLC
1 transaction
$2,000
3
BARBER BROTHERS, LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
4
COASTAL GREEN CBD LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
5
MALL DRIVE MANAGEMENT, LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
6
SEAGLASS PARTNERS, LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
7
TWIN RIVERS HOLDINGS LLC
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
GRIFFITH, JAMES
1 transaction
$6,600
2
RANNEY, TIM
1 transaction
$6,600
3
SINGER, PAUL
1 transaction
$6,600
4
GREENBLATT, SCOTT
1 transaction
$5,800
5
MOE, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$5,800
6
GLUECK, KENNETH
1 transaction
$5,000
7
HOME, CHARLOTTE
1 transaction
$5,000
8
DAVISON, KAY MS.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
HAAG, GORAN
1 transaction
$3,300
10
HAAG, ORPHA
1 transaction
$3,300
11
BUKOWSKY, BRANT
1 transaction
$3,300
12
BUKOWSKY, BROCK
1 transaction
$3,300
13
CATZ, SAFRA
1 transaction
$3,300
14
COOLEY, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$3,300
15
KELLOGG, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
16
TOPPER, LEWIS
1 transaction
$3,300
17
YODER, MAHLON
1 transaction
$3,300
18
CRUSEMANN, JEANNE
1 transaction
$3,300
19
EPSTEIN, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300
20
GRENADER, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Brown, Shontel M. [D-OH-11]

ID: B001313

Top Contributors

10

1
MORRIS-SINGER, ANDREW
SELF-EMPLOYED • MANAGEMENT
IndividualPORTLAND, OR
$6,600
Jan 24, 2024
2
MORRIS-SINGER, COREY
SELF-EMPLOYED • RESEARCH
IndividualPORTLAND, OR
$6,600
Jan 24, 2024
3
STEIN, KEVIN M
TRANSDIGM • CEO
IndividualCHAGRIN FALLS, OH
$3,300
Feb 15, 2023
4
MOSS, KAREN
NICOLAS GUDBRANSON & COOPER • ATTORNEY
IndividualCLEVELAND, OH
$3,300
Feb 24, 2023
5
SUMMERS, MICHAEL P.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualLAKEWOOD, OH
$3,300
Feb 28, 2023
6
JOHNSON, ALEX B
TRI-C • COLLEGE PRESIDENT
IndividualBEACHWOOD, OH
$3,300
Mar 7, 2023
7
SINITO, FRANK T
MILLENIA HOUSING COMPANIES • PRESIDENT
IndividualCLEVELAND, OH
$3,300
Mar 13, 2023
8
EMERSON, WILLIAM
ROCK HOLDINGS • VICE CHAIRMAN
IndividualBLOOMFIELD HILLS, MI
$3,300
Apr 14, 2023
9
JURVETSON, KARLA
SELF • PHYSICIAN
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$3,300
May 11, 2023
10
RATNER, ALBERT B.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualLYNDHURST, OH
$3,300
Jun 13, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Mace, Nancy [R-SC-1]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 62 nodes and 31 connections (58 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $113,600

Top Donors - Rep. Mace, Nancy [R-SC-1]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

7 Orgs20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.95

    Section 2(b) requires the Federal Acquisition Regulation Council to update FAR to incorporate requirements for covered contractors to receive information about potential security vulnerabilities, directly benefiting cybersecurity firms that provide vulnerability disclosure and related services.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(e) mandates the Secretary of Defense to review and revise the DFARS to ensure covered contractors implement vulnerability disclosure policies consistent with NIST guidelines, imposing new requirements but also creating compliance opportunities for defense contractors.

  • +Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.85

    Section 2(a)(1) calls for OMB, in consultation with CISA and others, to review FAR contract requirements for contractor vulnerability disclosure programs; large tech firms that are federal contractors will need to comply, driving demand for cybersecurity services and tools.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Mace, Nancy [R-SC-1])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 401-403AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on cybersecurity for federal contractors broadly, while the Project 2025 policy emphasizes energy infrastructure security and DOE-specific reforms; both share a concern for protecting critical infrastructure from cyber threats, but the bill lacks the energy-sector focus central to the Project 2025 objective."

Key themes:cybersecuritycritical infrastructure protectionthreat mitigationfederal oversight

— 368 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise National Energy Security. Protecting American infrastructure from cyber and physical threats, both natural and human, is vital to national security, the economy, and the well-being of the American people. Protecting and advanc- ing these national security interests is a proper role for the federal government. DESAS should: l Focus on studying threats to the electric grid, natural gas, and oil infrastructure; sharing such information with the energy industry; promoting the reliability and security of energy resources and infrastructure; and developing strategies and technologies to combat threats by working with the National Labs. The following offices would report to the DESAS Undersecretary of Energy Security: 1. Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), elevated to an Assistant Secretary. CESER would work with the existing or reconstituted versions (as described in more detail below) of the Office of Electricity (OE); Office of Nuclear Energy (NE); Office of Fossil Energy (FE), currently the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management (FECM); Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE); and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to identify and address threats to energy infrastructure.7 Instead of trying to decarbonize the American economy and allocating taxpayer dollars for commercialization of energy technologies, these offices would focus on energy security by identifying threats to energy supplies and infrastructure, developing strategies to address those threats, and funding fundamental science and technology where appropriate. 2. Office of Electricity (Assistant Secretary). 3. Office of Nuclear Energy (Assistant Secretary). 4. Office of Fossil Energy (Assistant Secretary, with Carbon Management deleted from its title and purpose. 5. Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (Assistant Secretary). 6. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (stand-alone or part of CESER). l Eliminate special-interest funding programs. Many DOE energy funding programs are not targeted on fundamental science and technology; instead, they focus more on commercialization and act as subsidies to the — 369 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions private sector for government-favored resources. The DOE Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (OCED); Office of State and Community Energy Programs; ARPA-E; Office of Grid Deployment (OGD); and DOE Loan Program should be eliminated or reformed. If they continue to exist, FECM, NE, OE, and EERE should focus on fundamental science and technology issues, particularly in relation to cyber and physical threats to energy security, rather than subsidizing and commercializing energy resources. l Eliminate political and climate-change interference in DOE approvals of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. In addition, Congress should reform the Natural Gas Act8 to expand required approvals from merely nations with free trade agreements to all of our allies, such as NATO countries. l Focus the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) on ensuring that government buildings and operations have reliable and cost- effective energy. FEMP should stop using taxpayer dollars to force the purchase of more expensive and less reliable energy resources in the name of combating climate change. l Ensure that information provided by the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), a data and statistical organization, is data-neutral. l Focus FERC on its statutory obligation to ensure access to reliable energy at just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates. FERC is a five-member commission created under the DOE Organization Act that regulates the wholesale sales and transmission of electricity, promotes electric reliability through standards, permits natural gas pipelines and LNG export facilities, sets natural gas pipeline shipping rates, and sets oil pipeline shipping rates. It is an economic regulator and should not make itself a climate regulator. l Streamline the nuclear regulatory requirements and licensing process. Such changes would help to lower costs and accelerate the development and deployment of civilian nuclear, such as advanced nuclear reactors (including small modular nuclear reactors). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is commission tasked with the licensing of civilian nuclear reactors and power plants and regulating other uses of nuclear materials, such as nuclear medicine. Although it is not a DOE agency, its jurisdiction over nuclear reactor, fuel, safety, and trade issues often relates to or impinges on DOE’s jurisdiction.

Intelligence Community

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on mandating vulnerability disclosure policies for federal contractors using NIST guidelines, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on improving cyber threat intelligence sharing with the private sector. However, the bill does not address intelligence sharing, declassification, or real-time auditing mechanisms central to the IC section of Project 2025, resulting in moderate rather than strong alignment."

Key themes:cybersecurityinformation sharingNIST guidelinesprivate sector collaborationthreat intelligence

— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 434-436AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 section emphasize strengthening cybersecurity to protect critical infrastructure from cyber threats, but the bill applies broadly to all federal contractors while the Project 2025 focus is specifically on electric grid reliability and related cyber/physical attacks."

Key themes:cybersecurityvulnerability disclosurecritical infrastructure protectionNIST guidelinesdefense against cyber attacks

— 401 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions nation in the summer110 and winter.111 Cyber and physical attacks also threaten the grid. Specific areas for reform include the following: l Limit the impact of subsidized renewables on price formation. Subsidized renewable resources are undermining electric reliability in RTOs. The increase in subsidized, intermittent resources is undermining the ability of RTOs’ pricing models to support the reliable dispatchable generation that is needed to serve the grid at all times.112 l Reform the application of reserve margins. Reserve margins have become largely meaningless. Traditionally, the electric industry has used “reserve margins” to ensure that the grid has enough power plants to guarantee reliability. Generally, reserve margins represent the amount of generation available (power plants) to meet peak electric demand (the time of day and year when people are using the most electricity) plus a percentage of additional generation for backup.113 However, given the increasing number of intermittent resources (like solar, which may be available during the heat of the day but disappears as the sun sets), other dispatchable generation needs to be available to meet customers’ electricity requirements. Therefore, the definitions and calculations of reserve margins and peak load need to be updated to focus on the modern grid’s reliability challenges for all times of the day and year. l Recognize the interdependence of electric generation and natural gas. The interdependence of electric generation and natural gas pipelines continues to grow. Given natural gas’s important role in generating electricity, especially as backup when renewables are not available, lack of natural gas pipelines or attacks on existing pipelines could threaten our ability to generate electricity. l Expand resource diversity and reliability. Resource diversity is needed to support grid reliability. Pressure to use 100 percent renewables or non– carbon emitting resources threatens the electric grid’s reliability. A grid that has access to dispatchable resources such as coal, nuclear, and natural gas for generating power is inherently more reliable and resilient. l Protect against cyber and physical attacks. The threat of cyber and physical attacks on electric infrastructure by foreign actors like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as terrorists, continues to grow. The attacks with guns on substations in North Carolina in December 2022 that left customers without power demonstrate the grid’s vulnerability.114

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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